
A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology

Kumārila on perception

The "Determination of Perception" chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*

Translation and commentary

John Taber



A HINDU CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

This is a translation of the chapter on perception (*Pratyakṣapariccheda*) from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's magnum opus, the *Ślokavārttika*, which is one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the logico-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. It is crucial for understanding the debates between Hindus and Buddhists about metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic questions during the classical period.

In an extensive commentary, the author explicates the argument of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* verse by verse while also showing how it relates to ideas and theories of other Indian philosophers and schools. Notes to the translation and commentary go further into the historical and philosophical background of Kumārila's ideas.

The book includes an introduction containing a summary of the history of Indian epistemology, an overview of Kumārila's philosophy, and a separate synopsis and analysis of Kumārila's text. It is a valuable contribution to the field of Indian philosophical studies.

John Taber is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, where he teaches courses in Asian thought and continental philosophy. His research has focused on the history of Indian philosophy, especially logic, epistemology, and metaphysics during the classical period, 500–1200 CE. He is also the author of *Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Śaṅkara, Fichte, and Heidegger.*

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SERIES FOREWORD

The RoutledgeCurzon Hindu Studies Series, published in collaboration with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, intends primarily the publication of constructive Hindu theological, philosophical, and ethical projects. The focus is on issues and concerns of relevance to readers interested in Hindu traditions and a wider range of related religious concerns that matter in today's world. The Series seeks to promote excellent scholarship and, in relation to it, an open and critical conversation among scholars and the wider audience of interested readers. Though contemporary in its purpose, the Series also recognizes the importance of a contemporary retrieval of the classic texts and ideas, beliefs and practices, of Hindu traditions. One of its goals then is the promotion of fresh conversations about what has mattered traditionally.

It is therefore most fitting that John Taber's *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception* should be one of the first volumes in the Series. Mīmāṃsā ritual thinking and exegesis, traditionally listed as one of the six major systems of Hindu theology and philosophy (darśana), is a superlative and uniquely Indian mode of thought. As Taber explains in his own Preface and his Introduction, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is not only a leading Mīmāṃsā thinker, but also one of the leading intellectuals of the Indian tradition, a formidable exemplar of the intellectual rigor, analysis, and argumentation for which India is rightly famous. Although Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* – of which a major chapter is translated and interpreted here – has been available in English for nearly a century, so great a classic deserves the benefit of multiple renderings in English, and indeed has long been in need of a thoroughly accurate translation and elaboration. Taber's painstaking yet lucid translation, accompanied by valuable notes, brings Kumārila's arguments to life, in a way that is accessible even for someone who is not a master of Sanskrit, while still satisfying trained Sanskritists.

As readers unfamiliar with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa gradually find their way into this demanding but richly rewarding treatise on perception, they may at first wonder whether and how this technical argumentation enhances our knowledge of Hindu religious traditions, even the ritual traditions connected with Mīmāṃsā. Yet *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology* clearly illumines an important dimension of the Hindu traditions – in part simply by showing us a leading Brahmanical

thinker at work, exemplifying how he thought through and deciphered the meaning of reality and our ways of knowing it, and how very elegant Indian religious thinking can be.

A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology also shows Kumārila in determined disputation with Buddhist opponents, arguing the fine points of epistemology; clearly, he is determined to concede nothing to his intellectual adversaries. As Taber points out – and highlights by the book's title – Kumārila's critique of Buddhist epistemology is a single extended argument (a treatise in itself, though actually only a part of the full argument that is the *Ślokavārttika*), a stellar example of how a committed intellectual makes his case, stands by his insights and proposals, and probes his adversaries' positions for what can be learned from them and what in his view is mistaken or needs to be corrected. Modern concerns and values have largely moderated our modes of interreligious conversation today, and few of us are likely to proceed so unrelentingly and fiercely as did Kumārila. Nevertheless, his intellectual rigor and uncompromising commitment to clear understanding are values *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology* fittingly highlights early on in this Series. Even in a crosscultural and interreligious environment, we need to remember how to argue well with one another.

Francis X. Clooney, SJ
Series editor
Academic Director
Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies

PREFACE

For a period of over eight-hundred years, from approximately the fifth century, the time of the composition of the oldest preserved commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, to the thirteenth century, the final demise of Buddhism in India, Indian philosophy experienced its Golden Age. What can be seen as a single, vigorous, and more or less continuous debate took place among the various schools of the three great religious–philosophical traditions, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, concerning the nature of reality and the means of salvation. Many of the problems of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of language with which we are familiar in Western philosophy were discussed at length, with great acumen and insight, by Indian thinkers during this period. Unique solutions to some of these problems, determined by the peculiarities of the historical development of the Indian debate and its broader cultural context, were achieved. Philosophers whose names are still mostly unknown to us in Europe and America – Vātsyāyana, Vasubandhu, Bhartṛhari, Mallavādin, Diṅnāga, Bhāvaviveka, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Akalaṅka, Maṇḍanamiśra, Śaṅkara, Śāntarakṣita, Vācaspatimiśra, Udayana, Śrī Harṣa, Rāmānuja, and Abhinavagupta – composed works worthy of being compared with the greatest masterpieces of Western philosophy.

Although our knowledge of this splendid period in the history of human thought has advanced much in the past fifty years, thanks primarily to the pioneering historical and philological work of Erich Frauwallner and his students, and to the interpretive work and philosophical explorations of B. K. Matilal, access to original sources has remained limited. The task of translating the texts of this era has just begun. We do not, for example, have full translations of either Diṅnāga's *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, nor of Dharmakīrti's, the *Pramāṇavārttika* (into a modern European language, that is; both were translated into Tibetan in medieval times), which marked important advances in logic and epistemology and which were the focus of many of the controversies of the classical period. The same goes for the major works of Mallavādin, Bhāvaviveka, Akalaṅka, Maṇḍanamiśra, Vācaspatimiśra, Abhinavagupta, and Udayana. In fact, critical editions of many of these texts, which should ideally serve as the basis of translations, are not even available. Moreover, those translations that we do have are in many instances rough first attempts. The few high-quality, accurate translations that exist, on

the other hand, have in most instances been produced by Indologists for other Indologists and are not easily used by the nonspecialist philosopher, let alone the general reader. (At the same time it must be acknowledged that it has been primarily through the production of philologically rigorous, annotated translations that our knowledge of classical Indian philosophy has advanced.) It would not be an exaggeration to say that our present state of knowledge of classical Indian philosophy is comparable to that of ancient Greek philosophy at the beginning of the Renaissance, when the first Latin translations of Plato's writings were starting to appear.

The present work is an attempt to provide a translation of a central chapter of one of the most influential systems of the classical period that both meets the criteria of an accurate, philologically correct translation and makes the text accessible to the nonspecialist. The text in question is the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* or "Determination of Perception," the fourth chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *magnum opus*, the *Ślokavārttika*, perhaps the greatest attack launched by a Brahmanical thinker against the metaphysical and epistemological theories of the Buddhists. One might doubt whether both of these purposes can be achieved in a single translation; indeed the translator acknowledges a certain hubris in his undertaking. I am well aware that it is an experiment that could easily fail. Nevertheless, I believe that one must make the attempt. Otherwise, if one does not try to make the text accessible outside a small circle of highly trained Indologists, modern philosophers will forever be denied firsthand appreciation of the rich reflection on issues of enduring philosophical interest that it contains. If one, alternatively, does not attempt a rigorously faithful translation, the reader will have been given access to ideas and theories that are not really Kumārila's but only the translator's, and therefore undoubtedly of an inferior sort.

The problem of achieving these two purposes in a single translation has, it is hoped, been solved by assigning them to distinct parts of the work. The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* consists of 254 verses, called *ślokas*. I have translated the verses more or less literally, based on a semi-critical edition of my own. That is to say, I have produced a new, emended edition based on five existing printed editions and the variants they cite; however, I have not made use of any manuscripts. This version of the Sanskrit text is presented in an Appendix. I have tried to keep the English wording of the verses as close to the original Sanskrit as possible – without, however, using square brackets to set off words and phrases I have had to add myself to complete the syntax or clarify the references of pronouns. I have only in a few cases used square brackets to introduce explanatory phrases that I believe are necessary to make sense of the verses. Then, in a commentary of my own, I have expounded the meaning of the text verse by verse, focusing on the philosophical argument it develops; it is by this means that I have tried to make the text as comprehensible as possible for the more general reader. With the benefit of the commentary the reader should be able to decipher the verses, which by themselves, without the commentary, will be obscure. In the end it is hoped that the reader, combining translated text and commentary, will be able to see clearly

the meaning of the text in the verses, while also coming to appreciate to some extent the remarkable precision and terseness of the language in which they are composed.

When learning a Sanskrit philosophical text it is customary in India, even today, not just to pick it up and read it but to study it with a teacher who will provide an oral commentary. In fact, most Indian philosophical texts are too difficult to comprehend without some kind of assistance. The wording of the texts is often elliptical, the arguments subtle, and a great deal of background knowledge – of the meanings of specific technical terms, of the theories of the other schools being attacked, etc. – is assumed. *Perhaps the greatest obstacle to Westerners gaining a picture of what Indian philosophy is about is that it is presupposed that its texts will be studied in this way*. It is, in any case, surely too much to expect a Western philosopher approaching this literature for the first time to be able to understand it without any of the advantages that Indian students have traditionally had. Therefore, the provision of a commentary along with the translation of an Indian philosophical text seems essential. However, it would defeat the purpose of a commentary if one were simply to translate along with the primary text one of the classical commentaries that has been handed down. That would just multiply the amount of (awkwardly) translated Sanskrit one must slog through. (For an *accurate* translation of philosophical Sanskrit is, I believe, almost of necessity somewhat awkward – though I am forced to acknowledge certain exceptions to this rule.) It seems better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones, and attempt really to *translate* the traditional understanding of the text into a modern idiom.

Among modern translators of Indian philosophical texts, it was Erich Frauwallner who pioneered this approach, by prefacing his superbly accurate and readable translations with summaries of the main argument of the text. (See especially his *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958] and *Philosophische Texte des Hinduismus, Nachgelassene Werke II*, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer and Chlodwig H. Werba [Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992].) Nevertheless, that great scholar chose not to try to explain every unfamiliar concept and theory mentioned or alluded to – no doubt, so as not to place too many demands on the reader, in the hope of making the text accessible to as wide an audience as possible. As a result, however, he invariably, and intentionally, left certain aspects of the arguments of the texts he translated unexplained. Since, for the philosopher, who is above all interested in the validity of the theories she studies, the details of the text, especially the subtler twists and turns of its argument, are crucial, I have, in attempting to make the text at hand accessible to *philosophers* – for, after all, it is a philosophical text – gone a step farther than Frauwallner and attempted to provide a commentary that leaves very few, if any, stones unturned. That is to say, I have followed out its argument in every detail, ignoring no feature that could affect its cogency or soundness, and explaining to the best of my ability every concept and theory mentioned or alluded to that is relevant to understanding the context and import of the argument.

In this endeavor I have been fortunate to have had access to two other invaluable sources of information besides the classical commentaries, namely, two scholars with whom I read and discussed the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* in Chennai (Madras) in the summer of 1997: Prof. J. Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī of Madras Sanskrit College and Prof. K. Śrinivasan of Vivekananda College. The former, a noted Mīmāṃsaka (specialist in Kumārila's school, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā), gave a superbly lucid, rigorous oral commentary on verses 52–86 and 111–185 of the text, in sessions attended by both Dr Śrinivasan and me. Afterwards, in separate sessions, Dr Śrinivasan and I reviewed the verses covered by Professor Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī and discussed further verses. (The young Japanese scholar Kei Kataoka was also present at some of these sessions and made helpful suggestions.) However, with only a few exceptions, I have not attempted in my commentary to distinguish the contributions of Professors Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī and Śrinivasan from those of the classical commentaries of Umbeka, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucaritamiśra, which I have also studied in detail; nor, for that matter, have I gone into the, for the most part, subtle differences between the classical commentaries. Rather, I have tried to synthesize all that I have read and heard into one smooth-flowing discourse. Nevertheless, certainly much of whatever understanding I have achieved of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is due to the help of these two superb scholars.

In addition to a commentary on the translated verses I have provided some notes in which I attempt to illuminate the historical and philosophical background of the text. I have tried to keep these to a minimum, mentioning what I feel to be only the most essential points and avoiding digressions into disputed questions, so as not to encumber the work with too much scholarly apparatus. Nevertheless, even as they are, I fear that philosophers will find them too detailed and Indianists will find them incomplete. The latter may be particularly disappointed that I have not included detailed justifications of my choices of variant readings and translations of difficult terms and phrases, but I believe that, for the most part, my readings and translations will be justified implicitly by whatever sense I have been able to make of the text in my commentary.

I have also, in the introduction to the translation, attempted to give an overview of the philosophical and historical background of some of the issues discussed in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, in particular, the problem of whether perception can be "conceptualized." Essentially, this is the problem of whether perceptual judgements, in which we identify objects as belonging to certain types or as possessed of certain properties – for example, "That is a cow," "The cat is on the mat," "The book is red" – are truly perceptual in nature, or whether only the bare, non-conceptualized given is the proper object of perception, perceptual judgements involving a rather substantial contribution by the mind (as opposed to just the senses). I also draw what I take to be some rather obvious connections to developments in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy pertaining to this issue. Here, again, Indologists might be inclined to feel that I have been too ambitious in trying to synthesize developments in Indian thought that extend over centuries, and in offering summary interpretations of theories that, in their details and evolution,

are not completely understood – primarily because most of the texts in which such theories are expounded still await proper editing, analysis, and translation. Here, however, I must say that, having perused the extant secondary literature on the problem of conceptualized versus nonconceptualized perception in Indian philosophy – what there is of it – I have found that much of it seems lost in the details; except for the work of Matilal, it generally conveys little sense of what the debate is really about. Surely we should not have to wait until every Indian epistemological text has been philologically processed before we are permitted to make generalizations about Indian epistemology. I see nothing wrong in working from the top down as we work from the bottom up, that is to say, trying to sketch maps of extended areas of Indian philosophical thought as we continue to explore the terrain. Certainly, the maps – our broader interpretations and theories – will have to be revised continually as we proceed, but that is the nature of any scientific enterprise.

The *Ślokavārttika*, including the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapter, was first translated nearly a hundred years ago by the great polymath Ganganatha Jha (Calcutta: Biblioteca Indica, 1900–1909; rpt. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1983). That translation represents an important scholarly achievement in that it is a *complete* translation of the *Ślokavārttika* and thus attempts to give the modern reader a glimpse of Kumārila's entire system. Although it contains, verse by verse, numerous mistakes, it also construes, sometimes quite felicitously, many difficult passages; overall it reflects a vast knowledge of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Its main defect, however, is that, supplied with only occasional footnotes based on the classical commentaries, not a sustained commentary of its own, it does not convey a coherent sense of Kumārila's argument by itself. One must, in fact, read it together with the original Sanskrit text in order to benefit from it. (Alas, this can be said of most of the philologically correct translations of Indian philosophical texts we have today!) Thus, although Jha's translation serves as an invaluable aid for Indologists (and has indeed served as such for this translator), a new translation, if only of a fraction of the material Jha ambitiously took on, is clearly in order.

In the end, of course, a translation, or at least one that is more or less faithful to the original, cannot presume to remove every vestige of foreignness from a text. Nor, perhaps, should it. It would, in the first place, be highly misleading to give the impression that Indian philosophical theories can be completely separated from the forms of expression in which they are couched. A text in verse, at least, even if composed in a simple sing-song meter like the *anuṣṭubh* (the meter of the *śloka*), and even if it presents arguments like any proper philosophical text, will still amount to a quite different kind of discourse from a Western treatise in prose. In particular, it will have more the air of an authoritative "saying"; the author may rely as much on the art and power of his language to impress and persuade as on the force of his argument. (Surely what is stated so elegantly must be true!) More importantly, although many Indian concepts may be translated directly into Western ones, many others need to be explained in terms of indigenous concepts, which are in turn to be explained by other indigenous concepts, and so on. The

scholar who studies a foreign philosophical text like the *Ślokavārttika* will in the end find herself, of necessity, learning to navigate in new waters. Enlightened by what she sees there, she returns home, somehow changed, somehow looking upon old things in a new way; however, she cannot bring what she has seen back with her. A successful translation of a text like the *Ślokavārttika* is perhaps one that will just assist the reader in feeling more comfortable in foreign surroundings.

The subtitle of this work alludes to the seminal study of the first chapter of Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Masaaki Hattori, published in the *Harvard Oriental Series* in 1965: *Dignāga, On Perception*. By making such an allusion I do not pretend that the present work is comparable in scholarship to Hattori's. In fact, I am greatly indebted to Professor Hattori for much of my knowledge of the logico-epistemological school of Buddhist philosophy; without knowledge of Tibetan myself, I have obviously relied heavily on his translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* from the Tibetan translations in which it has been preserved. Nor, obviously, have I used Hattori's work as a model. The arrangement of that study, with its deeply learned, but rather dense historical and philological notes in the back (comprising twice as many pages as the translation and chock full of Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese), and without a commentary that continuously traces the thread of the argument, makes it difficult for the nonspecialist to use. The significance of the allusion, rather, is as if to say: having allowed Diṅnāga to present the Buddhist point of view on various epistemological and metaphysical issues, as well as trenchant criticisms of Brahmanical – that is, essentially, Hindu – theories of perception, it is now Kumārila's turn to respond on behalf of his and the other Brahmanical schools. After more than thirty-five years of silence, it is now time for an orthodox thinker to be heard speaking in defense of his tradition. Then we shall see, as I believe – and it is hoped that the reader will excuse this hint of partisanship on my part – that the Buddhist arguments are not nearly as clever as they first appear!

A translation of a text on epistemology might seem an odd choice for a series dedicated to fostering cross-cultural conversation between India and the West. Yet the study of problems of knowledge, in both India and the West, has always been related to deeper issues. In European philosophy, the investigation of the faculties of human knowledge and their limits, which began with the British Empiricists and culminated with Kant, ultimately had to do with the critical evaluation of "the pretense of reason," that is, the claim that the human mind is able to reach beyond experience and ascertain such things as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will. So in Indian philosophy, questions about "the means of knowledge" (*pramāṇas*), even about so specific a faculty as perception, were to a great extent concerned with whether it is possible for humans to know, independently of scripture, the means of achieving happiness in this life and salvation in the next, that is, Dharma or righteousness – a matter which, Indians believe, also lies beyond the experience of ordinary humans. We shall see that this was the explicit context for Kumārila's inquiry into the nature of perception. In India, more

particularly, epistemology was the field upon which the debate over the authority of scripture was played out. The Brahmanical schools used epistemological arguments to defend the Veda, believed by them to be either an eternal, authorless document or the teachings of God, and challenged the scriptures of the heterodox traditions of Buddhism and Jainism, which were delivered by human teachers; the Jainas and Buddhists did the opposite. We also find epistemological questions – for example, the question concerning the relative strength of perception and scripture – at the heart of controversies between the different Vedānta traditions, Advaita, Dvaita, and Viśiṣṭa Advaita.

The study of Indian epistemology, then, in the final analysis is the study of traditions in conflict over fundamental presuppositions. It is a study in cross-traditional, if not cross-cultural, debate. A debate, of course, is not the same thing as a conversation. A conversation might be considered a friendly give-and-take guided by an interest in achieving truth or understanding, or both. A debate may not be friendly at all, and may not be motivated by a concern to arrive at mutual recognition of the truth or understanding. Rather, it is a way of grappling with the Other in a contest governed by clearly defined rules, that is, a way of coming to terms with the Other in an arena where power is controlled and mediated in specific ways. The mediation of power in the arena of debate is through reason, and it is the visibility of reason as arbiter that distinguishes debate from all other forms of conflict. As a contest that is mediated by reason and presents evidence and logic as the criteria for victory or defeat, debate encourages and supports the growth of rational inquiry and reflection. Although Indian philosophical debates sometimes degenerated into polemics, for the most part they were conducted on a very high level. Participants were stimulated to achieve new insights and more compelling statements of their views. The greatest discoveries of Indian philosophy were achieved in the context of heated, highly charged debate. Debate may never reach resolution. In medieval India debates between the Buddhists and the Brahmins were publicly staged, as a form of entertainment. The losers were compelled to renounce their religion – which after all had been proven false – and convert to the other side. Nevertheless, short of such drastic consequences, debate is often an effective means for opposing camps to engage each other, resist and challenge each other, without coercion or domination. Although understanding, once again, is never guaranteed – however, it can also never be ruled out – mutual destruction is at least usually avoided. And yet, a kind of understanding – at the very least, mutual respect – also often emerges when two parties, offering clear reasons for their views, remain true to their convictions. Understanding between humans should not be thought of just as the convergence of beliefs. In any case, sometimes it is unrealistic to think that we can arrive at understanding in the sense of a perfect seeing eye-to-eye and dispelling of conflict. Yet debate always remains a viable form of dialogue, a sphere in which opposing parties must still listen and respond to each other, and be held accountable for their views. Debate is a way for adversaries to live together in creative tension. Perhaps it is not the best way, but it is one that

humans have employed for centuries. Unfortunately, it is a method we seem to have forgotten how to practice today.

Funding for the initial research in India for this work was provided through the Research Allocations Committee of the University of New Mexico, for which I am grateful. The Philosophy Department and College of Arts and Sciences of the University of New Mexico generously financed trips to London, to use the British Library and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and Chicago, to use the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago. I also express my thanks to a number of individuals who assisted me in a variety of ways in bringing this project to completion. Two colleagues in the Philosophy Department at the University of New Mexico, Russell Goodman and Ian Eagleson, gave me helpful feedback regarding the introduction. My good friend Eli Franco took precious time to go over carefully the Introduction and the first part of the translation, correcting mistakes and offering numerous suggestions that led to improvements in the manuscript. My other good friend and colleague Richard Hayes did the same for the second part. Chris Framarin did a superb job of proofreading the entire manuscript before it was submitted for publication; he was compensated for his work by the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of New Mexico. Two librarians, James Nye, Bibliographer for the Southern Asia Collection of the Joseph Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago, and Joseph Lane, Director of the Interlibrary Loan Department of Zimmerman Library of the University of New Mexico, provided extraordinary assistance in helping me identify and obtain texts essential for carrying out the translation.

I, finally, take this opportunity to give belated thanks to my Indological mentors at the Universität Hamburg, where I studied from 1973 to 1976: Professors S. A. Srinivasan, Lambert Schmithausen, and Albrecht Wezler – for introducing me to the field of Indian philosophy and instilling in me (despite my resistance at the time) some of the scholarly interests and values that are, however imperfectly, reflected in this work.

INTRODUCTION

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* in context

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* or "The Determination of Perception" comprises the fourth chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *magnum opus*, the *Ślokavārttika*. The *Ślokavārttika* is the first part of Kumārila's massive three-part commentary on Śabarasvāmin's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*; the title *Ślokavārttika* itself can be translated, simply, as "Expanded Commentary in Verses." The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, which may be dated around 200 BCE, is the foundational text of the Mīmāṃsā school, one of the six major systems of Brahmanical philosophical thought.[1] (The term 'Brahmanical' refers to the ancient tradition of thought and practice focused on the Veda and its auxiliary ritual, legal, and scientific literatures, which is one of the strands of the extremely complex and diverse phenomenon known as Hinduism.) As its name indicates, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* summarizes the teachings of Mīmāṃsā in short aphorisms or *sūtras*. The doctrines and theories of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy were elaborated over the centuries primarily in commentaries and supercommentaries on this text. (Likewise for most of the other great Brahmanical systems – their teachings are presented mainly in series of commentaries and supercommentaries on their respective *sūtra* texts.) The commentary of Śabara on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, which is commonly referred to as the *Śābarabhāṣya* and which is the oldest commentary that has been handed down to us, was probably written in the second half of the fifth century CE. Kumārila wrote his supercommentary in the first half of the seventh century.[2]

Although adherents of Mīmāṃsā – Mīmāṃsakas – were prominent participants in the controversies of the classical period of Indian philosophy, in ancient times Mīmāṃsā was not a philosophical system at all but, strictly, a science of the Vedic ritual. The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* faithfully preserves this aspect of the tradition; most of the *sūtras* are devoted to matters of ritual practice handed down from centuries of priestly discussion. They consider such questions as which actions are to be performed in a sacrifice and their correct sequence, which mantras (spoken formulae) are to accompany which acts, who is eligible to perform the sacrifice, and what things can be substituted as oblations when preferred materials are not available. They typically resolve these matters by analyzing the scriptural passages

that prescribe the rituals in question; thus, to a great extent the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* has to do with textual exegesis. In that connection it frequently appeals to general principles of textual interpretation that later came to be widely applied throughout Indian commentarial literature.

An explicitly philosophical dimension of Mīmāṃsā emerged, however, when it moved beyond the discussion of ritual questions and assumed the task of an apologetics. This purpose, in effect, is declared by the first *sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, which says that Mīmāṃsā is an "inquiry into Dharma" (MS 1.1.1). Dharma means, in the strictest sense, righteousness – what one ought to do and avoid doing. More broadly, it refers to the way of life that leads to happiness on earth and salvation after death. The idea of Dharma is usually associated with the Dharmaśāstras, the Brahmanical treatises on law, ethics, and custom, the most famous and authoritative of which is the *Manusmṛti* or *Laws of Manu*. These texts spell out in great detail all aspects of pious Aryan existence[3] – the duties of the various castes and stations of life, the sacraments and other domestic rituals, dietary restrictions, etiquette, morality, spiritual practices, etc. By declaring itself an investigation into Dharma, Mīmāṃsā implicitly takes on the defense of the orthodox Aryan way of life as a whole along with its philosophical presuppositions.

This defense was in response to the emergence of so-called heterodox traditions, most notably Buddhism and Jainism, which developed their own conceptions of piety and righteousness – which they, too, called "Dharma" – and which rejected the authority of the Veda and Dharmaśāstras. These movements, Buddhism in particular, also developed distinctive metaphysical doctrines, such as the momentariness of all entities and the nonexistence of a self, that contradicted fundamental assumptions of Vedic practice. Much of the history of Indian philosophy is defined by the struggle over metaphysical, epistemological, linguistic, and logical theories, the ultimate implications of which are the truth or falsehood of the teachings of the different religious traditions.

The approach of the Mīmāṃsā school in combatting the heterodox challenge – other schools of Brahmanical thought, such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, evolved their own strategies – was to stress the sole authority of the Veda (together, that is, with the auxiliary literature of the Dharmaśāstras and the ritual manuals known as the Śrauta Sūtras, which were seen as merely explicating and elaborating the Veda) in regard to Dharma. The second *sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* declares "Dharma is a purpose (or goal) characterized by an injunction." That is to say, Dharma is something good or conducive to that which is good – that is, a meritorious act through which one will attain worldly happiness or salvation – which is made known by a Vedic commandment.

The full argument for this claim, as developed, for example, in the *Ślokavārttika*, is elaborate and complex. It rests on two highly interesting, if also highly controversial, ideas: the intrinsic validity of cognition and the eternality of the Veda. The former is the thesis that all cognitions are intrinsically true, that is, bear a sense of their own truth, unless and until they are overturned by other cognitions. The latter is the claim that the Veda has no author human or divine; that is, it was never

composed, but has simply been handed down forever from one generation to the next. The combination of these two theses yields the infallibility of the statements of the Veda in regard to Dharma. The Veda being eternal, no question can arise as to the reliability of its author; and Dharma being supersensible – for it has to do with connections between actions performed now and their future rewards – no cognitions achieved through other means of knowledge can contradict it. Thus, never effectively contradicted or otherwise called into question, the intrinsic validity of the statements of the Veda remains undiminished.

However, is it really the case that the statements of the Veda are never contradicted? What about the teachings of other religious masters, for example, the Buddha or the Jina, in regard to Dharma? The Buddha summarized his teachings in the Four Noble Truths, which have as corollaries the impermanence of all entities and the absence of a self. He laid down his own rule – a moderately ascetic way of life – for those who aspire to Nirvāṇa. He renounced the householder way of life and all the duties and obligations it entails, condemned the Vedic sacrifice – replacing it with the law of nonviolence – and criticized aspects of the caste system. Surely one's confidence in the truth of the statements of the Veda must be eroded by the existence of a completely different account of Dharma such as this.

The fourth *sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, however, which characterizes perception and declares that it is not a means of knowing Dharma, implies that the teachings about Dharma of religious teachers such as the Buddha pose no challenge to the Veda at all. For if those teachings are not covertly based on the Veda itself (as Kumārila will allege – and in that case their adherents are hypocritical in condemning the Veda) they can only arise from the employment of the human faculties of knowledge – first and foremost, perception, the other recognized means of knowledge, inference, comparison, and so forth, being ultimately based on perception. Yet perception depends on a connection between a sense faculty and its object; therefore, it can only apprehend objects that are actually present, not objects of the past or the future. Hence, perception cannot tell us about Dharma, which has to do with the beneficial or harmful results of previously performed actions, that is, the present results of actions performed in the past or the future results of actions performed in the present. Nor could the teachings of the Buddha and Jina be based on some kind of supernormal, yogic perception, since yogic *perception*, that is, perception which apprehends an object that exists in the past or future, is a contradiction in terms. Thus, the sayings of the Buddha are undermined for us by the realization that there is no possible reliable means of knowledge other than the Veda itself upon which such statements could be based; they do not succeed in contradicting the Veda.

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is the portion of the *Ślokavārttika* that pertains to Śabara's commentary on the fourth *sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. However, while Kumārila's primary concern throughout the treatise is indeed to establish that perception is not a means of knowing Dharma, many other matters having to do with the nature and validity of perception, divorced from any consideration of its role in the ascertainment of religious and moral truth, are discussed. Indeed, the

Pratyakṣapariccheda presents a comprehensive theory of perception that addresses a variety of epistemological issues that were debated by Kumārila's contemporaries. In order to understand the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* and its significance we must also have some acquaintance with these issues.

The question before Kumārila in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is, Is perception a means of knowledge in regard to Dharma? Discussion of the means of knowlege or *pramāṇas*, that is, the types of evidence or proof by which statements are established in scientific discourse, goes back to ancient times in India. The *Carakasaṃhitā*, an early medical text (composed sometime in the first two or three centuries CE), mentions different *pramāṇas* in different contexts. In an investigation of the question of whether there is an afterlife, it employs testimony (*āptopadeśa*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and a kind of causal argumentation that it refers to simply as "reasoning" (*yukti*).[4] Later, in a discussion of the methodology of debate – dialectic – it lists language (*śabda*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), testimony or tradition (*aitihya*), and comparison (*aupamya*) as concepts with which the debater should be conversant.[5] In the *Nyāyasūtra*, one of the earliest systematic treatises on methods of debate and acceptable and unacceptable forms of reasoning (portions of which may go back to the second century CE)[6], the *pramāṇas* are fixed at four: perception, inference, testimony (to which it refers as "language," *śabda*), and comparison.[7] The Sāṃkhya school, which considered the question of the *pramāṇas* in the context of a discussion of the requirements of a proper scientific treatise (*śāstrayukti*), recognized only three: perception, inference, and testimony (*āptavacana*).[8] The *Yogasūtra* (which achieved its present form perhaps in the fifth century), under the influence of Sāṃkhya, identifies essentially the same three, but now mentions the *pramāṇas* in the context of its treatment of basic states of mind (which may be "wholesome" or "unwholesome"; other states of mind are error, sleep, etc.).[9] The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (portions of which may have existed as early as the first or second century), without offering a formal list of *pramāṇas*, mentions only perception and inference and thus would seem to recognize only two. Although these early texts all list and define various *pramāṇas*, the attempt to define the concept of *pramāṇa* in general was not made until later.[10]

Already there was considerable ground for dispute. As one can see, there was from the beginning disagreement about exactly how many genuine *pramāṇas* there are. The earliest enumerations tended to be haphazard and unsystematic, whereas later treatments attempted to identify the most basic *pramāṇas* under which all others were to be subsumed. Thus, Sāṃkhya philosophers rejected comparison and tradition (*aitihya*, which some distinguished from testimony)[11] as distinct *pramāṇas* on the grounds that they are both forms of testimony (*āptavacana*). At the same time, they rejected certain varieties of reasoning – supposition (*arthāpatti* – knowing, e.g., that a lion has fought and defeated a boar from the fact that his body shows the wounds of a boar), inclusion (*sambhava* – knowing, e.g., that if you have a bushel of something you also have half a bushel), absence

(*abhāva* – knowing, e.g., that fire is absent from the fact that smoke is absent), and gesture (*ceṣṭā* – knowing, e.g., that someone is hungry from his patting his stomach) – as distinct *pramāṇas* on the grounds that they are to be included under inference (*anumāna*).[12] The Mīmāṃsā school was especially liberal in its acceptance of *pramāṇas*. Although the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* does not specify a certain number, Śabara mentions six: perception, inference, testimony, comparison, supposition, and absence. The Vedānta school eventually came to accept this list,[13] but philosophers of all other schools were unanimous in rejecting supposition and absence as *pramāṇas*.[14]

Other controversies arose over the definitions of the various individual *pramāṇas* – which, again, are already stated in the *Carakasaṃhitā*. Indeed, the Mīmāṃsā definitions of comparison, supposition, and absence differ considerably from the definitions of Sāṃkhya and the other schools. In general, the development of the theory of perception in Indian philosophy centered around the precise definition of the *pramāṇa* perception, while the development of logic was to a considerable extent taken up with the definition of the *pramāṇa* inference. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition perception is defined as a cognition arising from the contact of sense faculty and object; thus, *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4: "Perception is a cognition that has arisen from the contact of sense faculty and object and is inexpressible, not erroneous, and determinate in nature."[15] This is similar to a statement of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that has often been taken as a definition of perception (VS 3.1.13): "That [cognition] that comes about from the contact of self, sense faculty, mind, and object is another [means of knowledge besides inference, namely, perception]."[16] The Sāṃkhya school followed a different tradition. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (sixth century) states that perception is "an ascertainment [of the *buddhi* or intellect] in regard to a sense faculty,"[17] that is to say – according to the oldest preserved commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the *Yuktidīpikā* – a modification of the intellect (*buddhi*, i.e., roughly, the mind) in the form of the ascertainment of an object, brought about by the activity or "function" (*vṛtti*) of a sense faculty. The same idea finds expression in the ancient commentary of Vyāsa on the *Yogasūtra*: "The *pramāṇa* perception is a function of the mind (*citta*) resulting from the influence of an external object through the channel of the senses, having that [object which caused it] as its content . . . and chiefly consisting in the ascertainment of a specific property [of it]."[18] However, another ancient work of Sāṃkhya, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of *Vārṣagaṇya* (fourth century),[19] defines perception simply as "a function of [one of the senses,] the ear, etc."[20] In the Buddhist tradition one of the oldest preserved definitions is Vasubandhu's: "Perception is a cognition [that arises] from that object [which is represented therein]"; that is, a valid perception is a cognition arising from the same object it represents.[21]

These definitions stimulated reflection on a variety of philosophical issues. First, since perception is a *means* of knowledge, it should, strictly speaking, function as an *instrument* that yields knowledge as its result. Sanskrit grammar provides an analysis of action in terms of various factors (*kārakas*) that serves as the framework

for the epistemological discussion here. In sentences with an active verb, the agent of an action is indicated by a noun with a nominative ending in agreement with the finite ending of the verb;[22] the object by a noun with an accusative ending; the instrument by a noun with an instrumental ending; and the action proper by the verbal root.[23] In addition to these elements corresponding to grammatical categories there is also for any action a distinct result, that which is *brought about* by the action. In the case of the act of chopping down a tree these five factors would be the woodsman (agent), the tree (object), the axe (instrument), the chopping (action), and the felling of the tree (result). That knowledge is an action – evidenced by the fact that there is a verb 'to know' – implies that the same factors must be involved. The knower is the agent, the thing known the object, that by which one knows the instrument, etc. Now the word *pramāṇa*, which is derived from the verb *pra√mā* 'to know' literally means – once again, according to the rules of Sanskrit grammar – 'a means of knowing';[24] hence, a *pramāṇa*, whether perception or inference or any other *pramāṇa*, should serve as the *instrument* in the act of knowing. However, as can be seen from the definitions of perception cited above, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition generally conceives of perception as a *cognition* arising within the self, the knowing subject, as a result of the operation of the mind and senses in respect to a physical object. Such a cognition, which is presumably a state of knowledge (especially if it is considered "not erroneous"), would more naturally be conceived as the *result* of the process of perception, whereas perception itself, that is, *the instrument*, would be the functioning of the faculties that cause it or else those faculties themselves. If, indeed, the *cognition* arising from the operation of those faculties is considered perception, then the question arises, What other state of knowledge is evoked by this cognition such that it truly serves as a "means of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*)?[25] This difficulty is avoided by the Sāṃkhya definition that characterizes perception as an "ascertainment" of the intellect (*buddhi*) brought about by the functioning of the senses. In that case, that same ascertainment "residing in the self," which in Sāṃkhya stands above the intellect and passively witnesses its modifications, could be considered the result, whereas "residing in the intellect" it may be regarded as the means or instrument.[26,27]

A second issue that was immediately connected with the attempt to define perception was how best to formulate the definition so that it excluded other, nonperceptual cognitions such as erroneous cognitions, inferential cognitions, memory,[28] and doubt. All of these arise, at least indirectly, from the functioning of the senses, so that a statement such as that of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (perception is "[a cognition] that comes about from the contact of self, sense faculty, mind, and object . . . ") would immediately appear to be inadequate. The definition of the *Nyāyasūtra* attempts to exclude error and doubt, at least, with the qualifications 'not erroneous' and 'determinate in nature', doubt being an awareness which does not tell us definitely what its object is. But how are memory and inference excluded by such a definition? Vasubandhu's definition, by suggesting that

perception is simply a cognition that represents the same object that causes it, would seem to be more satisfactory than the others in this respect. It would seem to exclude at least perceptual error, which is, for example, *of* silver but caused by mother-of-pearl; inference, which is, for example, *of* fire but caused by smoke; and even memory, which is *of* something in the past but caused by something in the present.[29]

Another matter of debate concerning the proper definition of perception was whether all perceptual cognitions in fact arise from the *contact* of a sense faculty with its object. What about vision, for example, which is evidently the perception of an object from a distance?

Perhaps the most controversial issue about perception in early Indian epistemology, however, was, Assuming perception to be a kind of cognition,[30] is it a cognition that has conceptual content – does it, for example, identify its object as this or that specific type of thing or as having this or that property, or not? I shall refer to this as the debate about whether perception is conceptualized, but the terms 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' have also been used.[31] There was an early tendency to hold that perception is nonconceptualized (indeterminate); thus the Sāṃkhya philosopher Vindhyavāsin, proceeding from the definition of Vārṣagaṇya mentioned earlier, states that perception is "a function of the ear, etc., that is devoid of conceptual awareness."[32] The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* also states that the function of the senses in regard to their objects is "a mere seeing."[33] Yet in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* it is the function of the *buddhi* in regard to a sense faculty that is perception in the proper sense; the *buddhi*, moreover, is referred to as an "ascertainment" (*adhyavasāya*; see earlier), which, according to the *Yuktidīpikā*, is an *identification* of the object, such as "This is a cow" or "This is a man."[34] Thus the theory of a two-staged perception emerges: first, as the immediate result of the contact of sense faculty and object there arises a nonconceptualized, "mere grasping" or "mere seeing" of the object; then, as a result of the continued functioning of the sense faculty in contact with the object, together with the mind, there is a conceptual identification or determinate awareness of it. The word 'inexpressible' in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4 also allows for a definition of perception as devoid of conceptual content.[35] However, for the most part, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition took perception to be two-staged: first there arises a nonconceptualized cognition of the object, then a conceptualized one.[36]

The discussion of the means of knowledge, of perception, inference, and verbal cognition, in particular, reached a new level of sophistication with the sixth-century Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga.[37] Diṅnāga rigorously criticized the views of his predecessors while proposing ingenious, highly original theories of his own. After Diṅnāga, Indian epistemology is mainly taken up with debates over his ideas, whether as proposed by Diṅnāga himself or by his followers, the greatest of whom was Dharmakīrti, who was perhaps a younger contemporary of Kumārila's. Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* was one of the earliest and probably the most influential attempt to refute Diṅnāga's philosophy by a Brahmanical thinker.[38]

One of Diṅnāga's most provocative claims was that the Buddha himself is to be considered a *pramāṇa* in regard to Dharma.[39] To be sure, the Buddhists as well as the Jainas always believed the founders of their traditions to have possessed supernormal cognitive abilities, even omniscience. However, the explicit claim that the Buddha is a means of knowledge unto himself brought the issue of the authority of scripture squarely within the sphere of formal epistemology. It had the effect of refocusing attention on the concept of a *pramāṇa* in general, leading to Dharmakīrti's attempt to provide a definition of it, and stimulating reflection on what it is that makes us consider a cognition *true*.

Diṅnāga reduced the number of genuine *pramāṇas* to two: perception and inference. He argued that verbal testimony (*śabda*) is really only a form of inference – an inference to a state of knowledge of a reliable speaker from what she says. Although he was joined in this opinion by philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika school – the important Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda, probably a contemporary of Diṅnāga, also taught that testimony is a form of inference – he was unique in regarding the objects of these two means of knowledge as distinct. That is to say, according to Diṅnāga, perception and inference do not apprehend the same thing. Perception apprehends concrete particulars, which are real; inference apprehends universals, which are not real but imaginary, that is, mentally constructed. (As Dharmakīrti explained later, inference can still be considered *true* insofar as it is the basis of effective action, that is, insofar as it eventually *leads* one to the particular.)[40]

As for perception, Diṅnāga defined it simply as a cognition "devoid of conceptual construction."[41] Two important ideas are contained in this definition. First, perception is not conceptualized. It is a bare awareness without any identification or conceptual articulation of its object, which Diṅnāga understood specifically to be the association of a word with the object. Conceptual awareness is of the mind, not the senses, and in fact is always a falsification of the object because the referents of words – universals (for words refer across many individuals) – are not real features of the world. Second, perception need not arise from the contact of a sense faculty with an object, as is implied by virtually every other classical definition of perception. Diṅnāga's definition indicates only a phenomenological feature of perceptual cognition – it is nonconceptualized; it says nothing of its provenance. Thus it was open to Diṅnāga, following the idealist tendencies of the Yogācāra school, to suggest that the object that appears in a perceptual cognition may not be an external, physical object but, in fact, merely a form that arises from within consciousness itself. This led, in turn, to the idea that an act of perception is simply the process of a cognition assuming a particular form of which it itself becomes aware; that is, perceptual acts are acts of self-awareness! In that case, one can see that the means of knowledge that is perception – what does the work in the act of perception, so to speak – and the knowing that is its result are essentially identical; they are aspects of the same cognition.

As regards inference, Diṅnāga made important strides in clarifying the exact relationship that must exist between the terms of a valid syllogism. Following the

lead of Vasubandhu, he removed the study of inference from the art of debate or dialectic and established it firmly within the domain of *pramāṇavāda*, the scientific investigation of human knowledge, that is, epistemology. So influential were his achievements in this area that he could be considered to occupy a place in the history of Indian logic akin to that of Aristotle in the West.[42] As already mentioned, he considered the referents of the terms of syllogisms, as indeed of all words, to be mental constructs – universals or, better, pseudo-universals that are only loosely related to the reality of concrete particulars; there are no real universals, according to Diṅnāga. Concepts, as they could also be called, are not positive but negative in nature; they serve merely to differentiate certain more or less arbitrary groupings of particulars from others. (Thus, the content of the concept 'cow', e.g., is roughly 'that which is not a non-cow', i.e., that which is not a horse, a dog, a cat, a fire hydrant, etc.)[43]

On the whole, Diṅnāga's philosophy is nominalist and idealist in spirit.[44] Not only does it proclaim the authority of the Buddha in regard to matters of morality and religion and reject the authority of the Veda, it also propounds a metaphysics diametrically opposed to the realist worldview that undergirds Vedic practice. The above-mentioned epistemological doctrines go together with the traditional Buddhist denial of a self, which of course calls into question the existence of a soul that can reap the rewards of previously performed ritual acts, and the affirmation of the impermanence, indeed, momentariness, of everything, which questions the very possibility of action, *a fortiori*, ritual action, in the first place. It is little wonder that Diṅnāga evoked strong reactions from within orthodox circles.

Much of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* addresses and attempts to refute doctrines of Diṅnāga. The second chapter of the work, the *Codanāsūtra-adhikaraṇa*, refutes the authority of the Buddha in regard to Dharma by developing the theory of intrinsic validity, that is, the idea that all cognitions are valid unless and until they are refuted by other cognitions, mentioned earlier. Thus, only an eternal, authorless scripture such as the Veda will have validity for us in regard to transcendent matters. The intrinsic validity of the statements of a scripture that has a human author, on the other hand, will be annulled, for we know that humans are without faculties for apprehending the supersensible. The *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa* refutes the doctrine central to Yogācāra idealism (which it adapted from another movement within Buddhism known as Sautrāntika) that a cognition merely apprehends an object-form contained within itself, not an external object. The *Śabdapariccheda* chapter refutes the view that language is a form of inference, thus defending the thesis that language is a distinct *pramāṇa*. The *Ākṛtivāda* and *Vanavāda* chapters defend the reality and knowability of universals against Diṅnāga's claim that universals are merely mentally constructed or imagined. The *Apohavāda* chapter attacks Diṅnāga's theory of linguistic meaning, that words refer, not to real universals – that is, objective, common features of objects – but to artificially conceived "exclusions" (*apoha*) of objects from other objects that do not have the same effects.

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* of the *Ślokavārttika* is in large part a systematic response to the first chapter of Diṅnāga's *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, also titled *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, in which Diṅnāga presents his own theory of perception while exhaustively critiquing the definitions of other schools. Indeed, Kumārila is particularly concerned with the last section of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, in which Diṅnāga raises objections to *Mīmāṃsasūtra* 1.1.4, considered as a definition of perception; yet Kumārila will also address objections Diṅnāga brings against the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika definitions of perception (i.e., *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4 and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.1.13). The entire last half the Kumārila's *Pratyakṣapariccheda* (beginning with verse 111) is a powerful defense of the validity of conceptualized perception in opposition to Diṅnāga's claim that perception is essentially nonconceptualized.

Diṅnāga, however, is not Kumārila's only opponent in the *Ślokavārttika* or even the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. At least two other schools of Indian thought must be briefly discussed in order for us to understand fully the context of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* – the Grammarian school, especially as represented by the sixth-century thinker Bhartṛhari, and the Advaita Vedānta school.

According to Bhartṛhari, the entire universe, the proliferation of "name and form," is the unfolding of the transcendent word-principle (*śabdatattva*), which he identifies with Brahman, the Absolute of the Upaniṣads.[45] In reality eternal and changeless, the word-principle appears to transform itself, through its multiple potencies (*śaktis*), into linguistic forms – words and sentences – and their meanings. Like the Mīmāṃsaka, Bhartṛhari considered both the Veda and language in general to be eternal – that is to say, words, their meanings, and the relations between them are all eternal. Yet he held a number of other linguistic doctrines that were at odds with the Mīmāṃsā view of language, some of which Kumārila felt compelled to refute.

First, Bhartṛhari believed that individual words and their meanings are ultimately identical; both are simply different aspects of the same underlying word-principle. Indeed, for Bhartṛhari, *all* words and meanings are ultimately one. The differentiation of words and meanings is an illusory appearance of an essentially unified reality. Kumārila rejected this monistic word-mysticism, holding instead that there is a real plurality of eternal words and meanings, the latter being conceived as universals. The relations of words to their corresponding, but distinct, meanings rest for Kumārila not on the ultimate identity of words and meanings but on the inherent capacities (*śakti*) of words to express certain meanings.

Second, Bhartṛhari held that, insofar as individual words can be considered real, they are partless, that is to say, without internal divisions such as letters. The true word is a single, indivisible whole, referred to as the *sphoṭa*. Thus, a word is not to be identified with audible sounds. The audible sounds produced by a speaker, which of course are characterized by a certain sequence, merely serve to *manifest* the *sphoṭa*, which is without sequence. Kumārila, too, distinguished the true, eternal word from the audible sounds by which it is cognized, but he

denied that it is the *sphoṭa*. Rather, according to him, the eternal word consists of a collection of eternal phonemes. The *Sphoṭavāda-adhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika* is devoted to refuting the *sphoṭa* doctrine.[46]

Third, Bhartṛhari believed that insofar as the sentence is to be considered real, it also is a *sphoṭa*, a partless whole. From this point of view, the *words* that we consider to be the parts of sentences are mere abstractions, units arrived at by grammatical analysis. Although we are able to assign meanings artificially to words, the only true bearer of meaning is the sentence. This, according to Bhartṛhari, is proven by the fact that we cognize the meaning of a sentence in a single flash of intuition, without awareness of a sequence or combination of distinct word-meanings. Kumārila, on the other hand, adopted the more commonsensical view that a sentence consists of a series of real, distinct words. We comprehend the meaning of a sentence when the meanings indicated separately by the individual words combine to form the sentence meaning. In the *Vākya-adhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika* Kumārila criticizes Bhartṛhari's theory of the sentence.

The general thrust of Bhartṛhari's philosophy is to see reality as the expression of a single word-principle. The world *is* language; the diversity of the world, in its subjective and physical aspects, derives from the manifold potencies within this single principle to reveal different kinds of things. The unity that exists at the ultimate level of the word-principle is repeated at higher levels of its own appearance – at the level of sentences and individual words, insofar as the latter are *sphoṭas*.

Why did Kumārila feel compelled to refute the views of Bhartṛhari and, indeed, discuss many other linguistic issues in his *Ślokavārttika*? The central thesis of the Mīmāṃsā school is that the Veda is eternal. Yet the Veda is a discourse, a linguistic corpus. Thus, the question immediately arises, How can a linguistic discourse be eternal and authorless? In order to answer this question adequately an inquiry must be made into the nature of language itself. Thus, every aspect of language is examined in Mīmāṃsā: what words mean, how words can be eternal, whether the universals to which words apparently refer are real, how the relations between words and meanings can be eternal, whether language is a form of inference, how words and their meanings combine together into sentences and sentence-meanings, etc. The influential proposals Bhartṛhari put forward about the nature of language and its relation to the world entailed certain answers to these questions that Kumārila believed to be incorrect. Thus Bhartṛhari figures prominently as a target of criticism in many of Kumārila's discussions.

Bhartṛhari comes up in the *Pratyakṣaparicceheda* in relation to the debate about the validity of conceptualized perception. One of Bhartṛhari's most famous doctrines – another implication of his word-monism – was that all cognition is conceptualized insofar as it is necessarily informed by language: all cognition is permeated by language, as it were.[47] Although such a view might be seen as supporting Kumārila's thesis that there are (valid) conceptualized perceptions, he (along with other realist thinkers, in particular, the Naiyāyikas) rejected it insofar as it entails that there are no *nonconceptualized* perceptions. Kumārila, that is,

believed in two stages of perception: an initial nonconceptualized "mere awareness" of the object followed by a conceptualized cognition. By saying that all cognition is permeated by language, Bhartṛhari in effect denied the first stage. Kumārila argues against this as being contrary to our experience.

Another theory of Bhartṛhari is at the basis of another discussion in the latter part of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, namely, the idea that words are superimposed on their meanings. That is to say, a particular word, when uttered, first causes one to think of the *universal* of that word, the pronounced word itself being but an instantiation of a word-universal. Then it evokes an awareness of the meaning of the word, which is also a universal, *as identical with the word-universal*.[48] Kumārila takes this theory to imply that in processing speech we in effect confuse meanings with words; either the words are conceived as properties of the objects they denote or they completely obscure them. The opponent of the theory of conceptualized perception uses this peculiar doctrine to challenge the validity of the latter. A conceptualized awareness presumably involves language; hence, it superimposes one thing onto another. Such an awareness must surely be considered false.

Finally, we come to the Vedānta school, which is probably the most well known of the orthodox schools of Indian thought among Westerners. The Vedānta school of philosophy evolved out of the exegesis of the Upaniṣads, the later mystical-philosophical texts of the Veda, in the same way that the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy developed out of the exegesis of the Brāhmaṇas, which pertain to ritual. In fact, it is likely that the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the *Vedāntasūtra* were originally a single treatise summarizing all controversies concerning Vedic interpretation. The Vedānta school borrowed its hermeneutic methodology as well as most of it epistemological and linguistic doctrines, in particular, the theory of the eternality of language and the Veda, from Mīmāṃsā. However, it differed from Mīmāṃsā profoundly in its metaphysics and soteriology.

The ultimate reality, according to Vedānta, is Brahman, which is described in the Upaniṣads as being, consciousness, and bliss. According to the dominant monistic school of Vedānta philosophy, Advaita Vedānta, the most important exponent of which was Śaṅkara (who lived during the late seventh and early eighth centuries), Brahman is completely one, without any differentiation, diversity, or change. (Thus, the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta differs from the Śabda Advaita Vedānta of Bhartṛhari, insofar as the latter considers Brahman to be endowed with multiple creative potencies [*śaktis*].) The world of experience, of plurality and change, is an illusion superimposed upon Brahman. It has no reality apart from Brahman; indeed, it is identical with it, in the same way that the illusory snake, strictly speaking, *is* the rope upon which it is projected. The self, too, therefore, is identical with Brahman. That is to say, the self in its true nature is not an active, finite individual but changeless, infinite consciousness. According to Vedānta philosophy, there are not many selves but one universal Self. Salvation – liberation from the cycle of rebirth – follows upon realization of the identity of Brahman and the self through hearing and reflection upon the Upaniṣads. Upon

being fully liberated the self ceases to exist as an individual and consciously merges with the universal Self, Brahman, like a drop of water falling into the ocean.

Vedānta philosophy is not a frequent target of criticism in the *Ślokavārttika* and in one place, at least, Kumārila indicates a measure of respect for it.[49] Nevertheless, it comes up in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, once again, in connection with the discussion of conceptualized perception. Granting that there are two stages to experience, the Vedāntin wants to deny that the same object is apprehended in both stages. The first stage, that of nonconceptualized perception, apprehends the real nature of the object, the highest universal, Being. The second stage, that of conceptual awareness – which, however, the Vedāntin does not consider *perception*[50] – apprehends an illusory appearance of the object, the particular, which is differentiated from other objects. The first stage, in other words, apprehends truth, which is universal and homogeneous in nature; the second stage illusion, which is particular and differentiated. Indeed, this idea is akin to a theory propounded by the Advaita Vedānta thinker Maṇḍanamiśra, who was probably a contemporary of Śaṅkara, in his *Brahmasiddhi*.[51] It is actually quite similar to the Buddhist position, which maintains that true perception is without conceptual construction whereas all conceptual awareness is erroneous, except the Vedāntin considers the object of perception to be, not the particular, but the universal – Being itself. Kumārila, on the other hand, will argue that both stages of experience are veracious – and perceptual – and that they apprehend the same thing, namely, the determinate particular. However, the first stage apprehends it without distinctly apprehending what it has in common or how it differs from other objects, whereas the second stage apprehends it explicitly in that way. That implies that it grasps it as determinate, as being of a certain type and/or possessing certain properties.[52]

In general, Kumārila was opposed to all illusionistic teachings, Brahmanical and Buddhist alike. He belonged to a tradition that placed everyday piety – the practice of prescribed public and domestic rituals and the observance of social and ethical norms – above mysticism. Were the physical world merely an illusion, were it really One without any difference or Emptiness or a tissue of ideas existing only in consciousness, then there would be no real purpose to the rituals and practices that make up the orthodox way of life, and the prescriptions and prohibitions of scripture would be null and void. Indeed, Śaṅkara explicitly taught that once one realizes the true identity of the self as Brahman and comprehends the illusory nature of the empirical world, the various injunctions and prohibitions of the Vedic texts lose their force.[53] To be sure, Śaṅkara, himself a defender of orthodoxy, believed the Veda to have provisional validity up until the moment of enlightenment. However, Kumārila thought any distinction between provisional and ultimate truths, which was also current in Mahāyāna Buddhism, was nonsense; there is only either truth or falsehood, nothing in between.[54] Thus, insofar as he was a defender of the authority of the Veda, he was also, of necessity, a defender of common sense. This is reflected in many aspects of his system, and particularly in his views concerning perception: his belief that perception apprehends external, physical objects; his insistence on the reality of the various properties attributed

to objects in conceptualized perception; and his rejection of supernormal, yogic perception. More generally, it is reflected in his doctrine of the intrinsic validity of all cognitions, that is, that all cognitions are *prima facie* valid and should not be rejected without good reason, which roughly comes to this: how we initially cognize the world is for the most part how it really is – What you see is what you get.[55]

Nothing is really known of Kumārila's life,[56] but a popular legend depicts him as one who, above all, strove to live according to Dharma. In order to become better acquainted with the advanced Buddhist epistemological doctrines, the story goes, Kumārila disguised himself as a Buddhist monk and enrolled as a student under a certain Buddhist teacher. Having completely mastered the Buddhist system he then went on to refute it in his *Ślokavārttika* and other works. He came to realize, however, that this was a grievous violation of Dharma, the sin of disrespecting one's guru. To atone for this sin he vowed to bake himself to death in a pile of smouldering refuse. Even Śaṅkara, pleading with him to live and write a commentary on his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, was unable to dissuade him from carrying out this gruesome deed.[57] This story also may be taken as an indication of the great esteem in which Kumārila was held by philosophers of other schools.

The lack of accurate knowledge of the history of Indian philosophy and, in particular, of the development of Kumārila's own school, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, makes it, however, difficult even to assess exactly what Kumārila's contribution was. We know that he had numerous predecessors besides Śabara, most of whose names are unknown. Throughout the *Ślokavārttika* he frequently refers to "certain ones" or "others" (*ke cit*, *anye*) who held divergent interpretations of both the *sūtras* and Śabara's commentary.[58] In one place he specifically mentions Bhavadāsa (*Pratijñā* 63); and his commentator Pārthasārathimiśra names Bhartṛmitra as one of the earlier Mīmāṃsakas who had made Mīmāṃsā into the "materialistic" system (*lokāyatīkṛta*) that Kumārila declares himself, at the beginning of his work (*Pratijñā* 10), as being especially keen to refute.[59] Moreover, Kumārila generally presents his positions as not just his own, but as "ours" (*naḥ*). Indeed, the vast range of his system, its consistency, and the polish and sophistication of its teachings suggest that it is the culmination of generations of reflection, not the achievement of a single man. Kumārila, therefore, should perhaps be seen as the one who gave definitive shape to the teachings of his school, who synthesized them in a single, powerful statement; we can't really know how many of the theories and arguments of the *Ślokavārttika* originated with him. However, the fact that his is the only commentary on the *Śābarabhāṣya* that his successors managed to preserve suggests in any case that it stood out in importance above the others.

Many other doctrines and theories, of course, come up in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, especially those of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, which will be discussed in due course. Moreover, Kumārila often seems to be carrying forward ideas enunciated by the great Nyāya philosopher Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*; occasionally he also seems to be specifically drawing on theories developed by the Vaiśeṣika thinker Praśastapāda. Even the influence of certain

metaphysical doctrines of the Jainas can be seen in this work. However, the theories of Diṅnāga and Bhartṛhari and, to a lesser extent, of the Advaita Vedānta school figure most prominently in the text. Indeed, throughout the *Ślokavārttika* these can be seen as Kumārila's main interlocutors.

The argument of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*

Kumārila begins his *Pratyakṣapariccheda* (PP) by considering the question whether *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4 is intended as providing a definition of perception. We have seen that Diṅnāga takes it in that way and attacks the definition it supposedly presents in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. However, certain Mīmāṃsakas also considered it as providing a definition of perception; the commentaries specifically mention Bhavadāsa as one who held such a view. Indeed, Diṅnāga seems to have based his critique of Mīmāṃsā primarily on Bhavadāsa's (now lost) commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. Śabara expounds the views of another earlier commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, referred to as "the Commentator" (Vṛttikāra), who also sees a definition of perception in MS 1.1.4.

In fact, an initial reading of MS 1.1.4 suggests that it is not at all implausible to see it as containing a definition:

> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing (*sat*) object – that (*tat*) is perception; it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.

The first part of the *sūtra* certainly looks like a definition of perception![60] Kumārila, however, presents several arguments against such an interpretation. First, if MS 1.1.4 contained a definition of perception, it would not be connected with the preceding *sūtras*, which pertain to an inquiry into Dharma. (The first *sūtra* formally announces an inquiry into Dharma; the second defines Dharma as "that which is characterized by a Vedic injunction"; the third announces an investigation of the "basis" or grounds of knowing Dharma.) A definition of perception would be properly found in a treatise on epistemology such as the *Nyāyasūtra* and not a treatise on Dharma. Second, although the *sūtra* may be intended as excluding perception as a means of knowing Dharma and hence properly belong to an inquiry into Dharma, one needn't go so far as to present a formal definition of perception in order to do that. One need, rather, only mention, as the *sūtra* in fact does, the fact that perception is restricted to knowing what is here and now, "that which is present"; for Dharma is action that results in a future good, and such a thing could never be apprehended by a means of knowledge that is restricted to the present. Third, if the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* intended to provide a valid definition of perception – that is to say, if it were interested in epistemological issues – then it would also have provided definitions of the other *pramāṇas*, inference and so forth, like the *Nyāyasūtra* (PP, verses 1–2).

Finally, and most importantly, the first part of MS 1.1.4 does not even present an accurate definition of perception. For the statement, as construed earlier, merely specifies that perception arises from a connection of a sense faculty and an existing object, yet perceptual error – for example, the mistaking of a piece of mother-of-pearl for silver or a coiled rope for a snake – arises in that way, too. And so does inference: one has an inferential cognition, for example, that the mountain is on fire, as a result of seeing that it is smoking, that is, as a result of one's sense faculty being connected with an object. Thus, as a definition of perception the first half of MS 1.1.4 is too broad (10–11).

To be sure, it is possible to construe MS 1.1.4 in such a way that it expresses a valid definition of perception. Such a construal was proposed by the so-called Vṛttikāra, the earlier commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* who is quoted (or perhaps paraphrased) at length by Śabara. The Vṛttikāra specifically suggested that two words of the *sūtra* (*tat* = 'that' and *sat* = 'existing' or 'true') be switched around, resulting in a reading significantly different from that given above:

> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with that (*tat*) [same object that appears in the cognition] is true (*sat*) perception; it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.

When the *sūtra* is worded in this way, perceptual error and inference are excluded from the domain of the definition by the stipulation that the object that appears within the perceptual cognition must be the object that caused it; for erroneous and inferential cognitions both present objects that are *other* than those that cause them (13). This approach to perception is reminiscent of that taken by the Buddhist Vasubandhu, whose definition of perception was discussed earlier. However, this revised reading of the *sūtra* is not what is being proposed here by the opponent – presumably, Bhavadāsa – who wishes to construe it as a definition. Any suggestion that the *sūtra* provides a definition of perception should be rejected, Kumārila maintains, if it does not specify an appropriate reading of the *sūtra* (12, 14).

Kumārila then proceeds to clarify his own view of the significance of MS 1.1.4. The purpose of MS 1.1.4, he suggests, is not to define perception at all but simply to indicate a well-known feature that rules it out as a means of knowing Dharma. That feature is, namely, that it arises from an existing connection between a sense faculty and an object; hence it can only apprehend an object that is "present" – here and now (17–18). The ultimate purpose of such a statement is to exclude yogic perception as a means of knowing Dharma, that is, to reject the position of those who believe that certain revered religious teachers of the past have apprehended Dharma by means of some kind of supernormal "perception." The *sūtra* rejects this on the grounds that anything that is perception will apprehend only that which is *present* (21). Yogic perception – perception that apprehends that which will take place in the future as the result of a certain action performed now – is, thus, a contradiction

in terms. If the *sūtra* is taken in this way, then none of the problems raised earlier in connection with construing it as presenting a definition of perception comes up. In particular, since it does not present a definition of perception at all, it cannot be faulted for presenting a *bad* definition (22–24ab).

Further discussion of MS 1.1.4 in the first part of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* centers on the interpretation of the individual words and phrases of the *sūtra* in response to criticisms of it raised by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Traditionally, a commentator on a *sūtra* text like the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is obliged to show that each word of every *sūtra* is meaningful, necessary (i.e., not redundant or otherwise superfluous), and without unwanted implications. It would seem, for example, that the word 'existing' in the *sūtra* is superfluous, especially if it is taken as modifying the object that is in contact with the senses; for there cannot be contact with an object that does *not* exist![61] However, Kumārila argues that the word 'existing' should actually be taken as modifying 'connection'; hence, the *sūtra* should read, "The arising of a cognition when there is an *existing connection* of the sense faculties of a person [with an object] . . . " The purpose of specifying that the *connection* is an existing one is to exclude the hypothesis of other philosophers that perception could arise from a *past* or *future* connection between sense faculty and object and thus apprehend something in the past or the future (26–37).

Other questions concerning the expressions 'the arising of a cognition' – Why stress that a perception is a certain cognition *in a state of origination*? (53cd–58) – and 'of a person' – How is this expression to be related to the other words of the *sūtra*,[62] and what *is* this person that is being referred to, anyway? (52–53ab) – are also considered. However, most attention is devoted to the proper interpretation of the term *samprayoga* 'connection' (38–51). Diṅnāga raises various objections in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* against considering perception as a cognition that arises from the *connection* of sense faculty and object in the sense of *direct contact* (*sannikarṣa*). First, such a definition would seem to exclude perception at a distance, in particular, hearing and vision. Second, it would entail that a sense faculty could not apprehend something larger than itself. In the case of touch, for example, one's finger feels only the small area of the object that it is in immediate contact with. Thus, it seems, if all perception were to arise from the direct contact of a sense faculty with its object like touch, the sense of vision, too, would not be able to take in an area larger than the pupil of the eye.[63] In looking at the ocean, then, one would not see a broad expanse of water but only a small dot. Third, if a perceptual cognition were to arise as a result of contact, all properties of an object would be perceived, not just the one specific to the sense faculty in question; for insofar as a sense faculty is in contact with an object, it is in contact with all that inheres in it – not just one particular sensible quality but all sensible qualities, as well as all universals. Thus, one would never have any doubt about the nature of what one perceives.[64]

Kumārila initially addresses the first two of these criticisms – the third he takes up later – by saying that the word *samprayoga* need not mean 'connection' at all; it could rather mean 'proper functioning'. One possible, if far-fetched

etymology of *samprayoga* allows for such an interpretation. What is the proper functioning of the sense faculties in question here? Nothing other than their giving rise to cognitions that present the objects that cause them (not other objects, as would be the case when someone mistakes mother-of-pearl for silver). However, this is basically the relationship between sense faculty, object, and cognition that the Vṛttikāra (again, along with Vasubandhu) considered to be the essence of verdical sense perception.[65] Thus, when *samprayoga* is interpreted in this way, the first half of the *sūtra* could after all be seen as providing a correct definition of perception, that is, one that excludes perceptual error, even without any reordering of its words – though, to be sure, that still would not be the *purpose* of the *sūtra* (38–39).

Construing the *sūtra* in this way, Diṅnāga's first two objections, at least, are dispelled. At the same time, those objections can be dealt with even when one inteprets *samprayoga* in the usual way, as meaning 'connection'. For there are different ways in which one may hold that there is a connection. One can take it to mean simply that there is an *orienting* of the sense faculty toward the object, or else that there is a *capacity* of the sense faculty to perceive the object. Either of these interpretations would allow for the perception of objects at a distance or objects larger than the organ that is the seat of the sense faculty (42cd–43ab). However, even on the theory that 'connection' means 'contact' Diṅnāga's objections can be met. For Sāṃkhya philosophers believed that in perception the sense faculty comes directly in contact with the object insofar as a function (*vṛtti*) extends outward from the external, visible sense organ located in the body – the eyeball, the nose, etc. – to the object. This would explain how perception at a distance is possible, and also how objects larger than the visible sense organ can be perceived, for the function could also spread out and contact the object over a broad area (43cd–44, 47cd–48). Nyāya philosophers held similar theories.

Having determined the meanings of the individual terms and expressions of MS 1.1.4 Kumārila proceeds, beginning with *śloka* 59, to consider the question, what exactly is the *pramāṇa* perception? It would seem that this question has already been answered with the clarification of 1.1.4., but in fact, as we have seen, Kumārila does not believe that the *sūtra* is intended to tell us exactly what the *pramāṇa* perception is, but only to draw attention to a certain feature of it that excludes it as a means of knowing Dharma. Meanwhile, philosophers of various schools have put forward their definitions of perception based on the idea that it somehow involves a connection of sense faculty and object. Would any of these proposals affect the point at issue, viz., that perception cannot apprehend Dharma? Kumārila asserts, with *śloka* 59, that none of them does; however, in order to prove this claim he must consider each of the proposals individually. It is at this juncture that one feels that Kumārila's interest has actually shifted away from the exegesis of MS 1.1.4 toward issues of epistemology as such.

The question, What is the *pramāṇa* perception? is based on an understanding of a *pramāṇa* as *that which functions as the means or instrument in an act of cognition*. Such an understanding is based on the etymological analysis of the word *pramāṇa*

as ‘means of cognition’ – as explained earlier in the previous section. Just as an axe is a means or instrument in the act of felling a tree, or a stick the tool used in shaping a piece of clay, so a *pramāṇa* must function somehow instrumentally to bring about a knowing or cognizing; in the case of perception, the *pramāṇa* must function instrumentally to bring about a cognizing that is perceptual. To ask, What is the *pramāṇa* perception? then, is to ask, What is that thing that functions instrumentally in the act of perception? The answer to this question presupposes some idea of what, precisely, its function is and, more importantly, what the result, or *phala* (literally, fruit) of its functioning is. Realist philosophers insisted that one must be able to identify a result of the act of perception that is distinct from the *pramāṇa* – just as the felling of the tree is something distinct from the axe. However, the Buddhists believed that means and result could be the same thing seen from different perspectives.

Among philosophers who believed that perception involved some kind of interaction between the cognitive faculties and the external world, some considered the *sense faculty* to be the *pramāṇa*, that is, strictly, the means of knowledge perception, in which case the *cognition of the object* is the result. Others considered *the connection of sense faculty and object* the *pramāṇa* and the *cognition of the object* the result. Still others considered other connections involved in perception the *pramāṇa*; for not only must there be a connection between sense faculty and object for a perceptual cognition to arise, but it was generally believed that there must also be a connection between the sense faculty and the mind and a connection between the mind and the self.[66] Thus, some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers held the *pramāṇa* perception to be the *connection between sense faculty and mind*, whereas others held it to be the *connection between mind and self*; there were further theorists who held that it is *all of these connections* taken together.

All of the above theorists took the cognition of the object to be the result of the operation of the *pramāṇa* perception. However, there were also philosophers who considered the *cognition* of the object to be the *pramāṇa*, in which case *some other kind of cognition*, for example, the cognition of the value of the object as something to be acquired or avoided, was introduced as the result; for, as discussed earlier, a *means of knowledge* must carry out some function to yield some effect which, presumably, is a kind of cognition. Finally, there was the view propounded by the Buddhists that the cognition is *both* means and result (insofar as one and the same cognition assumes the form of the object and is aware of the form it has assumed).

Kumārila, interestingly, proceeds to defend *all* of the theories that accept some kind of interaction between sense faculty and object as viable options – against the various criticisms raised by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; indeed, it is only Diṅnāga’s own proposal, that the cognition is *both pramāṇa* and *phala*, that Kumārila deems unacceptable. Thus, the aim of this section of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* appears to be the complete demolition of the discussion of perception in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* – not only is Diṅnāga’s proposal wrong, every one of the theories he attacks is potentially right, or at least not wrong for

the reasons he gives. Thus, regarding the proposal that it is the connection of sense faculty and object that is the *pramāṇa* perception, we have already seen that Kumārila has disposed of two of Diṅnāga's objections against the idea that a perceptual cognition could arise from contact. Now Kumārila dispenses with his third objection, namely, if this is perception, then *all* properties of an object would be known; for if a sense faculty is connected with an object, it is connected with *all* of its properties (see earlier, p. 17). However, Kumārila rejects this possibility on the grounds that, even if one considers there to be a connection in the sense of direct contact, the connection in question would not be "connection in general" but some *specific* connection suitable only for the arising of a cognition of a *certain type* of sensible property of an object (62–63). Thus, indeed, a particular sense faculty will perceive only one particular sensible quality. And the various proposals according to which perception is either the connection of sense faculty and mind or the connection of mind and self, or else just the sense faculty itself, can be shown to be impervious to the criticisms raised by Diṅnāga as well (66–69).

Even theories that hold the *cognition* of the object to be the means of knowledge, with which Kumārila's own is to be grouped, can be shown to be coherent. Here, of course, the main problem is to explain how *pramāṇa* and *phala* are distinct, that is, how a cognition, which itself is a knowing of an object, can be construed as a means for the arising of *another* cognition that will be construed as the result (as it is on most theories of this sort).[67] This can be done in various ways: the *pramāṇa* could be a cognition of a qualifying feature of an object, such as the color blue, and the *phala* an awareness of that same object as qualified by that feature, for example, "The pot is blue." Or the *pramāṇa* could be a *nonconceptualized* perception of the qualifying feature and the *phala* a conceptualized awareness of it. Or the *pramāṇa* could be an awareness of the qualified object, the *phala* an awareness of it as desirable, undesirable, or neither (70–73).

Only the Buddhist proposal, then – that is, Diṅnāga's position – which *identifies pramāṇa* and *phala* as different aspects of the same cognition, is untenable. According to Diṅnāga, a perceptual cognition assumes the form of its object. When I have a perception of something blue, a cognition takes the form of blue and at the same time perceives *itself* as having that form. Thus, perceptual awareness is a kind of reflexive awareness, a cognition aware of (an aspect of) itself. The *means* of knowledge that is perception, then, according to Diṅnāga, is the cognition, whose intermediate function as a means or instrument is the assumption of a particular form, for example, blue. The *result* of the function of that cognition *qua* means of knowledge is that same cognition as the awareness of that form.

This identification of *pramāṇa* and *phala*, Kumārila argues, violates the fundamental distinction of means and result established throughout all experience. The axe by means of which I chop down a tree is different from the felling of the tree; the stick the potter uses to shape a pot is different from the shaping of the pot, and so on. Indeed, by identifying *pramāṇa* and *phala* Diṅnāga does avoid certain problems that tend to infect other theories.[68] However, the erasing of the distinction between means and result is too great a price to pay for this advantage. Overall,

it seems preferable to take the result of the action of the means of knowledge to be the awareness of a certain object and the means thereto to be whatever process outside of consciousness led up to it; or indeed, if one assumes a certain cognition to be the means of knowledge, then a distinct, subsequent cognition – say, of the value of the object as desirable or undesirable, or of the object as qualified by a certain property – should be considered the result (78).

There is a way, however, in which *pramāṇa* and *phala* can be seen as distinct on Diṅnāga's account, and that is to take the *pramāṇa* as the cognition of, say, blue and the *phala* as the self-reflexive awareness of that cognition as an awareness of blue. There are two problems with this proposal, however. First, a self-reflexive cognition is impossible, Kumārila argues, because the same thing cannot be both agent and object in one action. An axe cannot cut itself; a hammer cannot smash itself; so, a cognition cannot know itself.[69] Second, if the *pramāṇa* were the cognition of blue and the *phala* were the cognition of the cognition of blue, then we would have the problem of distinct *objects* for *pramāṇa* and *phala*, which was yet another defect Diṅnāga charged other theories with and thought he could avoid by considering *pramāṇa* and *phala* one (79).[70] Finally, even if a cognition were somehow able to be aware of itself, there would be the problem of a regress. For, according to Diṅnāga, a cognition must itself be illumined in order to illumine another object. Thus, given any cognition of X, it must be at the same time a cognition of itself cognizing X, a cognition of itself cognizing itself cognizing X, and so on *ad infinitum* (81–82).

In summary, then, the Buddhist teaching about *pramāṇa* and *phala* is untenable. Thus, the *pramāṇa* perception is better understood according to one of the realist theories explained earlier – realist in that each goes along with a clear commitment to an interaction between a sense faculty and an external, physical object. (Diṅnāga's commitment to such an interaction is ambiguous at best.) However, regardless of how one defines the *pramāṇa* perception it is clear that it can apprehend only that which is present, hence that it is not a means of knowing Dharma. And that is especially the case if one considers perception to be always nonconceptualized, as the Buddhist does; for the character of a particular action as a means to a certain end, which is what Dharma is concerned with, could only be grasped conceptually (85).

The allusion to the Buddhist doctrine of nonconceptualized perception now leads into a new topic. Śabara has declared in his commentary on MS 1.1.4 that, since perception is not a means of knowing Dharma, neither are inference, supposition, or comparison, for all of these are dependent in one way or another on perception.[71] If perception does not have Dharma as its object, neither can these. Thus, testimony or scripture, specifically, the Veda, remains the sole means of knowing Dharma.

However, it might be objected that inference, supposition, and comparison are not really dependent on perception. First, inference (*anumāna*) is based on conceptualized cognitions, whereas some hold that perception is always

nonconceptualized. Thus, the inferential cognition that a certain mountain is on fire is based on the observations (1) that the mountain is smoking and (2) that things that are smoking are always on fire. Both of these observations are conceptual in nature insofar as they apprehend objects as possessing certain properties (87–88c'). Comparison (*upamāna*), meanwhile, involves memory. The knowledge that a domestic cow is similar to a wild cow, which Kumārila argues in his chapter on comparison, the *Upamānapariccheda*, is neither perceptual nor inferential, depends on remembering what a domestic cow looks like as one observes a wild cow (88c'd). Memory, however, is a quite distinct mental state from perception. Finally, supposition (*arthāpatti*) – the postulating of entities or states of affairs capable of accounting for otherwise inexplicable facts (e.g., the postulating of an inherent expressive capacity of words to account for their ability to refer to their meanings) – obviously extends one's awareness beyond what is perceived (89). Thus, none of these *pramāṇas* being really dependent on perception, insofar as the latter is necessarily a bare, nonconceptual awareness of an object, they are *not* excluded as means of knowing Dharma along with perception.

To all this Kumārila responds: it is obvious that each of inference, comparison, and supposition is dependent on perception in a significant way. In inference, for example, one can only infer the existence of a property in the subject if one has perceived that the middle term ("inferential mark," *liṅga*) is present therein. In comparison, one can know that something is similar to something else only if one has perceived it (96). And, again, in inference one must establish by perception the relation of the middle to the major term ("that which is to be proved," *sādhya*). Thus, if one tried to show by inference that something has Dharma as its property on the basis of some other property X serving as the middle term, one would have to have previously established – by perception – a relation of invariable concomitance between the latter and Dharma (i.e., "Everthing that has X has Dharma") (98cd–99). Nor can supposition tell us anything useful about Dharma. Even if it could establish the *existence* of Dharma as the cause of varying experiences of pleasure and pain in life – that is, a particular person experiences a greater measure of pleasure than others because he lived according to Dharma in previous lives – which Kumārila disputes (for there could be other reasons for the discrepancies of misery and enjoyment among people) (101–104) – it still would not tell us which specific actions constitute Dharma, which is what we really need to know (105–108).

In sum, if one accepts that perception can be conceptualized, it is clear that inference, supposition, and comparison are dependent on it and hence excluded with the latter as means of knowing Dharma. However, the opponent may respond, what if perception is *nonconceptualized*? Surely in that case inference, etc., could not be dependent on it, so that by excluding the former the latter are not also necessarily excluded.

At this juncture, then, Kumārila begins to address the question of whether perception is necessarily nonconceptualized. This issue will occupy him for the remainder of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. Although the immediate occasion of the discussion is whether inference, etc., are means of knowing Dharma or not, it

obviously relates to other concerns as well. Most generally, it relates to the validity of our judgements about objects as being of certain types and as possessing certain properties. The Buddhist opponent wants to argue that such judgements are merely of the mind, not of the senses, and moreover, that being of the mind, they do not reflect the true nature of things – they are forms of error. In defending the validity of conceptualized perceptions Kumārila is implicitly defending the reality of the commonsense world consisting of tables, chairs, rocks, trees, dogs, and cats, as well as red roses, white horses, moving cars, and people with hats. The types and properties we identify things as being and having are real; our judgements to the effect that things are of such types and have such properties are dictated by the things themselves, not imagined or imposed by the mind.

Kumārila asserts at the outset that perception is not necessarily without conceptual construction: "for a conceptual awareness that assists in the apprehension of the form of the object is also considered a perception" (111c'd). However, that does not mean that all perception is necessarily conceptualized, either, as the Grammarians imply (see earlier, p. 11). Rather, there is an initial, nonconceptualized cognition of mere looking or seeing, like the cognitions of infants and others who lack language, "which arises from the undifferentiated object (*śuddhavastu*)." It is not distinctly aware of any specific or general features of the object; rather, it is predominantly aware of it as just an indeterminate particular, as "this" or "something" (112–113).

This nonconceptualized perception of the object is in most cases immediately followed by a conceptualized one. However, although it does not distinctly present specific properties of the object as such, we know by implication or supposition (*lakṣaṇā*) that it must nevertheless apprehend both universal and particular aspects of the object in some way, since otherwise it could not give rise in turn to a conceptual awareness, which explicitly identifies such features (117–118). Thus, it certainly does not apprehend the highest universal – undifferentiated Being or Substancehood – as the Advaita Vedāntin wants to believe. However, once again, in the initial, nonconceptualized perception the knower is primarily aware of the object only as an undifferentiated particular; its common features and differences emerge fully only in conceptualized perception, as a result of comparing and contrasting the object with other individuals (119).

Kumārila, however, now begins to consider the Buddhist position that the conceptual awareness that arises from nonconceptualized perception is not really a *perception*. One argument for this view is that any conceptual identification of an object will necessarily involve associating perceived features of the object with certain terms; in general Diṅnāga is taken to have held that conceptual awareness consists in the application of words or names to what one perceives. That, however, requires an act of memory. Now, a sense faculty by itself cannot remember anything; for one thing, it is a mere instrument of cognition, in itself unconscious. However, since a perception is generally understood to be a cognition brought

about by the functioning of a sense faculty, the existence of a conceptualized *perception* would entail that a sense faculty is capable of remembering something.

To this argument Kumārila responds that the act of memory involved in conceptualized perception is carried out by the self, not the sense faculty. The self, *using* the sense faculty, as well as the mind, as its instruments, associates what is perceived with an expression (121–122). The self is the knower. (Or else, according to another, non-Buddhist view of conceptualized perception, it identifies the object as qualified by a certain type of property it has known before.) Still, one could insist that a perceptual awareness should be one that arises directly from the operation of the senses. Since a memory cognition intervenes between the functioning of the senses and the arising of a conceptualized "perception," the latter should not really be considered a perception. To this Kumārila responds that any awareness of an object – even a conceptual awareness preceded by a memory – is a perception so long as the connection between sense faculty and object is not broken (123). Even when other conceptual awarenesses intervene – as happens when one makes a series of judgements about the object, or when the mind is distracted by other thoughts – one's awareness is perceptual so long as the connection between sense faculty and object is intact (125). However, shouldn't a cognition, if it is perceptual, arise *as soon as* there is a connection between sense faculty and object? No, says Kumārila, one should not expect this. When I enter a dark room from bright sunlight I do not immediately apprehend the objects around me, even though they are within range of my visual sense; similarly, I am not immediately, upon the first visual apprehension of an object from a distance, able to discern all of its features. Thus, a distinct, conceptualized cognition of an object can arise after an initial indistinct, nonconceptualized one and still be a perception (126–127). However, this should not be taken to imply that any cognition following upon the connection of sense faculty and object, whether immediately or not, is a perception. Certainly, I am not having a perception of an object if, after having looked at it, I close my eyes and think about it. Rather, a cognition counts as a perception only if the connection is preserved (128).

Kumārila then proceeds to argue that, even though the mind may be involved in conceptualized perception (*qua* faculty of memory), it is still etymologically correct to refer to it as a "perception" (*pratyakṣam*, literally, 'that which pertains to each sense faculty'), because, once again, the functioning of a sense faculty is the factor in the arising of such an awareness not involved in the arising of other types of cognitions. Indeed, the mind, as the function that effectively turns on the sense faculty by establishing a connection with the self, and the self, as the subject of knowledge, are involved in the arising of *all* cognitions (129). Moreover, conceptualized perceptions are generally recognized as perceptions in common discourse. Philosophers should not be allowed arbitrarily to define perception in such a way as to exclude something that most people agree is perception (132–133).

Moreover, Kumārila points out, even the Buddhist wants to recognize the self-reflexive awareness that accompanies every cognition as a kind of perception. Such a perception, however, obviously does not involve any sense faculty. Thus, it

is wrong for the Buddhist to insist that only a cognition arising directly from the functioning of a sense faculty is perception. Should the Buddhist say that the *mind* (*manas*) is the operative sense faculty in the self-reflexive awareness of a cognition, then let the mind also be the sense faculty that directly functions to give rise to conceptualized perception (134); for we know that the mind is able to apprehend external, physical objects with the assistance of the external sense faculties.

In summary, it is clear that the kind of conceptual awareness in question does not fit into any other category of cognition. It is not an inferential cognition, because it is not preceded by an awareness of some middle term, etc. It is not a memory because it does not present an object as having been previously experienced. Nor is it an error, for it is not invalidated by a later cognition. (Nor is it a state of doubt, for it is definite in content.) Hence, by process of elimination, one must consider it a perception (138–139).

Is it really the case, however, that the conceptualized cognitions under consideration here are not overthrown by other cognitions, that is to say, that they are not instances of error? The consideration of this question carries Kumārila to the end of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. From *ślokas* 140–155 he addresses two views to the effect that all conceptualized cognitions are forms of error insofar as they falsify the relation between property and property-bearer. First, he considers the charge that they erroneously represent property and property-bearer as identical. When I make the judgement "That is a cow" or "The pot is blue," I seem to be identifying property and property-bearer; for I am saying that that *is* [a] cow[72] and the pot *is* blue. I do not say that cowness *inheres* in that individual or the quality blue *inheres* in the pot. But surely this is wrong. Philosophical reflection tells us that the individual is not the same as the universal, nor a substance the same as one of its qualities. The property is one thing, the property-bearer another. Thus, these conceptualized cognitions are overruled by other cognitions and so must be considered errors (140).

In fact, however, Kumārila argues, such cognitions represent things exactly as they are, for property and property-bearer are in fact identical. This is confirmed by the sorts of perceptions we have of objects with properties: we cognize the property-bearer as *having the form of the property*; that is to say, we cognize property and property-bearer as somehow fused and inseparable. The identifying judgement that the pot is blue is certainly different from the identifying judgement that a crystal *is* the piece of lac that has been placed next to it and is reflected in it. The latter judgement is erroneous; it is overturned by the occurrence of cognitions of the crystal without the lac and cognitions of the lac without the crystal. However, we do not have similar kinds of separate cognitions of a particular animal and its genus or a pot and its color (141–144).[73]

However, conceptual judgements might be considered to falsify the relationship between property and property-bearer in another way, namely, by implying that they are distinct! It was indeed the standard Buddhist position that there are no property-bearers distinct from properties. A physical object is a mere collection

of properties without something else that has them, as a forest is merely a collection of trees.[74] A judgement such as "This is a cow," however, while implying that this thing and cowness are somehow identical, also implies, by the use of different terms, that they are distinct. Thus, it expresses a metaphysical mistake that is overthrown by correct philosophical understanding (151). In response to this, Kumārila continues to maintain that the sort of conceptual awareness in question apprehends things exactly as they are, for property and property-bearer are different as well as identical! Although their identity is established by the absence of distinct cognitions of property and property-bearer when the latter remains in one state, their difference is established by the alternation of properties on the one hand and the continuity of the property-bearer, on the other, when the latter changes states (152–153).

However, does the property-bearer really have the kind of integrity Kumārila attributes to it? It is generally acknowledged that the property-bearer is apprehended by more than one sense faculty; according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, a substance is apprehended by both vision and touch.[75] In general, however, distinct sense faculties apprehend distinct objects: vision apprehends color, touch texture, hearing sound, and so forth. Thus, the fact that the property-bearer is cognized by more than one sense faculty would seem to indicate that it is many things, not one. This is an objection raised by Diṅnāga at PS 1.4.1c. In reply, Kumārila points out that every sense apprehends that something exists; if different senses can apprehend the same universal, existence, they ought also to be able to apprehend a common property-bearer (157cd–158). Just as the mind and the external senses converge in regard to external objects (which the mind is also able to know *through* the external senses) but diverge with respect to internal mental states such as pleasure and pain (which are known by the mind but not the external senses), so the various *external* senses converge in regard to substances, but diverge in regard to individual sensible qualities of substances, color, taste, smell, etc. (160–161).

Having dealt with the charge that conceptual awareness falsifies the relation between property and property-bearer, Kumārila moves on to consider another way in which it might be considered a form of error, namely, it superimposes a word onto the perceived object. In judging "This is a cow" I am, so the objection goes, identifying the *word* 'cow' with the thing I perceive; for a conceptual awareness is just an awareness of words insofar as it is an articulation of what I perceive in terms of language. In that case, however, a distinct, nonlinguistic awareness of the object drops away and the words by means of which I think about it in effect refer only to themselves. Thus, a conceptual awareness confuses or falsely identifies the perceived object with the word and is therefore a form of error (171). Although such a problem can be seen as being raised by Diṅnāga in the chapter on *apoha* in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, it is in connection with the critical discussion of a theory of meaning he himself did not hold. In fact it was the Grammarians who believed that the "own form" of a word is superimposed upon its meaning, and who may also, for that and other reasons, have shared doubts with the Buddhists about the ultimate validity of empirical cognition. Kumārila at this juncture could be taking

advantage of an apparent reference to this idea by Diṅnāga as an opportunity to launch an attack against other enemies of conceptualized perception, led by his other great rival, Bhartṛhari.

Kumārila argues that in fact the above account is not in keeping with our experience. When I use a word to refer to an object I have separate awarenesses of the word and of the object. In whatever way I apprehend the object prior to remembering the word for it, in nonconceptualized perception, I apprehend it in the same way once the word is applied, in conceptualized perception (172). However, one might object that we do not cognize something *as* a cow or *as* white prior to acquiring the words 'cow' and 'white'; otherwise, children and others without language would be able to recognize such things. Thus our awareness of such things is inextricably bound up with language. Kumārila responds: just as one is surely aware of different colors prior to knowing the words for them, so is one aware of cowness, whiteness, etc. (173–175). Even when one articulates what one is perceiving by means of a linguistic expression there is no confusion of the linguistic expression with the perceived object, for they are objects of different senses, the linguistic expression being (potentially) an object of hearing and the perceived object (in most cases) an object of vision (177). Nor can one argue that the word, insofar as it is the "revealer" of the object, is confused with it in the same way a mirror revealing a face is mistaken for the face; for the analogy breaks down in the case of other agents of manifestation: no one, for example, confuses an object illumined by a lamp with the lamp (179). Even if it were the case that properties such as cowness are always cognized in conceptualized perceptions as having the nature of words, one could not take such perceptions to be errors; if objects are always cognized in a certain way, that is how they must be! If, on the other hand, one is confident that there is indeed a confusion of distinct entities here – words and objects – then one must in fact somehow cognize them *as distinct* and not really confuse them (180–181).

The Superimposition Theory, as I shall call it, moreover, leads to various absurdities. First, if we did not have a distinct awareness of the meanings of words, we would not be able to recognize polysemic words. We could not be aware of the different meanings of such words as 'pen' or 'ball' (Kumārila, of course, uses Sanskrit examples), apart from phonetic sequences themselves (186–191). Second, we would be unable to distinguish words as different parts of speech, or otherwise relate them semantically to each other, for example, see that one word specifies the meaning of another (193–194). Moreover, we could not recognize that two words are being used in grammatical coordination, hence that they refer to the same thing, such as the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in the phrase 'blue lotus'. Rather, on the view that the expression is superimposed on its meaning, each would be taken as referring, in effect, to itself, hence to *different* things (195–198). On the other hand, the use of a synonym to paraphrase another word would be indistinguishable from the use of two words in grammatical coordination (199).

Certainly, Kumārila continues, when one learns what a word means, that is, the convention that assigns the word to its meaning, one is aware of the meaning

as distinct from the word. Moreover, that meaning must be, not a particular, but a universal extending over many particulars distributed across space and time, to which the same word may apply (200–201). When we use a word later, or when we hear a word, it evokes the same awareness of the meaning we had when we learned it. Thus, words do not obscure their meanings and are not confused with them. Rather, they are reminders of them; that is, they evoke a distinct awareness of them (205–206).

The superimposition of the idea of one thing onto another is also possible only when there is some similarity between the two, as in the case of mother-of-pearl and silver (both are shiny) or a snake and a rope (both are long and curved). However, there is no similarity between the word 'cat', which is, on most views, a sequence of phonemes, and its meaning, which is a physical object with four legs, ears, fur, etc. Nor does the meaning stand in proximity to the word, so that it might receive some influence from it and thus appear like it, like a crystal placed next to a piece of lac (209–212).

Finally, if all conceptual awareness involved the false superimposition of words and were thus a form of error, then even inference and scripture – means of knowledge the Buddhist, too, wants to accept – would be rendered invalid, for they are conceptual in nature (213). The superimposition theorist's statement of his own position would clearly be self-refuting, because it is couched in words and concepts (214). The Superimposition Theory, more generally, is called into question by the refutation of idealism and defense of realism, which Kumārila will undertake in the *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa* and which tells us in effect that there is a world of objects that exist independently of how we perceive and think about them (215–216).

From verses 217–228 Kumārila takes up at greater length the point made at 180 that if one always conceived of things as having the form of words, then one's cognitions in fact would not be false; rather, they would reflect how things actually are. Here the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the eternality of language, in particular, of the connection between word and meaning, comes into play. If there is an eternal connection between word and meaning, then it will always be the same word that is applied to a certain meaning; the meaning will always be perceived as having the form of that word; that, in effect, will be its nature (221ab). Kumārila digresses for several verses to consider objections to the eternality doctrine.

From 229–237ab Kumārila considers the possibility that conceptualized cognitions are memories rather than perceptions, because they arise by associating a particular expression with the object, which must be retrieved by memory, or by identifying the object as a certain type of thing one experienced before (or both). Kumārila rejects this suggestion on the grounds (among other reasons) that, regardless whether one's awareness of the word, or of a previously experienced object of the same type, is a memory, one's awareness of the *object* is definitely a perception. That is to say, in conceptualized perception one is thinking about an object that one is currently *perceiving* by means of remembered types and terms,

and that would seem to place it in the category of a perception, especially if there is an unbroken connection between sense faculty and object.

One might, finally, object that a conceptual awareness of an object does not always arise when a sense faculty is connected with it and the other factors of perception are in place. One's mind may be distracted by some other train of thought or confused in some way, so that one is unable to apprehend the object conceptually. Thus, it does not seem that such a cognition is produced by the object itself, and so is not really a perception. Again, the most obvious alternative is that it is a kind of error, an awareness concocted by the mind independently of the causal powers of the object. In response, Kumārila notes that we commonly acknowledge that a certain kind of preparation is required in order have certain cognitions. Only a person trained in music, for example, is able to recognize distinct notes, though all people are able to *hear* them. The fact that mental training is necessary, that the mind plays a role, hardly means that such identifications are false (237cd–241ab). When all is said and done, a conceptualized cognition is false only when it attributes a property to something that doesn't really belong to it (246cd–247ab).

Having concluded his defense of the validity of conceptualized perception, Kumārila reaffirms that inference and so forth are indeed based on (conceptualized) perception insofar as they depend on the perception of the subject of inference as possessing the inferential mark, the connection of inferential mark and property to be proved, and so forth (247cd–248ab). Indeed, if there were no conceptualized perception, then inference would be impossible (248cd–249ab); for as Kumārila will show in his *Anumānapariccheda*, if the presence of the inferential mark in the subject cannot be *perceived* then it must be *inferred*, which leads to a regress. Nor does the acceptance of conceptualized perception require one to consider the awareness of a fire that one sees in the distance as hot and other such notions as perceptions, since such cognitions are mediated by other, more proximate cognitions, whereas the cognition "This is a cow" is not. In general, a conceptual awareness should be considered a perception only if it arises (in part) from the connection of the sense faculty with the object and is immediate and direct (248cd–254).

Thus, Kumārila has demonstrated that neither perception nor any of the other accepted *pramāṇas* is a "basis" of the knowledge of Dharma. As MS 1.1.2 states, the sole basis of knowledge of Dharma is the Vedic injunction.

Kumārila versus Dharmakīrti on conceptualized perception

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is a highly complex text, extremely rich in theories and arguments. In attempting to assess its philosophical significance in this and the next section of this Introduction I shall not consider all the doctrines Kumārila develops in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, but shall rather focus on only one of them, namely, the theory of conceptualized perception. This doctrine will undoubtedly be of the greatest interest to contemporary philosophers; it directly relates to a concern that

has always been, and remains, at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition – the problem of the relation of thought and language to the world.

The theory of conceptualized perception that Kumārila presents was not conceived in a vacuum. It is a response to a highly sophisticated, formidable counterproposal. We do not find this counterproposal fully developed by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the purpose of which is, after all, largely polemical. A much more complete and systematic treatment of the problem of whether perception can be conceptualized is found in the writings of Diṅnāga's eminent commentator, Dharmakīrti. Although Diṅnāga is Kumārila's target throughout most of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, there are certain places in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* where Kumārila addresses ideas that are more evident in Dharmakīrti than in Diṅnāga. Regardless of the answer to the question of whether Kumārila specifically had Dharmakīrti in mind when he composed his works, or vice versa,[76] Dharmakīrti's maturer statement of the Buddhist position provides a more helpful contrast to Kumārila's position. Thus, in order fully to understand Kumārila's proposal, we shall proceed to look at the challenge it was meant to answer as it is presented by Dharmakīrti.

Why, indeed, would one be inclined to consider only a *nonconceptualized* cognition to be the valid means of knowledge known as perception? For, generally, we consider that we *know* something when we make a *judgement* about it, when we grasp it in a determinate way. As Kant asserted: concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Although Kant felt obliged to prove this assertion, in a manner of speaking, in his Transcendental Deduction, the point seems self-evident at the outset.

It would appear that one source of this view is a belief, apparently widespread among early Indian epistemologists, that sense perception should be a strictly sensory process; it is a cognition that arises just from the functioning of the sense faculties in relation to an object, and nothing else. Thus, as we saw, one of the first definitions of perception, offered by the Sāṃkhya philosopher Vārṣagaṇya, is "the function of [one of the senses,] the ear, etc." Any *notion* of what the object is, insofar as that is supplied by the mind, then, will not be an aspect of sense perception. Another Sāṃkhya philosopher, Vindhyavāsin, may have thought he was simply explicating the meaning of Vārṣagaṇya's definition when he said that perception is "a function of [one of the senses,] the ear, etc., that is *devoid of conceptual awareness*." This idea was also established in earlier Buddhist philosophy. Vasubandhu, in his *Abhidharmakośa*, assumes that perception is nonconceptualized;[77] his authority may have been the *Vijñānakāya*, one of the treatises of the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda school (whose doctrines are summarized in the *Abhidharmakośa*), which states that a visual cognition "is aware of blue, not *that* something is blue."[78]

However, the rejection of conceptualized perception in Yogācāra epistemology would also appear to be rooted in the fundamental mystical orientation of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The earliest Mahāyāna scriptures – also called "Sūtras" – identify *vikalpa*, imagination or fanciful conception, as the main factor that

obscures the true nature of reality and keeps one bound up in the cycle of rebirth. The entire phenomenal world is a figment of the imagination, conceptual or discursive in nature, which is the product of ignorance (*avidyā*); it is superimposed upon an ineffable, nondual Absolute, variously referred to as "Suchness," "Dharma-hood," "Emptiness," "Buddhahood," etc.[79] In the early *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* disciples are instructed to free themselves from all notions whatsoever, especially those relating to Buddhist doctrine and practice – that is, the Buddha, enlightenment, the stages on the path, the virtues – even from the thought of an "entity" (*dharma*) of any kind, and give rise to "a thought which is nowhere supported, a thought unsupported by sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touchables or mind-objects."[80] Numerous other Mahāyāna scriptures point to discrimination or determinate awareness or "mind" (*citta*) as the cause of entanglement in the cycle of rebirth. The first Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher we know by name, and perhaps the greatest, Nāgārjuna (*c.*200 CE), sought to prove that all categories of mundane experience, causation, time, substance, being and non-being, etc., are logically incoherent. One must, therefore, give up all reliance on such notions and one's attachment to the vast illusion "similar to a dream or a mirage," the phenomenal world, which they concoct. One should know instead that reality that is "the cessation of all cognition, the quiescence of plurality,"[81] about which one cannot say anything. The highest vision, the culmination of spiritual practice in Mahāyāna, in both the earliest Sūtras and the later *śāstras* (scientific treatises), is *nirvikalpaka-samādhi*, a state of meditative absorption devoid of all conceptual awareness.[82]

Against this background it is not surprising that Diṅnāga and his followers adopted the proposal put forward by earlier Sāmkhya and Sarvāstivāda thinkers, that perception is, strictly, just the functioning of the senses without any contribution of the mind, as the foundation of their theory of *pramāṇas*. Indeed, they may have been motivated by a desire to justify philosophically the Mahāyāna rejection of conceptual thought as the root of all ignorance and existential delusion. Insofar as it is a *pramāṇa*, a perception must be *true*; it must apprehend that which is real. In their understanding of what is real, however, Yogācāra epistemologists – for the purpose of explaining *empirical knowledge* – deviated, provisionally, from the Mahāyāna teaching that denies the existence of external objects (and from which perspective there is really no such thing as empirical knowledge at all!) and were influenced by the Sautrāntika school of Hīnayāna Buddhism, which had marked realist – more precisely, representationalist – tendencies. Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, something is real (provisionally or practically speaking) if it is capable of causing a certain effect (*arthakriyā*) – pleasure or pain, the quenching of thirst, the realization of some purpose.[83] This pertains only to the *svalakṣaṇa*, the momentarily existing, concrete individual, an aggregate of atoms, which is initially manifest to us as a bare sensum and which – or, more precisely, a *series* of which – we then *interpret* as a single, conventional object – a pot, a chair, a human, and so forth. It is not the conventional object, itself a kind of universal,[84] that produces satisfaction or dissatisfaction in us, but only the momentary particular (or, again, a series thereof), which we *imagine* as an enduring substance

possessed of various properties.[85] Thus, true perception is "without conceptual construction," the bare awareness of this particular as it is prior to our ordering or categorizing it in relation to other things.[86] Yogic perception, which is listed in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as one of the three basic types of perception[87] – the vivid, direct, nonconceptual apprehension of objects in the past or the future, and even, paradoxically, of the content of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha: the absence of self, the Four Noble Truths – may actually have served as the paradigm case of perception for Diṅnāga and his followers.[88]

In Western philosophy a position similar to this evolved only quite recently. From the beginning, the dominant trend has been to consider knowledge to consist in the possession of discursive understanding. For Plato, one knows a phenomenon when one has grasped it through the intellect and is able to give an account of it; the senses are disparaged as sources of error and delusion. Although the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiricists stressed the role of "simple ideas of sense" as the foundation of knowledge, knowledge still consists for them in "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas," which they took to be a kind of propositional awareness. Kant was able to see that the concepts that organize our experience, the categories, are not just read off from the manifold of sensible intuition but are supplied by the mind itself; yet, he believed he showed how the categories, as the conditions of all possible experience, have objective validity. It is not, as far as I am able to ascertain, until the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, with the English philosopher F. H. Bradley and the French philosopher Henri Bergson, that we encounter Western thinkers who seriously considered that the concepts we use to think and talk about our experience might actually distort it, and that we must somehow dispense with concepts altogether in order to know things as they really are.[89] Unperturbed by these two voices of dissent, the empiricist tradition has forged ahead, continuing to maintain that knowledge has to do with the formulating of propositions adequate to what is given in sensation.

The Yogācāra epistemologist, however, could not rest content with the position that there is just one kind of nonerroneous awareness, namely, the direct, nonconceptual apprehension of a particular – perception; for Diṅnāga maintained that the Buddha was (and in his preserved sermons continues to be) a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*), and certainly the Buddha did not evoke *perceptions* in his hearers! Rather, he was a teacher who delivered discourses consisting of utterances possessed of propositional content; he told us about the nature of embodied existence – that it is suffering – and how to bring it to an end. In fact, although Diṅnāga maintained that perception is one of two *pramāṇas*, the other being inference (*anumāna*), he did not define what a *pramāṇa* is. That was left to Dharmakīrti, who declared a *pramāṇa* to be a cognition that is *confirmed* (*avisaṃvādin*).[90] By confirmed he meant that it presents an object of which one subsequently experiences the causal efficacy, *arthakriyā*. Thus, a visual perception of water is a *pramāṇa* if, acting on the perception, one would be able to quench one's thirst. This definition allowed for inferential cognitions – for example, the cognition

"There is fire on the mountain," evoked by the observation of the inferential mark (*liṅga*) of smoke and the remembrance of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire – to be valid cognitions, *pramāṇas*, even though they are strictly forms of error (*bhrānti*) insofar as they are propositional or conceptual in nature; for the inferential awareness that there is fire on the mountain can indeed lead one to experience the causal efficacy of fire (heat, pain), and thus be confirmed. As Dharmakīrti says, even a strictly erroneous cognition (*bhrānti*) can lead us aright: seeing the reflection of a jewel and mistaking it for the jewel itself, one may nevertheless obtain the jewel![91] In this way, the *pramāṇa*-hood of the Buddha is assured. His statements are inferential marks of valid states of knowledge on the part of their author, who is established to have been a supremely reliable person, free from error or deception and even capable of knowing such transcendent matters as Dharma; thus in turn, they evoke such knowledge in us. In the end, however, reverting back to the basic Mahāyāna perspective of illusionism, Dharmakīrti acknowledges that all talk of *pramāṇa* and non-*pramāṇa* has only provisional validity.[92] Ultimately speaking, it is no more correct to say that my perception of a glass of water, which I confirm by experiencing the causal efficacy of the object it represents, is a valid means of knowledge, than to say that my "perception" of a mirage in the desert is. For from the ultimate standpoint of Yogācāra idealism, that "everything is just consciousness," the reality of the external object is denied and confirmation never really takes place.[93] Thus, Dharmakīrti, too, must in the end accept that only *nirvikalpaka-samādhi* reveals the truth.[94]

Let us proceed to look in some detail, then, at the specific arguments Dharmakīrti directs against conceptualized perception as a valid kind of perceptual awareness.[95] In his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* Dharmakīrti begins his discussion of perception with a slightly emended version of Diṅnāga's original definition (see earlier, p. 8): "Perception is a cognition that is devoid of conceptual construction and not erroneous." The addition of the phrase 'not erroneous' (*abhrānta*) is intended to exclude from the domain of perception cognitions that arise under abnormal sensory conditions, such as the appearance of "bundles of hairs" or a double moon before the eyes when one is suffering from an eye disease. Arguably, if perception were defined merely as a cognition without conceptual construction, such sensings, which are not conceptual in nature, would count as perceptions, that is, valid experiences.[96] Explaining that "conceptual construction" (*kalpanā*) is "a cognition that has a representation capable of being combined with a verbal expression,"[97] he states that perception is without the latter because it arises "from the capacity of the object."[98] Perception, that is to say, is primarily considered to be a cognition produced directly by an object through the functioning of a sense faculty that reveals the true nature of the object. Words, however, clearly do *not* belong to the nature of the object; if they are part of the content of a cognition, they must originate from something other than the object itself. Hence, a cognition that presents something associated with words or that calls for being described by words, insofar as it could not arise from the object alone, could not be a perception.

Even if the object were responsible for a conceptual awareness in some way, for example, by evoking a memory of the convention according to which it is to be designated by a certain expression, it would not be the immediate and direct cause of the conceptual awareness, precisely because a memory intervenes.[99] The fact that a conceptualized cognition does not arise immediately, given the object, suggests that it is not really the *object* that produces it. If indeed the object did not produce it initially, as soon as the sense faculty was in contact with it, how could it be the object that produced it later?[100] It seems, in fact, that a cognition that arises after such a delay could arise altogether independently of the object.[101] If the crucial thing for a conceptual awareness is the remembering of a linguistic convention, surely that could occur in other ways; it is not clear that an object even has to be involved! Thus, again, it would seem that such an awareness is not a perception. Some, however, consider a conceptual awareness to consist chiefly, or even exclusively, in an act of judgement that unites, not a word with the object one is perceiving, but a qualifying feature (*viśeṣaṇa*), such as a genus or a quality, with it. When one identifies a certain object as a cow, one must judge that a certain genus belongs to a certain substance, which suggests that one must first discern genus and substance separately and then mentally join them together; and similarly, when one identifies something as white or walking.[102] However, can these operations really be carried out by an act of *perception*? For one thing, can a genus or quality or action ever be discerned separately from its substratum? Is a genus ever an object of perception at all?[103] If, on the other hand, one were to emphasize about conceptualized cognition that it is the association of a name with an object as a result of remembering a convention learned long ago, can *that* take place in a perceptual cognition, which is typically considered the mere taking in of what is immediately present, without any aspect of reflection on what is present or past?[104] Indeed, if perception involved reflection it would just be a kind of thinking or reflecting, which can take place whether its object is present or not. Like any other act of thinking, it could be suspended at will; it would not be an awareness imposed, as it were, by the object on the perceiver.[105]

Various experiences tell us that perception is essentially nonconceptualized. As Dharmakīrti rather paradoxically puts it: perception itself shows us that it is so. In a state of meditation, for example, when the mind is completely concentrated and without thought, one still *perceives* objects.[106] And it cannot be the case that one is really thinking then but unable to be explicitly aware of the fact; for when one comes out of meditation one does not recall having had a conceptualized cognition.[107] In the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti mentions that even when one's mind is occupied with something else, one is still able to *see* what is in front of one; one may think about a cow as one is perceiving a horse.[108] Thus, it would seem that perception by nature has nothing to do with what is going on in the mind. And although it may seem that I am sometimes able to think about what I perceive *as I perceive it*, that is just an appearance due either to the rapid succession of a nonconceptualized, perceptual awareness and a distinct conceptualized, mental one, or their co-occurrence.[109]

Finally, verbal and nonverbal cognitions are phenomenologically distinct. The object is not manifest the same way in both.[110] In a nonverbal awareness, the object itself appears, vivid and immediate; in a verbal awareness, on the other hand, one is occupied with the meanings of the words by means of which one is thinking *about* the object. And words cannot possibly pertain to what is being perceived, for we generally take the latter to be a particular, whereas words refer to universals, that is, entitities, whether real or imagined, that extend across time and space. (No convention was ever founded that establishes a general term as an expression for a single individual!) Only if the universals to which words refer were really *in* things would it be even possible that one could apprehend the nature of an object through a verbal awareness. But of course that is not the case. There are no real universals, only mentally constructed ones.[111]

What, then, are these mentally constructed universals that serve as the meanings of words? Dharmakīrti answers this question at length in his *Pramāṇavārtika*.[112]

Various things, he explains there, though in themselves distinct, can have the same effect. Various herbs have the effect of reducing fever; the various factors of sense experience – sense faculty, object, light, etc. – can each individually, insofar as the other factors are in place, be considered the cause of a perception. In this way, too, various things, in themselves distinct, can be the cause of the *same idea*, an idea, moreover, that serves to join them together as things of the same type. Various cows, for example, though each distinct from the other, can at the same time, insofar as each is capable of, say, yielding milk, give rise to the notion of "that which is excluded (i.e., different) from what is incapable of that effect."[113] By selecting a certain feature of a group of objects, relating to a certain effect they all have, one can conceive of them as *one* in contrast to all others that do not have such an effect; for they are relatively *more* similar to each other than all the things that do not have it. The important point here is that this unifying idea, though to be sure rooted in the reality of the objects that give rise to it, artificially emphasizes their similarity at the expense of their diversity and is, therefore, ultimately false. Nevertheless, it is our tendency to project it onto those objects as something real and so to believe that they are of the same nature.

Thus, words and concepts such as 'cow' refer, not to real universals, but to arbitrarily constructed "exclusions" (*apoha*, *vyavaccheda*). In general, words serve the purpose of separating things off from other objects; the word 'tree' singles out a class of things by excluding them from the things that they are not. Thus, words fail to indicate anything that is really common in their referents, any objective property. Just because a group of objects all differ from those things that do not have a certain effect does not mean they are all the *same*. (To give an example from contemporary philosophy: a great variety of contraptions can function as mouse traps while in themselves being quite different from each other.) In themselves, things are individual and discrete; they become the same type of thing only insofar as we choose to conceive or talk about them in a certain way.

In a conceptual awareness, then, insofar as that awareness is structured by language, one is aware of the meanings of words, which are artificially constructed "exclusions" that do not pertain to the true nature of particulars. Perception, however, grasps the particular. Therefore, a conceptual awareness cannot be a perception.

Dharmakīrti's critique of conceptualized perception in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Pramāṇavārttika* can be summarized in four main points. First, a so-called conceptualized perception is not caused by the object. There is some delay after the initial contact of the sense faculty with the object before the conceptualized perception arises. Moreover, a memory intervenes, which is to say that the event that immediately precedes the arising of the conceptualized perception is not the object's impinging on one's sensory apparatus but a mental state. Second, it is immediately evident to all of us that perception is without conceptual construction. In cases where we are able to experience perception in isolation – for example, in meditation, or when the mind is occupied with something else – we are aware that it involves no conceptual activity. The conceptual content that perceptions appear to have is an illusion due to their being quickly followed by or occurring simultaneously with mental cognitions. Third, the object of perception is generally recognized as being a particular. Words, however, apply to universals. Insofar as a conceptualized cognition is structured by words, then, it cannot pertain to a particular; hence, it cannot be a true perception. Finally, in response to the claim that words can refer to particulars insofar as they are *endowed with* universals or other properties, for example, a sensible quality or a motion, that are in turn instantiations of universals, it is maintained that words do not even refer to real universals but to artificially constructed "exclusions" (*apoha*). The properties we assign to objects when we describe them with words are figments of our imagination. Hence, a conceptual awareness does not apprehend the true nature of its object; therefore, it is not a valid means of knowledge, a *pramāṇa*, which is necessary for it to be a perception.

If we imagine Kumārila in debate with Dharmakīrti, we can see, from the summary given of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, that he has presented a robust defense against at least the first of these points. That the object itself is responsible for the conceptual awareness he wishes to call a perception is suggested by the fact that the latter arises *when the sense faculty is connected with the object*. So long as sense faculty and object are connected, he emphasizes, the cognition that arises is a perception, even if a memory intervenes. As he says, "there is no royal or Vedic decree that perception is that which is prior to memory" (234cd–235ab). Nor does the involvement of the mind falsify the awareness. We generally recognize that the employment of the mind is necessary to discriminate things from each other. In order to be able to distinguish the notes of the musical scale, for example – that is, in order to be *explicitly* aware of their differences, which are already revealed in an inchoate way in nonconceptualized perception – one must know, that is, comprehend conceptually, what the different notes are. The mind, for that matter, is

involved in other kinds of valid cognitions, even nonconceptualized perceptions, for example, of states of pleasure and pain; it may even be involved in acts of self-awareness, which the Buddhists consider perceptions. Nor is it a problem that a conceptualized perception arises after a certain delay. Not all causes immediately produce their effects. Kumārila discusses in this connection the example of entering a dark room from bright sunlight. Even though the objects in the room are in one's field of vision as soon as one enters the room, *nonconceptualized* perceptions of them arise only later. The crucial consideration, once again, is whether sense faculty and object remain connected. There is a great difference between conceptually apprehending an object when there is no connection – for example, thinking about it after one has perceived it, say, with the eyes closed – and conceptually apprehending it when it is vividly present.

As regards the second point, Kumārila of course recognizes that not all cognitions are conceptualized. There are indeed nonconceptualized perceptions, which usually immediately precede and occasion conceptualized ones. However, it would be wrong to declare that *one type* of perception is the very essence of perception. In fact, contrary to the assertion of the Buddhist, Kumārila maintains, it is conceptualized perceptions, that is perceptual judgements, that are generally recognized as perceptions in the world; nonconceptualized perceptions are not. Philosophers have no business arbitrarily redefining terms and concepts (131–133).

The third point made by Dharmakīrti, as I have construed him, begs the main point at issue. To assert that it is only the *particular* that is the object of perception is in effect to deny that cognitions that identify objects as possessing nameable properties, that is, universals, are *perceptions*. Kumārila's entire argument in the second half of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, therefore, can be seen as directed against this claim, which is not so much an argument for Dharmakīrti's thesis as a statement of that thesis itself.

So far it appears that Kumārila has the upper hand in this debate. Surely a conceptualized awareness can be said to be directly caused by an object if the latter presents a sensum that calls forth the word or words that inform a certain concept. Indeed, what else would determine us to apply certain words to things if not actual features of those things? Nor does it seem that the object would have to have this effect immediately. An effect need not follow upon its cause without interval, as we know from the proverbial example of seed and sprout.[114]

It is when it comes to the last point that the strength of the Buddhist position and the weakness of Kumārila's become apparent. For even if it is admitted that certain words are called forth by features of objects presented to us immediately in sensation, one can still ask, Are those features really as we represent them in our conceptualized cognitions; for example, are they unified, objectively existing universals? Even Dharmakīrti admits that the words we apply to things have some objective basis in those things; we call something a cow because it has a certain effect, say, it gives a certain kind of milk, or calls forth a certain cognition, that inclines us to associate it with other things that have that same effect – chiefly, however, by jointly *dissociating* them from things that *lack* that effect. Yet all of the

things we thus assemble together under the concept 'cow' are really quite distinct from each other, as would be evident if we were to examine them closely. There is no single nature they all have that the word 'cow' names.[115] Thus, a conceptual awareness that conceives of something as a cow, insofar as it as imputes to it a single, unified nature that it shares with all other cows, essentially falsifies its object. In order for Kumārila to maintain successfully that a conceptual awareness occasioned by sensory contact with an object is a perception, hence a veridical awareness, a *pramāṇa*, he must therefore be able to show that there are real universals that serve as the meanings of words – that when I call something a cow it is because there is a real, not imagined or mentally constructed, feature of the object that it shares with all other things called cows; that when I say something is blue that is because it has a property which itself possesses a real, not imagined or mentally constructed, feature that it shares with all other instances of blue, and so forth. Not only that, but he must also be able to show that such universals are *perceivable*; for it is presumably only insofar as they are available to us in immediate (nonconceptualized) experience that they are able to occasion our employment of terms.

This is a task Kumārila does not take on in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* – except marginally, in a way I shall discuss in the next section. It is left, rather, to other chapters of the *Ślokavārttika*. In the *Ākṛti*- and *Vanavādas* and the *Anumānapariccheda* arguments for the reality and perceivability of universals are advanced at length, whereas the denial of the constructed nature of universals is developed in the *Apohavāda*. Until these portions of his system are better understood – which remains a daunting project – we cannot fully assess Kumārila's achievement in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. What he does, however, attempt to do there is ward off another challenge to the veracity of conceptualized cognitions originating from the Buddhist camp, namely, that they misrepresent objects by regarding them as *substances* – substrata bearing properties. And in his response to this challenge we can discern the basic strategy that he will employ in answering other attacks on the truthfulness of conceptual awareness. Essentially, Kumārila urges us to take our cognitions at face value; it is, rather, analysis that leads us astray. If my cognition presents an object as somehow *both* the bearer of properties *and* those properties fused into one entity – that is, as a substance – then unless and until my cognition is overturned by another of equal force and clarity I must accept that that is how the object really is.[116]

The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* and modern philosophy: Kumārila's critique of the Superimposition Theory

We have seen that the Buddhists are not Kumārila's only opponents in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. The Grammarians also pose a serious challenge with the Superimposition Theory, considered as another objection to the validity of conceptual awareness in the latter half of the text, questioning whether in fact we

are ever able to be immediately aware of objects without the imposition of linguistic categories. In short, does a raw, unconceptualized "given" present itself at all in experience or is all awareness conceptual, that is, linguistic (if not explicitly, then at least in an incipient way), in nature? Here, we begin to see more clearly perhaps the possible relevance of Kumārila's *Pratyakṣaparicched*a to contemporary philosophy, for this is a position that has strong support among modern epistemologists.

Consider, for example, the following passage from Wilfrid Sellars' famous essay *Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind*:

> . . . All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short all awareness of abstract entitities – indeed, all awareness even of particulars – is a linguistic affair. According to [this view], not even the awareness of sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called immediate experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of language.[117]

This passage reflects a position that has come to dominate modern analytic philosophy; it has been developed in the works of such leading figures as Sellars, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty. According to it, we never directly confront objects in nonconceptualized, nonpropositional experience. The raw "given," which previous epistemologists believed ultimately grounds all our beliefs, is a myth. Thoughts can relate only to other thoughts, beliefs to other beliefs. That which is conceptual or propositional, that which makes a definite assertion about or offers an interpretation of how things are, cannot be based on that which contains no such assertion or interpretation.[118] Thus, all experience, insofar as it contributes to what we can be said to know, is mediated by concepts. As Sellars argues in his essay, even the ability to notice that one is having a certain kind of sensation – say, a visual sensation of red – presupposes the mastery of certain concepts – of a sensation, of red, etc. – which in turn requires the ability to follow certain rules or guidelines (about when it is appropriate to use those expressions, etc.), which in turn presupposes the mastery of other concepts, etc.[119] All experience, then, is essentially discursive, hence also linguistic. We are caught up in our interpretations of things and are never able to escape them to see if they "match up" with reality as it is "in itself," undistorted by any interpretation. Thus, in effect, nonconceptualized awareness drops out of the picture.[120] Although it may occur and have some causal role to play in the production of beliefs, it is not manifest to us as a sort of template against which we compare even our most basic perceptual judgements; it is not what makes those judgements true.[121]

This position grew out of a sustained critique of classical foundationalism by Anglo-American philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century. (A similar position has evolved in continental and postmodern thought, based on the observation, which goes back to Saussure, that words have meaning not by virtue of reference to nonlinguistic reality but by virtue of existing in a network of relations

with other words.) Foundationalism maintains that everything we believe must ultimately be grounded on certain "basic" beliefs that are "noninferentially justified," that is, not justified by other beliefs but either self-warranted (self-evident) or justified by immediate experience. If there were no such basic beliefs there would be an endless regress of epistemic justification, a belief always requiring another belief or beliefs in turn to serve as its warrant. As a result, no belief would be fully justified (an infinite regress of justification would mean that justification is never *complete*) and, given the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief," there would not be anything we could be said to know. Whereas rationalist philosophers such as Descartes identified what they thought were indubitable truths of reason as basic beliefs, empiricist philosophers thought that all knowledge is grounded on certain *perceptual* beliefs, for example, "This is a tree" or "I am at present having a visual sensation of red" – the latter kind of belief about one's own mental states being allegedly just as indubitable as truths of reason (for one cannot doubt that one is having a certain experience at the time one is having it!). Such basic perceptual beliefs were thought to be grounded on what is given "immediately," that is, without the mediation of any assertion or interpretation, in sense experience.

The critique of foundationalism, too complex to be recounted here in any detail, proceeded on at least three fronts. First, there was the effort to show that the awareness of sensations as such, often referred to as "sense data," is insufficient to ground any judgements about physical objects. Statements about what is taking place, or even about what *could* take place, in one's own consciousness simply do not entail statements about what exists in the physical world. Second, it was plausibly argued, especially by W. V. Quine and Thomas Kuhn, that in science, at least, few if any beliefs are justified by experience "piecemeal"; rather, higher theoretical considerations always come into play when deciding whether a particular judgement can be made on the basis of a certain set of data – all observation is "theory laden." Experience by itself does not dictate to us what we know; what we know, that is, understand in the context of a comprehensive scientific theory, to a great extent determines what we believe we experience. Finally, it was pointed out that the very idea of a belief being justified directly by experience is problematic. If the experience in question is nonpropositional, then it asserts nothing about how things really are and so cannot serve to support a belief. If on the other hand it is propositional – if it alleges that matters are a certain way or offers a certain interpretation of them – then it itself stands in need of justification; for the question can be asked, what reason is there to consider that the assertion it makes or the interpretation it offers is correct?[122]

In place of the foundationalist model most contemporary epistemologists have adopted one or another version of coherentism, which states, in essence, that our beliefs constitute a network or web, each belief in the web, even a simple perceptual belief, such as "This is a tree," supported collectively by all the other beliefs. The problem of the circularity of justification (the manifestation of the epistemic regress in another form) is obviated, or at least mitigated, by the fact

that the justification of a particular belief depends not on other *particular* beliefs, but on the overall system of beliefs and its coherence.

Of course, the coherentist proposal, as I shall refer to it here,[123] is not identical with the Grammarian position, the Superimposition Theory, that Kumārila attacks at the end of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* (vv. 171ff.). The coherentist would not say that words are superimposed upon their meanings, in effect referring only to themselves. In the coherentist view, words refer to objects we are able to identify in the context of a particular theory of the world, using, of course, other words and concepts. The referent of the expression 'red book', for example, might be said to be an aggregate of elementary particles that collectively have the property of reflecting a certain wavelength of light – that is, an entity that presents itself in the context of a certain scientific understanding of nature. Yet it does seem accurate to say of the coherentist position, as of the Superimposition Theory, that the world as it is "in itself" is in some sense obscured by language; at least we never confront it directly in uninterpreted experience; we cannot *see past* our words. Language informs everything we experience; we cannot be said to *know* anything, for example, that an object is possessed of a particular feature or property, nonconceptually.

Thus, to the extent that Kumārila is able to raise questions about this implication of the Superimposition Theory he can also be seen as challenging a thesis that is central to the coherentist project. How does he do that in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*? At first he seems simply to be contradicting the Grammarian. *In fact*, he maintains, objects and their properties *are* evident to us even prior to the employment of words, though not with full clarity. Certainly this is true for individual colors and sounds, for example – the individual sensible features of objects; but Kumārila wants to hold that it is the case even for types. That is to say, even a person who does not know the word for a particular *type* of substance or quality still apprehends in nonconceptual perception – even if indistinctly – a particular substance or quality of that type; that is, it is present as a certain *kind* of substance, a certain *kind* of quality (vv. 117–118; 175). Such a nonconceptual apprehension of the object, he suggests, is implied by the subsequent occurrence of a conceptual awareness with a certain content. That is to say, there must be some *reason* why I judge an object to be a horse rather than a cow; certainly, I do not do so completely arbitrarily, independently of any notice taken of the object.[124] Kumārila's tradition will later, in support of nonconceptualized perceptions, point to such phenomena as an infant's reaching for the breast, which it knows will give milk. Surely, insofar as the infant does this repeatedly, it recognizes the breast as a type, yet lacks the word for it.

Kumārila does point to other kinds of phenomena that indicate that there is an awareness of the *meaning* of a word which, though perhaps accompanied by an awareness of the word, is nevertheless clearly independent and distinct from it. When one learns the meaning of a word for the first time, he suggests, the word cannot already be superimposed on the object, for we do not yet *have* the word for it; thus, one must be somehow independently, that is, nonlinguistically

or nonconceptually, aware of it (200–201ab). Moreover, the awareness of the meaning and the awareness of the word are usually completely different kinds of representations, certainly not representations liable to be confused or superimposed upon each other. One's awareness of the meaning is in most cases visual, whereas one's awareness of the word relates to the sense of hearing (177). Then there are the various linguistic phenomena to which Kumārila draws attention. That two words are homonyms, identical in phonetic form but different in meaning, suggests that the awareness of the word and the awareness of the meaning do not coincide (186–191). The same thing is suggested by synonyms, two words identical in meaning but different in form (208). If we did not have an independent awareness of meaning we could not distinguish different parts of speech, that is, recognize that one word is a noun, another an adjective (193); we could not recognize that certain words stand in a relation of qualifier and qualificand to each other, for example, that the expression 'fig tree' specifies what is referred to by the expression 'tree' (194). If we did not have an independent awareness of meaning we could not recognize that different words in the same sentence or phrase, such as 'blue lotus', are used in grammatical agreement to describe the same thing (195–198).

Finally, in a somewhat different context Kumārila raises another consideration that seems relevant. Those who are not trained in music are certainly able to distinguish different kinds of songs but are unable to identify them by name; only one with training knows whether the song she hears is, for example, Vedic or not (237cd–241ab). The ability to distinguish even types, then, it would seem, is not dependent on the mastery of language. The ability to identify something according to a certain concept enhances one's cognition of it, to be sure. (It enables one to have a "discriminative knowledge" of it.) However, that does not mean that one is unable to have a cognition of it, or even of its specific features, without the concept (241cd–246ab).

Whether a decisive refutation of the coherentist–conceptualist position can be built upon such observations is of course not something we can decide here. It does, however, seem that it is incumbent upon the coherentist–conceptualist to save the appearances and explain how they are compatible with his theory.[125]

At least Kumārila does not fall prey to the worst mistakes of the foundationalists. Although he insists that we have nonlinguistic cognitions of objects, he does not consider those cognitions to serve as *evidence* for perceptual judgements, so that the latter may be considered "noninferentially justified." Of course, the problem of basic beliefs that put an end to the epistemic regress is not the context of Kumārila's discussion of nonlinguistic awareness in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, though it does come into play in the *Codanāsūtra-adhikaraṇa*. In any case, he does not appear to hold the paradoxical view that a nonpropositional mental state can give support to a belief. Rather, as we have seen, all cognitions that apprehend things in a determinate way, which would seem to include perceptual judgements such as "This is a tree," are *intrinsically* valid for Kumārila. They do not derive their justification from anything else – here, Kumārila is primarily rejecting the position that they must be confirmed by other cognitions in order for us to consider them

true – but they always arise bearing a sense of their own truth. For Kumārila, then, it would seem, nonconceptual perception does not assert or interpret anything, though it does *present* the objects that self-warranted, perceptual judgements are *about*.

It would be odd, however, to suggest that the philosophical significance of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* lies solely in its relevance to contemporary philosophy. The *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is part of a vast philosophical system, a system that presents one of the most compelling, sustained defenses of metaphysical realism that we know, as well as one of the most powerful defenses of scriptural authority. In the end, this system must be placed as a whole over against other ways of conceiving reality and human existence. It is not an argument here or there, which could be perhaps dressed up for an article in a contemporary philosophical journal, that makes it interesting. Athough the modern philosopher may initially be inclined simply to reject Kumārila's system out of hand as completely antiquated, especially in light of its defense of scripture as a valid means of knowledge (but it is a rigorously reasoned defense!), while at the same time attempting to salvage bits and pieces of it that might be shown relevant to contemporary philosophy (for it would be rude to imply that the Indians weren't really smart!), in fact, in order to do full justice to a thinker like Kumārila, one must attempt to enter fully into his world, antiquitated notions and all, and see things through his eyes – and see whether "it is good." Even when it comes to particular theories that intrigue us, the most important matter to consider is whether they are part of an overall approach promising more ready solutions to problems, including the great questions of philosophy, that continue to puzzle us.

1

"THE DETERMINATION OF PERCEPTION" (*PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA*)

Text and commentary, part 1

1.1 Critique of the interpretation of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4 as a definition of perception

The topic of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (MS) 1.1.4 and Śabarasvāmin's commentary thereon. An initial reading of the *sūtra* suggests the following translation:

> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object – that is perception; it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.

Kumārila's treatise will explore the import of this *sūtra* in all its aspects – its meaning and the truth of the various philosophical ideas implied by it. The first question to be taken up concerns the proper interpretation of the *sūtra*, specifically, whether it presents a definition of perception. The first part of the *sūtra*, "The arising of a cognition belonging to the self when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object – that is perception," indeed looks like a definition. Certain Mīmāṃsakas saw it as such – two in particular whom we are able to identify. One was Bhavadāsa, who wrote a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* prior to Śabara, which is now lost.[1] Bhavadāsa divided the *sūtra* into two separate statements, and may have even read MS 1.1.4 as two separate *sūtras*, namely, (a) "The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object – that is perception," and (b) "It is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present." He declared the first of these two *sūtras* to be a definition of perception. Another earlier Mīmāṃsaka who divided the *sūtra* was the so-called "Commentator" or Vṛttikāra whom Śabara cites in his discussion of MS 1.1.5.[2] This Vṛttikāra, who probably came after Bhavadāsa,[3] also considered the first half of the *sūtra* to present a definition of perception; however, in order for it to constitute a proper definition he thought its words had to be rearranged.[4]

In his discussion of 1.1.4 Kumārila directs his criticisms primarily against Bhavadāsa. He is kinder toward the Vṛttikāra, whom Śabara seems to have relied on heavily in composing his own commentary on MS 1.1.3–5. Moreover, Kumārila will point out that by switching around the words of the first part of the *sūtra* the Vṛttikāra actually achieves a correct definition of perception. Bhavadāsa, on the other hand, mistakenly thought that the first part of the *sūtra* could be a definition of perception as is.

Kumārila begins the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, however, by objecting in general to the inclination to take MS 1.1.4 as providing a definition of perception – a criticism that applies both to Bhavadāsa and the Vṛttikāra:[5]

> 1. He who states a definition of perception by dividing the *sūtra* should explain the connection of the *sūtra* with the previous assertion.

A statement in a scientific treatise such as the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* should be connected with the other statements preceding and following it. The first *sūtra* of the treatise, "Now, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma," announces the beginning of an inquiry into Dharma. The second, "Dharma is a purpose (or goal) characterized by an injunction," defines Dharma as that which is made known by a Vedic injunction. The third, "An investigation of its basis [is being undertaken]," announces that an inquiry is to be made specifically into the basis, or means, of knowing Dharma. From these first three *sūtras* it is clear that the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is concerned only with Dharma. How, at this point, would a definition of perception, the consideration of a general *epistemological* question, be relevant?

One might suggest that a definition of perception would be relevant insofar as it would explain why the Vedic injunction (*codanā*) alone is the means of knowing Dharma, which is the purport of MS 1.1.2. Only on the basis of a precise definition of perception will it be seen that perception along with all the other profane means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), inference, comparison, and so forth, which are based on it, are excluded as "bases" of Dharma. To this Kumārila responds:

> 2ab. By virtue of which portion [of the previous assertion] would a statement of a definition serve a purpose?

A definition of perception would serve no purpose in clarifying MS 1.1.2, which can be seen as involving two parts: (a) the Vedic injunction indeed is what "characterizes," that is, is a means of knowing, Dharma, and (b) the Vedic injunction, and not any of the other usual means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), is the *sole* means of knowing Dharma. It certainly would not serve to establish that the *Vedic injunction* is a means of knowing Dharma. Nor would it serve to rule out perception and the other *pramāṇas*, thereby establishing that the Vedic injunction is the *only* means of knowing Dharma; for one need not go so far as to *define* perception in order to do that. Rather, one need only indicate that feature of perception which would disqualify it, namely, it is "the apprehension of that which is present." Insofar as

Dharma is an action that will have a beneficial result, it pertains not to the present but to the future.

> 2cd–3. And why is a definition of inference, and so forth, not stated here? It cannot be said that they are not *pramāṇas*, nor that they are included in perceptual cognition, nor that they have the same definition as perception.

Another objection to construing MS 1.1.4 as presenting a definition of perception is that, if the text is concerned with epistemology, then why are the other *pramāṇas*, inference, comparison, etc., not defined by other *sūtras*? It would be implausible to argue that perception is the *only* valid means of knowledge (though this was the position of at least one school of classical Indian philosophy, the Cārvāka or materialist school);[6] nor could one say that the definitions of the other *pramāṇas* are somehow given with the definition of perception insofar as they are either varieties of perception or have the same general definition.

However, one might want to argue that definitions of the other *pramāṇas* are not defined by other *sūtras* because they are already implied by MS 1.1.4. Given a definition of perception, the definition of the other *pramāṇas* as "that which is dependent on perception," one might suggest, will be immediately understood,[7] for all the other *pramāṇas* depend in some way on perception. Inference requires an invariable concomitance between terms, established by perception; comparison requires the perceptual apprehension of the two things being compared, and so on. To this Kumārila responds:

> 4. Nor would these other *pramāṇas* be established implicitly from the definition of perception; for it is not determined that everything that depends on perception is a *pramāṇa*.

In fact, a definition of the other *pramāṇas* as "that which is dependent on perception" would be too broad. Memory, for example, depends on perception and so would be a *pramāṇa* by this definition. However, it is almost universally recognized in Indian epistemology that memory is *not* a *pramāṇa*, a valid means of knowledge, since a *pramāṇa* must reveal something that has not been revealed before.[8] Hence, the definition of the various *pramāṇas* cannot be considered implied by a definition of perception in MS 1.1.4 in this way.

But perhaps perception in some way presupposes the other *pramāṇas*; perhaps *it* is dependent on *them*? Thus, indeed, one could not adequately define perception without defining the other *pramāṇas*, so that the other *pramāṇas* and their definitions would be implicitly presupposed by any mention of perception. It would

only be the task of the commentator, then, to spell out what those definitions are. Kumārila replies:

> 5. And it is not the case that the statement of a definition of perception is not achieved without a definition of inference, etc. Thus, it is not correct to say that there is an indirect indication.

It is not generally believed that perception is somehow dependent on the other *pramāṇas*; rather, it is usually thought that they are dependent on it. Perception, in fact, can be defined quite independently of the other *pramāṇas*. Thus, an implicit definition of the other *pramāṇas* in MS 1.1.4 cannot be achieved in this way, either.

Returning to the proposal that MS 1.1.4 implicitly defines the other *pramāṇas* besides perception as "that which is dependent on perception," Kumārila raises another consideration:

> 6–7. And the idea that they are dependent on perception or something else would not arise from its definition. Or indeed, why shouldn't it be the case that it would follow from the statement of a definition [of perception] that inference, etc., are *independent* of it? Nor from the definition of perception is there in any way an ascertainment of their specific definitions, or their nature or number.

A definition of the other *pramāṇas* as "that which is dependent on perception" could not be implied by the *sūtra*, because the definition it gives there of perception does not in any way give one to understand that the other *pramāṇas are* dependent on it! That is to say, it is not the case that the definition in question would only be possible if the other *pramāṇas* were dependent on perception; it could as easily be the case that inference, etc., are dependent on something else.[9] If, from the mere statement of a definition of perception one arbitrarily declared that the other *pramāṇas* are dependent on perception, one could just as well declare that they are not. Moreover, even if what the *sūtra* says about perception did clearly imply that the other *pramāṇas* are dependent on it, such a definition of those *pramāṇas* (as "that which is dependent on perception") would be woefully inadequate. One would only have a general definition of them. One would still lack specific definitions for them individually; nor would one know their precise number, etc. If the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* were really a treatise on epistemology these things would still have to be spelled out.

This is not to deny, however, that inference, etc., are dependent on perception! Kumārila in fact will later argue that they are (PP 87ff.). It is only being denied that MS 1.1.4 conveys that they are, so that explicit definitions of them in other *sūtras* could be dispensed with.

If one argued, on the other hand, that the specific definitions of the individual *pramāṇas* are commonly known so that it would be sufficient if the *sūtra* implied

just a general definition of them (as "that which is dependent on perception"),[10] that would be true of perception, too.

> 8–9ab. If those individual definitions are not to be stated because they are already well known, that would apply to perception, too. Therefore, the *sūtra* is either for the purpose of indicating a different enumeration of *pramāṇas* [than is commonly thought], or else it is stated by someone who is confused. But it could not in any way coherently be defining a single *pramāṇa* among these.

If one takes the author of the *sūtras*, Jaimini, really to be defining just one among the many *pramāṇas*, then one must in the end resort to absurd hypotheses. Perhaps, like the Cārvākas, he intends that there is only one *pramāṇa*, perception, and does not recognize any of the others. Or perhaps he is simply confused in defining perception without also providing definitions of the other *pramāṇas*.

Moreover, to see the first part of the *sūtra* as enunciating a separate definition of perception violates a basic exegetical principle of Mīmāmsā.

> 9cd. And if it is possible for it to be a single sentence, a division of the sentence is not warranted.

Mīmāṃsakas hold that in interpreting a text a statement should never be divided into two sentences so long as it can be construed as one.[11] However, that is precisely what the opponent is trying to do in proposing that the first part of MS 1.1.4 is a definition of perception.[12]

However, perhaps the most decisive reason against interpreting MS 1.1.4 as involving a definition of perception is that it does not present a correct definition of perception.

> 10–11. Nor is perception clearly defined by this *sūtra*; for it is the same for perceptual illusions other than dreaming. For a dream cognition arises without the functioning of a connection of the sense faculty with an object. But there can be perceptual error, and so forth, only when there is a connection with some object.

If "the arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object" were intended as a definition of perception, it would also apply to various types of perceptual error. Thus, the definition would be too broad. The false cognition of silver that is projected onto a piece of mother-of-pearl (or of a mirage seen in the desert) indeed arises when the faculty of vision is connected with the mother-of-pearl (or the rays of the sun). The only type of erroneous perception-like cognition to which this definition of perception would not also apply is a dream cognition; for the latter occurs without any interaction of sense faculty and object. However, another type of non-*pramāṇa* that would

be included in the definition as it stands is doubt, for example, a cognition such as "Is that a man or a post?" Doubtful cognitions also arise as a result of a sense faculty–object connection.

Moreover, such a definition of perception would apply even to inference and other means of knowledge that derive in part from the functioning of the sense faculties. As already mentioned, in inference, for example, the middle term must be perceived, and its invariable concomitance with the major term must have been previously observed. Thus, an inferential cognition, too, is one that arises when there is a connection of the sense faculties with their objects.

In his discussion thus far Kumārila has been assuming that the correct reading of MS 1.1.4 is:

> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing (*sat*) object – that (*tat*) is perception; it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.[13]

However, Śabara's Vṛttikāra, mentioned earlier, presents a different reading of MS 1.1.4:

> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with that (*tat*) [same object that appears in the cognition] is true (*sat*) perception; it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.[14]

The Vṛttikāra comes up with this significantly different statement simply by switching around the words *sat* and *tat* of the Sanskrit text. The first half of the *sūtra* now asserts, in effect, that perception is a cognition that represents the very object with which the sense faculty is connected. Kumārila will later affirm that this would indeed be a valid definition of perception. Thus one achieves a valid definition by specifying a certain qualification of the connection involved. It is not a connection of the sense faculty with just *any* object from which a (valid) perceptual cognition arises; rather, it must be a connection with that very object presented by the perceptual cognition. In this way perceptual error is excluded from the domain of perception; for error occurs when an idea arises of something other than that with which the sense faculty is connected, for example, when an idea of silver arises when the sense faculty is connected with mother-of-pearl. Without this reversing of the words *sat* and *tat*, however, the *sūtra* fails to specify the object with which the sense faculty is connected. It says merely that it is an "existing" object, and so does not exclude error.

> 12. A qualification of the connection, such as 'with the object to be apprehended' or 'with another object',[15] by virtue of which there would be a difference [from perceptual error], such as will be stated later, has not been made.

If one were to take MS 1.1.4 as a definition of perception *without* switching around *sat* and *tat*, as Bhavadāsa recommends, then it would not assert that perception occurs only when there is a connection of the sense faculty "with the object to be apprehended," that is, the object that appears in the cognition itself, and so it would not exclude perceptual error. Nor does the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* go on to indicate that error and inference, etc., arise only when there is a connection of the sense faculty with something *other* than the object that is presented in the cognition. In short, if one took MS 1.1.4 as it stands as a definition of perception, the text would not articulate in any way a distinction between true and false perception – at least, not without further elucidation. Later on, with PP 38–39, Kumārila will explain how the *sūtra* can indeed be seen as implying a qualification of the relationship between sense faculty, object, and cognition that serves to exclude perceptual error. For now, his point is merely that such a qualification is not achieved by Bhavadāsa's interpretation.

> 13. And another reading *tatsamprayoge*, etc., was declared by the Vṛttikāra, thinking the *sūtra* unsuitable as a definition.

Precisely because the Vṛttikāra saw that the *sūtra* would not work as a definition of perception as it stands he proposed a different reading of it.[16]

> 14. Therefore, it follows [if one accepts the *sūtra* as it stands] that even a cognition of one object that arises when there is a connection of the visual sense, etc., with another object is perception.

This sums up the main objection against Bhavadāsa's position. Since it defines perception simply as a cognition that arises when there is a connection between sense faculty and object, a cognition presenting one particular object that arises when the sense faculty is connected with another – that is, an erroneous perceptual cognition – would count as a perception.

However, one might insist that precisely for that reason it must be assumed that a specific type of connection – namely, one between the sense faculty and the very object that appears in the cognition – is intended. Otherwise, the *sūtra* indeed would not succeed in presenting a definition of perception and so would have no point. The following *śloka* presents this objection and Kumārila's response to it:

> 15. [Objection:] The indication merely of a connection with an existing object is purposeless. [Reply:] This is precisely what is to be said to the opponent, too, but precisely for that reason a definition will not be achieved.

Indeed, the *sūtra* would have no point if the connection between sense faculty and object were not understood to be further specified, *given that it is intended as a definition of perception*! Let one, then, not take it as a definition of perception!

The objection brought forward by the opponent can be turned against the opponent himself, leading to the conclusion that the *sūtra* does not in fact present a definition of perception.

> 16. Or else the result of the term 'connection' will be the elimination of dreams, etc., from the domain of perception. Therefore, a definition not having been correctly stated, the *sūtra* does not have the character of an initial assertion or reiteration of a definition.

And it is not true that the expression *satsamprayoga* 'connection with an existing [object]' would make no sense unless interpreted to mean 'connection with the object that appears in the cognition'; for the notion of connection in general could be used to exclude dreams and other invalid cognitions that do not arise at all as a result of a connection of the sense faculties with objects. We shall see in fact that Kumārila specifically takes the *sūtra* to be rejecting yogic perception as a means of knowing Dharma precisely because it does not arise from any interaction of a sense faculty with an object. Having established that the *sūtra* does not contain a definition of perception, it could be neither the original statement (*vidhi*) of such a definition nor an allusion to a definition previously accepted (*anuvāda*).[17]

1.2 The correct interpretation of the *sūtra* as a rejection of yogic perception; the construal of the word 'existing' (*sat*)

Having refuted the idea that the *sūtra* intends to present a valid definition of perception, Kumārila now proceeds to give his own view of the matter.

> 17–18. Therefore this is not the assertion of the *sūtra*: "A cognition that arises when there is a coming together of the sense faculty with its object is to be known as perception." Rather, the *sūtra* asserts: "Since perception, which is well known to ordinary people, has such a property, it is the apprehension of that which is present. Therefore it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma."

Here Kumārila maintains that perception doesn't really need a definition. Everyone already knows what it is, namely, the sort of cognition that arises when a sense faculty comes into contact with an object. The *sūtra* intends therefore merely to point out that because perception has this feature, it cannot be a means of knowing Dharma; for Dharma – a sacrifice, for example, which will bring about some beneficial result later on – pertains to what will happen in the future, and a sense faculty cannot be connected with something that exists in the future.[18,19]

At this juncture, however, one might point to the following statement of Śabara in his commentary on MS 1.1.4. "That perception is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma is to be reflected upon. Why is it not a basis of Dharma? Because it has such a character (*evaṃlakṣaṇakaṃ hi tat*), namely, 'Perception is the

arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object. . . .' "[20] Doesn't the expression 'has such a character' (*evaṃlakṣaṇakaṃ*) suggest that what follows gives a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of perception? For in Sanskrit *lakṣaṇa* 'character' or 'characteristic' also means 'definition'. Thus the expression 'has such a character' could be construed as 'has such a definition'. Kumārila replies:

> 19–20. And the commentator (i.e., Śabara) does not say that perception is 'of such a character' with the intention of stating its essence, but rather insofar as he considers it to have this as its distinctive feature. Since there exists in perception this property of being an apprehension of that which is present, it is to be understood, by virtue of this well-known property, that it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma.

When Śabara says that perception "has this character" he simply means that it has a particular feature that excludes it from being a means of knowing Dharma – namely, it arises as the result of a connection between a sense faculty and an existing object, so that it apprehends only what presently exists. He does not intend to say that this is a complete and accurate definition of perception.[21]

But surely everyone knows that we do not ascertain Dharma by means of perception! I cannot *see* that a certain action will bring about a beneficial result in the future. Wouldn't an effort to exclude perception as a means of knowing Dharma be superfluous? Kumārila responds:

> 21. Having the nature of perception is the reason; the rest of the *sūtra* is for establishing the reason. Because this is well known in regard to our perception, etc., it is stated in regard to the yogin.

There were certain traditions – most notably, Buddhism and Jainism – that claimed that their founders apprehended Dharma directly through a kind of supernormal perception cultivated through the practice of yoga. It is expressly in order to rule out such alleged cognition as a means of knowing Dharma that MS 1.1.4 gives a characterization of perception. It does not intend merely to exclude ordinary perception.

Thus, the *sūtra*, according to Kumārila's analysis, implicitly contains the following argument: "*Yogic perception* is not a means of knowing Dharma, because it is perception, like our perception." This argument has the standard form of a syllogism of Indian logic, with a thesis, a reason, and an example. By stating that perception is not a basis of knowing Dharma, then, the *sūtra* in effect rejects yogic perception as a means of knowing Dharma, simply because it is alleged to be a form of perception. The rest of the *sūtra* establishes why no variety of perception can be a means of knowing Dharma by mentioning the salient characteristic of perception of arising from a connection of a sense faculty with an existing object.[22]

At this point in the discussion Kumārila's commentator Pārthasārathimiśra clarifies that the expression *satsamprayoga*, which at first glance might be taken to mean 'a connection with an existing object', should in fact be taken to mean 'an existing connection'; the Sanskrit admits of both alternatives. (According to the first alternative the expression is a *tatpuruṣa* compound, according to the second, a *karmadhāraya*.) In the sequel it will emerge that this is indeed how Kumārila interprets the expression, for when it is interpreted in this way yogic perception is more effectively excluded.

> 22–24ab. And there is a connection with the matter under discussion because it shows that the rest of the means of knowledge are not *pramāṇas* of Dharma. And it is established that they are not *pramāṇas* from the fact that there is no observing of a relation, etc. Since it can be understood from this *sūtra* that the other *pramāṇas* are not means of knowledge of Dharma, it is not mentioned by other *sūtras*. And the *sūtra* cannot be targeted for criticism because of the absence of any purpose of a definition. Nor is there the unwanted consequence, which applies to a definition, that it is too narrow or too broad.

The question under consideration at the beginning of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is, What is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of Dharma? Is the Vedic injunction the only means, or are there others? Therefore, when *sūtra* 1.1.4 is construed as a rejection of perception as a means of knowing Dharma, and specifically as a rejection of yogic perception, which certain philosophers maintained could apprehend things in the past and the future – that is, when *sūtra* 1.1.4 is *not* interpreted as a *definition* of perception – then it fits better in its context. Moreover, while a definition of perception would not provide for a *definition* of the other *pramāṇas*, the exclusion of perception as a means of knowing Dharma *would* provide for the exclusion of the other *pramāṇas* (besides scripture) *as means of knowing Dharma*, insofar as they are dependent on perception. Inference, in particular, which does have a certain capacity to apprehend that which is not immediately present to the senses, is excluded, since any relation of *probans* to *probandum*, which is essential to inference, must be ascertained by perception. Therefore, the explicit exclusion of the other *pramāṇas* except *śabda*, scripture, as ways of knowing Dharma need not be stated in other *sūtras*.

Finally, the above suggested construal of the *sūtra* does not have any of the other defects that pertain to the interpretation of the *sūtra* as a definition, such as whether it is of any use in the discussion, or whether it is too narrow or too broad.

Here, however, one might object that although the *sūtra* may not intend to provide a definition of perception, and therefore should not be assessed on the basis of whether it provides a proper definition, nevertheless it does offer a certain characterization of perception, and that characterization appears to be incorrect. For it says that perception is a cognition that arises as a result of a connection of a sense faculty with an object, which, as we have seen, is true of perceptual error as well

as perception. Shouldn't this be considered a defect of the *sūtra*? To this objection Kumārila responds:

> 24cd–25. This property of perception is accepted by us because it is in every way known to ordinary people. Due to this, there is not the unwanted consequence that a mirage, etc., is perception. On the other hand, that a mirage is *not* a basis of knowledge of Dharma is not excluded, either.

The property of arising from a connection of sense faculty and object is mentioned in the *sūtra* merely to bring out a well-known feature that disqualifies it as a basis of Dharma. There is no claim being made to the effect that this is the essence of perception. Precisely for this reason, that is, that the mentioned characteristic is not taken as constituting a definition, the *sūtra* avoids the implication that perceptual error, which also has this characteristic, is a kind of perception. At the same time, insofar as perceptual error also has this characteristic, "the consequence that a mirage is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma is not excluded, either"; that is, the *sūtra* does succeed in excluding erroneous perceptual cognitions as means of knowledge of Dharma as well. Certainly a statement that disallowed perception as a means of knowing Dharma but allowed perceptual error would be defective!

However, if the fact that perception depends on sense faculty–object contact is well known to everyone, why bother to mention it? Why go out on a limb and say anything about the nature of perception at all? At the most, all one need say is that perception has an object that is present. Why does the *sūtra* not simply point that out, thereby excluding both ordinary and yogic perception as bases of Dharma, along with all the other *pramāṇas*, inference, and so forth? Kumārila responds:

> 26–28ab. The perception of a past or future object, or of one that is very small or obstructed, is believed by some to belong to yogins and those who are liberated. For them, the claim that perception is the apprehension only of that which is present is not proven, or else the reason of Dharma being an object that occurs in the future is inconclusive, because of the objects that are allegedly apprehended by yogins and enlightened beings. So that neither of these two defects comes about, he states what is commonly known, namely, that [the connection of the sense faculties with their objects must be] "existing."

In fact, certain philosophers consider it possible for yogins and liberated or enlightened beings to have valid cognitions of past and future objects.[23] Unless it is specifically stated that perception arises from an *existing* connection of sense faculty and object – which in turn implies that its object resides in the present – the fact that a certain cognition is a perception would not disqualify it from being possibly a cognition of Dharma. Again, the specific reason given for why Dharma

cannot be perceptually apprehended – namely, that it exists in the future – would be inconclusive for those who believe in the supernormal powers of spiritually advanced persons. Thus the *sūtra* must make the attempt to characterize perception in a way that will thwart such views. It must say that it apprehends that which is present, insofar it arises from an *existing* connection of sense faculty and object.

> 28cd–29. For there is no perception of yogins over and above common perception. Since it, too, is perception, it must be the apprehension of something that is present or else it must arise from an existing connection, like our perception.

Once again, if yogic "perception" is truly *perception*, then like ordinary perception it cannot apprehend Dharma. For it could only apprehend that which is present, not something in the past or the future. Or else – what amounts to the same thing – it could only be a cognition that arises from an *existing* connection of sense faculty and object.[24]

Kumārila continues to refute the possibility of a supernormal, yogic perception:

> 30–31. The cognition that arises for yogins and liberated persons of an object that is not present is for that reason not perception, like desire, memory, and so forth. And it is not perception because its being perception or a valid means of knowledge is not commonly established, like intuition. The absence of these two characteristics is pointed out by the term 'existing'.

Whatever cognitions yogins may have of things in the past or the future, they should not be considered perceptions. If they were, then two defects would result. First, perception would not be distinguishable from other cognitions like desire and memory, which have for their objects things that are not present. Second, perception would not arise from a sense faculty–object interaction currently taking place and therefore have something present as its object, which would violate one of the most widely accepted beliefs about perception. The avoidance of these two unwanted features for perception is what is accomplished by appending the word 'existing' (*sat*) to 'connection' (*samprayoga*) in the *sūtra*.[25]

Why not, however, accept that yogic perception indeed arises without any connection of sense faculty and object, as is held to be the case for common intuitions, such as the spontaneously arising notion "My brother will come visit me tomorrow"?

> 32. Just as an ordinary intuition does not suffice for certainty without support from perception, etc., so would the cognitions of yogins as well.

Were one to compare yogic perception to intuition, for example, the spontaneous thought "My brother will come visit me tomorrow," then it would certainly not be a valid means of knowledge of anything. Such thoughts do not amount to an independent means of knowledge; they must always be confirmed by other means of knowledge for us to trust them.[26]

> 33. Were a perceptual cognition to arise with respect to a certain object from a conjunction that does not currently exist, then it would be capable of apprehending Dharma even though it exists in the future. Therefore he says it is "existing."

Certain philosophers believed that yogic cognitions arise without an existing connection of the sense faculty with an object. That is to say, they arise at a time when the connection does not occur; that is, the connection has occurred previously or will occur in the future – Kumārila will return to this point presently[27] – or they arise without any connection at all. In either case, the object of yogic perception would not have to be something that is present; thus Dharma could possibly be an object of perception. It is in order to reject these theories that the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* specifies that the connection of sense faculty and object must be "existing" – there must indeed be a connection and it must exist at the same time the cognition arises.

But what is Dharma, after all? Some righteous action, like a sacrifice. And surely we can *see* a sacrifice being performed. So how can one deny that Dharma is knowable by perception? To this objection Kumārila responds:

> 34. Dharma is perceptible neither prior to its execution nor after it has been carried out, since it does not exist at that time as a means of bringing about its result.

One can see a sacrifice being performed, but one cannot see it *as Dharma*. For that requires seeing that it causes some benefit or happiness, and one cannot perceive that at the time it is performed. Nor can one see it after the performance, when the result appears. For then the sacrifice is no longer evident, so that its relation with the result cannot be ascertained.[28]

> 35. Moreover, since it is an apprehending of that which is present, like our own perception, the perception of meditators is not believed to pertain to Dharma, because it is perception.

This is yet another way of formulating the essential idea of the *sūtra*. Compare *śloka* 18.

Having considered in general the purpose of the word *sat* 'existing' as excluding the possibility of yogic perception, Kumārila now appears to address a criticism of MS 1.1.4 that is made by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccya*.[29] It is at this point

in the text that an extended engagement with Diṅnāga begins. In the sixth section of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) Diṅnāga critiques MS 1.1.4, which he understands as being a definition of perception. At PS 1.6.1 he suggests that the term 'existing' needn't be added to 'connection' because certainly any connection must be with something that exists.[30] It is apparently to this objection that Kumārila now responds:

> 36. How would the rejection of the cognition of yogins as perception, due to its arising from a connection that does not currently exist, be obtained were 'existing' not mentioned?

In criticizing the employment of the word 'existing' in MS 1.1.4 Diṅnāga has assumed that the expression *satsamprayoga* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound, meaning 'a connection with an existing thing', hence that 'existing' refers to the object with which the sense faculties are connected.[31] However, in fact, according to Kumārila (who follows Śabara in this matter), *satsamprayoga* is a *karmadhāraya* compound, meaning 'an existing connection', so that 'existing' is a modifier of the word 'connection' (see earlier, commentary on v. 21). Taken in the latter way, the purpose of mentioning 'existing' is to emphasize that indeed there must be some connection between sense faculty and object at the time a perceptual cognition arises, so that only what exists in the present can be perceived. Thus, once again, 'existing' serves specifically to exclude the perception of yogins as valid perception.

But why can't yogic perception be excluded simply by mentioning that there must be a connection between the sense faculty and its object? Why does the word 'existing' have to be added? For Sanskrit allows for the indication of a causal condition by employing a word in the seventh, locative, case by itself. Thus, conceivably, the *sūtra* could read, "A cognition that arises *when there is a connection* of the sense faculties of a person is perception . . .,"[32] and yogic perception would still be excluded. According to the conventions for composing *sūtras*, a *sūtra* should be as brief as possible. It should not contain any unnecessary syllables. A *sūtra* with a superfluous word is defective indeed.

Kumārila answers:

> 37. The sense of 'existing' would be obtained just by the seventh case as well. But an attempt is made by Jaimini to exclude the postulate of others.

Kumārila admits that the idea that there must be some connection between sense faculty and object could be conveyed just by the word 'connection' (in the seventh case). However, the word 'existing' has been added by Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, to give special emphasis to the fact that the connection between sense faculty and object must occur at the same time the cognition arises. This is in order to exclude "the postulate of others." According to the commentators

Pārthasārathi and Sucaritamiśra, there were certain philosophers who held that yogic perception can occur by virtue of connections between sense faculty and object in the past or the future: there has already been a connection between sense faculty and object, or there will be one in the future. Thus, objects in the past or the future can be perceived.[33] Thus, to specify that the object of perception must exist in the present, Jaimini stresses that the connection must occur when the cognition arises.[34]

The qualification of the connection as existing, incidentally, will also serve to distinguish perception from inference. For even inference, strictly speaking, arises "when there is a connection of a sense faculty with an object." The inferential cognition that it will rain, for example, results from seeing that clouds are building up in the sky, that is, from a "connection" of the faculty of vision with the clouds. However, it does not arise simultaneously with that connection, but rather only slightly later. Thus, if one did not specify that for perception the connection between sense faculty and object must be "existing," that is, must occur at the same time the cognition arises, then inference would qualify as a type of perception! This qualification, finally, will also serve to include within the category of perception conceptualized cognitions that arise concurrently with a connection of sense faculty and object – this will become relevant later.[35]

1.3 Discussion of the term 'connection'; the problem of perception at a distance

Kumārila continues to defend the individual terms employed in MS 1.1.4, now moving on to the word 'connection' (*samprayoga*). Diṅnāga argues in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that MS 1.1.4 does not work as a definition of perception because, for one thing, there cannot be a connection between sense faculty and object in cases of vision and hearing, where one perceives objects from a distance and objects larger than the sense faculty (PS 1.6.4cd–5ab). Here, obviously, Diṅnāga understands 'connection' to mean, specifically, *contact*. He also is assuming that the sense faculties are confined to the body, and that they have approximately the same dimensions as the visible, external organs located in the body that serve as their "seats" – the eyeball, the nose, etc. The Buddhists believed the various faculties to consist of a subtler kind of matter located within or upon these structures.[36]

Diṅnāga develops a similar criticism of the Nyāya definition of perception (PS 1.3.1cd). The objection is apparently an ancient one, as it is already discussed in the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS 3.1.32–51).[37] Kumārila will presently explain how there can in fact be a connection between the faculty of vision and its object. But first, we must understand what *samprayoga* really means. Does it really mean 'connection'? The word can be divided into two parts: *sam* and *prayoga*. *Prayoga* has various meanings, one of which indeed is 'connection'. However, why is the prefix *sam*, which has various senses – most commonly, 'joint', 'total', 'complete' – added? What additional idea is being conveyed by the prefix *sam*?

> 38. The word *sam*, in the sense of 'correct', excludes improper employment. And the employment of the senses is said to be their functioning in regard to their objects.

The word *samprayoga* actually does not mean the connection of the sense faculties with their objects but rather their correct employment or proper functioning. Thus, Kumārila construes *sam* as meaning *saṃyak*, 'correct' or 'proper', and *prayoga* as 'use' or 'employment'.[38] This contrasts with the interpretation apparently recommended by Bhavadāsa, namely, that *samprayoga* should be taken to mean 'the entire or complete connection', that is, *all* the connections necessary to give rise to a perceptual cognition: between sense faculty and object, mind and sense faculty, and self and mind.[39]

> 39. Connection with mother-of-pearl is excluded, because it is a functioning that is defective, since silver is seen. And that being the case, even the reiteration of a definition would be possible.

With the addition of the prefix *sam* to *prayoga* erroneous perceptual cognitions are effectively excluded from the category of perception by *sūtra* 1.1.4. For in the case of an error such as mistaking mother-of-pearl for silver, the functioning of the sense faculty is defective; specifically, it gives rise to a cognition of silver although it is caused by mother-of-pearl. By interpreting *samprayoga* as 'correct or proper functioning' in this way, the first half of 1.1.4 can be seen as expressing a correct definition of perception after all – even without altering the word order. Although it would not be the original statement of such a definition, it could be taken as an allusion to a definition already established, that is, commonly known. Such a definition seems to build on the Vṛttikāra's suggestion (see above, vv. 12–13) that perception is the arising of a cognition that has as its content that very object with which the sense faculty is connected – except now there is no mention of how, or even whether, sense faculty and object are connected. The idea, rather, is simply that perception is the arising of a cognition that *accurately represents* its object. Bhavadāsa, on the other hand, who takes *samprayoga* to be, not the functioning of the senses in regard to their objects, but a kind of connection, fails to interpret the first part of *sūtra* 4 in a way that would exclude false perception, as we saw earlier.

Although Kumārila suggests here that MS 1.1.4 can be seen to contain a definition of perception if one wants, nevertheless the purpose of the *sūtra* is not to present a definition of perception; that would not fit the context of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, which is primarily concerned with Dharma. A definition of perception may be implied by the characterization of perception offered by the *sūtra*, but the definition of perception as such is not what it intends.

As mentioned earlier (v. 38), Diṅnāga, taking the word *samprayoga* in MS 1.1.4 to mean direct contact, argues that the *sūtra* cannot serve as a valid definition of perception, because there are certain types of perception in which the sense faculty

apparently does not come directly in contact with its object, namely, vision and hearing. If the faculties of vision and hearing did come directly in contact with their objects, then, like the other senses that function through contact, they would neither apprehend objects at a distance nor objects larger than themselves. The first point, that they would not apprehend objects at a distance or removed from themselves, is obvious; the second, that they would not apprehend larger objects, can be seen by analogy to the other senses. The faculty of touch, which is comprised of atoms of subtle matter covering the body and which does come directly into contact with its object, never apprehends anything larger than the surface area that is directly affected. When I touch a table with my finger, I feel only the spot that the tip of my finger touches, not the whole table. Thus it is difficult to understand how the visual sense, which according to the Buddhist consists of atoms of subtle matter confined to the pupil of the eye, if it functioned in the same way, could perceive the vast expanse of the ocean, or how the auditory sense, consisting of atoms lining the interior of the ear, could apprehend the noise made by a huge thunder-cloud.

To this Kumārila responds:

> 40–42ab. And therefore, when it is said by the Buddhists, in order to show that the definition is too narrow, that because the senses of hearing and seeing do not operate by coming in contact with their objects there is no connection [in their case] – for on the view that there is direct contact, there would allegedly be no apprehension of something at a distance, nor would an object that is larger than the seat of the sense faculty be apprehended, as in the case of touch, etc. – that is not illogical for us, because the word *saṃyoga* expresses merely a function.

The problems that Diṅnāga raises about perception at a distance and perception of objects larger than the sense faculty apply to MS 1.1.4 only if one takes the word *samprayoga* there to mean ‘contact’. If one takes it to mean ‘correct functioning’, on the other hand, as Kumārila suggests, then they do not apply.[40]

> 42cd. Or [that is not illogical] if *samprayoga* ‘connection’ is explained here as being positioned in line with the object.

Kumārila suggests another way in which *samprayoga* can be construed so as to avoid the problems raised by Diṅnāga. One may take it to mean just being directed toward the object, not directly in contact with it. Thus, the faculty of vision and that of hearing would not be excluded as organs of perception. In what way the faculty of hearing can be directed toward its object is unclear, but perhaps what is meant is turning one’s head in the direction of the sound and the absence of any obstruction between oneself and the source of sound.[41]

> 43ab. Or a connection characterized by a capacity, which is indicated by its effect, is to be stated.

One may even take *samprayoga* 'proper functioning' to mean the capacity of a sense faculty to apprehend its appropriate object, even at a distance, without any connection. Such capacities (*śakti*, *yogyatā*) in Mīmāṃsā are believed to be inferable from their effects. Just as the inherent capacity of a word to express meaning is inferred from the fact that we think of a certain thing when we hear the word, so the inherent capacity of a sense faculty to apprehend a certain type of object, given certain conditions, is to be inferred just from the fact that, given those conditions, a certain kind of cognition arises. If one construes *samprayoga* in this way, vision and hearing, again, are not excluded as types of perception by *sūtra* 4.

Although Kumārila seems to favor the first interpretation of MS 1.1.4 that he offers with verse 38, he is showing that there are several ways in which the criticisms of Diṅnāga of the word *samprayoga* can be turned aside. His purpose, indeed, seems to have shifted at this point from explicating the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* to refuting Diṅnāga.

> 43cd. Or else, let the view that there is contact be wrong only after one has refuted the Sāṃkhya, etc.

There are certain theories of vision and hearing, in particular, those that were developed by Sāṃkhya philosophers, which will be discussed later, according to which there actually is a direct contact of the faculties of vision and hearing with their objects. Diṅnāga cannot say that there is no contact of sense faculty and object in those cases until he has refuted all such theories.

> 44. And the faculty of vision and the faculty of hearing come directly in contact with their objects, because they are sense faculties, like the sense of touch, etc. And some state that they have a function that moves beyond the body.

More generally, one might maintain that we know that the faculties of vision and hearing must somehow come directly in contact with their objects, simply because they are sense faculties. For the faculties of touch, taste, and smell perceive their objects by coming directly in contact with them. (It was generally believed in ancient India, as today, that smell operates by direct contact insofar as particles of objects possessing smell reach the nose.)[42] Sāṃkhya theorists, moreover, specifically maintained that the faculties of vision and hearing are not confined to the body but extend beyond it by means of a "function" (*vṛtti*) that contacts their objects and assumes their forms. Their possessing such a function is due to the fact that, according to the Sāṃkhya scheme of cosmic evolution, they arise directly from the *ahaṃkāra* or ego and so are not comprised of the gross physical elements.[43]

Similarly, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers believed that the sense of vision can reach outward from the eye as a "ray" or sheaf of rays (*raśmi*), consisting of light, to contact distant objects, whereas, in the case of hearing, a succession of sounds emanating from objects being conjoined and disjoined reaches the ear.[44] Thus, once again, Diṅnāga must refute these kinds of theories before he can conclude that there is no sense faculty–object contact in the cases of vision and hearing.[45]

At PSV 1.3.2a Diṅnāga does, however, attempt to raise a specific objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that the senses of vision and hearing somehow extend beyond the body to contact their objects.[46] It would seem, he argues, that the sense faculties are confined to the body, for whenever one of them is impaired, it is only its corporeal seat – the eyeball, the ear, etc. – that is treated, and nothing extending beyond the body.[47]

Kumārila responds:

> 45–47ab. The application of medicine, etc., which is applied to the seat of the sense faculty, insofar as it treats precisely the seat, aids that which is based upon it [i.e., the sense faculty itself]. The treatment of that spot, moreover, is said to have the purpose of extending to the entire sense faculty. And it is observed that there is a benefitting of the sense of vision, etc., when medicine is applied to the foot, etc. Therefore, the location of the sense faculty there cannot be inferred conclusively from the treatment.

The sense faculty is not to be identified with, nor is it confined to, the corporeal structure that serves as its "basis" or "seat." To be sure, if the sense faculty is defective, one treats only the site of the sense faculty in the body, but that is because, by treating its seat, one treats the entire sense faculty – even the portion that extends beyond the body. Medicine is not always applied directly to the spot that is diseased. In Ayurvedic medicine one may treat a diseased eye by applying ointment to the soles of the feet.

> 47cd–48. And the external function of the faculties of vision and hearing is considered to be broad at the end and continuous. Therefore, something larger than the seat is perceived if there is a corresponding breadth in the function portion. The apprehension of objects in the distance, also, would be similar.

Because one is able to perceive objects larger than the seats of the faculties of vision or hearing (in the case of the latter that presumably means the sounds of large objects, such as thunder-clouds), one can infer that the function that extends outward from them is broader at the tip.[48] And because one perceives both near and distant objects, one may infer that the function extends out continuously from its corporeal seat. Similarly for the perception of objects at a distance – one is able to infer that the function extends outward for a certain distance. However,

the faculties of vision and hearing are capable of perceiving objects only as large as the width of their function, and only as far away as the function extends. They cannot perceive things of infinite size or at infinite distances.

However, it can be asked, if the sense faculty is really something extending beyond the corporeal sense organ, why can't it still perceive things even when the sense organ is damaged or obscured? Suppose, as you are looking at an object in the distance, your eye is somehow injured. Presumably, a function or vision-ray had already gone out from the eye to contact the object. If only the corporeal seat of the sense faculty is destroyed, why do you not continue to perceive the object, for the function or vision-ray, which presumably has not been injured, has come into contact with it? Similarly, why can't we continue to see objects even when our eyes are closed? This objection appears to be raised by Diṅnāga at PSV 1.3.2b. The answer is provided by an analogy:

> 49–50. As the light of a lamp is extinguished when the lamp is destroyed, so the function that has gone outward is extinguished as a result of the destruction of its basis. But even if the seat is only covered over, the object is not experienced by the self, since it has not been presented to it by that function whose effort has been interrupted.

Just as light emanating from a lamp ceases when the lamp is smashed, so does the function or vision-ray emanating out from the corporeal sense organ cease when the latter is destroyed. And even if the source of the function is not destroyed but merely covered over, as when the eyelids are closed, the function or vision-ray that extends out beyond the sense organ is cut off because the effort required to project it toward the object has been interrupted.

But why does the object look far away, if in fact the sense faculty is directly in contact with it?

Kumārila responds:

> 51ab. And the notion that the object is separated from the sense faculty would pertain to the seat.

Kumārila suggests that the impression that the object is removed from the sense faculty that perceives it has to do with the separation of the object from the *corporeal sense organ*, that is, the seat or basis of the sense faculty in the body.[49] The latter is to be distinguished from the sense faculty itself, which can extend out to the object and directly contact it.

Is the impression that sound is distant from the perceiver to be explained in the same way?

> 51cd. But in the case of sound, being larger than the sense faculty or disconnected from it are asserted erroneously, for that is not possible.

Here Kumārila reverts to the Mīmāṃsā theory of sound, having to this point argued against Diṅnāga from the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika perspectives. In the *Śabdanityatā* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* (88cd–121ab) Kumārila in fact will reject the Sāṃkhya theory of sound perception, as well as Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, and Buddhist theories. It is not the case that a *vṛtti* goes forth from the ear to contact the resonating object (the Sāṃkhya theory); nor is a succession of sounds transmitted through space from the object to the sense of hearing, which is the portion of space located inside the ear (the Vaiśeṣika theory). Rather, the resonating object (in the case of language, the vocal organs) sets up a disturbance in the air, referred to as *dhvani*, which upon reaching the sense of hearing (the portion of space within the ear canal) causes a modification in it that enables it to perceive the sound. Sound itself is eternal, partless, and omnipresent. It is not located at any particular point in space. Therefore, the impression of its coming from a certain distance and direction or being greater or less in magnitude can only be an illusion, the superimposing upon it of the properties of the *dhvani* that manifests it.

1.4 Discussion of the expression 'of a person'

Kumārila now returns to the consideration of the wording of MS 1.1.4. How is the expression *puruṣasya* 'of a person' to be understood? There are two questions here. First, what exactly does the word *puruṣa* mean, for it can be taken in an ordinary or a technical sense? According to the former, it just means 'person'. According to the latter, it refers to a metaphysical entity, the self or soul, which of course is conceived quite differently in different philosophical systems, and altogether denied by the Buddhists. Second, should the expression 'of a person' be taken together with *indriyāṇām* 'of the sense faculties' or should it be taken separately? There are three possibilities for construing it together with *indriyāṇām*, which yield three distinct readings of the *sūtra*. The first presupposes taking it in the ordinary sense; the other two presuppose taking it in the technical sense (for they are technical, philosophical statements). These three readings are as follows: (a) "The arising of a cognition when there is an existing connection *of the sense faculties of a person* [with an object] is perception," (b) "The arising of a cognition when there is an existing connection *of the self and the sense faculties* [with an object] is perception," or (c) "The arising of a cognition *of the self and the sense faculties* when there is an existing connection [with an object] is perception." All three are unsatisfactory in different ways. The first, which simply indicates that a "person" is the possessor of the sense faculties, makes *puruṣasya* pleonastic – surely it is unnecessary to point out that the senses in connection with the object belong to some person. The second is called into question by the Mīmāṃsā teaching that the self is eternal and omnipresent, hence always in contact with everything; thus, there could not be a specific time when it would come into relation with a particular sense object. The third is attended by the difficulty that the sense faculties, being material and therefore insentient, cannot have cognitions.

Kumārila addresses the second matter – whether to join *indriyāṇām* and *puruṣasya* together – first. Bhavadāsa may have favored taking *indriyāṇām* and *puruṣasya* together, according to the second of the above alternatives.[50] Kumārila, however, rejects construing the two words together:

> 52ab. And the words 'person' and 'sense faculties' are construed separately.

The two expressions 'of a person' and 'of the sense faculties' should not be construed together, but separately. In that case, the *sūtra* should be read as follows: "The arising of a cognition *belonging to a person/self* when there is an existing connection *of the sense faculties* [with an object] is perception. . . ."[51] In other words, it is the sense faculties that are specified as having a connection with the object, while a person or self is the possessor of the cognition. That is to say, a person or self is the *knower*. This reading implicitly rejects the position that the senses by themselves have the capacity to know things.

But does the *sūtra* intend to imply a philosophical view about the nature of the self, or should the word *puruṣa* just be taken in the ordinary sense?

> 52cd. It would be either the person as understood in ordinary discourse or else the one who will be demonstrated later in this treatise.

In fact, the word *puruṣa* can be taken either way. It can be taken in the ordinary sense, so that the *sūtra* can simply mean, "The arising of a cognition *for someone* when there is an existing connection of the sense faculties [with their objects] is perception . . . ," or it can be taken in the technical sense as suggested above, however one wishes. It is not the intention of the *sūtra* to go into the nature of the self, any more than to discuss the nature of perception. Thus, any problems that might be raised about the *sūtra* based on philosophical objections to the idea of a self, such as those pointed out by Diṅnāga at PS 1.6.11ab (if a cognition arises within the self then the self is subject to modification, hence not eternal, etc.) will be beside the point.

On the other hand, if one prefers to take the term *puruṣa* as having a precise philosophical meaning, then that will be discussed later at length in the *Śābarabhāṣya* and in the *Ātmavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*. In that case, however, one *will* have to provide an answer to the dilemma posed by Diṅnāga for anyone who would postulate a real self, that is, a permanent agent and subject of experience as opposed to a mere collection of constantly changing physical and psychic entities that we erroneously deem to be such. The dilemma is this: if the self were truly unchanging, then it could not undergo any modification, and therefore it could not be a knower, a subject of varying conscious states. If, on the other hand, the self were a knower, then it would not really be permanent (PS 1.6.11).[52] To this

Kumārila responds:

> 53ab. A transformation in the form of a cognition will not contradict its eternality.

According to the theory of the self that Kumārila will present in the *Ātmavāda-adhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika*, the self remains the same in its essential nature while it undergoes changes of state. Thus, it is both eternal and subject to transformation.[53] The permanence of the self is no more contradicted by the arising of modifications in it, in the form of cognitive states, than the continuing identity of a piece of gold is contradicted by the fact that it is moulded into different ornaments.[54]

1.5 Discussion of the expression 'the arising of a cognition'

At PS 1.6.9–10 Diṅnāga, criticizing MS 1.1.4 as a definition of perception, raises questions about the term *buddhijanman* 'the arising (or birth or origin) of a cognition'. The *sūtra* at first sight refers to perception as the *arising* (*janman*) of a cognition (*buddhi*) upon the union of the sense faculties with their objects. If that is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that is perception, then what is the result of the functioning of that means? For Mīmāṃsā insists that the means and the result of an action are always distinct. An axe, for example, is employed as a means for chopping down a tree; the axe is different from the felling of the tree it effects. In the case of an act of cognition, it would be natural to consider the arising of a certain kind of cognition the result. But then to say that it is also the *means* – that is, it is the *pramāṇa* known as perception – is to imply that result and means are not really distinct.[55]

Suppose, however, the Mīmāṃsaka conceives of the *arising* of the cognition as being somehow distinct from the cognition itself. In that case, the arising could be the means of knowledge and the cognition the result, and means and result would be distinct, as Mīmāṃsā requires. However, in what might the arising of the cognition consist and how could it be distinct from the cognition itself? Perhaps it is conceived as the inherence (*samavāya*) of the cognition in the self. The cognition, that is, is the result of the act of knowing while its coming to inhere in the self is the means of knowledge, the latter being referred to as "the arising of the cognition."[56] The problem with this theory, however, as Diṅnāga points out, is that inherence is, according to Vaiśeṣika, something eternal and so unable to be caused by a connection of the sense faculties with their objects.[57]

Finally, Diṅnāga alleges, if the arising (*janman*) and the cognition (*buddhi*) were considered as somehow the same, as Śabara suggests (see below), then the expression *buddhijanman* would be redundant.

To these doubts Kumārila responds:

> 53cd. And with 'the arising of a cognition' Jaimini states that a cognition is a means of knowledge as it is arising.

The word *buddhijanman* actually should not be construed in the way that first suggests itself, as a (*tatpuruṣa*) compound meaning 'the arising of a cognition', but rather as a (*karmadhāraya*) compound meaning 'an arising that is a cognition', the full sense of which would be 'a cognition as it is arising'. I shall refer to this construal of *buddhijanman* in the sequel as interpretation (a). In effect, then, the *sūtra* states that the means of knowledge that is perception is the cognition that results from a sense faculty–object connection *as it arises*. In other words, the cognition that results from sense faculty–object connection is a means of knowledge as soon as it arises. Thus, in effect, *buddhi* 'cognition' and *janman* 'arising' do refer to the same thing. However, since *buddhi* can be seen as *qualifying janman*,[58] the expression is not redundant, as Diṅnāga alleges.

But why would the author of the *sūtras* want to imply that a cognition is a means of knowledge as soon as it arises?

> 54–55. For the operation of factors of action is observed to be distinct from their arising. The word 'arising' is intended to mean that this is not also the case for the means of knowledge. For it does not last even for an instant; nor does it arise without the character of a knowing, so that it would function later to apprehend the object, like a sense faculty, etc.

In Indian epistemological texts, as previously explained, a means of knowledge, *pramāṇa*, is technically considered a kind of *kāraka*, a factor in an action. Now factors of action normally exercize their functions *after* they have arisen. The stick, for example, which the potter uses to shape a pot must already exist before he can employ it. Factors of action typically do not execute their functions the same time they come into existence. This, however, is not the case for a *pramāṇa*, a means of knowledge, insofar as a *pramāṇa* is a cognition; for, as was believed by most Indian philosophers, cognition (*buddhi*) lasts for only an instant.[59] It does not have time to arise and then execute its function, but rather must carry out its function simultaneously with its arising. Thus, as soon as a cognition that is a *pramāṇa* arises it has the character of a knowing. In this sense the *pramāṇa* perception, which, once again, Kumārila interprets here as a certain kind of *cognition*, is different from a sense faculty, which exists prior to performing its function in regard to its object.

> 56. Therefore, the function of the cognition in regard to its object is considered to be its arising; and that has the nature of a knowing. The cognition that possesses it is the means.

If the cognition is considered the *pramāṇa*, the means of knowledge that is perception, then it will have to be endowed with some function, just as an axe, the means of chopping down a tree, is endowed with up and down movement. In general, according to the usual Indian analysis of action, a means of action yields

its result through some kind of intermediate operation. Sticks are means of cooking rice insofar as they are set alight and burn. Thus, Kumārila – once again, apparently assuming here that the *cognition* (*buddhi*) is the actual means of knowledge in the act of perception – spells out what its function is, namely, simply its arising; for, as stated, it cannot first exist and then perform its function. However, its arising also has the nature of an awareness of the object. Thus it yields as its result the object's being known. As Kumārila will suggest later in the *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa*, it is only from an object's being known or being manifest that one *postulates*, as the cause thereof, the prior occurrence of a cognition (*Śūnyavāda* 182); one is not directly aware of the cognition itself when it occurs.[60]

In the above discussion it has been assumed that a *pramāṇa* such as perception is a *means* of knowledge that yields something else as its result. This is indicated by the grammatical form of the word *pramāṇa* itself. However, one needn't always be bound by the grammatical forms of words; sometimes words have meanings that deviate from their etymology. Thus, the *pramāṇa* perception could also be the *result* of the process perception, not the means. More often than not, in fact, we think of perception as the result of the functioning of the senses – a cognition or awareness of some kind – not the functioning of the senses itself. This is what is *prima facie* indicated, for example, by the Nyāya definition of perception, stated in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4: "Perception is a cognition that has arisen from the contact of sense faculty and object and is inexpressible, not erroneous, and determinate in nature." Similarly in the case of MS 1.1.4 – the *sūtra* seems to be saying that "a cognition that is arising" is perception; however, that would seem to refer to the result of the process, not the means. The means of perception in the strict sense would be either the sense faculty or the connection of sense faculty and object – for that is what produces the cognition.

If one takes this approach to MS 1.1.4, however, other interpretations of the expression *buddhijanman* than (a), discussed earlier, must be considered. According to (a), *buddhijanman* is a *karmadhāraya* compound that means 'an arising that is a cognition'. However, it would appear that it could be validly construed as a *tatpuruṣa* compound after all. In that case it could mean either (b) 'the arising of a cognition' (where *janman* = *janana*), as Diṅnāga seems to hold, or else (c) 'that which is born of/effected by a cognition' (where *janman* = *janya*, analogous to *karman* = *kārya*).[61] In case (b), with the *arising* of the cognition as perception (and *not* "an arising that is a cognition," that is, a cognition *as it is arising*), the sense faculty or the connection of sense faculty and object would be the actual means (*karaṇa*) in an act of perception; hence means and result would still be distinct, which would avoid the problem pointed out by Diṅnāga at PS 1.6.9. In case (c), with "that which is effected by a cognition" as perception, the cognition would be the means, so that means and result would once again be distinct.

In light of the above, *śloka* 56 could be taken as clarifying the meaning of MS 1.1.4 in terms of alternative (c), after having discussed *buddhijanman* as a *karmadhāraya* in the previous two verses. By this account, the word *janman* in the compound *buddhijanman* refers to what is brought about by the *buddhi* or

cognition. According to Kumārila's school, this is the "manifestness" (*prākaṭya*) or "knownness" (*jñātatva*) of the object – that is, the presentation of the object to a knowing subject.[62] This manifestation of the object, "which has the nature of a knowing," is considered the functioning of the cognition, that is, its *effect*. The cognition insofar as it is possessed of that functioning is the means in the act of cognition. Thus, the verse might be translated:

> The functioning of the cognition is considered that which is effected in regard to its object [i.e., its manifestness]; and that has the nature of a knowing. The cognition that possesses it is the means.

Therefore, means and result are fully distinct and the problem raised by Diṅnāga is averted.[63]

Kumārila will say presently that one is free to identify the means and the result in the act of perception as one wishes; one need only keep in mind that, in any case, perception will cognize only that which is present; hence Dharma is never an object of perception. One may choose the sense faculty or the connection of sense faculty and object (or any of a number of other connections) as the means; in that case the cognition will indeed be the result. However, on that view, if MS 1.1.4 is taken as saying that perception is the *cognition* – or, what comes to much the same thing, the *arising* of a cognition or a cognition *as it is arising* – then it will actually be identifying the *result* of the act of perception as "perception." If one chooses the cognition as the means, on the other hand, then some other awareness produced by the cognition, or else indeed the "manifestness" of the object, will be the result.

Śabara, however, seems to understand *buddhijanman* as a *karmadhāraya* compound, so that it has the sense of 'an arising that is a cognition', that is, as Kumārila seems to suggest in v. 53cd above, a cognition *as it arises*; for Śabara says, "That cognition of the self *which arises when there is a connection of the sense faculty and object*, that is perception."[64] Does he have any motive for interpreting the expression in this way other than to suggest that a cognition must perform its function immediately because it exists only momentarily? Here Kumārila says:

> 57. And the arising is mentioned as not being separate from the cognition by the commentator. And this qualification of the cognition is specified because it is possible for it to be past or future.

Śabara stresses that a perception is a cognition that arises simultaneously with the connection of sense faculty and object in order to reinforce the idea that cognitions that arise prior or subsequent to a connection of sense faculty and object are *not* perceptions. This would eliminate not only yogic perceptions but also inferential cognitions. Although the latter do arise as a result of a sense faculty–object connection – for example, the seeing of smoke – they do not do so at the same time as the occurrence of the connection. See the commentary to v. 37.

There remains the possibility of construing MS 1.1.4 according to alternative (b), that is, by interpreting *buddhijanman* as 'the arising of a cognition.' In this case *janman* would be the process of the cognition's coming into being as a property of the self. We have seen that Diṅnāga considered that the Mīmāṃsaka might think of this in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence, *samavāya*, as the cognition's coming to *inhere* in the self. That would be problematic because inherence in Vaiśeṣika philosophy is an eternal relation; it cannot not exist at one moment, then exist at the next; it cannot arise from the functioning of the sense faculties as its cause. Kumārila, however, suggests that even this way of construing *buddhijanman* is salvageable:

> 58. And even if, according to the view of the Vaiśeṣikas, inherence is what is referred to as "birth," its manifestation[65] is dependent on the sense faculty; therefore it is called "perception."

Although inherence itself is always uncaused, nevertheless a particular *manifestation* of inherence can depend on particular causal factors. Thus, the manifestation of the inherence of a cognition in the self, which is referred to in the *sūtra* as the "arising" of the cognition, may be due to the activity of the sense faculties after all.

Thus, Kumārila has shown that all three possible ways of reading the expression *buddhijanman* yield valid readings of MS 1.1.4!

1.6 The identification of the *pramāṇa*

We have seen that there are various candidates for *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and *phala* (result) in the act of perception. The cognition that arises from the operation of the sense faculty may be considered the *pramāṇa*, in which case something else that results from the cognition – the knownness of the object, or else a cognition of the object as a potential source of pleasure or pain – is the result; or else the sense faculty or the connection of the sense faculty with its object (or any number of other connections, as we shall see presently) could be the *pramāṇa* and the cognition the result. In the latter case, as we saw, the term 'perception' would refer in MS 1.1.4, not to the *pramāṇa* proper, but to the *phala*. Which of these alternatives is the correct one?

> 59. And however one may conceive of the relation of means of knowledge and result, perception is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present.

It doesn't matter which things one selects as *pramāṇa* and *phala* in the act of perception, Kumārila tells us here; for no matter how one identifies them, perception will still be something that occurs only when there is an existing connection of sense faculty and object. Thus perception will apprehend only that which is present, so

that Dharma cannot be known by any kind of perception. Here Kumārila probably has in mind the statement of Śabara: "Whether the cognition or its arising or the connection – this *sūtra* does not have the purpose of ascertaining any one of these [as the means of knowledge perception]."[66] That is to say, the interest of the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is not what counts as the means of knowledge that is perception and what counts as the result – one can analyze the matter however one likes; rather, the concern of the *sūtra* is just whether perception is a basis of Dharma.

> 60–61. When the sense faculty is the *pramāṇa* or its conjunction with the object or the union of the mind with the sense faculties or with the self or all of these, then the cognition is the result. And since they function to give rise to the cognition, they would be the *pramāṇa*; for when there is no functioning on their part, the result does not arise.

If one chooses to view the sense faculty as the *pramāṇa* or the connection of the sense faculty with its object or any one of the other connections involved in perceptual cognition, or indeed all of the connections together, as the *pramāṇa*, then the cognition would have to be considered the result of the act of cognition. For the various things mentioned can be seen as functioning to give rise to cognition. That which functions in order to bring something about is a means, whereas that which is brought about is the result.[67]

From v. 56 earlier it appears that Kumārila favors the view that the cognition itself is the *pramāṇa*, and that also seems to be what the *sūtra* itself recommends (insofar as it refers to the cognition that arises from the connection of sense faculty and object as "perception"). However, he considers other possibilities here in order to show that none of the objections raised by Diṅnāga against these various alternatives in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is valid; thus, once again, he is primarily concerned in this section with refuting Diṅnāga. He will first consider the theory that the *pramāṇa* is the connection of sense faculty and object. Diṅnāga points out that the Vaiśeṣika proposal that perception is the "contact" (*sannikarṣa*) of sense faculty and object (PSV 1.4.1, intro.) would seem to entail that *all* aspects of an object – not just a particular sensory quality but all sensory qualities, indeed, all properties that inhere in an object, including universals – would be perceived whenever the object is perceived.[68] For insofar as the sense faculty is in contact with the object, it is also in contact with all that inheres in it. Diṅnāga also alludes to this problem in his discussion of MS 1.1.4 at PSV 1.6.8cd, in relation to the proposal that perception is conceptualized and so able to apprehend the object in its universal aspect, as colored, etc.

To this Kumārila responds:

> 62–63. And there is not a connection of the object with the sense faculty in every respect, so that there would be an awareness of the entire object

> for those who call the sense faculty the *pramāṇa*. For the connection of the sense faculty with the object is not considered to be contact in general, lest by means of the sense of touch as a nonspecific cause there occur the discerning of color.

The connection of sense faculty and object is to be understood not generally but specifically, insofar as it is qualified by a certain capacity of the sense faculty in question to apprehend only a particular sensory quality. That is to say, given the capacity of a sense faculty to perceive a particular sensory quality, for example, of the faculty of vision to perceive color, a cognition of that quality will arise when there is a connection of the sense faculty with an object that possesses it. Thus, not all aspects of an object are immediately apprehended in perception. Were mere contact or connection in general the means of perception, the *pramāṇa*, then one ought to be able to ascertain the visual properties of an object by touching it. Obviously, that never happens.[69]

Another possible view to take of the connection of sense faculty and object is that it is not, strictly speaking, the *pramāṇa* in the act of perception; rather, it is the *cause* of the cognition that knows the object, hence the *cause of the pramāṇa*. The cognition in turn brings about the manifestness or knownness of the object as its result, as discussed in relation to *śloka* 56. In that case, then, the fact that the connection of sense faculty and object is qualified by a capacity of the sense faculty to apprehend only a specific sensory quality will determine, through the kind of cognition it causes, that only a particular aspect of the object, not all aspects, is made manifest.

> 64. Just as a specific kind of connection of sense faculty and object, due to the suitability of the sense faculty, is the cause of the emergence of the *pramāṇa* [i.e., the cognition], so will it be the cause with respect to the result [i.e., the manifestness of the object].

Via a cognition that apprehends only one aspect of an object, which is produced by the connection of sense faculty and object, only a certain sensory quality will be made known.

At PS 1.6.6cd–7ab Diṅnāga brings up another problem with considering the connection of sense faculty and object as the means of knowledge, namely, why would it be called "perception," *pratyakṣa*?[70] According to his own etymology the Sanskrit term literally means 'that which occurs in relation to each sense faculty'.[71] However, the connection of sense faculty and object involves, obviously, not just a sense faculty but a sensible object as well. Thus, from the mere name of the *pramāṇa* in question – *pratyakṣa* – it would seem that it cannot be the connection of sense faculty and object.

> 65. Although a connection depends on two terms, there is a designation of it based on just one of them; or else the sense faculty could be specific with regard to that.

Kumārila offers two responses to this objection. First, although two factors are involved in perception, it is entirely appropriate that its name refer to only one of them. Thus, one might refer to something as "chocolate" even if it contains many other ingredients besides chocolate.[72] Second, some object or other is involved in every *pramāṇa*; inference, testimony, etc., also involve an engagement with objects. What distinguishes perception from the other means of knowledge is the involvement of a sense faculty; the involvement of a sense faculty is "specific" to the *pramāṇa* perception. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to perception as that which pertains to each sense faculty or *pratyakṣa*.[73]

Next, Kumārila considers the view that the connection of self and mind is the *pramāṇa* in an act of perception. According to most Indian theories of perception, sense faculty and object are not the only factors involved in the production of sensory awareness. There must also be involvement of the mind as the function of attention, as it were, as well as the self, to which cognitions actually belong. That is to say, although our various sense faculties are always in contact with objects, we are not always aware of them. When my attention is turned toward one sense, I tend not to notice the objects of another, even though my other sense faculty may be "connected" with them. Thus Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers postulated the mind (*manas*) as the link that relates the sense faculty to the self, the latter being the "knower" in the proper sense (for the mind, being a mere instrument, and the sense faculty, being material in nature, are without consciousness).[74] Thus, two more connections enter into the act of perception – that between the mind and the sense faculty and that between the self and the mind. Implausible as it may sound to suggest that *the connection of self and mind* is the *pramāṇa* perception, Kumārila will cite in verse 68 at least one reason why one might think so.

If the connection of self and mind be considered the *pramāṇa*, however, then a new problem arises. One of the requirements of any theory of perception is that the means of knowledge and its result have "the same object." An axe, the means of felling a tree, must yield, through its intermediate function of chopping, the felling of that very tree to which it is applied. By using an axe on one tree another tree is not felled. However, if the connection of mind and self is the means of knowledge in an act of perception, then it would seem that this principle is violated. For the object of the result – the object of the *cognition* produced by the functioning of the means of knowledge – is (in most cases) the external object with which the *sense faculty* is in contact. The connection of mind and self, however, relates directly only to the mind and the self, not to the external object. Thus it would seem that the object of the connection of mind and self is different.[75]

> 66ac. [Objection:] But if the connection of mind and self were the *pramāṇa* perception then the *pramāṇa* and its result would have distinct objects.

The objection is raised by Diṅnāga in his discussion of the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception at PSV 1.4.1.[76]

To this Kumārila replies:

> 66cd. [Reply:] There is not a difference of objects, for both the *pramāṇa* and its result function in regard to the external object.

Although the connection of mind and self may not relate *directly* to the external object that is known in the cognition, nevertheless it carries out a function in regard to that object insofar as it serves as the mediating link between the sense faculty, which is in direct contact with the object, and the self, in which the awareness of the object arises – in other words, it helps *produce* an awareness of the object in the self. Thus it would seem that even when the connection of mind and self is considered the *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇa* and *phala* have the same object after all.

However, one might insist that the "object" (*viṣaya*) of the connection of mind and self must be considered the terms connected by it – namely, the mind and the self. That is to say, insofar as self and mind are mutually related, the self might be thought to have the mind as its object and the mind the self; thus mind and self are the collective object of the connection of mind and self viewed as the *pramāṇa*.[77] Even in that case, however, the connection of mind and self and the awareness it produces can be seen to have the same object.

> 67. If the basis of the connection is considered the object by you, not an object different from the connection, then since the cognition is located in the self, the cognition will not have a distinct object.

If we go by the "basis" or substratum (*āśraya*) in determining what the object of connection of mind and self is, then we should go by that in deciding what the object of the cognition is. What, then, is the substratum of the cognition? The self – insofar as the self is the knowing subject in cognition, all cognitions belong to it. However, in that case the "object" of the cognition and the "object" of the connection of mind and self is the same, for the self is also (along with the mind) the substratum of the latter.

Is there, however, any good reason to consider the connection of mind and self, as opposed to the connection of object and sense faculty, the means of knowledge in the act of perception? There is indeed, says Kumārila:

> 68. And that is the means, according to us, because it is the most efficacious factor, due to its proximity to the effect. Therefore, no other factor would be a *pramāṇa*.

If one in fact considers the cognition to inhere in the self and the connection of mind and self also to inhere (at least partially) in the self, then the two (the cognition and the connection) are "proximate" indeed. We sometimes think of the most efficacious factor in the production of an effect as that which is directly applied to the object in which the effect is to be brought about, for example, the stick that is applied to the clay in making a pot or the axe applied to the tree in felling a tree.[78] Therefore, according to the standard definition of a means of action as the factor that is most efficacious in bringing something about, it is plausible to consider the connection of mind and self the *pramāṇa* in the act of perception.[79]

Kumārila now proceeds to consider the view that *all* the connections involved in the act of perception are the means. This view was apparently held by the Mīmāṃsaka Bhavadāsa.[80]

> 69ab. If all the connections are the *pramāṇa*, then none of the defects obtains.

Neither of the objections considered above – that is, (1) that all aspects of an object would be known and (2) that there would be a difference of object for *pramāṇa* and *phala* – can be made good against this theory either. The same considerations that defeated those objections for the sense faculty–object connection and the mind–self connection theories apply also to the totality-of-connections theory. It too, then, is a viable candidate for a realist theory of perception, a theory that involves an interaction between the cognitive faculties and an external object.

Finally, the theory that just the sense faculty is the *pramāṇa* is also defensible against Diṅnāga's objections.

> 69cd. It is evident, for one who holds that the sense faculty is the *pramāṇa*, that there is the same object.

Clearly, the sense faculty performs a function directly in regard to the external object, while that same external object is the content of the cognition. Thus, when the sense faculty is taken as the *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇa* and *phala* clearly have the same object. The first objection mentioned earlier (that all aspects of an object would be known) also would not apply, for that objection pertains only to the view that the *connection* of sense faculty and object is the *pramāṇa*, whereas here the sense faculty by itself is being considered.

Having looked at different theories to the effect that the sense faculty or one or another of various connections is the *pramāṇa* while the cognition is the *phala*, Kumārila now goes on to consider various ways in which the cognition could be the *pramāṇa*. What could it mean to say that a *cognition* is a *means of knowledge* and not the result of an act of knowledge? One thing it could mean is that the cognition of a "qualifying feature" (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an object is a means of knowing

the object as qualified by that feature. Thus, the cognition of blue is the means of knowing that the pot is blue. This view may have been held by certain Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas and perhaps also by Bhavadāsa, alongside the position discussed earlier that perception consists of "all connections" (*sakalasambandha*).[81] However, Diṅnāga argues against this position that it would, once again, entail a difference between the object of the *pramāṇa* and the object of the *phala*; for a cognition of a property and a cognition of an object endowed with that property are clearly cognitions *of* two different things (PS 1.3.3d). In response to this objection Kumārila says:

> 70. When the cognition of a qualifying feature and the cognition of the object thus qualified are the *pramāṇa* and the result, then also the refutation of the charge that they have distinct objects has already been stated.

Although the immediate object of a cognition of a qualifying property is clearly different from the object of the cognition of a thing qualified by that property (*viśeṣya*), it also clearly subserves the latter. Hence both can be seen as pertaining to the same object – the awareness of a blue pot would not arise if one were not also aware of blue. Thus, *pramāṇa* and *phala* do not have distinct objects in this case, as Diṅnāga alleges. A similar argument was also employed in defense of the connection of mind and self in *śloka* 66.[82]

There is a second way in which a cognition could be the *pramāṇa* in an act of perception: a *nonconceptualized* cognition of the qualifying feature of an object could yield as its result a conceptualized cognition thereof. As explained in the Introduction, two basic types of cognitions are generally recognized in Indian epistemology – nonconceptualized and conceptualized. A nonconceptualized cognition is a bare awareness of an object without any identification of it as possessing a particular property, being of a particular type, etc. A conceptualized cognition on the other hand – by one account – is an awareness of the object as in some way determinate, for example, as blue, walking, holding an umbrella, a horse, etc. In perception, according to Kumārila's school, a nonconceptualized cognition, which is initially produced by the functioning of the senses, in turn gives rise to a conceptualized cognition of the object. Other philosophers believed that only nonconceptualized cognitions are produced by the functioning of the sense faculties, whereas conceptualized cognitions are produced by the mind and should not be considered perceptual at all; still others held that there are no cognitions that are nonconceptual. These matters will be discussed at great length in Chapter 2, from verse 111 onward. For now, Kumārila merely wants to suggest that a nonconceptualized cognition of a property of an object, such as blue, could be considered a *pramāṇa* in an act of perception.

> 71–72a. When the qualifying feature is what is to be known, the cognition consisting in mere seeing that later produces a determinate awareness

of it is postulated as the *pramāṇa* while the determinate awareness is the result.

When there is a desire to know the characteristics of a thing, an initial nonconceptualized perception of one of its features will give rise in turn to a conceptualized (or quasi-conceptualized) cognition of it, say, as "this type of feature that I've seen before."[83] In that case, the former is to be considered the *pramāṇa*, the latter the result.

In both of the preceding accounts of how a cognition can function as a *pramāṇa*, the cognition in question can be seen as having the same object as its result insofar as it *causes* the latter. That is, a cognition of a qualifying feature causes a cognition of an object qualified by it, or a nonconceptualized cognition of a particular feature of an object causes a conceptualized cognition of it; thus it would be natural to believe that in each case both cognitions have the same object. However, at PS 1.3.4a Diṅnāga raises the problem that a cognition of a qualifying feature does not invariably give rise to a cognition of an object qualified by that feature. For example, one could conceivably notice blue, but then be distracted by something before having the cognition that something *is* blue. Thus a real causal relationship between the two types of cognition is in doubt. Presumably, the same sort of objection could be raised against the suggestion that a nonconceptualized cognition of a feature of an object causes a conceptualized one of that same feature, and therefore has the same object. In an attempt to solve this problem Kumārila says:

72b–d. When a determinate awareness does not arise in respect to something that has been viewed, then the mere seeing would not be a *pramāṇa*, because an object is not ascertained.

If a nonconceptualized cognition of a feature of an object does not in turn give rise to a conceptualized cognition of it, then it simply should not be considered a *pramāṇa*. But in cases where it does, it should. The same sort of response can be given to Diṅnāga's charge that a cognition of a qualifying feature does not always give rise to a cognition of an object thus qualified. Note that Kumārila's statement here seems to imply that in order for a cognition to be a *pramāṇa* it must either be determinate in nature itself – it must ascertain an object – or cause a cognition that is. This already goes against the Buddhist view that only a nonconceptualized cognition is the *pramāṇa* perception.

Kumārila finally considers a third way in which a cognition can be considered a *pramāṇa*:

73ab. But if the cognition of the thing qualified is the *pramāṇa*, then the cognition that the object is to be avoided, etc., is the result.

One might regard the determinate awareness of the object as qualified by various attributes as the *pramāṇa*. In that case, the result of cognition is a subsequent awareness that such an object is desirable or undesirable or neither, that is, something to be obtained or avoided or neither obtained nor avoided, which in turn leads to action (or the absence thereof) in regard to the object.[84]

However, one might object that it is not an awareness of the value of the object that is immediately produced by a determinate awareness of it. Rather, a determinate awareness of the object will only produce a memory of the thing as having yielded certain kinds of experiences in the past, and it is that memory that produces the cognition of the object as something to be obtained, etc.

> 73cd. If there is the intervention of a memory of the benefit, etc., provided by the object, then this memory is the result.

If in fact the notion that the object is to be obtained or avoided is not what immediately follows upon a full awareness of the nature of the object (the latter being the *pramāṇa*), but rather a memory that the object was of use in the past, which in turn gives rise to such a thought, then let that memory be considered the result of cognition.[85]

Thus, Kumārila has now defended (1) the view that the *pramāṇa* perception is the connection of sense faculty and object (held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers), vv. 62–65; (2) the view that it is the connection of self and mind, vv. 66–68 (also perhaps held by certain Vaiśeṣikas); (3) the view that it is all the connections combined, v. 69ab (implied by various Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers and explicitly maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka Bhavadāsa); (4) the view that it is the sense faculty by itself, v. 69cd (the position of common sense, also defended later by certain Naiyāyikas); (5) the view that it is the cognition of the qualifying property, v. 70 (held, again, by certain Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas and also, apparently, by Bhavadāsa); (6) the view that it is the nonconceptualized cognition of the qualifying feature, vv. 71–72 (advocated perhaps by the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda); and finally (7) the view that it is the conceptualized cognition of the object, v. 73 (the standard second option of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition). All of these positions can be defended against Diṅnāga's objections in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. They all preserve the identity of the object of *pramāṇa* and *phala*, and none entails that all aspects of an object are perceived. Most importantly, they all imply that perception depends on a connection with an existing object, hence that perception is not a means of knowing Dharma!

1.7 Refutation of the Buddhist identification of *pramāṇa* and *phala*

We have seen in the previous section that the Mīmāṃsaka holds to the distinction of *pramāṇa* and *phala* (result) in regard to the act of perception. If the *pramāṇa* is the sense faculty or one of the connections, then the *phala* is the cognition; if

the *pramāṇa* is a particular kind of cognition, then the *phala* is some other kind of cognition or the manifestness or knownness of the object. It is a basic tenet of Mīmāṃsā (and all other realist schools of Indian philosophy) that means and end must always be distinct – an axe used to fell a tree is one thing, the felling of the tree another; to suggest that they could be identical is absurd.

Yet that is precisely what the Buddhist suggests. According to Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (1.1.8cd–10) the cognition is *both pramāṇa* and *phala* in an act of perception. It serves as *pramāṇa* insofar as it has the form of a particular object; it is the *phala* insofar as it is the awareness of that form. Thus *pramāṇa* and *phala* are simply the same cognition seen from different perspectives.[86] This theory may have been motivated in part by a desire to provide for the possibility of idealism. To suggest that the cognition can assume the form of the object without there necessarily being any input from the external world clearly opens the way to eliminating the external world from consideration altogether.[87] However, Diṅnāga's theory may also have been motivated by the concern to avoid the problem of a difference of objects for *pramāṇa* and *phala*, which he raises in relation to theories in which *pramāṇa* and *phala* are distinct; for obviously, if *pramāṇa* and *phala* are identical – if both are the cognition – then they must have the same object. Kumārila now attacks this approach:

> 74–75. But one who, considering *pramāṇa* and *phala* to have the same object, would declare the *pramāṇa* to be the *phala*, contradicts the usual difference between means and end. Just as there is no felling of a palāśa tree when there is the cutting of a khadira, so there is in common experience no identity of the axe with the act of cutting.

Kumārila's principal objection to the Buddhist proposal of the identification of *pramāṇa* and *phala* is that it violates common sense. One can no more expect means and end in an action – the axe and the cutting – to be identical than the *objects* of means and end – the tree to which the axe is applied and the tree that is felled – to be distinct.[88]

> 76. Rejecting a difference between *pramāṇa* and *phala*, you are satisfied with the identity of object. But others prefer the difference to the identity.

Kumārila scolds the Buddhist further: if you are allowed to please yourself by rejecting the commonsense distinction of *pramāṇa* and *phala* in order to avoid the problem of a difference of object for *pramāṇa* and *phala*, then someone else should be allowed to satisfy himself by giving up the commonsense identity of object for *pramāṇa* and *phala* in order to preserve a distinction between means and end. The one approach is just as arbitrary as the other; either one involves a violation of common sense. Ideally, one should find a way to preserve the distinction between means and end while also allowing for the identity of the object of *pramāṇa* and

phala. Indeed, that is what Kumārila thinks the various non-Buddhist theories of *pramāṇa* he has just discussed do.

A Buddhist, however, could object at this point that Diṅnāga does not really renounce the commonsense distinction of means and end; for he implies at PSV 1.1.8cd that even though the cognition is both *pramāṇa* and *phala*, the distinction is still valid in a figurative sense. "The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and thus is understood to include the act of cognizing. For this reason, it is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*, the means of cognition, although it is ultimately speaking devoid of activity."[89] Although in reality there is only a single cognition that contains a certain form, it can also be considered to *assume* that form as it arises, hence, to be possessed of a certain activity in relation to the object, in which case one might think of it also as a *pramāṇa*.[90]

To this proposal Kumārila responds:

> 77. If being a means of knowledge is conceived figuratively by you in relation to the result, then why can't identity of object somehow be postulated by others?

If one theorist is able to solve problems in his theory by resorting to the "figurative nature" of commonsense notions, so can another. That is to say, if one is allowed to say that a cognition, which one would ordinarily take to be the result of perception, can also figuratively be considered a *pramāṇa* (insofar as it is seen to have a certain function in regard to the object), so that there is no real distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala*, then another should be allowed to say that the identity of the objects of *pramāṇa* and *phala* is only figurative and not have to consider it real. What's good for the goose is good for the gander.

What, then, are the *pramāṇa* and *phala* if they are not both the cognition, that is, identical?

> 78. Because the ascertainment of the object is the result, that which has occurred immediately prior to it would be for us the *pramāṇa*. But if a cognition is the *pramāṇa* then a later cognition would be the result.

Kumārila alludes to the discussion of the previous section. It indeed appears that Kumārila does not bind himself to any one position concerning the identity of the *pramāṇa* in the act of perception, though he seems to favor the proposal of v. 56, which is closest to the statement of MS 1.1.4. He only holds that, whether one accepts the cognition as the means or result of perception, something else will serve as the other term.

As seen earlier, Diṅnāga's initial proposal (most evident in PS 1.1.8cd and 9cd) is that the cognition can be considered the *pramāṇa* insofar as it has the form

of a certain object; for the object is cognized *by means of* the form the cognition contains, and the cognition can be considered to be endowed with a certain activity or function insofar as it *assumes that form*. This proposal is associated with the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, which led the way to Buddhist idealism by developing a representationalist position: consciousness itself takes on the form of an external object as a result of the functioning of the senses. At PS 1.1.9ab, however, Diṅnāga offers a suggestion as to how one might actually see a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala* that seems quite compatible with the standpoint of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. The Yogācāra school was fully idealist in that it held that consciousness takes on the form of objects without any input from an external world. Factors within consciousness itself cause cognitions possessing certain forms to arise, which cognitions also cognize themselves – every cognition is thus not just the awareness of the particular form (object) it contains, but also an awareness of itself as an awareness of that form. If, as Diṅnāga seems to be saying in 9ab, one wishes to insist on a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala*, then, from the point of view of this theory, one can consider the cognition, which possesses the object form, the *pramāṇa* and the cognition's awareness *of itself* – the self-consciousness of the cognition as possessing that form – the *phala*.[91] Kumārila now criticizes this proposal.

> 79. That self-consciousness is the result is not correct, because the possibility of self-consciousness will be refuted later. It is also not correct because, if the *pramāṇa* is the object-portion of the cognition, then there is a difference of object.

First of all, the very idea of a cognition knowing itself will be refuted in the *Śūnyavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*, in which the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika theory of consciousness is examined at length. According to what Kumārila says there, the function of a cognition is exhausted in the awareness of its object; it does not also know itself.[92] Thus, in perception, we are aware only of the objects of perception; there is not simultaneously a second level of awareness of the awareness of the object. Moreover, it is impossible that a cognition could know itself; for then it would function both as agent and object in the same act, which is absurd.[93]

Second, if self-consciousness were the *phala* and the cognition the *pramāṇa* insofar as it has taken on the form of the object, then the principle of the identity of object for *pramāṇa* and *phala*, which Diṅnāga takes as his basis for criticizing other theories of *pramāṇa*, will be violated. For the object of the cognition *qua pramāṇa* will be the form – blue, yellow, sour, hot, cold, etc. – that appears within the cognition, whereas the object of the *phala*, that is, the self-consciousness of the cognition, will be the *cognition qua apprehending that object*. Clearly these are cognitions with different contents.

> 80. And another own-form of the cognition besides self-consciousness is not known which could be conceived as the *pramāṇa* in regard to self-consciousness, the result.

In PS 1.1.10 Diṅnāga restates his position. He identifies three aspects of a single cognition: the form of the object that appears in the cognition (*yadābhāsa*); the subject form (*grāhakākāra*), that is, the cognition insofar as it apprehends the object form, and [self-] consciousness ([*sva*-] *saṃvitti*).[94] The first is the object of cognition, the second the *pramāṇa*, the third the result. All three are ultimately identical insofar as each is simply an aspect of the same cognition. Thus, in perception, a single cognition is aware of itself as cognizing the particular form that it itself has assumed. Now if, in fact, self-consciousness is impossible, as the previous verse suggests, then the term usually employed for the latter, *svasaṃvitti* (= *svasya saṃvitti*), can only be taken to mean 'essential consciousness' (= *sva[rūpa]saṃvitti*).[95] In that case, however, the "own-form" (*svākāra*) of the cognition – that is, the subject form, which functions as the *pramāṇa* – is indistinguishable from the referent of the latter term (*svasaṃvitti*); for the own-form or subject function of a cognition is certainly nothing other than consciousness itself. Hence, according to what appears to be the only possible interpretation of the proposal that *svasaṃvitti*, "self-consciousness," is the result, any distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala* vanishes.

Suppose, however, it were somehow possible for a cognition to be aware of itself. Even in that case there would be unavoidable problems.

> 81–82. There is no ascertaining of the own-form without another form; and similarly for the latter also. Thus there would never be an ultimate form. And an own-form that has not been perceived cannot exist. And if the object-form is that which is to be apprehended, an apprehender distinct from it would not be ascertained.

In order for a cognition to know itself, it would also have to be aware of itself knowing itself; for every awareness is also a self-awareness. However, then it would also have to be aware of itself being aware of itself knowing itself, and so on *ad infinitum*. Or, in the way the matter is put here: in order for a cognition to know itself – that is, its "own-form" or the subject aspect, which knows the object – it would have to take on the form of that subject aspect, just as the subject aspect has taken on the form of the object; there would have to be a second-level own-form. However, then again it would have to take on the form of that second-level own-form, and so there would be a third-level own-form, and so on. It is not possible for the regress to end with a cognition that is aware, say, of its own-form without being aware of itself being aware of its own-form, because according to the Yogācāras every awareness without exception is self-aware; a cognition that itself is not illumined cannot illumine something else. Finally, even if a cognition might somehow be self-luminous, the Yogācāra view would still entail the conflation of

subject and object – the cognition that knows and the object that is known; for both are simply different aspects of one and the same cognition, and it remains difficult to see how one thing could function as both agent and object in the same act.

At this point an objection against the Mīmāṃsaka could be raised. Kumārila wants to reject the absurdity of a cognition cognizing itself. But aren't pleasure and pain mental states that cognize themselves? Such experiences, though evoked by and directed toward external objects, consist primarily in the apprehension of their own qualia as pleasure, pain, etc. If that is possible for these mental states, then why not for all cognitions?[96]

Kumārila responds:

> 83. However, there is a perceptual cognition of pleasure, etc., because the mind is a sense faculty. For the self knows them insofar as it is united with the mind.

Pleasure and pain are objects perceived by the self, with the mind (*manas*) functioning as the sense faculty; insofar as the self is conjoined with the mind functioning as sense faculty, it has perceptions of pleasure and pain. Thus in the case of these mental states as well, one has to do with a distinct subject and object, not with cognitions apprehending their own contents.[97,98]

1.8 Summary

Although there are many views as to the exact mechanism of perception – whether it involves direct contact with its object, whether it can apprehend an object in the past or the future, whether the sense faculty, the connection of sense faculty and object, or the cognition, etc., is the means of perception – there is also a dispute about the nature of the object of perception. Some, namely the Buddhists, insist that only particulars are perceived; others, namely the Advaita Vedāntins, hold that only Being, which is a universal, is perceived. Thus it might be suggested that an account of perception that fails to take a position on this latter dispute is fundamentally defective.

Kumārila responds:

> 84. What is connected with the sense faculty and is present is apprehended by vision, etc. Thus, it is not stated here whether it is the universal or the particular.

Kumārila reminds us yet again that the purpose of MS 1.1.4 is merely to exclude perception as a means of knowing Dharma, which it does by clarifying that perception has an object that exists in the present with which the sense faculty has some connection. Whether that object is particular or universal is beside the point.

Kumārila now summarizes the matter of the proper definition of perception, which has occupied him in the treatise thus far.

> 85–86. And whatever the definition of perception, or by whomever it is stated, it will not be a basis for knowing Dharma, because if it is ordinary perception, it is the apprehension of that which is present. If one holds that it is nonconceptualized, then even less is it a basis, for a connection of means and end is not apprehended without being conceptually represented.

Whatever definition of perception one might come up with, insofar as it faithfully reflects the undeniable fact that in ordinary experience perception apprehends only that which is present, it will entail that Dharma is inaccessible to perception. However, that will be especially the case if one defines perception as a cognition devoid of conceptual content, as Diṅnāga does. For knowledge of Dharma is impossible without grasping a relation between means and end, namely, that this particular action will inevitably lead to that result, which is of necessity a conceptual awareness.[99]

1.9 The relation of perception to the other *pramāṇas*

Having argued that perception is not a means of knowing Dharma, Śabarasvāmin proceeds in his commentary to assert that the other means of knowledge besides scripture – inference, comparison, and supposition – also are not means of knowing Dharma insofar as they depend on perception: "Because they are dependent on perception, inference, comparison, and supposition are not causes of knowledge of Dharma."[100] Diṅnāga briefly challenges this view at the end of the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS 2.47–49ab). Kumārila now presents an objection to Śabara's position that builds upon, but also extends considerably beyond, Diṅnāga's remarks.[101]

> 87–88. [Objection:] How would inference, etc., be dependent on perception if the cognition of a sense faculty, insofar it is incapable of memory, is without conceptual content? But without making a conceptual determination there is no apprehension of the inferential mark or the property to be proved or their connection. There is no dependence upon perception in the case of comparison, either, because of the apprehension of similarity in regard to something remembered.

The opponent points out that a sense faculty does not produce memories. It simply apprehends the object present before it; it does not recall something previously experienced in the past. However, memory is essential for a cognition to have conceptual content. In order to comprehend what I perceive as falling under

a particular type I must connect it with what I have seen in the past, or else I must associate it with an expression I learned before. It follows, then, that insofar as perceptual cognition is produced merely by the functioning of the sense faculties, it is devoid of conceptual content. How, then, could perception be of service in inference, which obviously involves conceptualization; for in inference, one must recognize what one perceives as a certain *type* indicative of the property to be proved?[102] Comparison also involves memory. In an act of comparison I know that an object that I experienced previously and am at present remembering (e.g., a domestic cow) is similar to an object (e.g., a wild cow) I am perceiving now.[103] Thus, insofar as both involve memory, inference and comparison cannot depend on perception.

Nor, it would appear, can the *pramāṇa* supposition (*arthāpatti*).

> 89. Supposition, on the other hand, is usually not thought to pertain to something that has been experienced by another *pramāṇa*. And the object on the basis of the perception of which it functions is conceptualized.

Supposition (*arthāpatti*) is a kind of reasoning by which one posits something in order to reconcile otherwise inconsistent facts. It is known, for example, that Devadatta is alive, yet he is not at home; thus, one supposes that he is somewhere else. Or, Devadatta is fat yet is never seen to be eating during the day; therefore, one supposes that he eats at night. Supposition is distinguished from inference (*anumāna*) on the grounds that the latter is not triggered by an observation of discrepant facts; rather, one simply perceives the presence of the inferential mark (smoke) in the subject of inference (the mountain) and, remembering its invariable connection with the property to be proved (being on fire), becomes aware of the presence of the property to be proved.[104]

The object of supposition thus may not be anything that is ever perceived. It is by supposition, the Mīmāṃsaka claims, that we know that words possess a natural capacity (*śakti*) to convey their meanings – for the fact that the uttering of words makes us think of their meanings cannot, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, be explained in any other way – even though no such capacity is ever directly observed.[105] Thus it would seem that supposition is not based on perception; rather, it extends our knowledge beyond perception. One might argue, however, that it is based on perception insofar as one must first perceive the things to be reconciled by the act of supposition (e.g., Devadatta's girth and his abstention from food during the day). Such "perception," however, would obviously be conceptual in nature – the things observed must be determinate in particular ways so as to give rise to an incompatibility – and so, according to the premise of the (Buddhist) opponent, could not really be *perceptual* at all; for, once again, perceptual cognitions are produced solely by the sense faculties, which are incapable of memory, and memory is required for conceptualization.

Suppose, however, one were to maintain that perception can be conceptual. Even then, it can still be seen that inference, at least, is not always dependent on perception.

> 90. And where both the inferential mark, the movement of the sun, etc., and the thing to be proved are inferred, how in that case is a dependence on perception ascertained?

It is not always true that one must *perceive* the inferential mark (middle term) in making an inference. In some instances, the middle term is *inferred*.[106] For example, when one infers from the movement of the sun that there is something that *causes* it to move, the movement of the sun, which has the role of inferential mark in the inference, is itself inferred. It is inferred, namely, from the observation of the sun at different locations in the sky. Thus, though some inferences might be based on perception, not all are – at least not directly.

> 91. And if the object is apprehended by perception, then how are these *pramāṇas*? When the object is cognized by them, at that time it is not an object of the sense faculty.

Moreover, it is intrinsic to the concept of a *pramāṇa* that it provides knowledge of something that has not been previously cognized.[107] The very idea of a *pramāṇa* thus implies independence from other *pramāṇas*. However, that inference, supposition, and comparison are dependent on perception would seem to mean that they cognize things that have *already* been ascertained by perception. Thus, to suggest that they are dependent on perception would be to suggest that they are not really *pramāṇas* at all. If one were to argue that they are independent *pramāṇas* insofar as they cognize at a later time what was originally cognized perceptually, then strictly speaking one would have to admit that the objects they cognize are *at that time not* objects of perception; hence that they are not really dependent on perception!

> 92ab. [Reply:] Yet as a result of the cognition of some object or other they would be dependent on perception.

The Mīmāṃsaka might hold that inference, etc., are dependent on perception just insofar as they arise as a consequence of some perceptual act or other; an inference need not know the same precise object as the perception upon which it is based. Thus, the inference of fire from smoke must be based on past perceptions of smoking objects that were on fire (as well as on a present perception of something smoking). However, the object inferred to be on fire now may be a completely new one. In this way, inference, etc., could be seen as both dependent on perception yet also as apprehending objects not previously apprehended, hence real *pramāṇas*.

To this the opponent, intent on denying the dependence of other *pramāṇas* on perception, responds:

> 92cd–93. [Objection:] Then the fact that the object occurs in the future would not be a reason why there is no knowledge of it; for some existing object having been cognized by sensory cognitions, Dharma, even though it does not presently exist, would be apprehended by those other *pramāṇas* – due to an inferential mark, for example.

If it were in general the case that the perception upon which an inference is based need not have the same object as the inference, then it should be possible to infer something about the future, having perceived something in the present. Although we may be restricted to perceiving only things that exist in the present, and although inference would presuppose perception, we would still be able to know things about the future through inference. Hence, we could know about Dharma through inference. The same possibility would seem to be available for the other *pramāṇas* as well. Surely that is something that the Mīmāṃsaka wants to rule out.

Thus it would seem that there is no satisfactory way that the Mīmāṃsaka can consider inference, etc., to be based on perception. So, let them not be based on perception! In that case, however, one cannot in fact succeed in excluding inference, etc., as means of knowledge of Dharma on the grounds that they are based on perception.[108]

Moreover, the position that other means of knowledge are not means of knowing Dharma insofar as they are based on perception would end up excluding the Veda, too.

> 94. Even in the case of the Veda, the object of knowledge is apprehended after the letters have been apprehended by perception, so that it, too, would not be a cause of knowledge of Dharma, because it is dependent on perception.

Testimony could be seen as dependent on perception in roughly the same way as inference, etc., insofar as it is necessarily preceded by some act of perception. For the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is preceded by the perceptual grasping of the sounds that comprise it. However, since being dependent on perception disqualifies something as a basis of knowing Dharma, testimony, including scripture, would be disqualified as a means of knowing Dharma, too – and of course the Mīmāṃsaka holds that the Veda is the sole means of knowing Dharma.

Having presented the opponent's theory that inference, comparison, and supposition are not in fact dependent on perception, Kumārila now moves on to consider the Mīmāṃsā position. First he considers a view apparently held by certain Mīmāṃsakas that he does not fully embrace.

95. [Reply:] Some think that being dependent on perception is not at all the reason. Rather, insofar as the validity of inference, etc., is due to its being based on perception, it is not possible [in regard to Dharma].

The statement of Śabara's translated earlier as, "Because they are dependent on perception, inference, comparison, and supposition are not causes of knowledge of Dharma," need not entail the assertion that inference, etc., really are dependent on perception and for that reason are not causes of knowledge of Dharma; for the 'because' phrase can also be construed merely as 'insofar as . . .' Thus, Śabara can be taken to be saying merely that whatever validity inference, etc., *might be thought to have* insofar as they are dependent on perception, they fail to have in regard to Dharma, just because the latter is not an object of perception. In this way, the objections raised earlier against the claim that inference, etc., really are not dependent on perception would not apply.[109]

Kumārila, however, declines to go along with this suggestion; for he thinks that inference, etc., are in fact dependent on perception. He now states his own view:

96. But when one has apprehended some inferential mark, etc., by means of perception, certainly, there is the use of inference, etc. And that sort of inferential mark, etc., does not exist in regard to Dharma.

It is obvious that inference, etc., are dependent on perception; for one can infer the existence of fire only after having perceived smoke, the inferential mark or middle term of the inference, and moreover only when one has previously perceived an invariable connection between smoke and fire. In comparison, one becomes aware of a similarity between an object one remembers – hence, one that was experienced perceptually sometime in the past – and an object one perceives now. Since Dharma, however, is never accessible to perception, one can never have perceived a connection between it and some other term, by means of which it might now be inferred; nor can one become aware of it as something previously experienced that is similar to something else one is experiencing now.

In *śloka* 90 it was argued that the inferential mark of an inference needn't always be perceived. It could be something that is inferred, as when we infer some cause of the movement of the sun from its movement, which itself is inferred. Couldn't that be the case for Dharma as well? We may not be able to infer that Dharma is present in a certain action from a property we perceive, but from a property we have inferred.

Kumārila responds:

97. And there is no possibility of an inference by means of an inference in this case, since the prior existence of inferential mark, the thing to be

proved, and the connection between them cannot have been previously established.

In any inference – that is, in determining that what one wishes to prove is present in the subject of inference because of the presence therein of the inferential mark – the property or thing one wishes to prove, the inferential mark, and the invariable concomitance of what one wishes to prove and the inferential mark must be previously established; they cannot be completely unknown. In the example of the motion of the sun, one can infer a cause of its motion from its motion, and its motion from being located at different places in the sky, only if one is already acquainted with each of these terms and their connections with each other – in particular, the connection between being located at different places and being in motion, and that between being in motion and being caused to move by something. So in the case of Dharma, one could infer its presence in a certain action from a certain property of that action that itself is inferred, only if one were already acquainted with it and knew that it is invariably connected with the inferred property. However, since Dharma is not accessible to perception, one cannot know this.

98ab. And the existence of something is not known by inference.

Moreover, Kumārila continues, one cannot originally prove that something exists through inference. One can prove through inference only that something one already knows to exist – by some other means – is present in the case at hand. Thus, even the existence of Dharma in general cannot be established by inference.

However, perhaps one seeks not to establish that there is Dharma, but that something, say, an action, possesses Dharma. But this will not do, either.

98cd. If something else qualified by Dharma is to be inferred, then the subject of inference would have a qualifying feature that is unknown.

Something that is not already known by a valid means of knowledge cannot be taken as the "qualifying property," that is, that which one seeks to prove as belonging to the subject term, in an inference. If the predicate one wishes to establish as true of the subject term itself is not known, and moreover its connection with the inferential mark is not established, then an inference cannot be carried out. Dharma, however, cannot be known except by the Veda; thus without reliance on the Veda Dharma cannot be employed as a term in inference. However, of course if one accepts the Veda, one can dispense with inference altogether in regard to Dharma!

99–100. Therefore, Dharma is not an object of inference, since it has not been previously seen together with any other thing, like a completely unique entity. And since some other thing's similarity to it has not been

observed, and because it itself has not been perceived, Dharma would not be an object of comparison, like a completely unique entity.

Since Dharma is never perceived at all, it is never perceived together with other things. However, inference is based on relating that which one perceives now to that which one wishes to know, which requires having observed them both together at one time. And comparison requires the perception of the similarity of something at hand to a remembered object,[110] as well as the prior perception of that remembered object (for one can only remember something previously experienced). Thus again, it appears that Dharma cannot be known through inference or comparison.

However, can't it be known through supposition (*arthāpatti*)? It seems one might posit the existence of Dharma and Adharma, that is, non-Dharma or unrighteousness, to account for the unequal distribution of misery and happiness in the world.

101–102. [Objection:] But wouldn't supposition be a *pramāṇa*, as a result of the observation of the diversity of the world? For the difference between the happy and the miserable is not possible but for some unseen reason. The factors we are able to observe are not invariably associated with them [i.e., happiness and unhappiness], because they arise even in their absence. Even when there is the same service and Vedic study a difference in result is observed.

Perhaps we can postulate Dharma and its opposite to account for the fact that some people are happy while others are not. Happy people, that is, would be those who lived according to Dharma in past lives, unhappy people those who lived according to Adharma.[111] We cannot account for differences in the happiness or unhappiness people experience in terms of factors we are able to observe – effort and the lack thereof, for example – since such factors are not invariably associated with happiness and unhappiness. Not everyone who is diligent in service to one's guru and Vedic study experiences happiness; not everyone who neglects them experiences misery. Thus it seems we must postulate previous adherence to Dharma and violation of Dharma as unseen factors that explain these differences. Thus it would seem that Dharma is an object of supposition.

Kumārila now refutes this objection:

103–104. [Reply:] This would be the case if a natural cause could be excluded, and if there were another reason for the difference of the potency of actions. But just as there is a capacity of actions of themselves to give rise to various effects, so the diversity of happiness and misery in the world will be possible as a result of the nature of actions.

The potency of actions to bring about certain effects, ultimately, the distribution of misery and happiness in the world, may be due just to the nature of those actions themselves and nothing else. No other unseen principle such as Dharma or Adharma need be postulated.[112]

However, even if we determined that the nature of actions cannot account for the differences we see in people in regards to happiness and unhappiness, hence, that we must postulate Dharma and Adharma to account for them, we would still lack any detailed knowledge of Dharma.

> 105–107ab. If Adharma or Dharma is not differentiated with regard to its result, then of what use to people is the knowledge that it is the cause of happiness or unhappiness? "Does suffering result from sacrifice?" "Does happiness arise from violence, etc.?" "What kind of actions give different results, like heaven, sons, etc.?" As long as one does not know these things, one does not act.

If one simply postulates Dharma and Adharma, righteousness and unrighteousness, in general as the causes of the unequal distribution of happiness in the world but does not know anything about what specifically constitutes Dharma or Adharma, then one's knowledge will be of no use!

> 107cd–108. And it is the basis of the knowledge that subserves activity that is sought. Therefore, even though the general thing may be established by supposition, the particular thing is not established without scripture. But the investigation of the particular thing is announced by the author of the *sūtras*.

It may well be that supposition can tell us that Dharma plays some role in the outcome of action, but it cannot tell us specifically which actions lead to which results. Hence, it is incomplete; it cannot guide us in acting. What we seek, rather, is a means of knowledge that tells us exactly what to do and what to avoid in regard to specific results, and that can only be scripture. When Jaimini declares, with MS 1.1.1, that Dharma is to be investigated, he surely means Dharma in its specific form, that is, which actions are conducive to which results, such as the attainment of heaven or the birth of a son.

One might think that, since supposition provides general knowledge of Dharma it may be considered a means of knowledge of Dharma *to that extent*; complete knowledge of Dharma, in its general and particular aspects, will be provided by supposition supplemented by scripture. Kumārila responds:

> 109. And the particular characteristic being understood from scripture, an understanding of the general characteristic also, effected by its inclusion in that, would also arise from scripture. Hence, supposition is not a cause of knowing Dharma.

Scripture, insofar as it provides knowledge of the particular characteristic of Dharma, *ipso facto* provides knowledge of its general characteristic. Hence scripture is the *only* means of knowledge necessary for Dharma. Supposition is quite superfluous.

> 110. And thus we do not accept the comparison of inference as being "like supposition." If it depended on scripture, let scripture alone be the means of knowledge.[113]

One who holds that supposition can tell us that Dharma is the cause of the diversity of happiness and misery might also hold that inference can do so, too – inference, that is, of a general sort that proceeds merely from the observation of the diversity of happiness and misery to some unspecifiable cause, which one may refer to as "Dharma," for every effect must have a cause. (Indeed, as Pārthasārathi points out, some – probably those who reject *arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa* – consider the supposition discussed earlier to be just a disguised inference.) However, just as supposition would not provide knowledge of Dharma that is of any use, neither would this kind of inference. That is, it would not tell us specifically which actions are Dharma and which are not. If one were to suggest that the Veda could fill in the details left unspecified by such inferential knowledge, then let us just consult the Veda about Dharma and have done with inference altogether!

2

"THE DETERMINATION OF PERCEPTION" (*PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA*)

Text and commentary, part 2

2.1 The defense of conceptualized perception: introduction

In the course of the above discussion it was asserted by the opponent (verses 87–89) that inference, etc., cannot depend on perception, because the cognitions upon which inference, etc., depend involve the conceptualization of their objects and the sense faculties are incapable of yielding a determinate, conceptual awareness of their objects. This understanding of perception is that presented by Diṅnāga in his famous definition of perception as "an awareness devoid of conceptual construction."[1] Kumārila now begins an extensive refutation of this position, which will occupy the rest of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*.

> 111. However, that the inferential mark, etc., is not apprehended by perception because there is no conceptualizing – that is false; for a conceptual awareness that assists in apprehension of the form of the object is also considered perception.

Kumārila asserts his principal thesis here, that a conceptual awareness of an object that reveals the nature or form of the object, insofar as it arises from a proper functioning of the senses in regard to the object, is also a kind of perception.[2]

However, what is the sense of the word 'also' in the above *śloka*? It would seem to imply that there is a conceptualized kind of perception *in addition to* a mere sensory awareness of an object without the determination of its nature in terms of concepts. At this point, however, it might be objected that all consciousness is necessarily conceptual and that it is not the notion of a conceptualized perception that is problematic but rather the notion of an awareness devoid of conceptual construction. Such a view reflects the position of Bhartṛhari and the Grammarian school (*Vaiyākaraṇa*). In an oft-quoted verse Bhartṛhari states, "There is no cognition in this world that is not associated with language. All cognition manifests itself as permeated by language, as it were" (*Vākyapadīya* [R]1.131). To say that awareness is permeated by language is to say that it is conceptual; for Indian philosophers frequently understood the conceptual nature of an awareness to consist

precisely in its involving linguistic representations.[3] In response to Bhartṛhari's position Kumārila continues:

> 112–113. For there is indeed first a cognition of mere seeing that is non-conceptual, which is similar to the cognitions of infants and the speechless, etc., and which arises from the undifferentiated object. At that time neither the universal nor the difference of the object is experienced [distinctly]; rather, only the individual, which serves as the receptacle of both, is ascertained.

Prior to any determinate, conceptual awareness of an object there occurs a bare awareness, a "mere seeing," of the object, which consists simply in looking at it or otherwise sensing it without yet fully discriminating it. In such an awareness one sees something – indeed, as Kumārila will explain in v. 118, an object endowed with various properties – but does not explicitly identify its properties nor ascertain its sameness or difference from other objects.[4] One identifies it, for example, neither as a "cow" that is the same as other cows, nor as a "white cow." The object is present, rather, simply as some individual with various features whose relationships to other objects are unclear.[5] Similarly, we think that a child, before he learns what things are, sees *something* – indeed, the same thing an adult possessed of language sees – but he is unable to *identify* it, to associate it or dissociate it from other things.[6]

Kumārila, interestingly, does not provide an argument here to establish that there indeed is such a nonconceptualized perception. He may have thought that it was simply a matter of observation, but he could also have believed that it is something we must infer. In verse 118 he will state that the fact that the object of nonconceptualized perception really possesses a dual nature, that is, is both general and particular in nature, is known indirectly. However, Pārthasārathimiśra says in his commentary on this verse that the nonconceptualized cognition of the undifferentiated object is "established by cognition," that is, known by experience. Yet he also argues (as does Sucaritamiśra) that there *must* be such a cognition prior to a conceptualized one, because the latter involves associating a certain word with a percept, and the memory of the appropriate word must be triggered by some other, preceding experience. (If the experience that triggered it were itself conceptual, a regress would ensue.)[7]

2.2 Critique of the Advaita Vedānta position that nonconceptualized perception apprehends the highest universal

However, what exactly is it that is grasped by the initial nonconceptualized cognition? The Advaita Vedānta school – in particular, the tradition represented by Maṇḍanamiśra – held that it is not a particular, as Kumārila suggests above, but a universal. Indeed, it is the highest universal, Being, which is identical with

Brahman, the ultimate reality. In other words, according to the Advaitins, in every perceptual act we initially directly perceive Brahman; subsequently, we are – erroneously – aware of the object as some other determinate type of thing.

> 114–116. But it is said by others that the highest universal, which is called "substance" or "the existent" [is experienced then]. So it is held that perception has that which is universal as its object. Differences, on the other hand, are cognized by conceptualized cognitions. Some are specific to each substance, others pertain to many things. But the perception that arises in regard to a cow or a horse without conceiving differences as distinct or common does not differ.

The initial, nonconceptualized perception apprehends that which is most general, that is, Being, say the Advaitins.[8] The subsequent, conceptual awareness, on the other hand, apprehends the object as different from other objects in a broad or narrow way. For example, in apprehending it as a man, it conceives of the object as different from a cow, a horse, etc., but as like other men; however, in conceiving it as Devadatta, it conceives of it as different from all other individuals. The original, nonconceptualized perception, on the other hand, apprehends each object in the same way, merely as a substance or that which exists, that is, as Being as such. Ultimately, there is no difference in the nonconceptualized perceptions of a cow and a horse!

Now in response to this theory of the Advaitins Kumārila states:

> 117. That is wrong; for there is an apprehension of a distinct form for each substance. Indeed, it is not to be understood that there is no difference of the object from the fact that it cannot be named.

In the first moment of nonconceptualized perception one apprehends a particular form of the object that is distinct from the forms of other objects – only one does not apprehend it explicitly *as distinct*. Certainly, the nonconceptualized visual perception of a cow is a different experience from that of a horse. The specific nature of the object of perception is plain even at the nonconceptualized level, and the fact that we do not at that stage identify the specific nature of the object *as such* does not mean that it is not presented to us;[9] for the specific nature of the object experienced at the nonconceptual level serves as the basis of an explicit consciousness of the object as the same or different from others at the conceptual level. In short, an object must first be known in its own, distinct nature before it can be associated or distinguished from others. Therefore, it is not mere Being or substancehood that is cognized in nonconceptualized perception.[10]

But is it only the distinct nature of the object that is known at the nonconceptualized level? In fact, Kumārila continues,

118. Even in a non-conceptualized awareness there is an apprehension of a thing that has a dual nature, which is known indirectly.[11] However, the undifferentiated object is apprehended by the knower.

Not only are we aware of the distinct form of the object in a nonconceptualized perception, which is the basis of distinguishing it from other things; we are also aware of its general nature, which is the basis for associating it with other things. According to Kumārila, every substance has both features, particular and general, and both are manifest at the level of nonconceptualized perception.[12] That one apprehends an object that possesses this dual nature in nonconceptualized perception, however, is something we know only indirectly, by supposition (*arthāpatti*), from the fact that both aspects emerge explicitly in conceptualized perception. (That is to say, the latter fact cannot be accounted for without assuming a preceding nonconceptualized perception of both aspects.) At the moment of nonconceptualized perception, the knower is predominantly conscious of the object just as an indeterminate "this" or "something," in that she has yet to bring out its particular and universal aspects by comparing and contrasting it with other things.

119. For it is not perceived as unique, because there is no distinguishing it from others; nor as a universal, because of the absence of a conception of being common to [other] particulars.

The reason why the object of nonconceptualized perception is not distinctly seen as different from some things and the same as other things is because there is no comparison of the object with others. One simply glimpses the object and apprehends its features without noticing that they serve to distinguish it from X,Y, and Z or associate it with U,V, and W; and it is only insofar as an object is consciously distinguished or associated with other objects that one is fully, distinctly aware that general concepts and terms apply to it.[13]

2.3 Defense of conceptualized perception against initial Buddhist objections

Having refuted the Grammarian and Advaita Vedānta positions, Kumārila now returns to his main concern – the defense of the idea of conceptualized perception against the Buddhist view that all perception is nonconceptualized:

120. The cognition, however, by which the thing is subsequently ascertained by means of properties such as its genus, etc., is also considered perception.

Kumārila here reiterates his principal claim of the second part of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, that the conceptual awareness that follows upon a nonconceptualized perception is also a *perception*. Indian philosophers recognized

five types of conceptualization or conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), which is the essence of a conceptual awareness: (1) the joining or associating (*yojanā*) of a substance with a certain name, for example, "This is Devadatta" (*nāmakalpanā*); (2) the joining of a substance with a certain universal, for example, "This is a man" (*jātikalpanā*); (3) the joining of a substance with a certain quality, for example, "This flower is red" (*guṇakalpanā*); (4) the joining of a substance with a certain action, for example, "The horse is running" (*kriyākalpanā*); and (5) awareness of a substance endowed with or possessed of another substance, for example, "The man is armed with a stick" (*dravyakalpanā*). The Buddhists, however, are generally taken to have understood all five types as instances of the association or joining of a linguistic expression, that is, either a proper name or another word, with the object. A *jātikalpanā*, for instance, could not really be the joining of a substance with a certain genus or universal because there are no real universals with which it could be joined. Rather, it is merely the joining of a particular word – a genus word such as 'cow' – with the perceived object. Similarly, the conceptual awareness of an object in terms of a certain quality is really just the associating of a quality word, such as 'white', with it.[14] In every case, then, the essence of conceptualization is just the joining of the percept with a term or expression. Kumārila, however, apparently believes that a conceptual awareness involves more than that; he says here that it is the ascertainment of an object "by means of properties such as its genus, etc."

At this point an objection is raised. However it is conceived of, conceptual awareness would depend on memory. If it were the joining of an expression with the perceived object, it would require recollection of the linguistic convention that assigns a certain word to that kind of object. If it were the joining of the categories genus, etc., with the object, that is, the apprehension of the object as endowed with certain properties, it would require the recognition of those categories. That is to say, one would have to identify the particular property one perceives the object as having as a *type* of property one has experienced before. However, a sense faculty is incapable of remembering anything; yet a cognition is perceptual only if it is produced by a sense faculty. Hence, it follows that a conceptual awareness is not a *perceptual* awareness. This argument is only hinted at by Diṅnāga – in connection with his critique of the Vaiśeṣika proposal that conceptualized perception is the apprehension of an object qualified by a certain qualifier.[15] It is clearer in Dharmakīrti, who considers the matter in relation to the kind of conceptualized perception that unites a verbal expression with the perceived object. At *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.8 (=PV 3.174) he says, "How can that which has the nature of an associating of something previously experienced [i.e., the associating of a previously learned word with the perceived object], which is assisted by remembrance of a linguistic convention, occur in a visual cognition, which is devoid of any reflection on what is before and after?"[16]

To this, Kumārila responds:

> 121–122. The sense faculty is the means of the arising of the cognition; the cognition is not located in that. Thus, a conceptual awareness is not excluded on the grounds that the sense faculty is incapable of memory. Cognition is located in the self only, for it is understood here as the knower. And it possesses the capacity of remembering and connecting, etc.

It is not the sense faculty that remembers. The sense faculty is merely an instrument employed by the self in knowing. It is unconscious; it is not the possessor of cognitive states at all. The self, rather, is the knower and the rememberer. It has the capacity, through the agency of the mind (*manas*), to identify a genus, quality, etc., it is currently experiencing as a genus, quality, etc., it has experienced before, that is, to think, "This is that [genus, quality, etc.]," and also to associate with it a particular term for which there exists a convention, "This is the name for that."[17] The fact that a sense faculty is incapable of memory does not mean that it is not a factor in the arising of a conceptual awareness, for it causes a (nonconceptual) experience of the object, which in turn evokes a conceptual awareness of it.[18]

It would seem, however, that an act of memory intervenes between the functioning of the sense faculty and the arising of the conceptual awareness. How, then, could the latter be considered a perception if it is not the functioning of the sense faculty but an act of memory that immediately gives rise to it? This objection, more or less, is raised by Dharmakīrti at *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.5.[19]

Kumārila responds:

> 123. Therefore, a person who conceives a thing by means of its property, though he may be remembering,[20] is having a perception if there is a connection of sense faculty and object.

Even though a memory arises in the process of conceptualizing an object, the functioning of the sense faculty need not be interrupted, and as long as the connection of sense faculty and object is not broken off, one's awareness is perceptual.[21]

(An alternative interpretation of verses 121–123 is as follows. In response to the objection that a conceptual awareness arises from memory, the first quarter of v. 121 states that the "means" of the awareness is the *sense faculty*, that is, either the external sense or the mind considered as a sense faculty. In other words, the identification of an object as having a certain quality, belonging to a certain genus, etc., is generated by a sense faculty, and so is properly called a perception. In response to the suggestion that the sense faculty (the mind or the external sense) itself could generate a conceptual awareness only by *remembering* the identity of the property, hence the conceptual awareness would still be a memory, not a perception, Kumārila says, with the rest of v. 121 and v. 122, that a sense faculty is not conscious and so cannot remember anything. Rather, it is the self that is the knower

and rememberer. Verse 123 then concerns a certain type of conceptual cognition in which memory undeniably plays a role, namely, the awareness of something as having a certain name, for example, "This is Devadatta" (*nāmakalpanā*). In the case of such an awareness, one must surely have remembered the convention that assigns the name to the object. However, so long as the senses are functioning, Kumārila responds, the cognition must be considered a perception, even though memory is involved. According to this interpretation, the expression *svadharmeṇa* 'by means of its property' in v. 123 should be taken as referring to the fact that the cognition arises from the functioning of the senses (*indriyajanyatvena*); thus, verse 123 should be translated:

> Therefore, when there exists a connection of sense faculty and object, a person who is conceptualizing a thing, even though he is remembering, is having a perception, due to its own property [of having arisen from the functioning of a sense faculty].

Kumārila explicitly considers the option of counting the mind as a sense faculty in verses 134–136.)[22]

Assuming again that a conceptual awareness depends on an act of memory, why should it be called *pratyakṣa*, which literally means 'that which pertains to each sense faculty'(cf. v. 65)? For it is now clear that it is not just the external sense faculty interacting with the object that produces such an awareness, but the sense faculty in conjunction with memory.

Kumārila responds:

> 124. And since that cognition is dependent on these sense faculties, it is referred to by means of them. However, a cognition that arises without a connection is not considered a perception.

Just insofar as a conceptualized cognition is caused by the functioning of a sense faculty, even though other factors may be involved, it can be called a "perception." Conceptualized cognitions that arise without the input of a sense faculty, on the other hand – as when one simply thinks about something – are not to be considered perceptual.[23]

Not only can a conceptual awareness be a perception even though it is preceded by an act of memory, so long as the connection of the sense faculty with the object is unbroken; but a conceptual awareness can be a perception even when there is another intervening conceptual awareness.

> 125. Even if a conceptual awareness were to occur again and again, as long as there is comprehension in conformity with the connection, each cognition is considered a perception.

Even when one repeatedly cognizes an object conceptually – as one would, for example, in gradually identifying the various properties of an object that one

initially perceives indistinctly – all one's cognitions would be perceptions so long as the connection of the sense faculty with the object remained intact.

Now another kind of objection is raised against the notion of a conceptualized perception. If the sense faculty in fact produced a conceptualized perception, it would do so immediately. Yet according to Kumārila and others, the sense faculty first produces a nonconceptualized perception, then a conceptualized one. It would seem, then, that the nonconceptualized cognition that immediately follows the functioning of the sense faculty would be a perception, but the second, conceptual awareness, which does not arise immediately from the functioning of the sense faculty, would not. A similar objection is stated by Dharmakīrti at *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.6ac'.[24]

Kumārila responds:

> 126–127. For from the fact that objects do not appear to people who have just entered the inner chamber of a temple, etc., from the heat, it does not follow that they are not apprehended by the senses. But just as people first know an object merely according to its initial appearance and then later comprehend it according to its true nature, so do they know an object according to attributes of genus, etc.

A perception does not necessarily arise immediately upon the connection of sense faculty and object; rather, there can be a delay. We see this in the case of entering a room from bright sunlight. Even though various objects are in one's field of vision as soon as one enters the room, and there is sufficient light to see them, one does not immediately notice them. One's eyes must become accustomed to the dimmer light. Similarly, when one sees an object at a distance one does not immediately notice its specific features – even though it is within one's field of vision. One does so only later, after approaching more closely. However, surely the later, clearer cognition of the object is just as much a perception as the earlier one. So, although an explicit, conceptual awareness of the properties of an object may not arise *immediately* upon the sense faculties coming into connection with the object, it also can be considered a perception.

(The above verses can also be read as responding to the following objection. The cause of X should *invariably* give rise to X. If, as the Mīmāṃsaka maintains, the connection of sense faculty and object causes a conceptualized cognition, then it will never cause a nonconceptualized cognition. In that case, a nonconceptualized cognition will not be a perception! To this, the response is: the sense faculty–object connection does not *immediately* give rise to its effect, a conceptualized perception. Rather, it first gives rise to a nonconceptualized perception and then, through that, a conceptualized perception. We see this from the example of a person perceiving objects upon first entering a dimly lit room from bright sunlight. There is initially an indistinct perception of the objects in the room followed by a distinct one. Yet both are counted as perceptions. Similarly, someone seeing an object from a distance at first, indeed, *sees* it but does not recognize it as a cow or

a horse. So, one may first indistinctly apprehend an object nonconceptually and then distinctly apprehend it conceptually according to the properties of genus, quality, etc. The former is no less a perception than the latter and the latter no less than the former. Both are produced by the operation of the sense faculties in conjunction with other factors – the object, the self, and the mind.

There is yet a third possible interpretation of verses 126–127. They can be seen as responding to the objection that cause and effect always resemble each other – the son resembles his father, a pot resembles the clay out of which it is made, etc. How, then, can a conceptual awareness be the effect of a nonconceptual one, that is, how can a nonconceptualized perception give rise to a conceptualized perception? For the latter involves an explicit awareness of genus and difference, whereas the former does not [cf. PV 3.183–184]. In reply, it is said that, just as an indistinct awareness [the initial cognition of one entering a temple, etc.] gives way to a distinct one, so a nonconceptualized cognition can give rise to a conceptualized one. And in fact, cause and effect are not always similar, for we observe that the betel nut, which is brown, produces red juice when chewed.)[25]

Now another objection is raised: Does the Mīmāṃsaka mean to say that an awareness is a perception simply if it follows upon a nonconceptualized perception? If so, then I could be "perceiving" an object by merely thinking about it with my eyes closed if I do so after having looked at it, that is, having apprehended it nonconceptually.

To this Kumārila responds:

> 128. But if someone, having looked at and closed his eyes, were to conceive of an object, that would not be perception, because it is not in accordance with a connection.

Kumārila reiterates the point that a cognition is a perception only if it arises when the sense faculty is actually connected with its object.[26]

We see from this discussion another reason for the addition of the word *sat* 'existing' to the expression *samprayoga* 'connection' in MS 1.1.4. To say that a perception is a cognition that arises from an existing connection or an existing proper functioning of the sense faculties is to suggest that so long as there is a connection of sense faculty and object, the cognition that arises is indeed a perceptual one. Thus the *sūtra* implies that conceptualized cognitions can be perceptions.

2.4 The role of the mind in conceptualized perception

It was stated earlier (v. 124) that something can be called "perception," *pratyakṣa* – literally, "that which pertains to each sense faculty" – if it is caused by a sense faculty. However, it has also now been made clear that other factors are involved, in particular, the mind (*manas*), which is the faculty of memory. In fact, at least four factors contribute to the arising of *any* perception: sense faculty, mind, self, and object. Why, then, is a conceptualized cognition arising from the functioning

of the senses not referred to as, say, *pratimanas*, "that which pertains to the mind"? Why is the factor of the sense faculty singled out?

Kumārila responds:

> 129. The self, etc., are equally the cause of a conceptual awareness of that which is without connection. Therefore, the sense faculty is specific in regard to conceptual construction.

The sense faculty is the specific factor responsible for the arising of the type of cognition in question. Mind and self may be involved, but they are also involved in the genesis of other kinds of conceptual awareness, that is, memory and inference, which do not reveal an object currently connected with a sense faculty. Since the (concurrent) functioning of a sense faculty is unique to the type of conceptual awareness Kumārila is talking about, it is properly referred to as *pratyakṣa*, "that which pertains to each sense faculty."

Moreover,

> 130ab. Even in the case of a non-conceptual awareness the sense faculty is not the sole cause.

The mind is involved even in the arising of a nonconceptualized cognition, as the faculty that mediates between a particular sense faculty and the self. Yet even the Buddhist recognizes that a nonconceptual awareness is properly referred to as *pratyakṣa*, for the sense faculty is the factor in the genesis of that kind of awareness that is not also involved in the production of other kinds of awareness. Thus, the involvement of the mind should not preclude the application of the term 'perception' to a conceptual awareness caused by a sense faculty, either.

The preceding discussion was based on the assumption that the sense faculty remains connected with the object when a conceptualized perception arises. One could hold, however, that the functioning of the sense faculty is exhausted in giving rise to the nonconceptualized perception and that conceptualized perception is caused in turn by the nonconceptualized one.[27] In that case, the objection that a conceptualized perception should not really be called a "perception," that is, "that which pertains to each sense faculty," becomes more serious.

Kumārila responds:

> 130cd. Or else there would be a conventional meaning [of the term *pratyakṣa*] in regard to that which has arisen indirectly from the sense faculty, like 'mud-born', etc.

A conceptualized cognition could be called *pratyakṣa*, "that which pertains to each sense faculty," simply because it arises *indirectly* from a sense faculty. Of course, various other cognitions arise indirectly from the functioning of sense faculties. Indeed, inferential and memory cognitions arise in that way. However, it is possible

that only perceptual cognitions, not inferential ones, are referred to by the term *pratyakṣa* due to a conventional restriction of the usage of the term. Similarly, the word *paṅkaja* 'mud-born' is used to refer to the lotus flower, which indirectly grows out of the mud. (Strictly speaking, a lotus sprouts from a *bulbous root* embedded in the mud.) Although there are various other things that might be referred to as "mud-born" in this way – for example, water lilies – only the lotus flower is so called, because of a conventional restriction of the word.[28]

> 131. Or else there is a conventional meaning without an etymological basis. Conceptualized perception is especially thought to be perception in the world, non-conceptualized perception is not.

Or, indeed, it could be that we just call conceptualized perceptions "perceptions" without paying any attention to the etymological meaning of the word. Although the conventional meaning of a word (*rūḍhi*) can be partially based on its etymological meaning (*yoga*), it can also not be based on it at all. Indeed, most words are like that.[29] Thus, objections raised to using *pratyakṣa* to refer to conceptualized perceptions based on its etymology are simply beside the point. In fact, in common practice, we find that people generally mean conceptualized perception when they talk about perception.[30] That is, by perception most people mean a perceptual *judgement*, the awareness that something is green or red, a dog or a cat, something moving or stationary, etc. One doesn't really even notice the moment of nonconceptualized perception.

> 132–133. For us, the meanings of all words are to be comprehended from the usage of elders. Therefore, this word should not be applied other than how it is usually employed.[31] Indeed, intelligent people should only follow what is already established. That which is established for everyone cannot be eliminated by a definition.

We should use words as they are employed by people who are versed in the language. If our elders, then, use the word *pratyakṣa* to refer to conceptualized perception, that should settle the matter – it is indeed a form of perception. A philosopher cannot declare something else to be perception by *fiat*.

In the preceding discussion the Buddhist has consistently argued that a conceptual awareness cannot be called a perception because it does not arise from the functioning of a sense faculty. In fact, however, the Buddhist does consider a conceptual awareness to be a perception in another sense; namely, it is a direct perception of itself. Every mental state, according to the Buddhist, directly perceives itself, for all cognitions are self-aware. Thus, even a conceptual awareness is a form of direct self-awareness, and in that sense is a perception, though, once again, it is not a perception of some external object. Diṅnāga says this at

Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.1.7ab.[32] Noting this doctrine, Kumārila raises the following point against the Buddhist:

> 134. How can there be dependence upon a sense faculty in the case of the self-awareness of a conceptual construction? If the mind were the sense faculty in that case, then that would be the same in the case of cowness, etc., as well.

If the Buddhist criticizes the Mīmāṃsaka for calling a conceptual awareness of an external object a perception because a sense faculty is not functioning when the cognition arises (for, according to the Buddhist, its operation ceases with the production of a nonconceptualized perception of the object), then how can he call a conceptual awareness a "perception" *of itself*; for in that case, too, a sense faculty is not involved?

The Buddhist, however, might say that the mind (*manas*) serves somehow as a sense faculty in the self-apprehension of a mental state; thus the latter is properly a *pratyakṣa*.[33] However, if the Buddhist held such a theory, the Mīmāṃsaka could hold that mind serves as a sense faculty in the genesis of a conceptual awareness of an external object, too – that is, it gives rise to a conceptual awareness when it perceives the object through the external senses and identifies its properties. Thus, such an awareness would be properly called *pratyakṣa*.

But it might be objected that *manas* can apprehend only that which is within; it cannot grasp the properties of external objects.

> 135a. [Objection:] If it is considered a perception only in the case of a self-awareness . . .

Kumārila responds:

> 135b–136. [Reply:] [We would respond that that is not correct,] for the common person does not consider matters thus. Therefore, one should accept that the word is used conventionally or else is a technical term. But just as cognitions of pleasure, pain, etc., are perceptions due to the mind being a sense faculty, so will its being a perception depend on that for us.

Ordinary people usually consider the cognition of an external object as a cow, etc., to be a perception, not the self-awareness of a cognition![34] Thus, if the Buddhist insists on calling the self-awareness of a conceptual awareness a "perception," he could do so only insofar as he is using the word in a strictly conventional or technical sense. In that case, however, the Mīmāṃsaka would be justified in using the word 'perception' conventionally or technically to refer to a conceptual awareness of external objects. If, on the other hand, one claimed that the awareness of a mental state such as pleasure and pain is to be called a perception because

the mind functions as a sense faculty therein, one could claim that the explicit awareness of an object as possessing a particular property, that is, a conceptualized cognition itself, may be called a perception for the same reason – insofar as the mind functions as a sense faculty therein; for insofar as the mind is assisted by the external senses, it too can apprehend external objects and their properties.[35]

One might object that if dependence on the mind is what justifies one in considering conceptualized cognitions perceptions, then one might regard inferential cognitions perceptions as well! Kumārila responds:

> 137. Although dependence on the mind is the same [in the case of inferential cognitions, etc.], nevertheless, just as only a certain cognition is considered perception for you as a result of mentioning that it is "devoid of conceptual construction," so for us.

Just as the Buddhist more or less arbitrarily restricts the term 'perception' to cognitions devoid of conceptual content, so might the Mīmāṃsaka restrict the term to cognitions not mediated by other concepts, such as an inferential mark.

> 138–139. And since there is no inferential mark, etc., this is not an inferential cognition, etc. Nor can it be a memory, because its object has not been experienced previously. And it is not an invalid cognition, because there is no refuting cognition. Therefore, it is indeed a perception; and so is your own practice.

Since conceptualized perceptions arise without the intervention of a cognition of a middle term or inferential mark, they are not inferential cognitions. A conceptualized perception apprehends an object immediately in conceptual terms. Nor is a conceptualized perception a kind of memory cognition. When I apprehend that the thing before me is a cow, I am not re-experiencing what I experienced previously. Although cowness will have been experienced previously, and a conceptual awareness consists in identifying the cowness one sees now as that which one experienced before (or in remembering the word for it, 'cow'; or both), the connection of cowness with this particular substance will not have been experienced previously. Finally, one might suggest that conceptualized perceptions are simply erroneous cognitions, like the cognition of silver superimposed upon mother-of-pearl. That also cannot be the case, for they are rarely overthrown by subsequent cognitions. One does not often identify an object as a cow and then realize that it is really not a cow. For Kumārila in general, a cognition is to be considered valid unless and until it is refuted by other cognitions, since every cognition arises with an initial sense of its own truth.

Having eliminated these other kinds of cognitions as possibilities, the only plausible alternative that remains is that the sort of conceptualized cognition in question is a perception. Indeed, even the Buddhist must acknowledge the application of conceptualized perception in inference, for example.[36]

2.5 Conceptualized perceptions are not erroneous cognitions

2.5.1 The relation of property and property-bearer

In the preceding discussion Kumārila has argued by process of elimination that a conceptualized cognition arising from the functioning of the senses is a perception. It is *not* an inferential cognition (or any of the other *pramāṇas*, it would seem, or doubt) or a memory or a kind of error. The only other type of cognition that remains is a perception. Yet how do we know that it is not an error? Kumārila suggests: because there is no subsequent cognition that refutes it. One might argue, however, that in fact there is a refuting cognition. The determination that genus and individual, or more generally, property and property-bearer, are distinct would refute the conceptual awareness of the individual as of a particular genus, etc.[37]

In this and the next section Kumārila seems to be considering conceptual awareness as the awareness of an object qualified by a certain modifier – a genus, quality, action, or another substance (such as a stick in the awareness "man armed with a stick"). In later discussions this kind of conceptual awareness is referred to as a "conceptual awareness of a qualified object" (*viśiṣṭavikalpa*). We have already seen, however, that there was also a tendency, especially among Buddhist philosophers, to consider conceptual awareness strictly as the associating of a name or expression with what is perceived. Kumārila seems to be considering conceptual awareness under this latter rubric (perhaps together with the former) in vv. 121–123 earlier and, more explicitly, in vv. 169ff. below. The same distinction in ways of conceiving conceptual awareness may also be seen reflected in Dharmakīrti's discussion.[38]

Now Kumārila states the objection:

> 140. [Objection:] Because the cognition arises when one has superimposed one kind of thing – the genus, etc. – on another thing that does not have that nature, it is similar to a mirage, etc.

In a conceptual awareness one typically conceives of subject and predicate as identical: "This [particular thing] *is* a cow," "The pot *is* blue," etc. In Sanskrit the former sentence consists simply of the pronoun 'this' and the noun 'cow' without an article, so that it actually can be taken to convey the idea "This [is] cow" (*ayaṃ gauḥ*), that is, as a statement of identity. Yet we realize subsequently that the subject and predicate are distinct. The animal is not "cow" but *is possessed of* cowness, and so forth. Therefore, conceptualized cognitions are not perceptions but instances of error. The idea that a conceptual awareness involves an "attribution of identity" is mentioned by Diṅnāga in his discussions of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā theories of perception, but he does not explicitly develop it into the objection Kumārila is considering here.[39]

Kumārila responds:

> 141. [Reply:] This is not the case, because of the impossibility of the superimposition, etc., of the ideas 'horse', etc.; for it is established for us that the genus, etc., are not other than the individual.

The attributing of property to property-bearer in a conceptualized cognition is not a kind of false superimposition, the construing of one thing as identical with another, because in fact property and property-bearer are the same thing! That is to say, the Mīmāṃsaka holds that property-bearer and property – including quality, action, and genus – are but different aspects of a single thing. Thus there is nothing wrong with saying, "That animal is [a] cow," etc., and even taking it as an identity statement.

Here, the Mīmāṃsaka sets himself especially in opposition to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher, who holds that the universal is something distinct from the particular but related to it through the relationship of inherence (*samavāya*). As we shall see below, the Mīmāṃsaka believes that the notion of inherence leads to various problems, including that of infinite regress.

On what grounds does the Mīmāṃsā philosopher hold that property and property-bearer are (at least partly) identical?

> 142. For if the qualifying feature were completely distinct from the thing qualified, how would it always produce a cognition of the thing qualified conforming to itself?

If the feature one recognizes an object as having in a conceptualized cognition – the, genus, quality, etc. – were really distinct from the object and a conceptualized cognition were therefore a kind of error, then why are we aware of the object *as existing in that form*? Indeed, we are not aware of property and property-bearer as distinct things; rather, we are aware of them as *fused together*, as it were. Such judgements should be taken at face value. If the genus, etc., cause in us cognitions that particular objects *are* the genus, etc., then surely it is because that is how they are![40]

> 143–144. But a cognition having the form of a piece of lac, etc., that would arise for an uneducated person in regard to a crystal would be false, because educated persons have a cognition of difference. However, nothing that is independent of the genus, etc., is ever seen; nor are genus, etc., seen separately from those, like the piece of crystal and the lac, etc.

Moreover, property and property-bearer are never found separately. The individual property-bearer cannot exist without the genus and the genus cannot exist without

the individual property-bearer. So it is correct to consider them identical.[41] Similarly, qualities and actions cannot exist apart from substances. Although a substance can have qualities and actions different from those it presently has, it cannot exist apart from the *particular* qualities and actions it now has, so long as it does not undergo change.[42]

One might hold that the identification of the genus with the individual, which is expressed in the judgement "This is [a] cow," is the same kind of error an unintelligent person commits when he thinks that a crystal reflecting a piece of lac placed next to it *is* the piece of lac. Kumārila responds: the latter case is clearly one of error because the cognition of identity is refuted by a cognition of difference, since intelligent persons know that the crystal and the lac are different things. However, the identification of genus and individual is not clearly contradicted by any cognition of their difference.

> 145. Or, if in that case, too, difference were never seen by certain people, how would the correctness of the idea of red, etc., be removed?

If, for that matter, no one ever apprehended a difference between crystal and lac, the cognition that they are identical would never be refuted and so would be true (for it would retain its initial intrinsic validity). So, if no difference between universal and individual is ever perceived, the perception of their identity must be true.[43]

However, the Vaiśeṣika philosopher believes that the fact that universal and individual are always found together and perceived as the same thing is due to their being related to each other by means of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Universal and individual are really distinct but they are inseparable; the former can occur only insofar as it inheres in the latter. Kumārila wards off this approach by critiquing the notion of inherence in the next several verses:

> 146. And there is no conception of things that are unable to exist independently, as terms of a relation. There is no relation of that which is not established, and if it is established, then it exists independently.

The Vaiśeṣika philosopher defines inherence as the relation existing between things unable to exist independently of each other, such as substance and quality, particular and universal. Of two things standing in such a relation to each other, one is the "container," the other the "contained."[44] Kumārila attacks this definition here as incoherent. If two things really can't exist independently of each other (*ayutasiddha*), then they cannot constitute the terms of a relation, which requires independent terms. If, on the other hand, each of the terms of the relation of inherence is established independently, then the one *can* exist without the other; hence they are not really "unable to exist independently."[45]

> 147. For that being the case, there would be no reason for a relation, and no relation of the six categories would be perceived.

Moreover, if the subject and property related to each other by inherence were really able to exist separately, there would be no valid reason why they would be joined together, related to each other by inherence. Given two other things that are distinct, say, a pot and a rope, one can discern in Devadatta, the person who ties the rope to the pot, the reason for their being united. However, we can identify no such reason for the union of property and property-bearer. As a result, if property and property-bearer were truly distinct, the various categories of substance, quality, action, etc., would never be joined together into wholes – as, say, a substance possessing a particular quality, etc.

Suppose, however, that property and property-bearer are related by inherence, how would each term stand in relation to inherence itself?

> 148. And because of a separation of inherence [from the terms it is supposed to relate] there would be a mutual disconnection of them. And if a relation is postulated, then there would be a regress, because every relation would have a connection with yet another relation.[46]

If neither property nor property-bearer were somehow related to inherence, then, since inherence is supposed to be what mediates them, they would not be related to each other. Suppose, then, that each is related to inherence by means of another relation. What type of relation this would be is unclear. It could not be "contact" (*saṃyoga*), since that is a quality only of substances and inherence, one of the terms to be related here, is not a substance. Nor, it seems, could it be inherence; for the Vaiśeṣika holds that inherence is only one,[47] and an inherence that relates inherence to the terms it relates would be a second inherence![48] Thus, one would have to posit another relation that mediates between property, property-bearer, and inherence. Now, however, one cannot stop. Yet another relation that mediates property, property-bearer, inherence, and the relation that relates inherence to the other two terms would have to be postulated, and so on. In this way, the concept of inherence involves a regress.

However, one might argue that it is of the very nature of inherence to relate its terms together. Inherence doesn't have to be related to its terms by means of another relation – any more than water requires some other kind of moisture in order to make things wet.[49]

> 149ab. [Objection:] There is no positing of another relation, because that is its nature.

Kumārila responds:

> 149cd. [Reply:] Because it is not different from them, let inherence be the essence of the property and property-bearer.

If inherence related together property and property-bearer without itself being related to either one by means of some other relation, then it would simply *be* the property and property-bearer standing in relation to each other; it would not in any way be distinct from them. In that case, one really has to do just with the property and the property-bearer as distinct aspects or natures of a single entity. Why bother to speak about inherence at all?

Kumārila summarizes the problems with inherence in the following verse:

> 150. Insofar as it is distinct, inherence does not bring about a relation [between property and property-bearer]; but if it is not distinct from them, they would not be different from each other.

An inherence that is distinct from the terms it would relate together in fact is not able to relate them. Yet if it is not distinct from those terms, that is, if is identical with them, then one does not have two distinct terms to be related. Each of the terms being identical with a third term – in this case, the inherence – they would be identical with each other.

Thus, the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence is incoherent. Therefore, genus and individual – more broadly, property and property-bearer – cannot be construed as distinct. There can be no error in perceiving "This is [a] cow," as if individual and genus are identical. Thus, once again, conceptualized perceptions are valid cognitions.

However, there is another way in which the cognition "This is a cow" might be considered erroneous. Just as this judgement suggests that property and property-bearer are identical, it also suggests that they are somehow different; for it employs distinct terms, 'this' and 'cow', thus implying that we have to do with two things. In particular, such a judgement is usually taken to imply that there is an enduring entity, the referent of 'this' – a substance – that possesses the property cowness. Yet surely that is a mistake. An enduring subject of properties, or substance, is a fiction. What we call a "substance" is nothing other than various properties that are always found together. Indeed, such was the view of substance urged by the Buddhists.[50]

Thus, in effect, the opponent, after arguing that the conceptualized cognition "This is [a] cow" is erroneous because it suggests an identity between the referents of 'this' and 'cow', now takes the opposite route by arguing that it is erroneous because it suggests a difference between them!

> 151. [Objection:] But isn't it the case that a cow, etc., would be merely a collection of properties, like a forest, etc., since the property-bearer is not apprehended as distinct from the properties?

How do we know that there is a property-bearer distinct from all the properties assigned to it? A thing is just a bundle of properties, and we cannot distinguish the various properties from an underlying something that has them.[51] Thus a conceptualized cognition structured as an awareness of an enduring subject of properties distinct from it is a form of error.

To this objection Kumārila responds:

> 152–153. That which continues when properties are appearing and disappearing,[52] or else that in regard to which there would be a cognition prior to the apprehension of properties – that is the property-bearer. Therefore, the property-bearer, which is apprehended by people in the form of a genus, etc., does not have another form, and so it is incorrect to hold that it is not a valid cognition.

There is indeed an enduring subject of properties. It is that which remains the same throughout all the changes of properties a thing undergoes. That which at one time is one color, at another time another color, etc., is the enduring subject – a piece of fruit, a pot, whatever.[53] Alternatively, one can think of the subject or property-bearer as the thing one perceives as "that" before one apprehends its specific properties, as one, say, approaches closer to it.[54] Clearly, then, we conceive of the property-bearer – the object itself – as something other than its properties, for we apprehend it without apprehending the latter.

Since the thing that is apprehended in a conceptual awareness *as a property-bearer having properties* is usually really that way (for it is not later discovered to be otherwise) – that is, an enduring thing possessed of properties and not just a collection of properties – the cognition of it as such is valid.

In the preceding discussion Kumārila has accepted the Mīmāṃsā premise that the property-bearer and its properties are identical. Although one can distinguish the property-bearer from the properties as that which remains constant throughout the change of properties, property-bearer and properties are not fully distinct but rather different aspects of the same thing. Indeed, the Mīmāṃsā view can be expressed by saying that property-bearer and properties are both identical and different. In a conceptualized perception one perceives the properties possessed by the property-bearer *as the very form or nature of the property-bearer* (at that particular time), not as something altogether distinct from it.

However, what if one takes property-bearer and properties to be different things, as the Vaiśeṣika philosopher does? Is a conceptualized cognition invalid then, insofar as it asserts that there is a certain identity between property-bearer and property?

> 154–155. Even for someone for whom there is a clear distinction between the property-bearer and its properties, the falsehood does not result for him, either, because the property-bearer always has that nature. A property-bearer that should be known according to one form but is

known according to another is false, not one that is always comprehended according to just that.

In fact, even if one believes that property and property-bearer are really different, the conceptual judgement that relates them, for example, "This is a cow," will not be false. Such a judgement can be taken to mean, not that "this" and "cow" are identical, but that a universal of cowness *inheres* in "this,"a distinct entity, so that they *appear* fused together as a single entity. Such a judgement will never be overturned; for any subsequent cognition of the form "This is a cow" can be interpreted in the same way – as a judgement of the inherence of one thing in another, not their actual identity. A cognition that is never overturned is true.[55]

2.5.2 The unity of the object of different senses

In the above discussion Kumārila argued that the object of a conceptualized perception is an enduring property-bearer possessed of properties, that is, what we call a substance, and not just a collection of properties. One way of establishing this idea is by pointing out that the substance itself, the thing that possesses the properties, is directly apprehended by different senses. Such a view was held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers, who maintained that the faculties of vision and touch, in particular, grasp the substance;[56] it is hinted at by Kumārila earlier, in v. 152. If that is the case, then the substance, the enduring bearer of properties, differs from the latter specifically insofar as it is cognized by more than one sense, whereas many of its properties, in particular, the sensible qualities of color, texture, sound, etc., are known by only one sense.[57]

Here, however, it can be objected that in fact one thing cannot be known by different senses. If something is known by different senses, for example, by vision and touch, then it is *ipso facto* many objects, many things. This point is made by Diṅnāga at PS 1.4.1c.[58]

To this objection Kumārila now responds:

156. And that which is apprehended by multiple sense faculties does not thereby become diverse, lest there be a diversity of form due to the fact that it is apprehended by senses situated in different bodies.

If something were many strictly because it is perceived by different senses, then an object seen by different people would become many; for they perceive it by means of different sense faculties (i.e., one person perceives it with *his* sense faculty, another perceives it with *his*, and so on). Thus, being an object of different sense faculties alone does not entail being more than one object.

The Buddhist opponent, however, might continue to argue with Kumārila as follows. An object seen by different people is not really apprehended by different senses; for one has to do with the same *type* of sense faculty in each case,

namely, vision. Thus Kumārila's counterexample to the principle that something experienced by different senses is many things is invalid.

Kumārila responds:

> 157–158. If one were to argue that there is a non-difference [of sense faculties located in different people] as a result of a non-difference of the type of sense faculty, then that is the same [in the case of something perceived by various sense faculties], insofar as they are all sense faculties. Therefore, because they give rise to the same idea, existence is not different as a result of a difference of sense faculties. And it would not follow that color, etc., are identical, because there are different cognitions. Or else, the object is considered both one and many, due to its having the nature of existence on the one hand and color etc., on the other.

If one is to consider sense faculties the same by appeal to type, then one is free to choose the relevant level of type. One can consider sense faculties (in different people) the same insofar as they are all the visual faculty, or one can consider sense faculties the same insofar as they are all *sense faculties*! Thus, vision, hearing, smell, touch, and taste could all be considered "the same sense faculty," which would undermine the above-stated Buddhist argument that what we perceive *by different senses* is in fact not a unified substance but many different objects. That is to say, the Buddhist assumption that vision, hearing, etc., are different sense faculties would be called into doubt.

Moreover, there is at least one established example of different sense faculties perceiving the same thing, namely, all the sense faculties apprehend existence (*sattā*), that is, the fact that their objects exist or are real.[59] Existence or reality is the highest universal inhering in the various qualities that the senses perceive. (They also all perceive the universal of qualityness, which inheres in them as well.) Existence, clearly, is *not* many things by virtue of being apprehended by different faculties; for the idea of existence to which each sense gives rise is the same in each case. A difference in the object of a faculty of knowledge would follow only upon its giving rise to a different idea. Conversely, from the fact that the senses all apprehend the same thing – existence – it does not follow that all sensible qualities are identical, as Diṅnāga suggests (PS 1.4.1c);[60] for, although indicating the object univocally as something that exists, they also reveal it as red, sweet, hard, etc. Alternatively, one could say that the senses reveal their objects as both one and many – one insofar as they exist, many insofar as they have different qualities. Thus, it seems quite possible that a unified bearer of many properties, the substance, could be revealed in perception as well.

However, one can object further. If the same object is grasped by different senses, then what need is there for a variety of senses; why can't we make do with just one? In fact, two sense faculties apprehending the same object should be considered merely one sense faculty, since there is no functional difference

between them. Thus, it would seem to follow from Kumārila's position that one thing is apprehended by a variety of senses that in fact there is not a variety of faculties of vision, taste, smell, etc., but only one. Diṅnāga seems to present this objection at PS 1.4.2a.[61]

To this objection Kumārila now responds:

> 159. And it is not ascertained that, insofar as there is a convergence of sense faculties in regard to one object, there is just one sense faculty, since there is a distinction based on difference in strength and weakness in regard to a certain object.

One cannot hold that the different senses really amount to only one insofar as they have the same object, say, existence or qualityness; for they can still be distinguished from each other on the basis of their relative acuity with respect to other objects. That is to say, every sensory experience may involve the notion of existence. Yet sometimes a cognition of one particular sensible quality, e.g., color, arises, while at other times a cognition of another sensible quality, e.g., hardness, arises. Thus, it is not the case that ideas of all the sensible qualities arise at the same time. On the basis of this observation we postulate distinct sense faculties. A healthy faculty of vision accounts for why a cognition of color arises for one person (in the presence of a colored object) but not another; a healthy faculty of hearing accounts for the arising of a cognition of sound for the other person, but not the first, and so forth.

But how is it that the senses will unite with respect to one object, but diverge with respect to others? It would seem, rather, that if they sometimes apprehend different things, they should always do so.

To this, Kumārila says,

> 160–161. For just as there is a functioning of the mind together with vision, etc., in respect to color, etc., so a functioning of the mind by itself is observed in respect to pleasure, pain, etc. From the absence of a convergence of the sense faculties in regard to one thing it does not cease in regard to all, and from the observation of convergence in regard to one, convergence in regard to all is not postulated.

The mind sometimes perceives the same objects the senses do. When assisted by the sense of sight, for example, it is able to perceive shapes and colors. Thus frequently the functions of the mind and the external sense faculties coincide. However, at other times they do not, as when the mind apprehends interior mental states such as pleasure and pain, which the external senses are unable to apprehend.[62] Thus, it is to be expected that in certain circumstances the various *external* sense faculties will have the same object – namely, existence, qualityness, or, indeed, a certain substance – while in other circumstances they will have different objects, that is, the different sensible qualities.

Let's examine further the example just brought up – how do we know there is a mind at all distinct from the external senses? If the external senses and the mind sometimes apprehend the same objects, then by the same logic that led Diṅnāga to deny the necessity of postulating a plurality of external senses (if two senses could apprehend the same object, namely, substance, then one sense ought to be able to do the work of all), one might deny that there is any need to postulate a mind distinct from the external senses.

> 162. A distinction is known from the fact that one remembers words, etc., even though hearing, etc., are impaired, and from the fact that there is no cognition of a present object.

Sometimes we have cognitions even though the sense faculties are not functioning. A deaf person, for example, can still have memories of previous auditory experiences.[63] On the other hand, it is evident that this faculty of memory is not another *external* sense faculty; for when the external sense of hearing, for example is not functioning no auditory perceptions are received at all. Therefore, another, internal faculty besides the external senses must be posited, namely, the mind (*manas*), which is able independently to give rise to memories (i.e., without relying on any of the external senses at the time of remembering; the object must of course have been perceived sometime in the past) or apprehend internal mental states, but which is dependent on the external senses in apprehending external objects now.[64]

In the above discussion the Buddhist has maintained that if various senses apprehend the same thing, then in fact they should be considered just one sense. Kumārila presents another point against this argument:

> 163. If there were one sense faculty, then every sensible quality would be apprehended or none. If one posited a difference of capacities, then a capacity would be a sense faculty.

If there were just one sense faculty,[65] then at any given time, one would not perceive just one kind of sensible quality; rather, whenever one perceived any sensible quality of an object, one would perceive all its qualities, which is clearly not the case. Thus, from the fact that all the sense faculties perceive existence and qualityness, it does not follow that there is only one sense faculty.

Were one to suggest that one has to do, actually, with different *capacities* of a single sense faculty,[66] then one's position would differ from Kumārila's merely in wording. One would in effect still be saying that there are distinct sensory faculties, not just one. One might as well call those different capacities different senses.

> 164. A deaf person would hear sound with the sense of vision, etc., if there were a convergence [of the senses], or he would hear sound if the mind were independent in respect to cognitions of present objects.

In verse 161 Kumārila has stated that just because the sense faculties coincide in respect to one object – existence or qualityness – does not mean that they coincide in respect to all objects, that is, all sensible qualities. Here Kumārila states that if they did there would be the absurd consequence that a deaf person – that is, someone whose sense of hearing is irreparably damaged – would be able to hear; for he could use his other senses to apprehend sound! In verse 162 Kumārila implied that the mind is able to apprehend external objects only with the help of the external senses. This fact is supported by the same absurd consequence that would follow upon its denial: even though his ear is destroyed, a person would be able to hear – through the mind alone!

If the mind works in conjunction with the external senses in apprehending external objects, why is it not also dependent on them in remembering past experiences? Kumārila responds:

> 165. The deaf person would not remember sound if hearing were the cause of memory, or else, like memory, he would have a cognition of a present object as well.

If the functioning of the external sense faculty were necessary in order for the mind to remember previous experiences, then memories would not arise for someone for whom the relevant external sense faculty is no longer functioning. That, clearly, is not the case, since people who have become deaf can remember previous auditory experiences. If, on the other hand, the mind functioned independently in respect to external objects, then once again a deaf person, that is, one whose hearing is damaged, could have auditory perceptions through the mind even now, just as one is able to have memories.

But how is it known that there is a perception by the mind of an external object in conjunction with the functioning of the external senses?[67] Kumārila explains:

> 166. And there would not be a memory later if the mind did not apprehend the object; and at the time of apprehending something by hearing, there would not be the absence of a memory of anything.

The mind is the faculty of memory, more precisely, the instrument by means of which the self remembers things.[68] Clearly, one can only remember things one has previously experienced. It is difficult to comprehend how the mind could access in memory an object that *it* had not previously been involved in experiencing – especially if that object is remembered as something *determinate*.[69] Moreover, at the time of experiencing an object one is unable to remember things; when one is experiencing something, the mind is not free to remember. That, however, suggests that the mind, too, is occupied with experiencing the object. Therefore, the mind must be apprehending external objects in conjunction with the external sense faculties.

However, how do we know that it is not the *self*, rather than the mind, that apprehends external objects in conjunction with the external sense faculties? The occurrence of memories of past experiences of sensible objects after the corresponding external sense faculties have been destroyed could be accounted for by the self having experienced those objects.

Kumārila responds:

> 167. If the soul were not also dependent on an instrument in apprehending an object, then it would simultaneously apprehend everything, because its nature is consciousness.

The self cannot apprehend objects directly without some mediating function that establishes a connection between the self and a particular sense faculty. Otherwise, the self being omnipresent, it would stand in connection with all the sense faculties at once and, being of the nature consciousness, it would cognize objects of all the senses at the same time. However, in fact we find that we are aware only of one sense object at a time. Thus, there must be some faculty that mediates between the mind and the senses, that is, that establishes a link between the mind and now this sense faculty, now that one. That is the mind (*manas*).

> 168. Thus, a convergence and divergence [of the senses] in regard to a certain object are postulated according to cognition, from the capacities of the agent and the object of apprehension, based on their effects.

This verse summarizes the preceding discussion, beginning with verse 159. We know that two sense faculties diverge with regard to a certain object – say, vision and touch with regard to the sensible quality of color – from the fact that, given that the object is accessible to two perceivers A and B (this is what is meant by "the capacity . . . of the object of apprehension" – it is not too far away, obscured, or in some other way unsuitable to being perceived), a cognition of it arises for perceiver A but not perceiver B, while other cognitions of other objects (i.e., other sensible qualities, such as texture) arise for perceiver B but not perceiver A. That is to say, on the basis of such a pattern of cognitions, we postulate that perceiver A has a faculty capable of perceiving the object (sensible quality) in question, which, however, cannot be apprehended by the faculties possessed by perceiver B. Similarly, we know that two faculties coincide with regard to a certain object – for example, vision and touch in regard to substance – from the fact that whenever a cognition of the object arises for perceiver A so does one arise for perceiver B. Thus, from the arising of certain cognitions in certain situations, one infers the capacities of the sense faculties for apprehending objects, and from that their divergence or convergence in regard to certain objects.

However, if a distinction of faculties is based on the different types of cognitions that occur, how is it that there are only five different sense faculties? While there

are distinctions between odor, taste, color, sound, and texture, there are also subvarieties of each. Why isn't there a sense faculty for each subvariety of color, for example – one for blue, another for red, a third for green, and so on? Indeed, since there is an infinite variety of cognitions, there would be an infinite number of sense faculties.[70]

Kumārila responds:

> 169. But it is established that there is a five-fold difference of the sense of vision, etc., and visible form, etc. Therefore, even though there is a difference between blue, etc., there is no postulating of an infinite number of sense faculties.

A distinction of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, as of their objects form, sound, smell, taste, and texture, is clearly fixed by observing the varying acuity of sensory powers discussed above. However, a distinction between faculties that apprehend different colors, different sounds, etc., is not to be achieved in the same way. If a person perceives one color, he will most likely perceive all of them; if he perceives one wavelength of sound he will most likely perceive all. Thus, although the different colors obviously *are* distinct from each other, there is no reason to postulate different sense faculties corresponding to them.

> 170. Therefore, it is established that there is knowledge of existence and qualityness through each of the five senses, of substance and size[71] through two of them, and of color, etc., by each individually.

Kumārila concludes the discussion that began with verse 156 with this verse. Just because something is apprehended by different senses does not mean that it is many things. Sometimes different senses converge on the same object.[72] Thus, although substance is apprehended by both vision and touch, it remains one thing. A substance is not a mere collection of properties, but a unified subject of properties that is also in some sense distinct from the latter. Therefore, a conceptual awareness that attributes various properties to a unified subject is not a form of error.

2.5.3 Conceptualized cognitions do not involve the false superimposition of a word upon its meaning

2.5.3.1 We have independent, nonlinguistic cognitions of objects

In the preceding discussion Kumārila has considered the validity of judgements that attribute a property such as a genus, etc., to a subject. In other words, he has considered the validity of combining together in thought different categories. However, as has already been mentioned, conceptual construction is often thought of, especially by the Buddhists, as involving the associating of a certain term or expression with what one perceives, and that would seem to introduce

new possibilities for error.[73] Although it may not be wrong to think of a particular substance as being a horse or white, surely it is wrong to identify a substance with the *words* 'horse' or 'white'. Thus, an opponent objects:

> 171. [Objection:] But isn't it the case that, even though there is an object having the form of a genus, etc., a cognition that functions by identifying it with a word would be false, like the notion of water in regard to salty soil?

It may be the case that objects have the attributes of genus, quality, action, etc., and that it would be correct to cognize them as such, and even in a sense to equate them with those attributes (for, as we have seen, subject and property are in a sense identical). Yet that is not what a conceptualized cognition really does. Rather, it apprehends the object in terms of a *word* – as "cow," "white," "walking," etc. That is to say, it superimposes a word onto a thing; it conceives of the thing *as identical with the word*, just as when one thinks of a certain person merely in terms of his name, as "Devadatta." However, that is surely a form of error, like the illusion of water projected onto sand; for words are not (concrete, physical) things. Thus, such cognitions cannot be *pramāṇas*, valid means of knowledge.

Sucarita interprets this objection slightly differently: "Although there is a subject having the form of genus, etc., since those do not exist separately from words, when a thing is characterized as having that form it results that there is a characterization of it as a word."[74] That is to say, the genus – and so we may assume, other properties – has no reality apart from the word for it; the genus *is* merely a word.[75] Thus, to characterize a thing as being a particular genus, etc., is simply to identify it with a word, which is clearly an error.

The source of this objection is difficult to determine. It may originate from a discussion found at the beginning of the fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In the fifth chapter Diṅnāga presents the *apoha* theory of the meaning of words in the course of refuting alternative theories. He rejects, in succession, views that general terms refer to particulars, to universals, and to relations between universals and particulars. Then (5.4–8ab) he takes up the doctrine that words refer to individuals *possessed of* universals.[76] Among the two main objections he raises against the latter proposal, he suggests that words in that case would always be used *figuratively*. In calling something a cow, for example, one would be referring to an individual possessed of cowness by employing the word 'cow' as a metonym, in the same way one uses the word 'crown' to refer, not to the actual crown, but to the person who wears the crown; for, according to this theory, in the first instance 'cow' still indicates the universal cowness (or, as we shall see presently, the word itself, which is then *superimposed* upon the universal), which implies the individual as the substratum in which it inheres. Diṅnāga, however, argues that there is no real basis for an extension of meaning in this case. Usually, we employ a word figuratively if there is some similarity between its primary and secondary meanings. We might refer to a man as a lion because he shares certain

qualities with a lion. However, there is no "sameness of form" between universals and particulars, Diṅnāga maintains – neither by virtue of the notion of one being transferred to the other, as in the case of the comparison "The servant is the king," nor by virtue of the particular appearing to take on the properties of the universal, in the way a crystal assumes the color of an object placed next to it.

In developing this critique, Diṅnāga mentions the idea that words refer primarily (i.e., literally, not figuratively) either to universals or to their "own form" (*svarūpa*).[77] This is an allusion to a well-known theory of the Grammarian Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari seems to have favored, among the various theories of meaning he considered, the idea that in the first instance a word indicates its "own universal," then a "meaning universal" *upon which the word-universal is superimposed*.[78] What this means is that a word can indicate its meaning, which Bhartṛhari tended to view as a universal – cowness, humanity, etc. – only by indicating *itself* – or more precisely, the universal of which it is an instantiation, that is, not the particular *utterance* of the word 'cow' in question but *the word* 'cow', which we recognize as the same in all such utterances – and conveying an idea of the meaning-universal (cowness, etc.) *as identical with itself*. His reasons for adopting this theory are complex, but one more or less plausible consideration in favor of it is the following. In order to comprehend uttered sounds, one must first recognize the word being used; thus, a pronounced word must refer in the first instance to its "own universal." It is *that* which conveys a meaning in the world, cowness, or whatever, not the uttered sounds.[79] Bhartṛhari himself, however, did not explain why he believes that the word is superimposed on its meaning. His commentator Helārāja, however, mentions the fact that a word seems to be *identified* with its meaning when it is taught. The elder instructs the child, "This is [a] cow," "This is [a] horse," where the words 'cow' and 'horse' may be taken as referring to themselves; for the Indian Grammarians recognized, as have modern linguists, that words are often used to indicate themselves *qua* sequences of phonemes.[80] Helārāja also suggests that the word functioning as a revealing medium becomes indistinguishable from the thing it reveals. Just as the light of a lamp cannot be separated from the object it illumines, so a word overlays the meaning it makes known and cannot be distinguished from it.[81]

As Diṅnāga continues to attack the theory that words refer to particulars possessed of universals (which is also hinted at by Bhartṛhari)[82] he maintains that it would follow from such a view that every cognition – and presumably he means every cognition involving words, that is, every conceptualized cognition – would be false "because of the characteristic of mixture or confusion" (*saṃsargarūpāt*),[83] that is, presumably, because it would combine with the object, which is particular in character, something that doesn't belong to it, namely, something universal in character. Now in v. 7cd–8ab of his discussion Diṅnāga states that the same problems having to do with the figurative use of language would pertain to the other theories he previously rejected, namely, (1) the theory that words refer to particulars, (2) the theory that they refer to universals, and (3) the theory that they refer to the relations between universals and particulars. Specifically in regard

to the second theory he says that if the universal were the meaning of a word, then insofar as it is indicated "through the superimposition of the own form of the word" the same defects would arise.[84] In particular – drawing out the implications of what Diṅnāga says – it would follow from such a theory that all cognition is false insofar as it combines with the object something that does not belong to it, in this case, the form of the word.[85]

Although Diṅnāga in this passage is ostensibly engaged in a critique of a theory of meaning he himself did not hold, and points to the fact that such a theory would entail that all (linguistic) awareness is false as a *reductio ad absurdum* of it, Kumārila could easily have taken Diṅnāga to have been implicitly attacking the validity of any kind of awareness that involves linguistic representations, especially since the theory that words express universals, which is among the theories Diṅnāga is attacking here, is the theory Kumārila himself embraced.

Thus, we may tentatively take this passage in the fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* to be the source of the objection Kumārila considers here.[86] Then, however, one must identify Bhartṛhari himself as the real culprit behind this objection, *for it is his theory that in fact implies that all conceptual awareness is false insofar as it involves superimposition*. Here it should be noted that there is clear evidence that Diṅnāga was strongly influenced by Bhartṛhari in a variety of ways.[87] A most salient fact in this regard is that one of Diṅnāga's early works, the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, which is ostensibly a refutation of the reality of time, is almost entirely borrowed, verse for verse, from the second half of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* chapter of the third part of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.[88] Why Diṅnāga resorted to this method in composing a work remains a mystery – the solution to which, however, might lie in the commentary he wrote to accompany his text, which is now lost. In any case, there are many verses of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* that Diṅnāga could easily have seen as supporting, not only the illusionistic philosophy of Yogācāra Buddhism in general, but also specifically the idea that *vikalpa*, false conceptualization or imagination, is instrumental in the projection of an illusory empirical world.[89] In particular, vv. 53–55, which form the opening of Diṅnāga's text (after an introductory verse of his own), suggest that "a cognition arising from words" distorts its object, even superimposes a foreign element on it.[90]

Thus, it seems appropriate that at this juncture in his defense of conceptualized perception Kumārila should turn his attention to Bhartṛhari – a Brahmanical thinker who questioned the reality of the empirical world and therefore only encouraged the Buddhists! – specifically, to his theory of the superimposition of the word upon its meaning;[91] for once again, that theory clearly implies, whether Bhartṛhari intended it or not (but it seems that he did!), that any conceptual awareness, considered as an awareness involving language, necessarily falsifies its object. Kumārila is occupied with the refutation of this theory for almost the entire remainder of his treatise, through v. 228. Thus, he devotes more space to this topic than any other in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, and for good reason. It is in connection with this problem that he is able to work out an understanding of the relation of language

to reality, on the basis of which his view of conceptual awareness as a potentially valid apprehension of real states of affairs will appear more convincing.

Kumārila responds to the above objection:

> 172. A cognition does not arise in regard to things as identical with words; for however a cognition is prior to the application of a word, so is it after the word as well.

Although words may be used to express what one perceives, they are not conceived as identical with what they express. The word is simply the means of presenting the object to which it refers; it is not itself what is being presented. Moreover, that which is being presented by the word is also apprehended independently by the sense faculty; it is not revealed only by the word, and so is not at risk of being identified with the latter. One might say, in a sensory cognition one apprehends the substance and its properties themselves and then employs words to indicate them and their relation to each other. One does not merely apprehend words.[92]

But how do we know that what we apprehend in a conceptual awareness is not just a word?

> 173–174. [Objection:] But isn't it the case that there are never any cognitions of the form of a cow, etc., as cowness, etc., prior to an awareness of the connection of the word with the thing? If the genus, etc., really had that nature, then even someone who did not know the word would ascertain it. By the method of coincidence and disparity it is ascertained that it is the word that has that nature.

No one recognizes something as a cow, white, and so forth, prior to applying the words 'cow' or 'white'. The distinct awareness of a genus or property is dependent on the awareness of a word. Indeed, if awareness of the genus or property were not dependent on language, then infants and others without language would be able to identify things as being a certain type of animal, having a certain type of quality, etc. However, that is not the case. Thus, by the method of "coincidence and disparity" – that is, by observing that whenever there is awareness of a property there is awareness of the word for it and whenever there is no awareness of the word for it there is no awareness of the property – it would seem that the properties we ascribe to subjects just *are* words.[93] Thus the conceptual identification of a thing is simply the identification of the thing with a word, and that is surely a form of error.

Kumārila now responds to this view:

> 175. As separate colors, etc., are comprehended each according to its nature prior to the word, so is this [genus, quality, etc.]; merely its having a particular name is known later.[94]

Kumārila directly contradicts the opponent: we are indeed aware of the various properties of objects prior to the application of words. Just as particular colors, sounds, etc., are evident to us in nonconceptualized cognitions prior to the application of words, so is the genus of an object, as well as the genera of the various properties it has. If the word for a property is remembered and used to refer to a type of property cognized in a conceptualized cognition, one continues to be aware of the property-type as presented prior to the remembrance of that word, but is now simply aware of it as being referred to by that word. The awareness of the property that served as the basis of the application of the word does not change. Thus, word and property are not confused, and so, by referring to the subject as a cow or white, one is not identifying it with the word.[95]

> 176. And it is not the case that an object that is to be expressed is not apprehended because it is not conceived by means of a word. Therefore, even someone who does not know the word knows cowness, etc.

Kumārila also denies the contention that children and others who do not have command of language are unable to cognize the genera and other properties of things. As he argued previously in refutation of the Grammarians (vv. 112–113), not all cognitions are necessarily imbued with language; rather, it is the initial, nonlinguistic apprehension of the object that serves as the basis for associating it with a particular name or word.

Nevertheless, one could argue that even though the nature of the object, consisting in its various properties, is known in nonconceptualized perception without expressing it in words, it *is* necessarily expressed in words in conceptualized perception. Thus, the object is falsely identified with words in the latter.

Kumārila responds:

> 177. Even when there is knowledge through a connection with language there is no ascription of identity, because of the distinction of things and words founded on cognitions of sight and hearing.

Although words are applied to the object in conceptualized perception, the properties of the object thus expressed and the words used to express them are held distinct; for a word and its referent are typically known by different sense faculties – the referent is usually seen by the eye whereas the word is heard by the ear. Thus there is no possibility of confusing the object with the word.[96]

> 178. A word would be merely a means of ascertaining one attribute of a subject possessing many attributes. It would not be a cause of imposing itself.

A word does not originally enable one to be aware of any particular property of an object. In a nonconceptualized perception one is in fact aware of all its properties. A word applied in a conceptualized perception merely enables one to focus attention on one of its properties, to know it distinctly; it certainly does not cause one to identify the entire object with itself![97]

Well, then, it can be objected that the word serves as a means of revealing the object, that is, making the nature of the object more evident than in the nonconceptualized cognition. In that case one might expect a confusion of the revealing agent and that which is revealed by it, that is, the word and the object. We see in the case of a mirror that reflects a face that it is falsely identified with the face.[98]

Kumārila responds:

> 179. And it is not necessarily the case that there is a superimposition of the form of the means of revealing something upon that which is assisted [i.e., revealed by it]; for there is not thought to be a superimposition of the form of a lamp, sense faculty, etc.

Just because the word more clearly reveals the nature of the object does not mean that it is superimposed upon the object or *vice versa*; for a lamp is used to reveal objects, but one does not confuse the objects it reveals with it. Also, a sense faculty reveals objects, but one never thinks that the objects revealed by the sense faculty are identical with the sense faculty.

> 180. And if cowness, etc., are always apprehended as a word and another form is not experienced, then how could there be difference and superimposition?

The opponent has stated that conceptualized cognition is *always* in terms of language and therefore must consist simply in the identification of what is cognized with certain words. If, however, we always do this, then we can never be aware of the properties of things by themselves; we will always only be aware of words. In that case, we will never be aware of words and objects as distinct things and so could not in that case speak of the false *superimposition* of one thing onto another![99]

> 181. If there were an identity, then there would not be falsehood; if there were an essential difference, then it would not follow that there is superimposition. Rather, the postulate of superimposition would be false.

If we were to accept the view that the genus, etc., are nothing other than words, then again there would be no false superimposition; in conceiving of the property as identical with the word one will not be confusing two distinct things.[100] If, on

the other hand, there were a clear distinction between the word and the property, then in applying the word to the object one would certainly not confuse the two and so again there would be no superimposition.

How, then, is superimposition possible? Kumārila explains as follows:

> 182–184. And the designation of an object that has been apprehended is possible only by means of a word. And the word 'cow' is the designation for those who wish to refer to the object it expresses or the word itself or the cognition. The designation being the same, the hearer ascertains that a cognition of word, cognition, or object of knowledge is the essence of the speaker. Although all three are equally the cause of error, one believes that the thought and the word are superimposed upon the meaning, because they are the means [of cognizing the meaning]. One does not, however, think there is a superimposition of the meaning upon those two.

At VP(R) 3.3.1 Bhartṛhari states that spoken words evoke cognitions of three types of things: their meanings, the ideas in the minds of the speakers who use them, and the words themselves.[101] Thus, the word 'cow' is normally used to refer to whatever it means: a particular cow, the universal cowness, etc. (depending on one's theory of meaning); but it can also be used to refer either to the *idea* of a cow in the mind of the speaker, or the *word* 'cow'. Thus, when someone calls something a "cow," the hearer may understand the speaker to be referring to any one of these three things.[102] In that case, a false awareness might arise for the hearer in which a physical object, which, let us suppose, is what is really intended by the speaker, is identified as either the idea 'cow' or the word 'cow'. Although all three things, object, word, and idea, are indicated by the expression 'cow', the latter two, the idea and the word, are typically superimposed upon the object and not the other way around, because the object is typically known through the word and the idea, which are the means of its presentation.

This account of superimposition assumes that the cognitions associated with the object cow, the idea of a cow, and the word 'cow' are more or less indistinguishable; only in that case could the one thing be falsely confused with the other. In fact, however, the object cow, the idea of a cow, and the word 'cow' are apprehended by means of quite distinct cognitions, so that it would really be impossible to mix them up, as Kumārila now explains:

> 185. In reality, there is an awareness of cowness in the form of that which possesses a dewlap, etc., of the word, in the form of the letters 'c', etc., and an awareness without form, of the cognition of both.

Just as cowness is evident to us in the form of the characteristic features of a cow such as a dewlap, horns, etc., so is the word 'cow' evident to us as a different kind of thing, characterized by certain letters in a certain sequence. Similarly,

a formless cognition, to be identified as the cognition 'cow', is later *inferred* as that which caused one to be aware of a cow.[103] Likewise, one may infer the occurrence of a cognition that caused one to be aware of the word. Thus, there is no real possibility of confusing any of the three with the others. The false superimposition of the notion or the *word* 'cow' onto the *object* cow, therefore, cannot really occur.[104]

In sum, in a conceptualized perception the sensory and conceptual components can be distinguished. We are aware not only of the words we apply to things but also of the things as they are given prior to the words. We are aware of the word as one thing and the object as presented by sensory data as another. The superimposition theorist maintains that we are just aware of the words, and that surely is not the case.

2.5.3.2 Absurd consequences of the superimposition doctrine

> 186. And if the meaning is cognized as identical with the word, then in the case of *akṣa*, etc., it would follow that a die, etc., would be identical.

If we superimposed the word onto the meaning and identified it with the word, then it would have the properties of the word for us. In that case, various things referred to by a single word – for example, a die, a sense faculty, and an axle, which are all referred to by the word *akṣa* – would be identical for us! Since in fact they are not, we must be aware of the referents of words as distinct from the words.

It should be noted that by 'meaning' (*artha*) in the present discussion, Kumārila means the universal inhering in the object, that is to say, primarily the universal and secondarily the individual object. (In Sanskrit *artha* means 'thing' or 'object' as well as meaning.) According to Mīmāṃsā, universals are the primary meanings of words; individuals objects, the substrata of universals, are the secondary meanings of words, which are understood by supposition (*arthāpatti*) from the primary meanings, insofar as universals must always inhere in particulars. Another point to be noted is that Indian philosophers did not explicitly distinguish sense and reference; rather, they simply talked about "meaning." Yet in many texts meaning is "indicated," "designated," "referred to," or even "named" by words. Thus, the Indian concept of meaning comes closer to that of reference – again, either the universal or the particular in which it inheres – than that of sense in modern Western philosophy.

The opponent might at this juncture grab the bull by the horns and argue that the various meanings of *akṣa* are in fact identical, in that they can all be taken to be 'that which is not a non-*akṣa*'. That is to say, each of the meanings of *akṣa* is something that is not not referred to as *akṣa*, and so they are the same![105] Thus we are not aware of various distinct referents of the word *akṣa*.

Kumārila mentions this objection and responds:

> 187ab. If [the various meanings of *akṣa* are indeed one] by virtue of exclusion of that which is not an *akṣa*, [then we would respond:] That is not cognized prior to the word.

The identity that a die, etc., have insofar as they are share the characteristic of being different from what is not an *akṣa* is not something that could be cognized prior to learning that the word *akṣa* refers to those things. In that case, one could not know what the word means before knowing what it refers to, which is absurd. Therefore, the unity of the referent of *akṣa* cannot be accounted for in this way.

The opponent might continue: how, then, is the word 'cow' able to have a single referent, cowness? If the word *akṣa* is unable to do so, then it would seem that no other word could.

Again, after mentioning the objection Kumārila responds:

> 187cd. If one held that it is the same in the case of 'cow', etc., [then we would respond:] No, because a single form is seen.

In fact, in the case of the various objects to which we apply the word 'cow' we do see that they all have a common form, namely, cowness. Thus, on the basis of our independent cognition of the referent of the word 'cow' we are justified in holding that it is indeed one.

However, Kumārila continues to explain, we are not justified in holding that the referents of *akṣa* are one on the basis of our cognitions of them. Rather, we must consider that they are many.

> 188–189. Indeed, in the case of the three meanings there is no continuity of a property for a die, etc. The common word for them is different from the word for a genus. Rather, the three genera [that are the referents of *akṣa*] are cognized as distinct from each other. And that would not be possible if there were superimposition, because there is no distinction of the form of the word.

It is evident to us that the three main referents of the word *akṣa*, namely, a die, a sense faculty, and an axle, are quite distinct in nature. In that respect, *akṣa* is different from a word for a single genus, such as 'cow'. Yet it could not have mutually distinct referents if it were *superimposed* on its referents, as the opponent suggests; for then whatever is referred to by *akṣa* would be known simply as an *akṣa*. Thus, a conceptualized cognition, insofar as it involves the application of a word, is not a false superimposition of a word onto a thing. Rather, it indicates a feature of an object that one has cognized independently, by means of a word.

Suppose, however, that one actually has to do with three different, homophonous words *akṣa* here. Although all are expressed by the same phonetic

sequence, each word transcends the individual sounds that manifest it – it is in fact a partless, timeless entity without sequence, what the Grammarians call the *sphoṭa* – and so is different in each case. Thus, we can distinguish different meanings of *akṣa*, even though whenever one of the words pronounced *akṣa* is employed, it is superimposed on its referent and in effect becomes its own referent.

Kumārila answers:

> 190. If one thought there might be different words *akṣa*, [we would reply:] No, because there is seen to be doubt as to the meaning. That doubt would not occur without a common nature; and an identity of form is comprehended.

When we hear the word *akṣa*, we are not always sure what it means. That would be possible only if there were a "common nature" among the different occurrences of *akṣa*, which is apparently one word, not distinct words. Thus, it would seem that there is only one word *akṣa* with several meanings. While one might hold that the common nature that gives rise to doubt in this case is simply based on the phonetic similarity of distinct words *akṣa*, we nevertheless positively ascertain the different occurrences of *akṣa* to be the same word. Whenever *akṣa* occurs, we recognize it as the *same word akṣa* that we heard many times previously; for, contrary to the *sphoṭa*-theorists, a word consists of its letters, and every occurrence of *akṣa* contains the same letters.[106]

> 191. And it follows on the hypothesis that there is superimposition that *bhavati* would always mean the same thing, even though it is distinct according to whether it designates a noun or a verb, because its form is the same.

The Sanskrit word *bhavati* has different meanings according to whether it is taken as the locative of the personal pronoun *bhavān* 'you' or the third person, singular, present form of the verb √*bhū* 'to be'. If, when we designate things by words, we superimposed the word onto the object and were aware of the object as the word, then there would be no distinguishing the meanings of *bhavati*.

> 192. And how, since it is identical with the completion of the word, could the meaning of a verb be something yet to be achieved? And how could there be a meaning that has form if the verbal expression is without form?

More generally, if words were superimposed on their meanings and their meanings took on their properties, action and change could not be expressed by verbs; for words, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, are eternal entities. They are not the sounds that arise and vanish; rather, they are universals we are made to cognize by those sounds. Conceiving the meaning of the word *as* the word by virtue of

superimposition, we could never consider the meaning of the word (or, more specifically, the individual object, which is the secondary meaning of the word) to be acting or undergoing any change; that is, we could not consider the verb to express something yet to be achieved but only something eternal and established – namely, itself. Moreover, according to Grammarians, the word is ultimately without form.[107] How, then, if the word is superimposed upon its referent in a conceptualized cognition, could we conceive of any object as having form?

> 193. And how, without depending on the form of their meanings, will there be a distinction of the expressiveness of such words as ‘cow’, ‘horse’, ‘white’, etc., with respect to genus, qualities, etc.?

Kumārila develops another unacceptable consequence of the theory that words are superimposed upon their meanings in conceptual awareness. We often distinguish words from each other on the basis of their meanings. Some words are substantives, others adjectives, depending on the kinds of things to which they refer. If in fact the meanings of words were obscured by the words themselves, we could not make such distinctions.

> 194. There being the same difference of the words ‘tree’, ‘fig tree’, etc., as ‘pot’, etc., how could there be a relation of qualifier–qualificand without regard for their meanings?

If words are superimposed onto their meanings, thereby obscuring the meanings, how could they stand in the relation of qualifier–qualificand to each other?[108] For such a relation can only be ascertained by comprehending the relation of the meanings of words to each other. We know that the expression ‘fig tree’ serves to qualify or specify the meaning of the expression ‘tree’ only because we know that fig trees are a subclass of trees. If we were only aware of the words when we employed them and not their meanings, such a relation would never emerge. The words ‘fig tree’ and ‘tree’ by themselves reveal no relationship of qualifier–thing qualified to each other, anymore than do the words ‘pot’, ‘cloth’, etc.

> 195ab. And there would be no grammatical coordination [of words], like the cognitions of words.

Moreover, if words were superimposed on their meanings, there would be no basis for their being used in grammatical agreement, according to case, number, and gender, as in the phrase ‘blue lotus’. Words are used in grammatical coordination when they refer to the same thing. However, if ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ were superimposed on their meanings, they would no more refer to the same thing for us than the *cognitions* of the word ‘blue’ and the word ‘lotus’ do.

However, one might hold that we take 'blue' and 'lotus' to refer to the same thing in the phrase 'blue lotus' insofar as they produce the ideas of blue and lotus in regard to the same individual, which is presented by a nonconceptualized cognition. (If it were manifested by a conceptualized cognition, a regress obviously would ensue.) Kumārila responds:

> 195cd. And there is no joining together of two cognitions in regard to one thing that is nonconceptualized.

An individual cognized by a nonconceptualized cognition would not have, distinctly, as its features a particular genus, like lotushood, and a particular quality, like blue. Thus, there would be no basis for the application of the words 'blue' and 'lotus' to it.

Perhaps, then, both words can be taken to refer to one object insofar as each can be taken to indicate some thing or other – a thing in general. Kumārila replies:

> 196. If there were a joining together [of the cognitions of blue and lotus] with respect to the thing in general, then all words 'cow', etc., would have the same referent; for a thing is comprehended by every word.

Indeed, every word ultimately indicates some thing. Thus, if 'blue' and 'lotus' are to be taken as referring to the same thing insofar as each refers to a thing in general, all words should be taken as describing the same thing!

> 197. And it is not believed that 'blue lotus' pertains to a unique individual; for there would not be an application to something else. Yet it is held that it is applied to another.

Returning to the idea that 'blue lotus' refers to a unique individual, Kumārila points out that in that case the expression could only be used to describe that individual; it could never be applied to another. However, in fact we do see that 'blue lotus' is applied to numerous individuals.

Could there be a universal that corresponds to 'blue lotus', which accounts for the application of the expression to numerous individuals? The referent of the expression would then indeed be one thing, and in employing the expression we would superimpose the words of the expression onto that referent. This will not do either, Kumārila explains.

> 198. And it is not believed that there is any single entity that is a blue lotus; for there is understood to be a difference of two meanings in conformity with the parts of the expression.

It is clear that in the expression 'blue lotus' we have to do, not with a single, seamless concept to which a universal might correspond, but with a combination of concepts. Since, however, the *words* 'blue' and 'lotus' do not stand in the relation of qualifier–qualificand, these concepts must depend on an awareness of distinct features of a single object. Thus, in employing the expression 'blue lotus' we do not superimpose the words upon that object but are independently aware of it.

Suppose someone were to hold that the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in the phrase 'blue lotus' can be considered to be in grammatical agreement simply because they are used together. Kumārila brings out an absurd consequence of such a proposal:

> 199. And there is seen to be a superimposition of two words in cases of synonyms, also; thus, such words would be in grammatical coordination, like 'blue lotus'.

Sometimes we employ a synonym in order to help someone understand what we are saying. We might say, for example, "That's iron pyrite, fool's gold." If the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in the phrase 'blue lotus' were in grammatical agreement simply because they are used together – even though they do not refer to the same thing, but only refer to themselves – then for the same reason the expressions 'iron pyrite' and 'fool's gold' in the phrase in which they are juxtaposed as synonyms would have to be considered as being in grammatical agreement, as if one were the modifier of the other, or one the subject and the other a predicate in an assertion. However, that is certainly not how those words are being used in that instance.

In summary, it would seem that there is no satisfactory way in which, on the theory that we superimpose words onto their referents in conceptualized cognitions, the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in the phrase 'blue lotus' could be seen as being properly used in grammatical coordination. That is to say, there is no way in which the words 'blue' and 'lotus' of the expression could be taken to be describing a single thing.

2.5.3.3 An independent awareness of meaning is essential for learning language

Kumārila now turns to another issue of relevance to whether, when we employ words, we have a distinct awareness of their meanings or simply superimpose them on their meanings. He considers the question, How can we learn what words mean in the first place if we are not independently aware of their meanings? Presumably a false identification of the word with its meaning will occur only after the connection between word and meaning has been learned. Thus, it would seem that when one learns the relation between word and meaning for the first time, at least, one must have an independent awareness of the meaning.

> 200–201ab. And a word is not employed in reference to an object that has not been comprehended previously. In that theory, what kind of

> meaning is cognized when the convention is learned? For at that time there is no possibility that the form of the word is superimposed on the form of the meaning.

If we are aware of just words when we employ them, if, that is, we superimpose words on their meanings, then what does one cognize as the meaning of a word when one learns the convention that assigns a word to its meaning? In fact, it does not seem that one could be aware of the meaning as having the form of the word at that time; for it could take on the form of the word only *after* one has learned that the word indicates it. Thus, it would seem that one must have a distinct cognition of the meaning when one learns the convention.

One might perhaps hold that at the time of learning the convention one is aware of a particular individual as the meaning of the word, but one does not have a cognition of a genus or other property of the object; that is just the (illusory) result of superimposing one's awareness of the word onto the object.

To this Kumārila responds:

> 201cd. And there is never comprehension of a connection with a unique aspect.

Linguistic conventions obviously cannot be established in regard to nonrecurring individuals. If they were, we would have to learn an infinite number of conventions in order to use words, which is impossible. Thus, one must have a direct awareness of the general features of things, independently of language, when one learns how to use words.

However, one might insist that one need not first learn the connection between a word and its distinctly cognized meaning in order to superimpose the former on the latter. Rather, since the word is *always* superimposed on the meaning, the word in effect *is* the meaning, so that all one needs to know is the word.

Kumārila responds to this suggestion:

> 202. If, on that theory, there is a capacity of superimposing itself when there is no dependence on a previous cognition of the meaning, then a word would be superimposed on its meaning even the first time it is heard.

If the meaning of the word is just the word, then the meaning of a word would be apparent the first time one heard it. One would not have to learn anything in order to know what the word means!

Yet the Mīmāṃsaka believes that there is an eternal, natural connection between a word and its meaning. So he, too, the opponent could argue, must believe that all we need to learn is words and not artificial conventions that assigns the words to meanings.

Kumārila responds:

> 203–204. For me, there would not be a remembering of the meaning from the word, because one is not versed in its meaning, but there would be for you, because the form of the meaning is seen in the expressions for it. Just as, for those who don't know the word, a cognition of it does not arise when the meaning is present, so for those who don't know the meaning, a cognition of the meaning does not arise when the word is perceived.

Although according to the Mīmāṃsaka the connection between word and meaning is eternal, it is not immediately evident; rather, it must be learned from someone who has already mastered language. Thus, when we hear a word we do not immediately know what it means, any more than, when we see a certain type object, we immediately know the word for it.[109] On the Superimposition Theory, on the other hand, we would know the meaning of a word the first time we heard it because the word *is* the meaning.

> 205. Therefore, there would not be an excessive dependence of meanings upon words [on our view], but, because words are reminders, it is understood that there is a dependence of words upon meanings.

Kumārila sums up his discussion of the Superimposition Theory so far. Our awareness of objects and their properties is not dependent on an awareness of words; we are not aware of objects and their properties just insofar as we superimpose words on them. Rather, since words serve as reminders, as it were, of their meanings, one must have been originally, independently aware of those meanings, that is, the universals that are manifest in objects and their properties. Since words are used to talk about objects and their properties, the relation of dependence goes the other way – from meanings to words.

> 206. Therefore, the nature of the meaning that is ascertained at the time of learning the convention, that is also ascertained from the word, and so the form of the meaning does not disappear.

Words convey to us as their meanings types of objects and properties we already know; for the object or property must be known independently when the convention for employing the word for it is learned. Thereafter, the employment of the word evokes an awareness of that same type of object or property. Thus, the object or property is not in any way obscured by the word.

2.5.3.4 It is impossible to confuse word and meaning

Kumārila continues with his discussion of absurd consequences of the Superimposition Theory:

> 207. The notion to act or abstain from acting that a word causes is not in any way cognized as the nature of the word.

In scripture we meet with certain injunctions and prohibitions: one should perform this or that ritual; one should avoid this or that transgression. The meaning of such texts is that one should bring about or not bring about certain actions. However, words are entities that already exist – in fact they are eternal – not things to be brought about, like actions.[110] Thus, in such passages words surely indicate meanings other than themselves.

Moreover,

> 208. If one supposes there is superimposition, from such words as *kara*, *hasta*, etc., different meanings would be cognized due to a difference in the form of the words.

On the Superimposition Theory, words having different phonetic shapes, like *kara* and *hasta*, which both mean 'hand', could not be synonymous.

Moreover,

> 209–210ab. And the superimposition of something is seen to result from either similarity or influence. Now, no similarity of a word with its meaning is cognized here; and the influencing of that which is located somewhere else by the word is not possible.

Kumārila resumes a thought he began in verse 185: there has to be some similarity between things in order for superimposition to take place. Thus, the idea of silver can be superimposed on mother-of-pearl, because mother-of-pearl is shiny, like silver. Alternatively, there must be some influence of one object upon the other. Thus, redness can be superimposed upon a crystal, which is inherently colorless, because the crystal appears to take on the color of the rose juxtaposed to it. Neither option applies to the case of words and their meanings. A cat certainly does not *resemble* the word 'cat'; nor is it located next to it, so that it might somehow take on its properties. Therefore, it is difficult to see how words could ever be superimposed on meanings.[111]

One might, however, suggest that the word is reflected in the object, causing the object to appear to take on its properties, even though it is not located next to it, as the moon is reflected in water.[112] To this suggestion Kumārila responds:

> 210cd. And a distant reflection of something without visible form is not cognized.

We can only speak of the reflection of objects that have form, which can potentially be seen by the eye.[113] Thus, the moon, which is a visible object in its own right, can be reflected in water, or a face in a mirror. However, a word is not a visible object; it is without visible form. So it is inappropriate to think of it as possibly being reflected in anything, such as its meaning.

However, isn't it true that the word is everywhere? According to Mīmāṃsā, words are limited in neither time nor space. In that case, it is in the same location as its meaning, whether one conceives of the latter as the universal or the particular object in which the universal inheres; and so why couldn't the meaning receive some influence from the word?

Kumārila responds:

> 211. If it is said that, because a word is omnipresent, it reaches the meaning, then there would be an influencing of every meaning by every word.

From the hypothesis that a word "colors" an object because it is contiguous with it, it would follow that every object would be colored by, and so be liable to be taken as the meaning of, every word; for every word, being ubiquitous, is contiguous with every object.

Finally in refutation of the notion that superimposition can be based on the influencing of the nature of the meaning by the word, Kumārila says:

> 212. And nothing that is grasped by a different sense faculty is capable of influencing something; for no cognition arises from touch, etc., in regard to a crystal, even though it is colored by lac.

A thing can influence the nature of another only if they are both perceived by the same sense faculty. A piece of red lac can influence the appearance of a crystal insofar as both are seen. However, a piece of lac, insofar as it is seen, cannot influence one's *tactile* experience of the crystal. Thus, a word cannot impose its appearance on its meaning, because, typically, the word is perceived by the ear and the meaning by the eye.[114]

2.5.3.5 Further arguments against the Superimposition Theory

Kumārila now mentions a more general undesirable implication of the Superimposition Theory:

> 213. Inference and scripture would be false on the hypothesis of superimposition. As a result of the falsehood of a determinate awareness, the non-existence of everything would follow.

Clearly, inference and scripture depend on the apprehension of the world in a determinate way. If all conceptual awareness were false, then scripture and inference would not be valid means of knowledge, both of which the Buddhist wants to accept.[115] Nor, indeed, could there be any mundane or sacred activity, for

that too depends upon perceiving reality in a determinate, conceptualized way, as consisting of objects of certain types possessing certain properties. Everything would stop.

Suppose, however, the opponent were to accept that no conceptual awareness – neither inference nor scripture nor the determinate beliefs on the basis of which we act – is valid?

> 214. If one were to say, "So be it!" then, his own statement being false, how could he speak in this way? For a [true] meaning is not cognized from a false statement.

The view that all conceptual awareness is false is self-refuting; for the view itself is a conceptual awareness! If one's statement of the view is true, then it is also false; if, on the other hand, one accepts that it is false, then it is not the case that all conceptual awareness is false.[116]

> 215–216. And as a result of the refutation of idealism, the employment of cognitions and words corresponds to the object, but the form of the object is never dependent on them. Therefore, objects that are apprehended by means of cognitions of difference and identity even prior to the employment of words – those would always truly exist.

In the *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika* Kumārila will present an extensive refutation of the Yogācāra teaching that there are no objects external to consciousness. It is an implication of that refutation that our thoughts and words, when they are true, conform to objects existing independently of consciousness; objects and their properties are not dependent on our thoughts and words. This will support the position Kumārila is developing here. On the basis of a nonconceptualized perception of an object, through which we (indistinctly) apprehend its sameness or distinctness from other things, we conceive of the object, in a conceptualized perception, as being of a certain type and having certain properties.

2.5.4 Even if conceptualized cognitions involved superimposition they would not necessarily be false

Even if we were to accept that one cannot be aware of the meaning except through the word, insofar as the word is what reveals the meaning, it still would not follow that conceptualized cognition is false.

> 217–218. Even if the meaning is assisted by the word, and in the absence of the word a cognition of the meaning does not arise, the form in the

> object does not cease to exist; for in the absence of the sense of vision, etc., the nature of color, etc., is not apprehended, but it is not believed that there is a cessation of the nature of color, etc., just because of that.

Let us grant that one can become aware of an object only through a cognition or a word, hence, that objects are dependent, in "the order of knowing," on thought and language. That still would not mean that they are dependent on thought and language in "the order of being," that is, that they do not exist at all in the absence of cognitions of them or statements about them. As will be shown in the refutation of idealism, just because something is not being apprehended does not mean that it does not exist – to be is not to be perceived. Just because color is not being seen does not mean that it is not there to be seen. So, even if it is accepted that we are not aware of a meaning except through a word, it does not follow that the meaning ceases to exist when it is not being revealed by the word. The meaning is not a figment of the word.

One might argue, however, that although the meaning might exist independently of the word, nevertheless once one begins to use the word the meaning is obscured by it and thus a false awareness arises insofar as, once again, one considers the meaning to be identical with the word.

Kumārila responds:

> 219. And because the connection is eternal, the meaning would not not have the form [of the word]; for everyone does not at the same time have an awareness of the meaning as having another form.

Because the connection of word and meaning is eternal, the form that a meaning is perceived to have due to its identification with a word would be the form it always has. Thus, that could be said to be its true form, so that the cognition of the meaning as identical with a certain word would not be a false awareness.[117]

Although, indeed, some may perceive an object, prior to learning the word for it, as *unconnected* with the word, not everyone perceives it that way; in particular, those who know language do not. Thus, that could not be said to be the true form of the object and the object as identified with the word its false form. So, given that its relation to a certain word is inherent in the meaning, even the perception of an object in the form of the word that designates it is not a false awareness.

However, it might be objected that, if everyone does not perceive the object to have the form of the word (insofar as it is expressed by a certain word and it comes to be identified with the word that expresses it), then that would seem to imply that that is not its true form.

After mentioning this objection, Kumārila responds to it:

> 220–222. If one said, matters are similar in regard to the meaning having the form of the word, [then in response it may be said that,] both being possible, it is to be considered whether the meaning does not have that nature or there is an incapacity of the perceiver. Since it is contradictory for something [viz., the form of the word] to both exist and not exist in the meaning, it is impossible [that the difference has to do with the nature of the meaning itself]. But due to a difference in perceivers, both the ability and the inability to perceive it are possible – just as for a blind and a seeing person in regard to the proximity of color. So will it be stated. Thus, the cognition of the form of the word arises in regard to the meaning for someone who has been assisted by the audible word, but not for another.

Kumārila has argued that the fact that certain people, in particular, those without language, do not perceive an object (which is being considered here as the meaning of a word) as having the form of a word does not entail that the object is really without that form; for others, that is, those with language, do tend to perceive it as having the form of the word. However, it would seem that if *everyone* does not cognize the meaning of a word as having the form of the word, then one is no more able to say that the meaning really has that form than that it does not. That is the gist of the objection being raised here. In response, Kumārila notes that there are two possibilities that could explain the fact that an object is not always cognized as having the form of the word. It could have to do either with some variation in the object itself or with a variation in those who cognize it. To attribute it to the object itself would be to attribute contradictory predicates to a single entity. Thus, it must have to do with a variation in the cognizers of the word. Those who have mastered language and know the word for the type of object in question perceive that type of object as having the form of that word; those who have not simply apprehend the object by itself. Kumārila will develop this point more extensively in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra-adhikaraṇa*.[118]

The opponent now goes on to raise an objection against the eternality of the connection between word and meaning, which has served as a premise in the above discussion:[119]

> 223. [Objection:] But since in the case of such words as 'Devadatta' the connection is observed to have a beginning, and since the meaning is not eternal, possessing that form is not eternal.

We observe that we invent words for certain things. For example, we assign names to persons, like the name 'Devadatta'. Thus, the relation between word and meaning cannot be eternal; it must be conventional. Moreover, the meaning of a word, the type of object to which it refers, is in most cases something perishable (like

Devadatta), not something eternal. Hence, the relation between word and meaning cannot be eternal, and so the meaning's having the form of the word is not something that is always true of it; it does not pertain to the true nature of the meaning.

Kumārila responds:

> 224. [Reply:] In that case, too, there is believed to be an innate capacity of agent and object of apprehension in regard to the cognition of that form, but the assignment is not eternal.

Even in the case of proper names like 'Devadatta' there is an eternal connection between the name and its meaning, which according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy is a universal.[120] Thus, the name 'Devadatta' actually means 'gift of the gods', and so can all other proper names be seen to have general meanings. Thus, there is no violation in the case of proper names of the principle that word and meaning are eternally related. The word always has the capacity to make one aware of that meaning, indeed, as having the form of the word, while the meaning has the capacity to be evoked by that word – as having its form.[121] Only the assignment of a name to a particular person has a beginning in time.

It is nevertheless objected further that one does not apprehend Devadatta as having the name 'Devadatta' prior to being told that that is his name. Thus, surely, a proper name cannot pertain to the essence of a thing!

> 225. [Objection:] In that matter, since Devadatta is cognized by everyone as not having that form prior to the assignment of the name, therefore certain people believe, assuming that there is superimposition, that the cognition is false.

Kumārila responds, first from the standpoint that the connection of word and meaning is not necessarily eternal:[122]

> 226. [Reply:] But when the word is the cause of remembering the kind of individual that was cognized prior to knowing the word, then in that case the cognition is true.

Whether the connection between words and their meanings is eternal or not, words evoke an awareness for us of the type of object that we were taught they denote at the time we learned them. Thus, when one uses the word 'Devadatta' to refer to the person standing in front of one, one thinks of the sort of thing that was presented as the meaning of the word when one learned it. One therefore is not thinking something like, "This is the word 'Devadatta'," but rather, "This is that person called Devadatta." Even if the designation 'Devadatta' were purely conventional, there would still be no confusion of the word 'Devadatta' with Devadatta when one uses it.

Now Kumārila responds to the objection raised in verse 225 assuming that the connection between words and their meanings is eternal.

> 227. Or else, let the capacity of the object to be comprehended by the word become manifest after the assignment of the name; it does not follow from that that it has the form of something else.

Assuming the connection between word and meaning to be eternal, the object Devadatta always has the capacity to be brought to mind by a certain word; however, that capacity does not become *manifest* to us until we observe the usage of elders or it is directly pointed out to us. Thus, once again, the cognition of the object as having the form of the word is not a false awareness, that is, an awareness in which the object is presented as having the form of something other than itself, which is to say, an awareness that presents the object otherwise than how someone who has mastered language would perceive it.

However, one might object that any word could be used to refer to any object as a result of a convention. So how could it be the case that a specific meaning is eternally connected with a certain word?

Kumārila responds:

> 228. Or else, the meaning being capable of being ascertained according to any form and the word being capable of effecting an idea of a meaning of any form, a restriction is made.

Let it be the case that any meaning can be expressed by any word. That needn't exclude an eternal connection between word and meaning. A word could have an inherent capacity to express all meanings, and a meaning an inherent capacity to be expressed by all words. A convention, then, would simply restrict a word to being used to express only one of the many possible meanings it is capable of expressing or – what comes to the same thing – it would assign a meaning to only one of the many words by which it is capable of being expressed. Even then, however, the word would have a natural connection with the meaning to which it is assigned and *vice versa*.[123] Thus, it remains the case that the word used to express a meaning belongs to it inherently, and it would not be false to conceive of it through that form. Thus, even if conceptual awareness involved a superimposition of word onto meaning, it would not be an error.

2.6 Conceptualized perceptions are not memories

Kumārila now returns to an objection he considered previously, vv. 121–123, in regard to his claim that the conceptualized cognition arising immediately after a nonconceptualized perception of an object is a perception. The opponent objected that such a cognition cannot be considered a perception, because it involves an act of memory. Either it associates a particular expression with the object, which

must be retrieved by memory, or it identifies the object as being the same type of object that one experienced in the past, or both. However, a sense faculty by itself is incapable of remembering anything. Since a perception is considered a cognition arising from the functioning of a *sense faculty*, then such a cognition cannot be a perception.

In his response to this objection Kumārila stated, v. 123, that "a person who conceives a thing by means of its property, though he may be remembering, is having a perception if there is a connection of sense faculty and object." Having now explained, in connection with his critique of the Superimposition Theory, what it is to conceive of a thing in terms of a certain property by associating a certain expression with it, he is now in a much better position to show how, in conceptualized perception, one is in a true state of perception, not merely recollection.

Kumārila now responds to this objection:

> 229–230. In regard to that, a cognition that arises for the knower who is remembering the connection of word and meaning, due to associating a previously apprehended object [with the one that is being experienced], that would not be a non-perception if the object is conjoined with the visual sense; for the objects of memory and perception are distinct.

Although one's conceptualized cognition of an object may be mediated by memories of a previously experienced object of the same type and of the connection between a certain expression and that type of object as its meaning, one is nevertheless in a state of perception insofar as one's sense faculty is currently in contact with the object. One may indeed be remembering an object previously experienced, but one is also currently, distinctly perceiving an object here and now. Just because the one is not being perceived does not mean that the other is not.

Kumārila explains further:

> 231–232. The word and the connection would be remembered, so let them not be objects of perception, but the perceivability of the object is not excluded by the their not being perceptible. Although cowness, etc., were comprehended previously and are contacted through memory, they are nevertheless presently being cognized distinctly from the previous awareness.

We indeed remember the word by which the object we are experiencing is to be identified, through remembering the connection previously established for us between that type of object and that word. That does not, however, mean that the object we are experiencing now and conceiving in terms of that word is not something we are perceiving. In recalling the convention, we may even remember

the object as it was experienced when we learned the convention, but we are now having another experience that is distinct from that earlier experience.

Nevertheless, it could be objected, in a conceptual awareness one is experiencing an object now that one experienced previously. So how is it not a memory?

Kumārila responds:

> 233ab. There is place for a *pramāṇa* in regard to that object due to a difference in the individual, the time, and so forth.

Although one may have cognized the same object, for example, cowness, previously, one did not cognize it in relation to this particular individual, time, and location. Thus, one is not just repeating a cognition one had previously.[124]

Still, one might object that cowness is the same both in the past and the present. A valid means of knowledge like perception should not cognize an object that has been cognized previously. Insofar as one's cognition is of cowness, then it is of that which was cognized before, and so is not a perception.

Kumārila responds:

> 233cd–234ab. The aspect that was previously comprehended is not what is being cognized in this case, for existence in the present moment was not comprehended by the previous cognition.

Insofar as one's cognition is just of cowness, it is not a perception. However, insofar as it is a cognition of cowness existing in this particular moment, which is something that was not cognized previously, it is a perception.

One might hold, however, that a perceptual cognition must arise immediately upon the establishing of a connection between sense faculty and object; a memory cannot intervene.

Kumārila responds:

> 234cd–235ab. For there is no royal or Vedic decree that a perception is that cognition which is prior to memory.

Just because memory intervenes does not mean that a conceptual awareness is not an immediate awareness. Indeed, it is so long as it arises when the sense faculty is connected with the object and one's awareness of the object remains unobscured by the memory.[125]

Might not a memory disturb or distort the functioning of the sense faculties?

Kumārila answers:

> 235cd–236ab. Nor is the functioning of the sense faculty after a memory excluded by anything . Thus it is not at that time defective.

The functioning of a sense faculty is not hindered in any way by memory. Very often we have memories, but our senses function just as well after we have them as before. Therefore, the arising of a memory does not make a sense faculty defective.

Kumārila summarizes:

> 236cd–237ab. Therefore, let it be understood that any cognition that arises from the connection of sense faculty and object, whether prior or subsequent to a memory, is a perception.

2.7 A conceptualized perception does not attribute something to the object that does not belong to it

Now a new objection against the validity of conceptualized perception is raised. It seems that not everyone whose sense faculty is in contact with an object cognizes that object conceptually. Sometimes a person will identify what he perceives as this or that kind of object, or as possessing this or that quality or action, etc., but sometimes a person will perceive a thing without identifying it. Thus, it would appear that the conceptual identification of an object is due not just to the connection of the object with the sense faculty but involves some contribution of the mind that is not directly caused by the object. Hence it is an erroneous awareness.[126]

Kumārila responds:

> 237cd–241ab. Certain persons who are perplexed, or others who are deceived by similarity, etc., do not know an object even though it is connected with the senses; but that does not mean that another person who, due to skill, can apprehend an object distinctly among similar objects or an object that is subtle, is mistaken. Similarly, those whose minds are trained [in music] distinctly comprehend Vedic and secular songs according to the distinctions of the first *svara*, etc., while those who are not trained therein just cognize the song. Because of the ignorance of the latter one cannot declare that those possessed of discrimination are mistaken.

There are various reasons why a person might not conceptually identify an object she is perceiving. It may be too small or far away to perceive clearly; or it may resemble other objects, so that its identity does not stand out; or one could be confused or distracted. Thus, the nonidentification of an object has to do with some inability of the perceiver or some defect in the conditions under which the object is being perceived. It does not have to do with the object's not really having the properties that would, in appropriate circumstances, cause the conceptualized cognitions in question.

The conceptual identification of an object and its properties depends on the perceiver knowing the terms for the categories that apply to it. Even if one apprehended the properties of an object in a nonconceptualized cognition, one would

not be able to *identify* them if one did not know the words for them. Kumārila gives an analogy: one might apprehend the different notes in a piece of music but not be able to identify them because one is not informed as to what the different notes are. So, one might apprehend the different aspects of an object but not be able to identify them conceptually because one does not know what they are, that is, what they are *called*. The fact that everyone is not able to identify conceptually objects and their properties all the time hardly means that those properties are not real.

However, since the distinctions we attribute to objects when we identify them conceptually do not emerge immediately to the untrained perceiver but only to those whose minds have been prepared in a certain way, the doubt remains that they are somehow contributed by the mind and not inherent in the objects themselves.

To this, Kumārila responds, while continuing to develop the above analogy:

> 241cd–243ab. For just as they comprehend the distinctness of sounds even without the words for the notes *ṣaḍja*, etc., so do they apprehend the entities cowness, etc. But those who are untrained [in words] know the mere object confused [with other things], while those whose minds are prepared by the remembrance of the word achieve discriminative knowledge.

In fact, even people who are not versed in music are still able to perceive distinct sounds, but they do not identify them explicitly *as* distinct, implicitly comparing and contrasting them with other sounds.[127] Similarly, people untrained in the concepts 'cow', etc., perceive the distinct entities cowness, etc., but they are unable to identify them *as* distinct. Thus, the properties of cowness, etc., really do belong to cows, and they are already manifest to us in nonconceptualized perception. A word or concept, however, serves to categorize a thing in relation to others. Thus, the perceiver who lacks the word for a thing, or who is unable to retrieve the word for it, apprehends the latter in a less than fully determinate way. The perceiver who is able to think of the word for an object when his sense faculty is connected with it achieves a clearer awareness of it that is "discriminative," that is, discursive, in nature.

Kumārila elucidates the latter point with another analogy:

> 243cd–246ab. Just as someone who only has the sense faculty for a colored object, etc., apprehends just that and not some other object, because he lacks the means, so when one obtains one of the causes of discriminative knowledge, only then does a cognition occur in regard to that for which it is the means, due to its assistance. Therefore, knowers would have a nonconceptualized cognition only so long as they are not observed to have the means of discriminative knowledge.

Someone can perceive a certain sensible quality, for example, color, only when he or she has the sense faculty appropriate for perceiving it, for example, vision.

So, someone can achieve a clear discriminative awareness of an object, in which one conceptually identifies one of its properties, only if one is endowed with the appropriate means thereto, namely, knowledge of the concept of the property. Without such knowledge one will apprehend the object only nonconceptually, hence, indistinctly. Thus, the fact that not everyone, for example, a child, is able to achieve a discriminative awareness of an object has to do with the fact that some people lack the faculty for doing so, just as people who are blind lack the capacity to see colors. It does not have to do with the fact that the properties of objects apprehended in conceptual awareness are not real.

Kumārila concludes:

> 246cd–247ab. Therefore, there would be the illusion of a valid means of knowledge when a thing is conceived as being another thing, but not when there is a conceptualization of it according to its own property.

Error, "the illusion of a valid means of knowledge," arises not from conceiving an object to have certain properties, but from conceiving it to have properties it really doesn't have. That is not what happens in a conceptualized perception, where one's judgement about the object is in effect dictated by the nature of the object itself.

2.8 Conclusion: the other *pramāṇas* are based on perception

Kumārila finally returns to the issue that triggered the discussion of conceptualized perception, namely, whether the other means of knowledge, inference, comparison, and supposition, can be considered as being based on perception and thus excluded as means of knowing Dharma; for only if perception is conceptualized can inference, etc., be based on it (see verses 87–89 and 111).

> 247cd–248ab. Thus it is established that the universal as well as the connection [between the inferential mark and property to be proved in an inference] are perceptible, and so inference, etc., arise dependent on perception.

That an object is of a particular type, and that certain properties invariably go together with other properties (e.g., possessing smoke and possessing fire) – these sorts of facts, upon which inference and other *pramāṇas* besides perception are based – are known by perception, that is, *conceptualized* perception. Thus, inference and the other nonscriptural means of knowledge besides perception, insofar as they are dependent on perception, are not means of knowing Dharma.

Moreover, if one holds that perception cannot apprehend such facts, as the Buddhists do, then indeed the other means of knowledge cannot operate; for they depend on the apprehension of such matters by perception.

> 248cd–249ab. And it will be stated in regard to inference that if perception is nonconceptualized, then all the other *pramāṇas* inference, and so forth, cannot function.

Kumārila will explain in his treatment of inference later in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Anumānapariccheda* 146ff., how inference depends on the apprehension of universal properties and the invariable concomitance of universal properties by perception.[128]

It has been argued earlier by Kumārila that a cognition is a perception so long as it arises as a result of the active functioning of a sense faculty, even if memory intervenes. One might, however, object that this makes the notion of perception too broad. Suppose, due to the influence of memory, a cognition of some other object associated in past experience with the object that one is perceiving now were to arise when one's sense faculty is connected with the latter, for example, an idea of heat when one's eye is connected with fire. Such a cognition, it would seem, would also be a perception according to Kumārila's analysis.

> 249cd–250ab. [Objection:] But isn't it the case that if matters are this way then the conceptualizing of heat as a result of fire seen from a distance would also be perception, like the cognitions of cowness, etc.?

When one sees fire from a distance, one cannot *feel* the heat. The idea of heat that arises in such circumstances surely cannot be a perception.

Kumārila responds:

> 250cd–251ab. There is no cognition that is more proximate in regard to cowness that is considered a perception. Thus, for us this cognition is perception.

The idea of heat that arises when one sees fire from a distance is an inferential, not a perceptual, cognition; for it arises through another cognition that is clearly more "proximate" to the object, that is, one caused directly by the functioning of the senses and the mind. A visual cognition of a cow, on the other hand, arises directly from the functioning of the senses and the mind and is not derived from some other more "proximate" cognition. Thus, the conceptualized cognition of a cow that one has upon seeing a cow is properly considered a perception, whereas the conceptualized cognition of heat upon seeing fire is not. Kumārila's understanding of perception as involving the application of memory thus does not lead to the inclusion of the latter kind of conceptualized cognition in the domain of perception.

> 251cd–252ab. A cognition that arises in regard to cowness, too, is not thought to be a perception by someone who does not believe that there is a connection with the sense faculties.[129]

Nor is a cognition of cowness considered a perception if one does not think that it arises immediately from the functioning of the senses and the mind. Suppose one sees a cow from a considerable distance and is unable to tell whether it is a cow or a buffalo. One identifies it as a cow from the mooing sound it makes. In such a case one will consider the cognition of the cow to be, not a perception, but an inference – similar to the cognition of heat as a result of one's visual perception of fire.

In sum, there are two kinds of conceptualized cognitions of a cow: ones that are immediate and ones that are indirect. Only the former are perceptions.

> 252cd–253. But a cognition of heat arises as a perception when there is a connection with the sense of touch; it is not an immediate cognition when fire is revealed by vision. Therefore, only when there is a connection with the sense faculty that is considered the means of apprehending a certain property would there be a perception, not otherwise.

When fire is connected with the sense of touch an immediate awareness of heat arises. That is a perception. However, when fire is connected with the sense of vision and one has, through a visual cognition of fire, a cognition of heat, then one's awareness is not immediate; it is not a perception. A cognition is a perception only if it arises when the sense faculty that gives rise to an immediate awareness *of that type* is connected with the object, but not if it arises when a sense faculty that gives rise to an immediate awareness *of another type* is connected with the object. Thus, a cognition of heat is a perception if it arises while the sense of touch, which can give rise to an immediate awareness of heat, is connected with the object, not if it arises when the sense of vision is connected with it. In the latter case, one has to do with inference, not perception. By this modification of his analysis, then, Kumārila is able to exclude from the sphere of perception such cognitions as that of heat when one is *visually* apprehending fire. A conceptualized cognition of a cow is a perception if it arises when the sense of vision is connected with the object, and the object is close enough to be identified, but not if it arises from an auditory cognition of the sort of *sound* a cow makes.

Kumārila concludes:

> 254. Thus, although the manner of conceptual awareness is the same, that cognition which is in conformity with the result of a connection with a sense faculty is perception. And it is accepted as such in the world – without a definition.

Although both the cognition of something as fire and the cognition of something as heat are conceptual awarenesses generated in part by the functioning of the faculty of memory, the former but not the latter is a perception because it is the sort of immediate awareness of its object normally caused by the sense faculty – in this case, the sense of vision – that is currently connected with the object. This distinction is something that is evident to ordinary people, even though they are ignorant of a formal definition of perception.

Thus, Kumārila has come full circle in his discussion of the meaning of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4. Perception is not a means of knowing Dharma. Nor are the other *pramāṇas* inference, etc., insofar as they depend on perception. The Vedic injunction alone is the means of knowing Dharma.

This concludes my commentary on the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* chapter of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*, titled *Pratyakṣaparicchedasaṃśayacchettā*, "The Destroyer of Doubts Concerning the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*."

APPENDIX

THE SANSKRIT TEXT OF THE *PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA*

In producing the present text of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, upon which I have based my translation, I have compared five available published editions: *The Mīmānsā-Śloka-Vārtika of Kumārila Bhatta with the Commentary Called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra*, ed. Rāma Śāstrī Tailaṅga, *Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series*, nos. 11, 12, 15–21, 24, Fasciculus I–X (Sanskrit title page: *grantha* no. 3) (Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book-Depot, printed by Freeman and Co., Ltd., 1898–9) (abbreviated Ch_1); *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the Commentary called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārthasārathimiśra*, ed. anonymous, *Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series*, nos. 11, 12, and 15, Fasciculus I–III (Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, date unknown) (Ch_2);[1] *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimiśra*, ed. Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, *Prāchyabhārati Series*, no. 10 (Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978) (T); *Mīmāmsā Slokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamiśra*, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*, nos. 90, 99 (Trivandrum, 1926, 1929; rpt. Trivandrum: CBH Publications, 1990) (Tr); and *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umbeka Bhaṭṭa*, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy, *Madras University Sanskrit Series*, no. 13 (Madras: Madras University, 1971) (M). In a few instances I have also cited variants found in citations of what may be *Ślokavārttika* verses in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Bauddha Bharati edition) (TS). However, one must reckon with the possibility that these are actually citations from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

In selecting readings for my text from these editions I have adhered to the following criteria, which are mentioned here in order of relative weight.

(1) *The reading is favored by the classical commentators.*

Here, the evidence consists of *pratīkas* and glosses. Of course, in many cases there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to determine whether a particular commentator favored a particular reading. In cases of conflict among the commentators I preferred the reading favored by the majority, when there was one (i.e., two against one). In cases where there was only sufficient evidence to ascertain that there was a conflict between a reading favored by Umbeka and one favored by

either Pārthasārathimiśra or Sucaritamiśra, but not both, I tended to prefer the reading supported by Umbeka (who lived closer in time to Kumārila). It should be noted that the editors of the editions I used seem not to have taken the commentaries into account in selecting their readings. For just one example: in v. 139 *vaḥ* is supported by all the commentaries, but selected only for edition M.

(2) *The reading makes the most stylistic and/or philosophical sense.*

This criterion rarely conflicted with (1), but in many instances I had to employ it without being able to apply (1), for example, in selecting *buddheḥ* over *buddhiḥ* in v. 121. In such cases it often appeared that one had to do simply with a misprint. However, cf. v. 125b, where three editions have the phrase *satī jātiḥ pratīyate*, which I think is rather awkward to construe, and therefore rejected in favor of *yāvān adhigamo bhavet*.

(3) *The reading is favored by the previous editors – presumably on the basis of the manuscripts they used.*

This criterion was decisive only when the other two did not apply, usually in fairly trivial circumstances, when it was, say, a matter of *ca* versus *tu* or *ucyate* versus *iṣyate*.

These criteria were not applied mechanically. Criterion (1) did not necessarily trump (2) and (3); in some cases (2) and (3) taken together outweighed (1). And on one occasion I resorted to a reading not chosen by any of the four editions, but attested (in a footnote) in the edition of Musalgaonkar (see below) and confirmed by Umbeka's commentary, namely, in v. 171.

Seventy-eight out of 106 times the reading I selected agreed with Ch_2, 72 times with T, 71 times with Ch_1, 67 times with Tr, and only 53 times with M. Thus, this analysis can also be taken to imply a somewhat negative judgement of the reliability of M.

Needless to say, this text is a far cry from a critical edition. The shortcomings of my methodology should be obvious. Following *pratīkas* in commentaries in *edited* texts is vulnerable to the possibility that the editors altered them to agree with their readings of the *mūla*-text; and there is also the possibility that Kumārila's text changed even before the first commentary was written – changes can be introduced into a text the first time it is copied. Commentators' glosses also can diverge significantly from the wording of the *mūla*-text. Meanwhile, judgements about style and philosophical sense are highly subjective. Nevertheless, I do think my text is an improvement over the four earlier editions I used. I have at least carefully reviewed the decisions made by the previous editors, who in footnotes list the manuscript variants they rejected in favor of the readings they chose (though I could not confirm how accurately they document this). I should also add that I did check my results against two other editions – the *editio princeps*, which appeared in *The Pandit*, 1878, n.s., vol. 3, pp. 129–53, and another

fairly recent edition, *Mīmāṃsā Darśana Ślokavārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa with Śābarabhāṣya, the Comm. Nyāyaratnākara, and Notes*, ed. Gajānana Śāstrī Musalgaonkar (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1979) – and found no reason to alter them. Although a new edition based on a reconsideration of all the available manuscripts is certainly a desideratum, especially in light of the discrepancies between the existing print editions, I did not think undertaking such a project would be the best use of my time, since the discrepancies, in my opinion, do not yield substantive differences in the ideas expressed in the verses.

The variant readings for the verses are given in endnotes. I first list the edition or editions which contain the reading I have chosen, then, after a semicolon, the readings from other editions.

Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣapariccheda

1 *varṇyate sūtrabhedena yena pratyakṣalakṣaṇam |*
tena sūtrasya sambandho vācyaḥ pūrvapratijñayā ||
2 *lakṣaṇasyābhidhānaṃ tu*[2] *kenāṃśenopayujyate |*
kimarthaṃ cānumānāder lakṣaṇaṃ nātra kathyate ||
3 *na tāvad apramāṇatvaṃ teṣāṃ nāpy akṣabuddhiṣu |*
śakyate 'ntargatir vaktuṃ na ca lakṣaṇatulyatā ||
4 *na cāpi siddhir eṣāṃ*[3] *syād arthāt pratyakṣalakṣaṇāt |*
na hi tatpūrvakaṃ sarvaṃ pramāṇam iti niścitam ||
5 *pratyakṣalakṣaṇoktiś ca nānumānādilakṣaṇāt |*
vinā na sidhyatīty evam arthākṣepo na yujyate[4] *||*
6 *tadatatpūrvakatve*[5] *dhīr na ca tallakṣaṇād bhavet |*
tadukter vānumānādi kiṃ na syāt tadapūrvakam ||
7 *na ca lakṣaṇabhedasya svarūpeyattayor*[6] *api |*
pratyakṣalakṣaṇād eṣāṃ kathaṃcid avadhāraṇā ||
8 *prasiddhatvād avācyatvaṃ pratyakṣe 'pi prasajyate |*
tenānyaparisaṃkhyārthaṃ sūtraṃ mūḍhena vocyate ||
9 *na tv ekaṃ*[7] *lakṣayed eṣu buddhipūrvaṃ kathaṃcana |*
sambhavaty ekavākyatve vākyabhedaś ca neṣyate ||
10 *na cāpy etena*[8] *sūtreṇa pratyakṣaṃ lakṣyate sphuṭam |*
tadābhāseṣu[9] *tulyatvāt svapnajñānaikavarjanāt ||*
11 *tad dhīndriyārthasambandhavyāpāreṇa*[10] *vinā bhavet |*
kenacit samprayoge tu bhrāntyādi[11] *syān niyogataḥ ||*
12 *grāhyeṇānyena vety etat kṛtaṃ naiva viśeṣaṇam |*
samprayogasya yena syād viśeṣo vakṣyamāṇavat ||
13 *asāmarthyaṃ ca matvāsya vṛttikāreṇa lakṣaṇe |*
tatsamprayoga ity evaṃ pāṭhāntaram udāhṛtam ||
14 *tenānyenāpi saṃyoge cakṣurāder yad utthitam |*
viṣayāntaravijñānaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ prasajyate ||
15 *satsamprayoganirdeśo vyarthaś ced etad eva hi |*
pratipādyaṃ parasyāpi lakṣaṇāsiddhir eva ca ||

16 *svapnādīnāṃ nivṛttir vā phalaṃ tasya bhaviṣyati |*
tasmād vidhyanuvāditvaṃ nānukte lakṣaṇe bhavet ||
17 *tena naiṣā vacovyaktir yat satīndriyasaṅgame |*
vijñānaṃ jāyate[12] *tasya pratyakṣatvaṃ pratīyatām ||*
18 *pratyakṣaṃ yaj jane siddhaṃ tasyaivaṃdharmakatvataḥ |*
vidyamānopalambhatvaṃ tena dharme 'nimittatā[13] *||*
19 *evaṃlakṣaṇakatvaṃ ca na svarūpavivakṣayā |*
evaṃliṅgakam ity etad bhāṣyakāreṇa varṇyate ||
20 *yato 'sti tatra dharmo 'yaṃ vidyamānopalambhanam |*
tasmāt tena prasiddhena gamyatām animittatā ||
21 *pratyakṣatvam ado hetuḥ śeṣaṃ hetuprasiddhaye |*
asmadādau prasiddhatvād yogyartham abhidhīyate ||
22 *prakṛteṇa ca sambandhaḥ śeṣāprāmāṇyadarśanāt |*
tadaprāmāṇyasiddhiś[14] *ca sambandhāder anīkṣaṇāt ||*
23 *śakyam anyāpramāṇatvam iti sūtrair na paṭhyate*[15] *|*
na ca paryanuyogo 'tra lakṣaṇānupayogataḥ ||
24 *na ca nyūnātirekādiprasaṅgo lakṣaṇaṃ prati |*
sarvathā lokasiddhatvād dharmo 'yaṃ tāvad iṣyate ||
25 *tataś ca mṛgatṛṣṇādi na pratyakṣaṃ prasajyate |*
animittaprasaṅgas tu tasyāpi na nivāryate[16] *||*
26 *atītānāgate 'py arthe sūkṣme vyavahite 'pi ca |*
pratyakṣaṃ yogināṃ iṣṭaṃ kaiścin muktātmanām api ||
27 *vidyamānopalambhatvam asiddhaṃ tatra tān prati |*
bhaviṣyattvasya[17] *vā hetos tadgrāhyair vyabhicāritā ||*
28 *mā bhūtām iti tenāha lokasiddhaṃ sad ity ayam |*
na lokavyatiriktaṃ hi pratyakṣaṃ yoginām api ||
29 *pratyakṣatvena tasyāpi vidyamānopalambhanam |*
satsamprayogajatvaṃ vāpy asmatpratyakṣavad bhavet ||
30 *teṣām avartamāne 'rthe yā*[18]*nāmotpadyate matiḥ |*
pratyakṣaṃ sā tatas tv eva nābhilāṣasmṛtādivat ||
31 *loke cāpy aprasiddhatvāt pratyakṣatvapramātvayoḥ*[19] *|*
pratibhāvad dvayāsattvaṃ sad ity anena kathyate ||
32 *laukikī pratibhā yadvat pratyakṣādyanapekṣiṇī |*
na niścayāya paryāptā tathā syād yoginām api ||
33 *avidyamānasaṃyogāt syāc cet pratyakṣadhīḥ kvacit |*
bhaviṣyaty api dharme syāc chaktety āha sad ity ayam ||
34 *pratyakṣaḥ prāg anuṣṭhānān na dharmo 'nuṣṭhito 'pi vā |*
phalasādhanarūpeṇa tadānīṃ yena nāsty asau ||
35 *asmatpratyakṣavac cāpi vidyamānopalambhanam |*
pratyakṣaṃ dhyāyināṃ[20] *dharme pratyakṣatvāc ca neṣyate ||*
36 *avidyamānasaṃyogāt pratyakṣatvanirākṛtiḥ |*
yogināṃ kena labhyeta neṣṭaṃ sadgrahaṇaṃ yadi ||
37 *saptamyāpi*[21] *tu labhyeta sadarthaḥ kalpanā punaḥ |*
pareṣāṃ vāraṇīyeti yatno jaimininā kṛtaḥ ||

38 *saṃyagarthe ca saṃśabdo duṣprayoganivāraṇaḥ |*
prayoga indriyāṇāṃ ca vyāpāro 'rtheṣu kathyate ||
39 *duṣṭatvāc chuktikāyogo vāryate rajatekṣaṇāt |*
evaṃ saty anuvādatvaṃ lakṣaṇasyāpi[22] *sambhavet ||*
40 *tataś cāprāpyakāritvād yad bauddhaiḥ śrotracakṣuṣoḥ |*
lakṣaṇāvyāptisiddhyarthaṃ[23] *saṃyogo neti kīrtyate ||*
41 *prāpyagrahaṇapakṣe hi*[24] *sāntarāgrahaṇaṃ kila |*
adhiṣṭhānādhikaś cārtho na gṛhyeta tvagādivat ||
42 *vyāpāramātravācitvād aviruddhaṃ tad atra naḥ |*
yadi vārthārjavasthānaṃ samprayogo 'tra varṇyate ||
43 *yogyatālakṣaṇo vācyaḥ*[25] *saṃyogaḥ kāryalakṣitaḥ |*
sāṃkhyādīn vā vinirjitya prāptipakṣo 'tra dūṣyatām ||
44 *tayoś ca prāpyakāritvam indriyatvāt tvagādivat |*
kecit tayoḥ śarīrāc ca bahir vṛttiṃ pracakṣate ||
45 *cikitsādiprayogaś ca yo 'dhiṣṭhāne prayujyate |*
so 'pi tasyaiva saṃskāra ādheyasyopakārakaḥ ||
46 *taddeśaś cāpi saṃskāraḥ sarvavyāptyartha ucyate*[26] |
cakṣurādyupakāraś ca[27] *pādādāv api dṛśyate ||*
47 *tasmān naikāntataḥ śakyaṃ saṃskārāt tatra vartanam |*
bahirvṛttis tayoś[28] *ceṣṭā pṛthvagrā santatāpi ca ||*
48 *adhiṣṭhānādhikaṃ tena gṛhyate yatra yādṛśam |*
pārthavaṃ[29] *vṛttibhāge syād dūre 'pi grahaṇaṃ tathā ||*
49 *dīpaprabhā yathā tasmin vinaśyati vinaśyati |*
tathā bahirgatāpy eṣā mūlacchedād vinaśyati ||
50 *adhiṣṭhānapidhāne*[30] *tu*[31] *saty apy ucchinnayatnayā |*
tayārtho 'nupanītatvād ātmanā nānubhūyate ||
51 *vicchinna iti buddhiḥ syād adhiṣṭhānam apekṣya ca*[32] |
śabde tv ādhikyavicchedau bhrāntyāivoktāv asambhavāt ||
52 *puruṣendriyaśabdau ca vyavadhānena kalpitau |*
puruṣo laukiko vā syād yo vāsmin sādhayiṣyate ||
53 *vikriyā jñānarūpāsya na nityatve virotsyate |*
buddhijanmeti cāpy āha jāyamānapramāṇatām ||
54 *vyāpāraḥ kārakāṇāṃ hi dṛṣṭo janmātirekataḥ |*
pramāṇe 'pi tathā mā bhūd iti janma vivakṣyate ||
55 *na hi tat kṣaṇam apy āste jāyate vāpramātmakam*[33] |
yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat ||
56 *tena janmaiva viṣaye buddher vyāpāra iṣyate*[34] |
tad eva ca pramārūpaṃ tadvatī karaṇaṃ ca dhīḥ ||
57 *janma cāvyatirekeṇa bhāṣyakāreṇa varṇitam |*
tac ca bhūtabhaviṣyatvāt kṛtaṃ buddher viśeṣaṇam ||
58 *yadāpy*[35] *aulūkyasiddhāntāt samavāyasya janmatā |*
vyaktis tasyendriyādhīnā[36] *tena pratyakṣam ucyate*[37] ||
59 *pramāṇaphalabhāvaś ca*[38] *yatheṣṭaṃ parikalpyatām |*
sarvathāpy animittatvaṃ vidyamānopalambhanāt ||

60 *yadvendriyaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt tasya vārthena saṅgatiḥ |*
manaso vendriyair yoga ātmanā sarva eva vā ||
61 *tadā*[39] *jñānaṃ phalaṃ tatra vyāpārāc ca pramāṇatā ||*
vyāpāro na yadā teṣāṃ tadā notpadyate phalam ||
62 *na ca sarvātmanākṣeṇa sambandho 'rthasya vidyate |*
yena sarvārthabodhaḥ syāt tatpramāṇābhidhāyinām ||
63 *prāptimātraṃ hi sambandho*[40] *nendriyasyābhyupeyate |*
mā bhūt kāraṇamātreṇa tvacā rūpāvadhāraṇam ||
64 *yathā pramāṇaniṣpattau yogyatvād indriyārthayoḥ |*
niyatā saṅgatir hetuḥ phale 'py evaṃ bhaviṣyati ||
65 *yogasya dvyāśrayatve 'pi bhavaty anyatarāśrayaḥ |*
vyapadeśo 'thavāpy akṣaṃ tatrāsādhāraṇaṃ bhavet ||
66 *saṃyoge tv ātmamanasoḥ syāc ced viṣayabhinnatā |*
pramāṇaphalayor nāsāv arthe hi vyāpṛtaṃ dvayam ||
67 *athāpy āśraya iṣṭas te na yogād viṣayāntaram*[41] *|*
ātmasthatvena vijñānaṃ na bhinnaviṣayaṃ tataḥ ||
68 *prakṛṣṭasādhanatvāc ca pratyāsatteḥ sa eva naḥ |*
karaṇaṃ tena nānyatra kārake syāt pramāṇatā ||
69 *pramāṇe sarvasaṃyoge doṣo naiko 'pi vidyate |*
pramāṇaṃ tv indriyaṃ yasya tasyaiko viṣayaḥ sphuṭaḥ ||
70 *pramāṇaphalate buddhyor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayoḥ |*
yadā tadāpi pūrvoktā bhinnārthatvanirākriyā[42] *||*
71 *viṣeśaṇe tu boddhavye yad ālocanamātrakam |*
prasūte niścayaṃ paścāt tasya prāmāṇyakalpanā ||
72 *niścayas tu phalaṃ tatra*[43] *nāsāv ālocite yadā*[44] *|*
tadā naiva pramāṇatvaṃ syād arthānavadhāraṇāt ||
73 *hānādibuddhiphalatā pramāṇaṃ ced viśeṣyadhīḥ |*
upakārādisaṃsmṛtyā vyavāyaś ced iyaṃ phalam ||
74 *viṣayaikatvam icchaṃs tu yaḥ pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ vadet |*
sādhyasādhanayor bhedo laukikas tena bādhitaḥ ||
75 *chedane khadiraprāpte palāśe na cchidā yathā |*
tathaiva paraśor loke cchidayā saha naikatā ||
76 *bhavate bhedahānena rucitā viṣayaikatā |*
tattyāgena parebhyas tu bhedo rucim upāgataḥ ||
77 *karaṇatvopacāras tu phale cet kalpyate tvayā |*
kathaṃcid viṣayaikatvaṃ parair vā kiṃ na kalpyate ||
78 *paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyānantarasya naḥ |*
pramāṇatvam[45] *bhavej jñāne pramāṇe tu paraṃ phalam ||*
79 *svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ tu tanniṣedhān na yujyate |*
pramāṇe viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvān na yujyate[46] *||*
80 *svākāraś ca svasaṃvittiṃ muktvā nānyaḥ pratīyate |*
prāmāṇyaṃ yasya kalpyeta svasaṃvittiphalaṃ prati ||
81 *svākārasya paricchedo na cākārāntarād vinā |*
tasyāpy evaṃ tathā ca syān nākārāntaḥ kadācana ||

82 *na cāsañcetitaḥ sattāṃ svākāraḥ pratipadyate |*
grāhye ca viṣayākāre grāhako 'nyo na labhyate ||
83 *manasas tv indriyatvena*[47] *pratyakṣā dhīḥ sukhādiṣu |*
manasā samprayukto hi tāny ātmā[48]*pratipadyate ||*
84 *sambaddhaṃ vartamānaṃ ca gṛhyate cakṣurādinā |*
sāmānyaṃ ca viśeṣo vā grāhyaṃ nāto 'tra kathyate[49] *||*
85 *lakṣaṇaṃ yac ca yair uktaṃ pratyakṣe laukike sati |*
vidyamānopalambhatvāt[50] *sarvasyaivānimittatā ||*
86 *nirvikalpakapakṣe tu sutarām animittatā |*
sādhyasādhanasambandho nāvikalpya hi gṛhyate ||
87 *kathaṃ pratyakṣapūrvatvam anumānādino*[51] *bhavet |*
yadā smṛtyasamarthatvān nirvikalpendriyasya dhīḥ ||
88 *na cāvikalpya liṅgasya liṅgisambandhayos*[52] *tathā |*
gṛhītir upamāne 'pi sādṛśyagrahaṇāt smṛte[53] *||*
89 *arthāpattiḥ punaḥ prāyo nānyadṛṣṭe*[54] *'rtha iṣyate |*
pravartate ca yaṃ dṛṣṭvā so 'py arthaḥ savikalpakaḥ ||
90 *yatra cānumitaṃ liṅgaṃ sūryagatyādi liṅgi ca |*
tatra pratyakṣapūrvatvaṃ katham adhyavasīyate ||
91 *pratyakṣāvagate cārthe kutas teṣāṃ pramāṇatā |*
tair yadā sa pratīyeta[55] *tadā nākṣasya gocaraḥ ||*
92 *atha kasyacid arthasya jñānāt tatpūrvatā bhavet |*
tadārthasya bhaviṣyattvaṃ na syād ajñānakāraṇam ||
93 *vartamāne hi kasmiṃścid vijñāte 'rthe 'kṣabuddhibhiḥ |*
liṅgād avidyamāno 'pi dharmo gamyeta tais tadā ||
94 *pratyakṣeṇa gṛhītvā ca varṇān vede 'pi gṛhyate |*
prameyam iti so 'pi syāt tatpūrvatvād akāraṇam ||
95 *kecit tatpūrvakatvaṃ tu hetur naiveti manvate |*
tatpūrvakatvād yat tāvat prāmāṇyaṃ tadasambhavaḥ ||
96 *pratyakṣena gṛhītvā ca liṅgādyanyatamaṃ dhruvam |*
pravṛttir anumānāder na ca dharme 'sti tādṛśam ||
97 *anumānānumānāder na cāpy astīha sambhavaḥ |*
sambandhaliṅgiliṅgānāṃ[56] *pūrvasiddher asambhavāt ||*
98 *sattā ca nānumānena kasyacit pratipadyate |*
dharmeṇānyad viśeṣyaṃ cet pakṣo 'siddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ ||
99 *tasmād adṛṣṭapūrvatvāt kenacid vastunā saha |*
dharmasya nānumeyatvam asādhāraṇavastuvat ||
100 *adṛṣṭasadṛśatvāc ca svayaṃ cānupalambhanāt |*
dharmasya nopameyatvam asādhāraṇavad bhavet ||
101 *nanv arthāpattir evaṃ syāj jagadvaicitryadarśanāt |*
sukhiduḥkhyādibhedo hi nādṛṣṭāt kāraṇād[57] *ṛte ||*
102 *dṛṣṭasya vyabhicāritvāt tadabhāve 'pi sambhavāt |*
sevādhyayanatulyatve dṛṣṭā ca phalabhinnatā ||
103 *syād evaṃ yadi śakyeta svābhāvikanivāraṇā |*
karmaśakteś[58] *ca vaicitrye hetur anyo bhaved yadi ||*

104 *yathā ca*[59]*phalavaicitrye karmaṇāṃ śaktatā svataḥ |*
tathā vicitratā[60] *loke svabhāvād upapatsyate ||*
105 *adharme dharmarūpe vā hy avibhakte phalaṃ prati |*
kim apy astīti vijñānaṃ narāṇāṃ kvopayujyate ||
106 *kiṃ nu yāgādito duḥkhaṃ hiṃsādeḥ kiṃ sukhodbhavaḥ |*
svargaputrādibhedaś ca kīdṛśāt karmabhedataḥ ||
107 *iti yāvad avijñānaṃ tāvan naiva pravartate |*
pravṛttyaṅgaṃ ca yaj jñānaṃ tasya mūlaṃ pratīkṣyate ||
108 *tasmāt siddhe 'pi sāmānye viśeṣo nāgamād ṛte |*
viśeṣasya tu jijñāsā sūtrakāreṇa sūtritā ||
109 *gamyamāne viśeṣe ca tadantarbhāvakāritaḥ |*
sāmānyapratyayo 'pi syāc chāstrād evety akāraṇam ||
110 *yathārthāpattir evaṃ ca nānumā nopameṣyate*[61] *|*
śāstraṃ cet tad apekṣate tasyaiva syāt pramāṇatā ||
111 *pratyakṣāgrahaṇaṃ yat tu liṅgāder avikalpanāt |*
tan neṣṭatvād vikalpasyāpy artharūpopakāriṇaḥ ||
112 *asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ prathamaṃ*[62] *nirvikalpakam |*
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam ||
113 *na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate |*
tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate ||
114 *mahāsāmānyam anyais tu dravyaṃ sad iti cocyate |*
sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca pratyakṣasyaivam āśritam ||
115 *viśeṣās tu pratīyante savikalpakabuddhibhiḥ |*
te ca kecit pratidravyaṃ kecid bahuṣu saṃśritāḥ ||
116 *tān akalpayad utpannaṃ vyāvṛttyanugamātmanā*[63] *|*
gavy aśve copajātaṃ tu pratyakṣaṃ na viśiṣyate ||
117 *tad ayuktaṃ pratidravyaṃ bhinnarūpopalambhanāt |*
na hy ākhyātum aśakyatvād bhedo nāstīti gamyate ||
118 *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ |*
grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddhaṃ tu gṛhyate ||
119 *na hy asādhāraṇatvena*[64] *paravyāvṛttyakalpanāt |*
viśeṣānugamākḷpteḥ[65] *sāmānyam iti nāpi tat ||*
120 *tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair*[66] *jātyādibhir yayā |*
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā ||
121 *karaṇaṃ cendriyaṃ buddher*[67] *na tatra jñānam āhitam |*
tataḥ smṛtyasamarthatvād[68] *vikalpo 'to na vāryate ||*
122 *ātmany eva sthitaṃ jñānaṃ sa hi boddhātra gamyate |*
smaraṇe cāsya sāmarthyaṃ sandhānādau ca vidyate ||
123 *tenendriyārthasambandhe vidyamāne smarann api |*
vikalpayan svadharmeṇa vastu pratyakṣavān naraḥ ||
124 *tac caitadindriyādhīnam iti tair vyapadiśyate |*
tadasambandhajātaṃ tu naiva pratyakṣam iṣyate ||
125 *punaḥ punar vikalpe 'pi yāvān adhigamo bhavet*[69] *|*
tatsambandhānusāreṇa sarvaṃ pratyakṣam iṣyate ||

126 *na hi praviṣṭamātrāṇām uṣṇād garbhagṛhādiṣu |*
arthā na pratibhāntīti gṛhyante[70]*nendriyaiḥ punaḥ ||*
127 *yathā tv ābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṃ jñātvā svarūpataḥ |*
paścāt tatrāvabudhyante[71]*tathā jātyādidharmataḥ ||*
128 *yadi tv ālocya sammīlya netre kaścid vikalpayet |*
na syāt pratyakṣatā tasya sambandhānanusārataḥ ||
129 *asambandhavikalpe*[72] *'pi tulyam ātmādi kāraṇam |*
tenāsādhāraṇatvaṃ[73] *syād atrākṣasyaiva kalpane ||*
130 *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi nākṣaṃ kevalakāraṇam |*
tatpāramparyajāte vā rūḍhiḥ syāt paṅkajādivat ||
131 *animittaiva vā rūḍhiḥ sutarāṃ savikalpakam |*
pratyakṣaṃ sammataṃ loke na tathā nirvikalpakam ||
132 *vṛddhaprayogagamyāś ca śabdārthāḥ sarva eva naḥ |*
tena yatra prayukto 'yaṃ na tasmād apanīyate ||
133 *siddhānugamamātraṃ hi kartuṃ yuktaṃ parīkṣakaiḥ |*
na sarvalokasiddhasya lakṣaṇena nivartanam ||
134 *kalpanāyāḥ svasaṃvittāv indriyādhīnatā katham |*
manas tatrendriyaṃ cet syād gotvādāv api tat samam ||
135 *svasaṃvittau tad iṣṭaṃ cet loko na hy evam icchati |*
tasmād rūḍhatvam[74]*eṣṭavyaṃ pāribhāṣikatāpi vā ||*
136 *manasas tv indriyatvena sukhaduḥkhādibuddhiṣu |*
yathā pratyakṣataivaṃ nas tadadhīnā bhaviṣyati ||
137 *tadadhīnatvasāmye 'pi kalpanāpoḍhaśabdanāt |*
pratyakṣaṃ kiṃcid eveṣṭaṃ yathā tava[75]*tathaiva naḥ ||*
138 *liṅgādyabhāvataś cāpi nānumānādidhīr iyam |*
na ca pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt smṛtitvam upapadyate ||
139 *bādhakapratyayāsattvān nāprāmāṇyaṃ ca yujyate |*
tasmāt pratyakṣam evedaṃ vyavahāras tathaiva vaḥ[76] *||*
140 *jātyādyarthāntaraṃ yasmād atadrūpe*[77] *'pi vastuni |*
bhavaty adhyasya dhīs tasmān mṛgatṛṣṇādibhiḥ samā ||
141 *naitad aśvādibuddhīnām adhyāropādyasambhavāt |*
sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ ||
142 *yadi hy ekāntato bhinnaṃ viśeṣyāt syād viśeṣaṇam |*
svānurūpāṃ sadā buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayet katham ||
143 *sphaṭikādau tu lākṣādisvarūpā yā matir bhavet |*
avyutpannasya sā mithyā vyutpannānāṃ hi bhedadhīḥ ||
144 *na tu jātyādibhir muktaṃ*[78] *vastu dṛṣṭaṃ kadācana |*
tadvimokena vā tāni lākṣādisphaṭikādivat ||
145 *tatrāpi cen na dṛśyeta bhedaḥ kaiścit kadācana |*
raktādibuddhisaṃyaktvaṃ vinivāryeta kena vā ||
146 *na cāpy ayutasiddhānāṃ sambandhitvena kalpanā |*
nāniṣpannasya sambandhaḥ niṣpattau yutasiddhatā ||
147 *tathā ca sati sambandhe hetuḥ kaścin na vidyate |*
ṣaṇṇām api[79] *na sambandhaḥ padārthānāṃ pratīyate ||*

148 *samavāyaviyogāc ca viśleṣaḥ syāt parasparam |*
tatkḷptāv avyavasthā syāt tasya tasyānyasaṅgateḥ[80] ||
149 *atha tasyātmarūpatvān nānyasambandhakalpanā |*
abhedāt samavāyo 'stu svarūpaṃ dharmadharmiṇoḥ ||
150 *na hi vyatiriktaḥ san sambandhaṃ pratipadyate |*
tasmiṃs tābhyām abhinne tu na nānātvaṃ tayor bhavet ||
151 *nanu dharmātirekeṇa dharmiṇo 'nupalambhanāt |*
tatsaṅgamātra evāyaṃ gavādiḥ syād vanādivat ||
152 *āvirbhāvatirobhāvadharmakeṣv anuyāyi yat |*
taddharmi yatra vā jñānaṃ prāg dharmagrahaṇād bhavet ||
153 *ato jātyādirūpeṇa dharmi yad gṛhyate naraiḥ |*
pārarūpyaṃ na tasyāstīty aprāmāṇyaṃ na yujyate ||
154 *yasyāpi vyatirekaḥ syād dharmebhyo dharmiṇaḥ sphuṭaḥ |*
nityaṃ tasyāpi tādrūpyān na mithyātvaṃ prasajyate ||
155 *yo hy anyarūpasaṃvedyaḥ*[81] *saṃvedyetānyathā*[82] *punaḥ |*
sa mithyā na tu tenaiva yo nityam avagamyate ||
156 *na cānekendriyagrāhyaṃ bhinnatāṃ pratipadyate |*
mā bhūd bhinnaśarīrasthagrāhyatvād bhinnarūpatā[83] ||
157 *jātyabhedād abhedaś ced indriyatvena tat samam*[84] |
tulyabuddher ato bhinnā na sattendriyabhedataḥ ||
158 *buddhibhedāc ca naikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate |*
ekānekatvam iṣṭaṃ vā sattārūpādirūpataḥ[85] ||
159 *kvacic ca saṅkarān nākṣam ekam ity avasīyate |*
dārḍhyadaurbalyabhedena vyavasthāpi yataḥ kvacit ||
160 *yathā hi manasaḥ sārdhaṃ rūpādau cakṣurādinā |*
pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādau kevalasyaiva dṛśyate[86] ||
161 *na kvacit saṅkarābhāvāt sarvatraiva nivartate |*
kvacic ca saṅkaraṃ dṛṣṭvā saṅkaro 'nyatra kalpyate ||
162 *śrotrāder upaghāte 'pi śabdādismṛtidarśanāt |*
vartamānasya cājñānād vyavasthā sampratīyate ||
163 *ekaṃ yadi bhaved akṣaṃ sarvaṃ*[87] *gṛhyeta vā na vā |*
kalpyate śaktibhedaś cec chaktir evendriyaṃ bhavet ||
164 *śṛṇuyād badhiraḥ śabdaṃ saṅkare cakṣurādinā |*
manaso vā svatantratve vartamānārthabuddhiṣu ||
165 *na smared badhiraḥ śabdaṃ śrotraṃ cet smṛtikāraṇam |*
smṛtivad vā bhaved asya vartamānārthadhīr api ||
166 *smṛtiś ca na bhavet paścād gṛhṇīyāt tan na cen manaḥ |*
śrotragrahaṇavelāyāṃ na ca sarvāsmṛtir bhavet[88] ||
167 *bodhātmakatayā puṃsaḥ sarvatra grahaṇaṃ bhavet |*
yugapad viṣaye 'py asya karaṇāpekṣitā[89] *na cet ||*
168 *tasmāj jñānānusāreṇa vyavasthāsaṅkarau kvacit |*
grāhyagrāhakaśaktibhyaḥ kāryadvāreṇa kalpitau ||
169 *cakṣūrūpādibhedas tu pañcadhaiva vyavasthitaḥ |*
tena nīlādibhede 'pi nendriyānantyakalpanā ||

170 *tasmāt pañcabhir apy akṣair bodhaḥ sattāguṇatvayoḥ |*
dravyamūrtau[90] *punar dvābhyāṃ rūpādāv ekaśaḥ sthitiḥ ||*
171 *nanu jātyādirūpe 'pi śabdābhedopacārataḥ |*
pravartamānā mithyā syād buddhir ūṣe 'mbubuddhivat[91] *||*
172 *na śabdābhedarūpeṇa buddhir artheṣu jāyate |*
prāk śabdād yādṛśī buddhiḥ śabdād api hi tādṛśī ||
173 *nanu gotvādirūpeṇa gavākārādibuddhayaḥ |*
na prāk śabdārthasambandhajñānāt santi kadācana ||
174 *jātyādes tatsvarūpaṃ ced aśabdajño 'pi lakṣayet |*
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ śabdarūpatvaniścayaḥ ||
175 *yathā rūpādayo bhinnāḥ prāk śabdāt svātmanaiva tu |*
gamyante tadvad evaitat saṃjñitvaṃ kevalaṃ param ||
176 *na cāvikalpitaḥ śabdād iti vācyo na gṛhyate |*
tenāgṛhītaśabdo 'pi gotvādīn pratipadyate ||
177 *śrutisaṃsparśabodhe 'pi naivābhedopacāratā |*
vivekād arthaśabdānāṃ cakṣuḥśrotradhiyā[92] *kṛtāt ||*
178 *anantadharmake dharmiṇy ekadharmāvadhāraṇe |*
śabdo 'bhyupāyamātraṃ syān nātmādhyāropakāraṇam ||
179 *na copeye 'bhyupāyasya rūpādhyāsaḥ prasajyate |*
na hi dīpendriyādīnāṃ rūpādhyāropa[93] *iṣyate ||*
180 *nityaṃ yadi ca gotvādi śabdarūpeṇa gṛhyate |*
rūpāntaraṃ na dṛṣṭaṃ[94]*ced bhedādhyāsau kuto nv imau ||*
181 *yady abhedo na mithyātvaṃ bhedaś cet syāt svarūpataḥ |*
nādhyāropaprasaṅgaḥ syād bhrāntyā tv adhyāsakalpanā ||
182 *śabdenaiva ca nirdeśo gṛhīte 'rthe 'vakalpate |*
gaur ity eva ca nirdeśo vācyatadbuddhivādinām ||
183 *nirdeśatulyatāyāṃ ca śrotrā vaktṛsvarūpatā*[95] *|*
śabdajñānaprameyeṣu vijñānasyāvasīyate ||
184 *bhrāntihetusamānatve 'py upāyatvān matiśrutī |*
manyate 'rthe samadhyaste nārthādhyāsaṃ tayoḥ punaḥ ||
185 *gotve sāsnādimadrūpā*[96]*gādirūpābhidhāyake |*
nirākārobhayajñāne saṃvittiḥ paramārthataḥ ||
186 *yadi cābhedarūpeṇa śabdenārthaḥ pratīyate |*
ekarūpatvam akṣādau devanādeḥ prasajyate ||
187 *syād anakṣanivṛttyā cen na prāk śabdāt pratīyate |*
gavādiṣv api tulyaṃ cen naikarūpasya darśanāt ||
188 *traye bibhītakādīnāṃ naikadharmānvayo 'sti hi |*
śabdaḥ sādhāraṇas teṣāṃ jātiśabdād vilakṣaṇaḥ ||
189 *parasparavibhinnaṃ tu jñāyate 'trākṛtitrayam |*
tadadhyāse na yujyeta tadrūpasyāvibhāgataḥ ||
190 *bhinnāḥ syur akṣaśabdāś cen nārthe saṃśayadarśanāt |*
na sāmānyād ṛte sa syād rūpābhedaś ca gamyate ||
191 *bhavatyādau ca bhinne 'pi nāmākhyātatvasaṃjñayā |*
rūpaikatvena cādhyāse tulyārthatvaṃ prajasyate ||

192 *śabdaniṣpattyabhedāc ca tiṅantarthasya sādhyatā |*
kathaṃ kathaṃ ca mūrtārtho vācake mūrtivarjite ||
193 *gavāśvaśuklaśabdāder vācyarūpānapekṣaṇe |*
vācakatvavyavasthānaṃ kathaṃ jātiguṇādiṣu ||
194 *vṛkṣaplakṣādiśabdānāṃ tulye bhede ghaṭādibhiḥ |*
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ katham arthānapekṣayā ||
195 *sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca na syād vācakabuddhivat |*
ekatra copasaṃhāro na buddhyor nirvikalpake ||
196 *vastumātre sa ced evaṃ sarveṣām ekavācyatā |*
bhaved gavādiśabdānāṃ sarvair vastu hi gamyate ||
197 *na cāsādhāraṇe bhede nīlotpalam itīṣyate |*
na hi śabdapravṛttiḥ syād anyatrānyatra ceṣyate ||
198 *na ca nīlotpalaṃ nāma vastv ekaṃ kiṃcid iṣyate |*
śabdārthayor yato bhedo gamyate 'vayavānugaḥ ||
199 *śabdadvayasya cādhyāsaḥ paryāyeṣv api dṛśyate |*
ekādhikaraṇās tena syus te nīlotpalādivat ||
200 *na cānavagate pūrvaṃ padam arthe prayujyate |*
tatra sambandhavelāyāṃ kīdṛśo 'rthaḥ pratīyate ||
201 *tadānīṃ nārtharūpe hi śabdarūpasya sambhavaḥ |*
na cāsādhāraṇāṃśena sambandhānugamaḥ kvacit ||
202 *tatra pūrvānapekṣatve yady ātmādhyāsaśaktatā |*
śabdasya prathame 'pi syāc chravaṇe 'dhyastarūpatā ||
203 *mama vācyānabhijñatvān na bhavet smaraṇaṃ tataḥ |*
bhavatas tv artharūpasya vācakeṣv api darśanāt ||
204 *yathā tv ajñātaśabdānāṃ vācye taddhīr na jāyate |*
tathaivājñātavācyānām upalabdhe 'pi vācake ||
205 *tasmān nātīva vācyānāṃ vācakādhīnatā bhavet |*
smārakatvāc ca teṣv eva pāratantryaṃ pratīyate ||
206 *tena sambandhavelāyām arthātmā yo 'vasīyate |*
śabdād api sa eveti nārtharūpaṃ praṇaśyati ||
207 *pravṛttau vā nivṛttau vā yāṃ śabdaḥ kurute matim |*
tādātmyaṃ tasya śabdasya na kathaṃcit pratīyate ||
208 *karahastādiśabdebhyaḥ śabdarūpasya bhedataḥ |*
bhinno 'rthaḥ sampratīyeta tadadhyāropakalpane ||
209 *ātmādhyāsas tu sādṛśyād uparāgāc ca dṛśyate |*
na tāvad arthasādṛśyaṃ śabdasyeha pratīyate ||
210 *na cānurāgaḥ śabdena bhinnadeśasya yujyate |*
dūrasthapratibimbaṃ ca nārūpasya pratīyate ||
211 *śabdasarvagatatvena yady arthaprāptir ucyate |*
sarvārthānāṃ bhavec chabdaiḥ sarvair evānurañjanam ||
212 *na ca bhinnendriyagrāhyaṃ kiṃcid asty anurāgakṛt |*
na hi lākṣānurakte 'pi sphaṭike dhīs tvagādibhiḥ ||
213 *anumānāgamau mithyā syātām adhyāsakalpane |*
nirūpaṇasya mithyātvāt sarvābhāvaḥ prasajyate ||

214 *tathāstv*[97] *iti yadi brūyān mithyā svavacane sati |*
katham evaṃ vaded artho nānṛtād dhi pratīyate ||
215 *śūnyavādottarāc cāpi yathārthaṃ buddhiśabdayoḥ |*
pravṛttir na tu tattantram[98] *artharūpaṃ kadācana ||*
216 *tasmāt prāg api ye śabdād bhinnaikatvādibuddhibhiḥ |*
gṛhyante sarvadā teṣāṃ paramārthāstitā bhavet ||
217 *śabdābhyupāyake 'py arthe tadabhāve ca yady api |*
arthabuddhir na jāyeta nārthe rūpaṃ praṇaśyati ||
218 *cakṣurāder abhāve hi rūpādyātmā na gṛhyate |*
svarūpanāśo rūpādes tāvanmātreṇa neṣyate ||
219 *sambandhasya ca nityatvān nārthasya syād arūpatā |*
yugapan na hi sarveṣām anyākārārthavedanam ||
220 *tadākāre 'pi tadvac ced dvaye sati parīkṣyatām |*
kiṃ nv[99] *arthasyātathābhāvo grahītuḥ kiṃ nv aśaktatā ||*
221 *sadasadbhāvayor arthe virodhitvād asambhavaḥ |*
grahītṛbhedāc chaktatvam aśaktatvaṃ ca yujyate ||
222 *yathāndhānandhayoḥ pārśve rūpasyety abhidhāsyate |*
tenārthe dhvanyupāyasya taddhīr nānyasya jāyate ||
223 *devadattādiśabde tu sambandhādyatvadarśanāt |*
arthasyānityatāyāṃ ca tādrūpasyāpy anityatā ||
224 *tatrāpy autpattikī śaktis tadrūpapratyayaṃ prati |*
grāhyagrāhakayor iṣṭā niyogasya tv anityatā ||
225 *tatra sarvair atādrūpyaṃ prāg niyogāt pratīyate |*
teneṣṭam eva mithyātvaṃ kaiścid adhyāsakalpane ||
226 *yadā tu yādṛśaḥ piṇḍaḥ pūrvaṃ śabdāt pratīyate |*
tādṛśasmaraṇe hetuḥ śabdas tatra yathārthatā ||
227 *niyogāt parato vāpi śabdena vyajyatām iyam |*
tadgrāhyaśaktir arthasya pārarūpyaṃ na tāvatā ||
228 *sarvākāraparicchedyaśakte 'rthe vācake 'pi vā |*
sarvākārārthavijñānasamarthe niyamaḥ kṛtaḥ ||
229 *tatra śabdārthasambandhaṃ pramātuḥ smarato 'pi yā |*
buddhiḥ pūrvagṛhītārthasandhānād[100] *upajāyate||*
230 *cakṣuṣā sannikṛṣṭe 'rthe nāpratyakṣam asau bhavet |*
viviktā eva te 'py arthāḥ smṛtipratyakṣagocarāḥ ||
231 *smaryete śabdasambandhau mā bhūt pratyakṣatā tayoḥ |*
tadapratyakṣabhāvena na tv arthasyāpi vāryate ||
232 *gṛhītam api gotvādi smṛtispṛṣṭaṃ ca yady api |*
tathāpi vyatirekeṇa pūrvabodhāt pratīyate ||
233 *vyaktikālādibhedena tatrāsty avasaro miteḥ |*
yaḥ pūrvāvagato 'ṃśo tra sa na nāma pratīyate[101] *||*
234 *idānīntanam astitvaṃ na hi pūrvadhiyā gatam |*
na hi smaraṇato yat prāk tat pratyakṣam itīdṛśam ||
235 *vacanaṃ rājakīyaṃ vā vaidikaṃ vāpi vidyate*[102] *|*
na cāpi smaraṇāt paścād indriyasya pravartanam ||

236 *vāryate kenacin nātas tat tadānīṃ pradusyati |*
tenendriyārthasambandhāt prāg ūrdhvaṃ vāpi yat smṛteḥ ||
237 *vijñānaṃ jāyate sarvaṃ pratyakṣam iti gamyatām |*
vimanaskā yadā kecit sambaddham api cendriyaiḥ ||
238 *na budhyante tathā cānye sādṛśyādivimohitāḥ |*
tatra yo 'rthaṃ vivekena kauśalāt sadṛśeṣv api ||
239 *sūkṣmaṃ vāpi prapadyeta tasya bhrāntir na tāvatā |*
yathā ṣaḍjādibhedena gāne laukikavaidike ||
240 *vivekenāvagacchanti yeṣāṃ tatsaṃskṛtā matiḥ |*
gānamātraṃ vijānanti tatrānadhikṛtās tu ye ||
241 *tadajñānān na mithyātvaṃ vaktuṃ śakyaṃ vivekinām |*
te hi ṣaḍjādiśabdebhyo vināpy eṣāṃ viviktatām||
242 *yathāvad adhigacchanti*[103] *tadvad gotvādivastv api |*
saṅkīrṇam arthamātraṃ tu budhyante 'bhyāsavarjitāḥ ||
243 *vivekaṃ pratipadyante ye śabdasmṛtisaṃskṛtāḥ |*
yathā rūpādimaty arthe yasyaivāsti yad indriyam ||
244 *sa tanmātraṃ gṛhītvānyan na gṛhṇāty anupāyataḥ*[104] *|*
tathā vivekahetūnāṃ yadā yaṃ pratipadyate ||
245 *tadupeye tadā jñānaṃ vartate tadanugrahāt |*
tena yāvat pramātṛṇāṃ vivekopāyadarśanam ||
246 *na syāt tāvad bhavet teṣāṃ vijñānaṃ nirvikalpakam |*
tasmād yatra prakalpyeta[105] *vastu vastvantarātmanā ||*
247 *pramāṇābhāsatā tatra na svadharmavikalpane |*
pratyakṣatvam ataḥ siddhaṃ sāmānyasya tathaiva ca ||
248 *sambandhasyeti tatpūrvam anumānādi jāyate |*
sarvaṃ cāpy anumānādi pratyakṣe nirvikalpake ||
249 *na pravartata ity etad anumāne 'bhidhāsyate |*
nanv evaṃ sati yāpy agner dūrād apy auṣṇyakalpanā ||
250 *sāpi pratyakṣam eva syād yathā gotvādibuddhayaḥ |*
pratyāsannataraṃ gotve[106] *pratyakṣatvena sammatam ||*
251 *vijñānaṃ*[107] *nānyad astīti pratyakṣam idam eva naḥ |*
tatrāpy akṣair asambandhaṃ manvānasyopajāyate ||
252 *yadā buddhis tadā naiva pratyakṣatvena kalpyate |*
sparśanena tu sambandhe pratyakṣatvena jāyate ||
253 *matir auṣṇye parokṣeyaṃ cakṣuṣāgnau prakāśite |*
tasmād yad indriyaṃ yasya grāhakatvena kalpitam |
tenaiva sati sambandhe pratyakṣaṃ nānyathā bhavet ||
254 *evaṃ samāne 'pi vikalpamārge*
yatrākṣasambandhaphalānusāraḥ |
pratyakṣatā tasya tathā ca loke
vināpy ado lakṣaṇataḥ prasiddham ||

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 On the formation of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* see Parpola (1981); on its content, see Clooney (1990).

2 For general surveys of Mīmāṃsā thought and literature one may consult Jha (1942), Kane ([1977], vol. 5, pt. 1, pp. 1152–1351), and Verpooten (1987). The date of Kumārila is a somewhat vexed matter. Most scholars have tended to consider him an older contemporary of the great Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, but recent evidence that the latter lived as early as 530–600 CE (Lindtner [1980] and [1992a]) makes this approach problematic. It would be most desirable if Kumārila's dates could be fixed independently of Dharmakīrti, but there is little evidence to go by – the only item of significance being his assignment to the reign of Srong-tsan-gam-po, 627–650, by the Tibetan historian Tāranātha. The most we seem to be able to say with certainty is that Kumārila came after Diṅnāga (*c*.480–540), whom he quotes, and before Maṇḍanamiśra (*fl. c.*700 – though this, too, is disputed), who quotes him.

There is evidence that besides his three preserved works, the *Ślokavārttika*, *Tantravārttika*, and *Ṭupṭīkā*, Kumārila composed two other commentaries on the *Śābarabhāṣya*: a *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and a *Madhyamaṭīkā*. In fact, many verses explicitly identified as deriving from the former that relate to topics also covered in the *Ślokavārttika* have been quoted by later authors. However, we have no identifiable passage from the *Madhyamaṭīkā*. Frauwallner and others hold that the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* is a work of Kumārila's old age (see Frauwallner [1962]) and revises some of the theories of the *Ślokavāttika*, but I have questioned this hypothesis (Taber [1986–92] and [2001]).

3 The Āryas are identified in the Veda as the bearers of Vedic culture.

4 CS, *Sūtrasthāna* 11.17–33. (For the abbreviations of texts mentioned in these notes, see Bibliography.)

5 CS, *Vimānasthāna* 8.27 and 38–42.

6 The dating of the earliest philosophical texts of India is approximate at best. This is especially true for the *sūtra* texts, which were edited and revised over centuries.

7 NS 1.1.3.

8 SK 4. See Frauwallner (1984), pp. 88–92.

9 YS 1.7. There, the word for testimony is *āgama*, which is often translated 'scripture'.

10 Dharmakīrti appears to have been the first to attempt a general definition, in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, as either "a cognition that is confirmed" (2.3) or "the awareness of an object not previously known" (2.7). There has been considerable debate about whether he intended these criteria to be combined or as constituting two distinct definitions. See Franco (1997), Chap. 2, for a summary of the debate. Franco himself argues that Dharmakīrti did not intend to offer a definition of *pramāṇa* at all. An

earlier, more rudimentary proposal is Vātsyāyana's, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, namely, the *pramāṇas* are "means of cognition/perception" (NBh 1.1.3): *upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇāni*. Cf. Uddyotakara, NV, 1.1.1, p. 15, l. 5: "a *pramāṇa* is a cause of cognition," *upalabdhihetuḥ pramāṇam*, and the ensuing discussion.

11 See NBh 2.2.1, p. 573, ll. 1–2: "Tradition is the handing down of a report or saying without indication of its author, in the form, 'so they say.' "

12 See YD, pp. 70, l. 25–74, l. 21, which offers alternative accounts of *arthāpatti* and *abhāva*. One of the explanations of *abhāva* it gives – from the fact that Caitra is not home one gathers that he has gone out (p. 74, ll. 9–16) – becomes a stock example of *arthāpatti* (not *abhāva*) in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. For the rejection of tradition, supposition, inclusion, and absence as distinct means of knowledge in Nyāya (which offers its own analyses of these concepts) see NS 2.2.1ff. The Vaiśeṣika thinker Praśastapāda, meanwhile, subsumed all of these together with gesture, comparison (*anumāna*), and even testimony (*śabda*, *āgama*) under the category of inference, thus in the end recognizing only two distinct types of *pramāṇas*: perception and inference (with "knowledge of the *ṛṣis*," *ārṣa jñāna*, as a possible third).

13 See the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (sixteenth century CE), for example. The great Advaita thinker Śaṅkara, however, does not develop a formal position on the *pramāṇas*, but in a list of means of knowledge at BĀUBh 3.1.1 (p. 423, l. 2) he mentions only the first five, leaving out absence, *abhāva*.

14 And within Mīmāṃsā, only Kumārila's school, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, accepts all six. The other main tendency of Mīmāṃsā, the Prābhākara school, rejected absence.

15 I use the terms 'sense faculty' and 'sense' interchangeably to translate the Sanskrit word *indriya*, often rendered by others as 'sense organ', to distinguish it from the visible, external organ that is generally in Indian epistemology considered the seat or basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the sense faculty.

16 It has been disputed, in both classical and modern times, whether this is really intended as a definition of perception. See, for example, Hattori (1966). *Carakasaṃhitā*, *Sūtrasthāna* 11.20 also offers a definition of perception in terms of sense faculty–object contact.

17 SK 5.

18 YBh 1.7.

19 Only fragments of this text exist. The initial portion concerning epistemology was reconstructed by Frauwallner (1958).

20 See Frauwallner (1958), pp. 124, 127 (trans.).

21 See Frauwallner (1957), p. 120.

22 Strictly speaking, it is the verbal ending that expresses agency; the nominative case, which is incapable of expressing a *kāraka*, reveals specifically who or what the agent is.

23 The analysis is different for passive sentences. In a sentence such as *ghaṭaḥ kriyate devadattena*, "A pot is made by Devadatta," the object is specified by a noun with a nominative ending in agreement with the passive verb, while the agent is indicated by a noun with an instrumental ending. If an instrument is involved, for example, a stick, it is also indicated by a noun with an instrumental ending.

24 A 3.3.117. Thus, NBh 1.1.3: *pramīyate 'neneti karaṇārthābhidhāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ*.

25 Classically, Nyāya considered the possibility that the idea that the object is something to be obtained or avoided (or neither) could be the result of the act of perception if the cognition of the object arising from the contact of sense faculty and object were taken as the *means*, that is, the *pramāṇa* proper. This option was initially put forward by Vātsyāyana *ad* NS 1.1.3. Jayantabhaṭṭa considers the intricacies of the problem at NM, pp. 174–89.

26 See YD, pp. 77, l. 11–78, l. 12; YBh 1.7. The Sāṃkhya view evoked other controversies, in particular, what is the nature of *buddhi*? In Sāṃkhya it is conceived as a permanent faculty distinct from the self or *puruṣa* that assumes different functions. Other schools, however, understood *buddhi* to be a cognition or awareness and disputed its permanence. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for example, *buddhi* is a property of the self produced by the operation of the cognitive faculties, in particular, the mind (*manas*). (See, for example, NS 1.1.16 and 3.2.3 with Vātsyāyana's commentary.) In general, in Indian philosophy the discussion of perception ties in with reflection on the nature of consciousness, the self, and the mental faculties.

27 The question of what is the *means* of knowledge becomes even more complicated in the case of inference. Is it the perception of the middle term? The recollection of the relation of middle and major terms? etc. See, for example, NV 1.1.5, pp. 142–4.

28 Although memory is generally considered a way of knowing things by Western philosophers, specifically, things that have occurred in the past, it was rejected by almost all Indian philosophers as a *pramāṇa* (with certain Jaina philosophers constituting the exception), for it is not considered to reveal an object in the past so much as a *cognition* of it. If the object is known, it is the original cognition that knows it, not the memory of that cognition. (This, roughly, is the explanation given by Śrīdhara, NKand, p. 627, citing Kumārila.)

29 See Frauwallner (1957), p. 120. Vasubandhu does not explicitly mention that the definition excludes memory, but he does say that it is designed to exclude error (*mithyājñāna*) – for example, the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver – "conventionally true cognition" (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) – for example, the cognition of an empirical object like a pot (which according to the Buddhist is caused, not by a *pot*, which is strictly speaking unreal or exists only in a conventional sense, but by the multitude of atoms constituting it) – and inference.

30 Following scholarly usage, I shall employ the term 'cognition' in this study to translate the term *jñāna* and its synonyms – *vijñāna*, *buddhi*, *dhī*, and *pratyaya*. These expressions refer to a momentary awareness, whether propositional or not. 'Mental state' would be another possible translation.

31 In the German secondary literature on this topic we find the pairs *vorstellende/vorstellungsfreie* and *prädikative/nicht-prädikative Wahrnehmung*.

32 *śrotrādivṛttir avikalpakā*, cited by various authors, for example, Jayanta, NM, p. 259, l. 6.

33 *ālocanamātram*, SK 28b. Indeed, the idea that perception is a mere "grasping" of sense-objects by the senses without any accompanying act of reflection seems to go back to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, which predates the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. See Frauwallner (1958), pp. 112–4. It should be kept in mind that in Sāṃkhya a function of the sense faculty as such is not conscious. Consciousness of an object arises only in the self, which witnesses changes brought about in the senses, mind, and intellect.

34 SK 5ab'; YD, p. 188, ll. 18–19.

35 This seems to be the tendency of Vātsyāyana's remarks, NBh 1.1.4. It was further developed by the school of Naiyāyikas referred to as the Vyākhyātṛs, "Expositors," in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (who consisted of Pravara, an early commentator on the NBh, and his followers) (see NM, pp. 206–10; also Wezler [1975]). However, one is then confronted with the problem of how appropriately to construe the expression 'determinate in nature' (*vyavasāyātmaka*), which would appear to apply only to conceptualized cognitions (see NM, p. 230). According to Vātsyāyana, *vyavasāyātmaka* is supposed to exclude cognitions arising from the functioning of the senses having the form "Is this is smoke or dust?" that is, doubtful cognitions. Thus, it would seem that a proper

perception would have either the content "This is smoke" or the content "This is dust" – to the extent that it is definite, it would have to be conceptual.

36 Thus, one can take the word 'inexpressible' *avyapadeśya* in the definition at NS 1.1.4 to be referring to nonconceptualized perception and the expression 'determinate' *vyavasāyātmaka* as indicating conceptualized perception: "Perception is a cognition that has arisen from the contact of sense faculty and object, that is not erroneous and [either] inexpressible [i.e., nonconceptualized] or determinate [i.e., conceptualized]." This is, implicitly, Vācaspatimiśra's reading of NS 1.1.4; see NVTṬ, p. 108, ll. 22–28. A doubtful cognition, he explains further, is already excluded from the domain of perception by the expression *avyabhicārin* 'nonerroneous'; for a cognition that presents something ambiguously, as either X or Y, can never be verified. Thus, *vyavasāyātmaka* means, primarily, *savikalpaka* 'conceptualized'; it does, however, function secondarily to exclude doubt. See NVTṬ, p. 114, ll. 21–30. Bhāsarvajña alludes to this reading (NBhūṣ, p. 100, l. 4), but he favors the view that the word *avyapadeśya* serves to specify that perception is nonconceptualized. *Sūtras* 1.1.14 and 2.2.66, meanwhile – which mention the qualities of the different elements as objects of the senses and "individual, configuration, and universal" as the meanings of words – "seem to suggest" (*leśataḥ sūcitam*) that perception is also conceptualized (NBhūṣ, loc. cit.).

Jayantabhaṭṭa recognizes both conceptualized and nonconceptualized perception as well. Following an earlier school of commentators on the *Nyāyavārttika*, the Ācāryas, he takes *avyapadeśya* to exclude the sort of cognition that arises when someone speaks the name of an object one is looking at, as one is being taught the meaning of the word, for example, when one is told, "This thing is to be called by the word 'cow'." Such a cognition is verbal (*śābda*) in nature because it is caused by another person's statement. Thus, perceptual cognitions, even though conceptualized, are *not* to be considered verbal cognitions. However, nonconceptualized perceptions can also be seen as implied by the definition; for if *avyapadeśya* does not function to exclude cognitions that are conceptualized, there will be no hesitation about including cognitions that are not (NM, pp. 220, l. 7–225, l. 2, esp. *kās*. 49–52, p. 224)!

The notion that perception can be conceptualized seems already implied by VS 8.6–7. It is more fully developed by the sixth century Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (pp. 442–75). His statement there that a "mere seeing" of universal and difference may be considered the means of knowledge that is perception, whereas "a cognition having as its object a substance, and so forth" may be considered the result (p. 471), suggests a two-stage process in which a nonconceptualized perception of certain properties gives rise to a conceptualized perception of a substance, etc., as qualified by those properties (see NKand ad loc.). Later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas continued to develop this model: a conceptualized perception is a *viśiṣṭajñāna*, a cognition of something qualified by a certain qualifying feature or property; as such, it must be preceded by a nonconceptualized perception of the qualifying feature or property.

Other debated questions regarding the *pramāṇas* were: Is there only one faculty of perception (with multiple powers) or many? Are the senses material in nature, that is, derived from the elements earth, water, fire, etc., or are they modifications of the psychological faculties (specifically, the ego, *ahaṃkāra*)? Are the senses to be identified with their physical seats, the eyeball, the tongue, etc.? Can distinct *pramāṇas*/sense faculties apprehend the same object, or does each *pramāṇa*/sense faculty have a distinct object? What is the role of mind (*manas*) in cognition? Do cognitions simultaneously reveal themselves as they cognize their objects? etc.

37 The affiliation of the Buddhist epistemologists with a particular movement or school is disputed, since, for one thing, neither Diṅnāga nor Dharmakīrti declares

any. In Tibetan Buddhism they are identified variously as Yogācāras, Sautrāntikas (specifically, "Sautrāntikas who follow reasoning"), and even Mādhyamikas. In general, their thought represents a synthesis of Yogācāra and Sautrāntika ideas. However, since both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti ultimately deny the reality of an external object and thus subscribe to the "consciousness only" (*cittamātra*) doctrine, which is distinctive of Yogācāra, the designation 'Yogācāra' seems justified for them. Schmithausen in his seminal article of 1967 discusses the problem in relation to Diṅnāga's precursor Vasubandhu; Franco (1997), Chapter 3, reconsiders the question in regard to Vasubandhu and discusses it at length in relation to Dharmakīrti.

38 The definitive study of Diṅnāga's thought remains Frauwallner (1959).

39 The exact meaning of the word used by Diṅnāga, and his interpreter Dharmakīrti, to express this idea, *pramāṇabhūta*, has been the subject of much discussion. Following Steinkellner (1989) and Vetter (1984), p. 14, n. 6, we should probably distinguish its meaning as used by Diṅnāga from its meaning as used by Dharmakīrti. In the former case the expression should be translated 'one who is a *pramāṇa*', in the latter, 'one who has become a *pramāṇa*'. Dharmakīrti himself says (PV 2.9bc') that *bhūta* 'has become' is mentioned in order to set the Buddha off from (allegedly) eternal *pramāṇas* such as God (*īśvara*), recognized by other philosophers. See also Krasser (2001), which summarizes the debate and proposes certain refinements.

40 The parallels between Dharmakīrti's epistemology and pragmatism are striking. Thus, William James states,

> From this simple cue pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the commonsense level, the truth of a state of mind means this function of a leading that is worth while. When a moment in our experience, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience again and make advantageous connexion with them.
>
> (James [1946], pp. 204–5)

The relationship between Buddhism and pragmatism has been explored by Kumari (1987).

41 *kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣam*, PS 1.3c.

42 An accessible summary of Diṅnāga's achievements in logic can be found in Matilal (1998), Chap. 4.

43 More precisely, the meaning of 'cow' is defined as the class of all things excluded from those that lack a certain *causal property* (for example, that of giving milk, or else that of giving rise to a certain perceptual image) that a certain group of quite distinct individuals appear to have in common. The definitive study of the Buddhist theory of universals, the so-called *apohavāda*, remains Frauwallner (1932–3), which is based, however, not directly on Diṅnāga but on Dharmakīrti. The relevant sections of the dissertations of Keyt ([1980], Chap. 4) and Dunne ([1999], Sec. 3.2.3) are also of interest.

44 Although what Diṅnāga says about a cognition assuming the form of the object in his PS is consistent with both representationalism (that is, Sautrāntika epistemology), which assumes a causal interaction with an external object, and idealism, he appears to refute the existence of an external object in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. This has been disputed by scholars such as Wayman (1979), Hall (1986), and Rahula (1978), Chap. 7, but I find their arguments unconvincing, even puzzling. In any case, Diṅnāga clearly intends to deny the reality of the external world in his *Hastavālaprakaraṇa*, much along the lines of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* (see Frauwallner [1959], pp. 128–9).

Certainly, his Brahmanical and Jaina opponents thought of him as an idealist, in the sense of someone who holds that consciousness is the only reality. Nevertheless, it is also true that, in his PS Diṅnāga does not come out and say exactly what is perceived, that is, whether it is an external object. And in general, his successors were more explicit in denying the reality of the external world than he was.

45 For reliable introductions to Bhartṛhari's thought see Biardeau (1964), Brough (1996), and Houben (1995).

46 In this section of the *Ślokavārttika* Kumārila builds on the view of the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarṣa, who is cited by Śabara as holding that the word *gauḥ* 'cow' is just the letters *g*, *au*, *ḥ* (MSBh, p. 38, l. 3). In his discussion Śabara explicitly rejects the position that the word is something *other* than the letters, which seems to reflect the *sphoṭa* theory.

47 VP(R) 1.131.

48 See, for example, VP(R) 3.1.6.

49 Or at least the Upaniṣads. See ŚV, *Ātmavāda* 148.

50 See Thrasher, pp. 80–1.

51 However, since Maṇḍana cites passages from Kumārila in his works he probably came slightly after Kumārila. Thus, Kumārila must be referring to an earlier Vedāntin who held this view.

52 Another Advaita Vedānta doctrine with which Kumārila disagrees is that liberation, *mokṣa*, is brought about merely through knowledge of the purport of the Upaniṣads. He refutes this idea in ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 102–111, arguing instead that the exhaustion of karma through the "enjoyment" of its effects, accompanied by performance of obligatory karma and the avoidance of prohibited karma, is the means to liberation. Knowledge of the self seems to play a supporting role, insofar as it enables one to carry out obligatory actions in a state of desirelessness, thereby inhibiting the arising of any further karmic effects, which would continue to bind one in the cycle of rebirth.

53 BSBh 1.1.1, intro.

54 ŚV, *Nirālambanavāda* 10.

55 See Taber (1992).

56 B. Shastri (1995), Chap. 3, consolidates most of the evidence we have; see also Kaviraj (1983).

57 Tapasyananda, pp. 80–4. The text says that he was also atoning for the sin of having denied the existence of God in this way. The older *Śrīśaṅkarācāryavijaya* of Anantānandagiri, however, says that it was a Jaina master whom he felt he had disrespected (ŚSV, p. 173).

58 At *Pratijñā* 26ff., six different interpretations, presumably deriving from earlier teachers, of the opening passage of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya* are discussed! See also TV 3.4.9, pp. 314, l. 20–315, l. 3, and the article by Ramaswami Sastri.

59 Pārthasārathi explains that "Bhartṛmitra and others" made Mīmāṃsā into a materialist system by holding that there is no benefit to be obtained by performing obligatory acts, nor harm incurred by committing forbidden ones.

60 Eli Franco has suggested (personal communication) that a more natural translation of the *sūtra* would be something like "The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense faculties of a person with an existing object – that perception is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma, because it is the apprehension of that which is present." This phrasing would discourage the division of the *sūtra* into two parts and the interpretation of the first part as a definition of perception – which would be in keeping with an established Mīmāṃsā principle that a sentence should not be interpreted as two statements unless absolutely necessary. However, none of the

classical commentators – not even Kumārila, who resists seeing a definition in the *sūtra* – proposes it.

61 PS 1.6.1.

62 That is, should it be construed with 'of the sense faculties' or with 'the arising of a cognition'? In the latter case, the *sūtra* would read "The arising of a cognition of a person when there is an existing connection of the sense faculties [with an object] is perception. . . ."

63 PS 1.6.4cd–5ab; cf. 1.3.1cd.

64 This objection is raised in relation to the Vaiśeṣika definition, PSV 1.4.1, Hattori (1968), pp. 42–3 (Bb); cf. PS 1.6.8cd, Hattori (1968), p. 68.

65 Except the Vṛttikāra probably conceived of the causal relationship between sense faculty and object specifically in terms of some "connection."

66 A connection between sense faculty and mind is posited to explain why, for example, there is no sensation of touch when one is asleep. Although the skin, the organ of touch, is in contact with the bed, there is no tactile sensation of the bed. Perception, therefore, must also depend on a connection between the mind and the sense faculty in addition to the connection between the sense faculty and the object. A connection between mind and self is postulated to explain how the cognitions that arise as a result of acts of perception are properties or "qualities" (*guṇas*) of the self – not of the mind or the senses, which are inherently without consciousness.

67 Kumārila's own view is that the result of knowing is, not another cognition, but the knownness (*jñātatā*) or manifestness (*prākaṭya*) of the object. This is not explicitly stated in the ŚV, but it is generally taken to be implied by *Śūnyavāda* 182 and 190–2: the fact that a cognition has occurred is postulated on the basis of the fact that an object has become known. See ŚVVT, as well as the more sophisticated treatment of the NR, ad 182; also NM, pp. 43–4; Bhatt (1962), pp. 48–56. Cf. *Codanā* 83. Jayanta develops an interesting critique of this view, NM, pp. 53–6.

68 In particular, the problem of the discrepancy of the object of the means and the object of the result. Means and result should pertain to the same object; the tree to which the axe is applied should be the tree that is felled. However, on the theory that the *pramāṇa* perception is the connection of mind and self, for example, the means of knowledge relates directly to the *mind* and the *self*, not to the object represented in the cognition. Thus, the object of the *pramāṇa* is different from the object of the *phala*. The same difficulty pertains to some of the other theories Diṅnāga attacks.

69 This argument will be developed at greater length in the *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa*, verses 64ff.

70 See note 68.

71 Absence (*abhāva*), the sixth *pramāṇa* of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, does not come into consideration here, because any useful knowledge of Dharma would be positive in nature.

72 The Sanskrit sentence normally translated "This is *a* cow" (*ayaṃ gauḥ*), actually lacks an article corresponding to 'a'. Thus, the sentence literally says, "This is cow," and has the same form as an identity statement, for example, "This is George."

73 The pot could of course lose its blue color and take on another color, and blue could appear in another substance, but one would not be talking about the *same* blue. Kumārila apparently followed the Vaiśeṣikas in conceiving of the color of a substance as a particular.

74 See, for example, MP, pp. 19–21, AK 3.50a, p. 158, ll. 21–27; AKBh 9, pp. 475, l. 12–476, l. 3; TS 555ff.

75 This is implied by NS 3.1.1. See also PDhS, p. 63, l. 3.

76 On this question see Steinkellner (1997), Kellner (1997), Krasser (1999), and Taber (2001). It is my belief at this time (I reserve the right to change it as more evidence

becomes available!) that neither Kumārila nor Dharmakīrti had before him the other's writings. Neither quotes the other; more significantly, they appear in many instances to be arguing past each other. Yet they were both familiar with many of the theories and arguments the other presents. These theories and arguments must have been in circulation for some time among other Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka teachers (whose names are lost to us) before they were provocatively summarized – no doubt also given new shape – by Dharmakīrti and Kumārila. On the other hand, Kumārila clearly had studied Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Yet it is doubtful that he would have been able to learn that text without the assistance of a teacher; indeed, his legend tells of one. It is possible that explanations provided by his teacher are the source of some of the arguments against conceptualized perception considered by Kumārila in his *Pratyakṣapariccheda* that are more explicit and polished than those found in Diṅnāga.

77 See AKBh 1.33ab. It has been stated at AK 1.32ab that all five sensory cognitions are accompanied by *vitarka* and *vicāra*, the subtle and gross states of thought (defined at AK 2.33 ab'; cf. YSBh 1.42–43). How, then, Vasubandhu asks, can sensory cognitions be nonconceptual (*avikalpaka*)? AK 1.33ab responds: insofar as they are devoid of *abhinirūpaṇā* and *anusmaraṇa*, examination and recollection, which pertain to mental cognition (*manovijñāna*); they are still accompanied, Vasubandhu explains in his commentary, by "natural" *vikalpa* or *vikalpa per se* (*svabhāvavikalpa*), which he identifies as *vitarka* (*vicāra* for some reason is left out). It seems from this discussion that in fact perceptual cognition does involve some mental awareness, but of a very subtle kind, in any case not active thought processes. Perhaps it is simply "intentionality" (see Schmithausen [1967], pp. 122–3). Cf. AK 2.24, which states that *saṃjñā*, which is the grasping of the distinctive characteristic of an object (1.14c'd), as well as *prajñā*, arise together with every cognition (see La Vallée Poussin [1971], vol. 1, p. 28, n. 1). See also AK 1.41cd.

The terms *vitarka* and *vicāra* have been given varying interpretations in Abhidharma literature. They are of particular interest because they are two of the factors serving to differentiate the stages of *rūpadhyāna*, that is, the first four stages of meditative absorption. Both *vitarka* and *vicāra* are said to be present in the first *rūpadhyāna*, while *vitarka* drops away in the second and both are missing from the third on. The *Visuddhimagga* understands them along the lines of "applied thought" and "sustained thought," respectively (these are common translations), explaining them according to similes of a bell, a bird, and a bee.

> Herein, applied thinking (*vitakkana*) is applied thought (*vitakka*); hitting upon is what is meant. It has the characteristic of directing the mind onto an object. . . . Sustained thinking (*vicaraṇa*) is sustained thought (*vicāra*); continued sustainment is what is meant. It has the characteristic of continued pressure on (occupation with) the object. . . . Applied thought is the first impact of the mind in the sense that it is both gross and inceptive, like the striking of a bell. Sustained thought is the act of keeping the mind anchored, in the sense that it is subtle with the individual essence of continued pressure, like the ringing of a bell. . . .
>
> (VM 4.88–89, pp. 114–5; Ñānamoli [1991], pp. 139–40)

Vasubandhu, on the other hand, gives the following (somewhat less helpful) account in his *Pañcaskandhaka*:

> Which is *vitarka*? An inquiring mental discourse, a particular kind of volition or insight, which is the gross state of thought. Which is *vicāra*? A judging mental discourse, a particular kind of volition or insight, which is the

> subtle state of thought. Volition is established in a state without reasoning, insight in a state of reasoning.
>
> (Cited by Yaśomitra, AKV ad AK 1.33ab, p. 89, ll. 23–35; see La Vallée Poussin [1971], vol. 1, p. 175, n. 2.)

The terms *abhinirūpaṇā* and *anusmaraṇa* are even more obscure, but see, again, La Vallée Poussin, vol. 1, pp. 60–1, n. 4. The *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 19ff. (beginning with *kārikā* 19cd), however, contains a discussion of all these expressions much deserving of attention.

A vivid depiction of *vitarka* as a kind of negative or impure thinking, such as the thought of injuring someone to repay him for harm done, which inhibits the efficacy of the moral and ritual observances prescribed by yoga (that is, the so-called *yamas* and *niyamas*), is found at YSBh 2.33–34.

78 See La Vallée Poussin (1971), vol. 1, p. 28, n. 1; Frauwallner (1964), pp. 89–90; Hattori (1968), p. 88, n. 1.36. The passage is cited by Diṅnāga, PSV 1.4ab (Hattori [1968], p. 26 [Daa-2]). The Nikāyas do appear to distinguish the functioning of the senses *per se* from perceptual judgement, *saṃjñā*, but do not declare which is *perception*, properly speaking. Thus, MN, vol. 1, pp. 111, l. 35–112, l. 4:

> Visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññāna*), your reverences, arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (*phassa*); feelings (*vedanā*) are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives (*yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti*); what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye, past, future, present.
>
> (Horner [1954], p. 145)

Sarathchandra's judgement that "[early] Buddhism regarded perception as a complicated process, beginning from a simple sensation and proceeding by degrees to a discriminative apprehension of the object" (p. 4) seems accurate. This is especially evident in the analysis of perception preserved in the Theravāda school, especially in the writings of Buddhaghosa, according to whom perception begins with a bare sensory awareness of the object, which in turn is "assimilated" in a mental awareness, then "examined," "ascertained," and finally fully "cognized" or "experienced" (see Sarathchandra [1958], pp. 49–61). Although this account conceives of a progressive discrimination of the object culminating in full consciousness of it, it preserves a fundamental distinction between the bare awareness of the object in sensory awarenesses and the discriminative awareness of the object in thought (cf. Stcherbatsky [1979], pp. 17–19, who distinguishes *vijñāna* and its synonyms as "pure sensation" from the same accompanied by "secondary mental phenomena" such as *saṃjñā*). However, it, significantly, does not exclude the latter from the sphere of valid perception, as Diṅnāga and his school did. Sarathchandra explains,

> There is no implication here, as in the theory of perception of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, that conceptual activity of the mind contributes anything to an original sensation. The mind does not introduce relations into the primitive perception . . . in such a way that it falsifies the true nature of reality. . . . Such a view may have been implicit in the Nikāya theories, at least it would not have been entirely illegitimate to draw such a deduction from them. For Buddhaghosa, however, the mind only performs the function of selective discrimination. The external object is only more clearly seen as the result of mental activity.
>
> (p. 51)

Cf., however, Matilal's discussion of the above-cited passage from the *Majjhimanikāya*, (1986), pp. 310ff. He takes *papañca* 'obsession' as 'verbal proliferation', which obscures the true nature of the object. The passage is analyzed quite differently by Sarathchandra (1958), pp. 3 ff.

79 Cf. the statement of Diṅnāga's predecessor Vasubandhu at *Triṃśikā* 17, which relates the Yogācāra teaching of "consciousness-only" to the idea of false imagination, *vikalpa*: "This transformation of consciousness is a false imagination. Therefore it does not exist. Therefore, everything is mere consciousness," *vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate | tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam ||*.

80 Conze (1958), pp. 47–8.

81 MMK 25.24ab.

82 See Lindtner (1997); MMK 15.19.

83 The term *arthakriyā* has two basic meanings, 'the fulfillment of a purpose' and 'causal efficacy', which frequently coincide. See Nagatomi (1967–8), also Halbfass (1997). Diṅnāga himself did not propose *arthakriyā* as a criterion of reality; it was Dharmakīrti's innovation (for all we know).

84 For it is a collection of entities more or less arbitrarily considered to belong together – by separating them off from other entities markedly less similar.

85 *Arthakriyā* as a criterion of reality is related to another criterion found in Abhidharma philosophy, namely, not ceasing to exist when broken or analyzed into component parts. See, for example, AK 6.4; also Frauwallner (1959), pp. 123–4.

86 *Vikalpa*, on the other hand, falsifies its object insofar as it apprehends it *partially*, focusing on just one aspect of it while ignoring all others. See Katsura (1984).

87 Or *four* basic types. There is a dispute about whether Diṅnāga in PS 1.1.6ab counts the self-awareness of mental states as a type of perception distinct from mental perception. See Franco (1993) and Wayman (1991). Dharmakīrti clearly sees Diṅnāga as considering self-awareness a distinct, fourth type of perception, but this conflicts with Diṅnāga's own explanation of 6ab.

88 See PS 1.1.6cd, Hattori (1968), p. 27 (Dc). At PV 3.107 Dharmakīrti says that the yogin "ascertains all forms" of an object "just by looking at it." Cf. NBhūṣ, p. 176, ll. 8–10. See also YSBh 1.43 on *nirvikalpā samāpatti* as "the highest perception" (*paraṃ pratyakṣam*).

89 See in particular Bergson's *Introduction to Metaphysics* and William James' discussion of Bergson's philosophy in *A Pluralistic Universe*, Chap. 6.

90 More precisely, *is not disconfirmed*; thus, PV 2.3ab': *avisaṃvādi jñānaṃ pramāṇam.* Cf., however, Van Bijlert's discussion of *avisaṃvāda*, (1989), p. 174, n. 12. As mentioned earlier (n. 10), Dharmakīrti also offered another criterion for a *pramāṇa*, namely it is "an awareness of an object not previously known" (*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*, PV 2.7c), whose relation to the former criterion or definition is obscure. See Krasser (2001).

91 PV 3.57–58.

92 See PVin 1, trans., p. 101, ll. 13ff., discussed by Lindtner (1984), pp. 156–8. See also PV 3.3–4.

As mentioned earlier, the Advaita Vedānta tradition adopts this position as well. Thus, Padmapāda states, "Ordinary dealings such as perception, etc., are impossible without using the senses. The senses cannot function without a location [the body]. And no one acts through a body which is without the superimposed sense of Self. And without all of the above, the Self, who by nature is unattached, cannot logically become a cogniser. And [it has been argued that] epistemological operations do not occur without a cogniser. Therefore, all the means of valid knowledge, including the scriptures, only refer to one who is subject to erroneous superimposition" (quoted by Comans [2000], p. 439).

93 Thus, even the idea of *arthakriyā*, causal efficacy, becomes dubious. Dharmakīrti questions the ultimate reality of action and causal factors at PV 3.3–4, 319. On the illusory nature of both subject and object see, for example, PV 3.211–219, discussed by Vetter (1964), pp. 69–71.

94 See PVin, p. 101; Lindtner (1984), pp. 156–8. See also Katsura (1984), esp. pp. 222–3.

95 The following account is based on Dharmakīrti's discussions in PVin 1 and PV 3 (also titled *Pratyakṣapariccheda*). For other treatments of Dharmakīrti's rejection of conceptualized perception see Vetter (1964), pp. 37–8 and Keyt (1980), Chap. 4.

96 See Franco (1986). It appears, on the one hand, that Diṅnāga thought all error to be introduced by the mind. Hence, he says that the expression *avyabhicārin* 'non-erroneous' in the Nyāya definition of perception is superfluous; for a cognition just produced by the contact of sense faculty and object cannot be mistaken. See PS 1.3.1ab, Hattori (1968), p. 36 and pp. 122–3, n. 3.7. Dharmakīrti, however, believed, on the basis of other statements of Diṅnāga's, that he accepted the distorted visual cognition of someone with an eye disease, for example, of hairs before the eyes, as a kind of perceptual error devoid of conceptual construction. Thus, Dharmakīrti thought his specification 'not erroneous' was actually in keeping with Diṅnāga's own views. See Hattori (1968), pp. 95–7, n. 1.53.

97 PVin, *Vṛtti* ad 1.4b'c': *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*. In his careful analysis of this statement in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* Dharmottara is clear that *pratibhāsa* 'representation' means the presentation or appearance (*ābhāsa*) of an object designated by the expression (*abhilāpa*) in question; it (the presentation or appearance) is thus capable of being combined with that expression, or it actually *is* combined with it. See NBṬ, p. 10, ll. 1–14. By, in effect, specifying that *kalpanā* is the presentation of something that *can* be designated by an expression, Dharmakīrti distinguishes himself from Diṅnāga, who is traditionally taken, more strictly, as considering *kalpanā* to be the actual associating of a name or word with what is perceived.

98 PVin 1.4c'd.

99 PVin 1.5. Cf. PV 3.188.

100 PVin 1.6ac'. This idea seems to relate to the doctrine of momentariness. The object that gives rise to the nonconceptualized cognition is not present a moment later when the conceptualized cognition arises.

101 PVin 1.6c'd.

102 PVin 1.7 = PV 3.145.

103 See PV 3.146–148.

104 See PVin 1.8 = PV 3.174.

105 PVin 1.9ac. Cf. PV 3.176.

106 The text says, one perceives them "with the visual sense." Presumably Dharmakīrti is referring to a type of meditation in which the eyes remain open? Or else, he might mean a state in which the mind is totally focused on a certain object, while one is still able to register visually the presence of something else. Prajñākaragupta mentions the latter alternative (*anyavikalpasammukhībhāve*, PVBh, p. 245); Śāntarakṣita seems to understand the argument in this way, TS 1242–44. See also PKM, p. 32, ll. 13–17.

107 PVin 1.13–14 = PV 3.124–125

108 PV 3.175. Moreover, self-awareness, which Dharmakīrti considers a type of perception, is never conceptualized. Although I may articulate to myself that what I see before me is a cow, I do not articulate to myself that "I am now having a cognition of a cow." See PV 3.177.

109 PV 3.133.

110 PVin 1.15. Cf. PV 3.176, 186, also 283ab and 299. Prajñākaragupta, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, especially stresses immediacy (*aparokṣaviṣayatva*) and vividness or clarity (*spaṣṭatva*) as the marks of perception and the lack of those qualities as the mark of conceptual awareness. See, for example, PVBh, p. 327, ll. 3–7.

111 PVin 1.16 = PV 3.126.

112 PV 1.68ff. Cf Frauwallner (1932–3), pp. 263–85.

113 In some passages, for example, PV 1.73, it seems that the causal capacity that sets a class of objects off from those lacking it that is most important for Dharmakīrti is the capacity to give rise to a certain representation or judgement. Thus, it would be the fact that all cows produce in perceiving subjects (more or less) the same perceptual image that enables us to distinguish them from those that do not produce such an image. In other passages, on the other hand, for example, PV 1.92–96, it seems that objects are excluded from others on the basis of possessing a "causal efficacy" (*arthakriyā*) that is relevant to everyday praxis, such as yielding milk (in the case of cows) or quenching thirst (in the case of water), though Dharmakīrti does not specifically mention such effects. See Dunne (1999), pp. 134–43, who emphasizes the former kind of causal capacity in his interpretation of Dharmakīrti's account of *apoha*.

114 The most telling objection against the view that perception cannot be conceptualized is, interestingly, not developed by Kumārila, namely: it is difficult to see how a nonconceptualized perception of a momentarily existing particular could ever be confirmed, hence, count as a *pramāṇa*. For how could the causal efficacy of the particular that one perceives, which ceases to exist in the next moment, ever be experienced? See, for example, NM, pp. 62–4; cf. PKM, pp. 32, l. 21–36, l. 12. The Buddhist answer, as developed, for example, by Dharmottara (see NBṬ, pp. 15, l. 17–16, l. 7 and the study of Dharmottara's *Laghuprāmaṇyaparīkṣā* by Krasser, pp. 41ff.; it is anticipated by Dharmakīrti, HB, pt. 1, pp. 33, l. 20–35, l. 16), that it is not the momentary *svalakṣaṇa* that is "obtained" but the series (*santāna*), which is an object of conceptual "ascertainment" (*adhyavasāya*), seems tantamount to throwing in the towel. It would appear that it is not, after all, the *svalakṣaṇa* that we know in perception but the conventional object!

115 A modern thinker, however, might identify the "nature" that all cows have in common as the possession of a certain set of genes.

116 Extensive refutations of the Buddhist view that perception must be nonconceptualized are found in the writings of later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā authors such as Prabhākara (Bṛh, pp. 38–46), Śālikanātha (PPañc, pp. 160–7), Jayantabhaṭṭa (NM, pp. 235–59), Bhāsarvajña (NBhūṣ, pp. 180–7), Vācaspatimiśra (NVTṬ, pp. 115, l. 2–121, l. 18; NKaṇ, pt. 4, pp. 1382–424), Śrīdhara (NKand, pp. 448–59), and Pārthasārathimiśra (ŚD, pp. 55–8, 65–9). The Viśiṣṭa Advaita authors Yāmuna (ĀP, pp. 143–4) and Rāmānuja (ŚrīBh, pp. 50–1) also reject it. Many of these later accounts build on points made by Kumārila and cite him with approval. A distinct tradition of criticism in Jaina philosophy begins with Akalaṅka (e.g., TAV, pp. 54–5; LT 1.18, 23–4) and is carried forward, for example, by Prabhācandra (PKM, pp. 27–39; NKC, pp. 43–51). The defense of the Buddhist position after Dharmakīrti was taken up by Śāntarakṣita (TS, *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, in which he attempts directly to counter some of Kumārila's arguments), Prajñākaragupta (PVBh, pp. 245ff.), and Dharmottara (NBṬ, pp. 10–11). A comprehensive historical study of the debate about conceptualized vs. nonconceptualized perception in Indian philosophy remains to be written, but a useful survey of positions can be found in Sinha (1958), Chap. 2; see also Matilal (1986), Chap. 10, Shah (1967), pp. 236–46, Mesquita (1990), pp. 129–59, and Schmithausen (1965), pp. 177–84.

117 Sellars (1963), p. 160.

118 See Rorty (1979), p. 183: "The crucial premise of this argument is that there is no such thing as a justified belief which is nonpropositional, and no such thing as justification which is not a relation between propositions."

119 Sellars (1963), p. 169: "The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says." Thus, ". . . it follows . . . that one could not have observational knowledge of *any* fact unless one knew many *other* things as well" (p. 168).

120 See Rorty (1972).

121 See Putnam (1981), p. 54:

> Internalism does not deny that there are experiential *inputs* to knowledge; knowledge is not a story with no constraints except *internal* coherence; but it does deny that there are any inputs *which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our concepts*, by the vocabulary we use to report and describe them, or any inputs *which admit of only one description, independent of all conceptual choices*. Even our description of our own sensations, so dear as a starting point for knowledge to generations of epistemologists, is heavily affected (as are the sensations themselves, for that matter) by a host of conceptual choices. The very inputs upon which our knowledge is based are conceptually contaminated; but contaminated inputs are better than none.
>
> (author's italics)

Even more boldly, Michael Williams states,

> Justification is a matter of accommodating beliefs that are being questioned to a body of accepted beliefs. Justification always terminates with other *beliefs* and not with our confronting 'raw chunks of reality', for that idea is incoherent. Neither have we seen any reason to suppose that justification must terminate always with beliefs drawn from some permanent body of purely observational knowledge. The beliefs which current inquiry is leaving alone can be of many different kinds.
>
> (Williams [1977], pp. 112–13)

122 See Williams (1977); also BonJour (1995), Chap. 4.

123 Putnam in *Reason, Truth, and History* calls his position "internal realism"; Rorty identifies his as a version of "pragmatism."

124 This interpretation, I should point out, rests on my own reading of PP 118, which is not found in the classical commentaries.

125 A few philosophers have recently questioned the view that all experience is conceptualized and have maintained instead that perceptual experiences have "nonconceptual content." Evans was the first prominent figure to do so; see (1982), pp. 122–9, 154–60, 226–31. Christopher Peacocke (1992), esp. Chap. 2, (1998) and (2001) has developed this position further. McDowell (1994), esp. Lecture 3, has challenged it.

1 "THE DETERMINATION OF PERCEPTION" (*PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA*): TEXT AND COMMENTARY, PART 1

1 It is chiefly Bhavadāsa's construal of Mīmāṃsā that is attacked by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. That is to say, Diṅnāga attacks the views of a certain "Vṛttikāra" or "Commentator," who we may be confident is identical with Bhavadāsa (see Frauwallner [1968], pp. 98–100). Further information about Bhavadāsa's (i.e., the "Vṛttikāra's") teachings is presented by Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. According to Erich Frauwallner Bhavadāsa lived in the first half of the fifth century CE (ibid., pp. 101–3). This is corroborated by Franco and

Preisendanz (1995), who present evidence that Bhavadāsa's views are also referred to by Vātsyāyana in his NBh, and possibly even in the *Nyāyasūtra* itself. Vātsyāyana is assigned to the second half of the fifth century, whereas the *Nyāyasūtra* may have received its final redaction shortly before Vātsyāyana composed his commentary. Franco (2002) reports on fragments of a Mīmaṃsā text in the Schøyen manuscript collection that may be from Bhavadāsa's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* commentary. Ramaswami Sastri ([1934], pp. 449–50) cites evidence that Kumārila considered Śabara to be rejecting some of the views of Bhavadāsa in his *bhāṣya* – hence Bhavadāsa would have to have preceded Śabara. Given Śabara's date as the latter half of the fifth century, this evidence fits with the assignment of Bhavadāsa to the first half of that century. Kumārila himself mentions Bhavadāsa by name at ŚV, *Pratijñā* 63.

2 This "Vṛttikāra" is to be distinguished from Bhavadāsa, whom Diṅnāga also refers to just as the "Vṛttikāra" (see preceding note). To avoid confusion, I shall refer to Śabara's Vṛttikāra as "the Vṛttikāra" and to Diṅnāga's Vṛttikāra by his name, Bhavadāsa. Precisely how much of Śabara's commentary on MS 1.1.5 consists of a quotation from the commentary of the Vṛttikāra or a summary of his views is not clear. After presenting one complete interpretation of MS 1.1.3–5 Śabara presents another quite different interpretation of precisely those verses, which he introduces with the words, "The Vṛttikāra has explained this section differently . . ." (p. 24, ll. 16–17) and which extends all the way to the end of his commentary on 1.1.5; so it seems quite plausible that the entire section consists of a quotation or summary of the Vṛttikāra. That he might be *summarizing* his views as opposed to actually quoting him seems to be indicated by the fact that the style of the passage is consistent with Śabara's own, as well as the fact that "the revered Upavarṣa," who many believe is identical with the Vṛttikāra, is mentioned in it (if the words were the Vṛttikāra's own, obviously, it is doubtful he would refer to himself in that way). Kumārila does say, at the beginning of his *Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa*, that with the words *nanu sarva eva nirālambanaḥ svapnavat pratyayaḥ*, "But isn't every cognition without an object, like a dream?" which come near the beginning of this passage (p. 26, l. 22), the Bhāṣyakāra, that is, Śabara, undertakes to refute both the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas (*Nirālambana* 14–16), thus suggesting that at this point Śabara has returned to presenting his own views. However, Kumārila may simply mean that Śabara is now employing the Vṛttikāra's views for the purpose of refuting the Buddhists.

3 See Frauwallner (1968), p. 101. Both Kumārila (TV 2.3.16) and Pārthasārathimiśra (ŚD, p. 77, l. 4) identify Śabara's Vṛttikāra as Upavarṣa, and nothing decisive in my opinion speaks against accepting this identification. See Ramaswami Śastri (1934), pp. 431–3. However, since the matter is not certain, I shall continue employing the epithet 'Vṛttikāra' to refer to this thinker.

4 Meanwhile, he believed that the second half of the *sūtra* presents an objection against the veracity of the Veda that is in turn answered by *sūtra* 5. That is, he thought the phrase *animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt* means that the *Vedic word* is not a means of knowing Dharma, because it is contradicted by experience. Vedic commandments such as, "He who is desirous of cattle should perform the Citrā rite," imply that cattle will result from the performance of the sacrifice. In fact, however, cattle are not seen to arise immediately upon the performance of the sacrifice! Thus, this part of the *sūtra* actually represents an objection against scripture as a means of knowing Dharma, to which a response is given in *sūtra* 5, to the effect that the Vedic injunction must indeed be a *pramāṇa* because of the eternal connection of word and meaning. The Vṛttikāra's understanding of the second half of MS 1.1.4 is presented by Śabara, MSBh, pp. 32, l. 14–34, l. 12. Kumārila discusses this portion of Śabara's commentary in the *Citrākṣepa* chapter of his ŚV. It is not clear, however, from either of these discussions exactly how the Vṛttikāra understood the *sūtra*, word for word.

5 In doing so he is apparently being true to Śabara's understanding of the *sūtra*. See MSBh, p. 22, ll. 16–18.

6 Some Cārvākas rejected inference primarily because they believed it impossible to establish a necessary connection or invariable concomitance between the middle and major terms of a syllogism. See SDS, pp. 7–12; NM, pp. 312–16. This tendency is associated with certain followers of the Cārvāka teacher Purandara, but another school of thought descending from Purandara (associated with Udbhaṭa) apparently accepted commonsense inferences while rejecting inferences used to establish the existence of things beyond the senses. See Hegde (1982); also Jayatilleke (1980), pp. 69–79. A third Cārvāka school, associated with Jayarāśi, was thoroughly skeptical, denying the validity of all means of knowledge, including perception. See Franco (1994).

7 This relates to a slightly different idea advocated by another early commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, a certain "Bhāṣyakāra," mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi (see Frauwallner [1968], p. 102), as represented by Diṅnāga at PS 2.47; namely, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* does not define the other *pramāṇas* because they are dependent on perception "and therefore are similar to it." Presumably this means that because they are dependent on perception, which can only apprehend that which is present, the other *pramāṇas*, too, cannot be means of knowing Dharma. See Frauwallner (1968), p. 85 (trans.) and n. 27. Kumārila will take up this issue at length later in the text, vv. 87–110.

8 This is roughly Diṅnāga's response to the suggestion of the Bhāṣyakāra (see previous note) that the other *pramāṇas are not mentioned* "because they are dependent on perception." If that's the defining characteristic of the *pramāṇas* other than perception, then "memory, desire, aversion, effort, etc." would be *pramāṇas* (PS 2.47).

Kumārila explicitly rejects memory as a *pramāṇa*, following the Vṛttikāra, at ŚV, *Autpattika* 11. A *pramāṇa* does not just repeat what is already known; rather, it *discovers* something about the world. Thus, beginning with Dharmakīrti (who may have gotten the idea from the Mīmāṃsakas, if not Kumārila himself), it was considered that one of the features of a *pramāṇa* in general is that it "has for its object that which has not already been comprehended" (*anadhigatārthaviṣayam*, HB 3. ll. 8–9; *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*, PV 2.7c). See Krasser (2001); also Franco (1997), pp. 62–4. Cf., however, NM, pp. 56–9 (also p. 245, ll. 2–5), where Jayanta rejects this criterion on the grounds that it would exclude a continuous series of cognitions of the same object as valid cognitions. That, however, does not mean that he accepts memory as a *pramāṇa*; for a memory is not really produced by the object it represents. (Cf., however, NBhūṣ, p. 93, ll. 1–15, where Bhāsarvajña argues that memory *is* produced by its object. It is not a *pramāṇa*, however, because it is not an "immediate experience" [*aparokṣānubhava*] of its object.)

9 In interpreting the expression *tadatatpūrvakatve* I have followed Sucarita's gloss.

10 Cf. the statement of the Vṛttikāra ad MS 1.1.3, *nimittaparīṣṭiḥ*, which he apparently read as *na nimittaparīṣṭiḥ* or *nimittāparīṣṭiḥ*, MSBh, p. 24, ll. 16–19. See ŚV, *Autpattika* 17c.

11 MS 2.1.46 states, "So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which upon being separated are found to be wanting, they form one sentence" (Jha [1973], p. 213). This is a criterion for determining the identity of mantras employed during a sacrifice. Where does one mantra stop and another begin? Answer: "So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words . . ." – for example, they are used to accompany a particular act: cutting a branch, pouring ghee into the fire, etc. – "they form one sentence," that is, one mantra. Thus, there is a presumption in favor of construing a group of words as a single sentence. As long as it is possible to construe them as such, insofar as they serve a single purpose, they should be. One should not assign more than one purpose to a set of words and divide them into two sentences

unless absolutely necessary. The phrase '. . . which upon being separated are found to be wanting . . .' refers to the fact that the words in question should also be syntactically related to each other. See Wicher (1999) for further discussion of this rule.

12 This appears to be Śabara's reason for not seeing a definition of the *pramāṇa* perception in 1.1.4; see MSBh, p. 22, ll. 16–18.

13 ***sat****samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma* ***tat****pratyakṣam; animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.*

14 ***tat****samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma* ***sat****pratyakṣam; animittaṃ vidyamānopalanbhanatvāt*; MSBh, p. 26, ll. 1–2.

15 I have found the interpretation of the phrase *anyena vā* to be especially challenging. The commentaries provide little help.

16 Kumārila discusses further the Vṛttikāra's reading of MS 1.1.3–4 at ŚV, *Autpattika* 17–26. He suggests, 19cd–20, that 1.1.4 can be rendered into a valid definition of perception *either* by transposing *sat* and *tat*, as the Vṛttikāra recommends, *or* supplying understood words (*adhyāhārakalpanā*, 20d) – without transposing *sat* and *tat*! According the Sucarita (if I understand him correctly), Kumārila means by the latter proposal that one may *add* the word *tat* to the compound *satsamprayoge* and the word *sat* to the phrase *tat pratyakṣam*. As a result, the *sūtra* would read: *tatsatsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat sat pratyakṣam*. . . . The advantage of this reading is that it both includes *tat* as a reference to the object that appears in the cognition, thereby excluding inference and error, etc., as perceptions, and also preserves the qualification of the connection by *sat*, in the sense of 'existing', so that yogic perception is excluded. Kumārila will argue for the construal of *sat* as a qualification of *samprayoga* 'connection' in this sense, PP 26–37. The *sūtra* construed in this way would be translated "The arising of a cognition when there is an existing (*sat*) connection of the senses of a person with that (*tat*) [object which is represented by the cognition] – that (*tat*) is true (*sat*) perception. . . ."

Note, again, that by resisting the view that MS 1.1.4 presents a definition of perception Kumārila is going against what appears to have been an established trend of exegesis of MS 1.1.4; for *both* Bhavadāsa and the Vṛttikāra appear to have seen it that way. Śabara, on the other hand, supports Kumārila's reading; see MSBh, p. 22, ll. 16–18. Kumārila's efforts to acknowledge ways in which the *sūtra* can be seen as articulating a correct definition – more or less in accordance with the Vṛttikāra's proposal (here, and also later at PP 38–39) – appear to reflect more respect for a certain tradition of interpretation than his own inclination.

Jayanta, it should be noted, believes that even the Vṛttikāra's reading of MS 1.1.4 results in a definition of perception that is too broad, since it would not exclude doubt (*saṃśaya*). Even a doubtful cognition, such as "Is that a man or a post?" he maintains, presents the same object with which the sense faculty is connected but lacks the property of being a means of knowledge (because it is not definite). See NM, pp. 262, l. 8–263, l. 7.

17 Jayarāśi criticizes the suggestion that the *sūtra* is a repetition (*anuvāda*) of a previously established definition, TUS, p. 276, ll. 7ff.

18 See ŚV, *Codanā* 13–14. Although Dharma may be considered just the milking of the cow, the act of sacrificing, and various other visible things, those things are not Dharma by virtue of features we can see, but by virtue of their capacity to bring about welfare and salvation (*śreyaḥsādhanatā*) in the future. In that sense the fact that an action is Dharma (*dharmatva*) is *not* perceptible. According to Jayanta, Dharma is imperceptible, not because it relates to the past or future, but precisely because "it has the nature of something to be done, which is not related to any of the three times [past, present, or future]" (NM, pp. 270–1). That is to say, it is of the nature of an 'ought', for it is expressed by a verb with an optative ending.

19 The notion that the object of external perceptual consciousness must be present (*vidyamāna*, *vartamāna*) was well established in Indian philosophy prior to Kumārila. See, for example, AK 1.23a: *prāk pañca vārtamānārthyāt*. The five external senses are distinguished by the fact that they can apprehend only an existing object; mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), on the other hand, can apprehend objects in all three times. A similar distinction was also apparently made in the early Sāṃkhya text, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (see Frauwallner [1958], pp. 110–11), which carried over to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Thus, SK 33cd: *sāmpratakālaṃ bāhyaṃ, trikālam ābhyantaraṃ karaṇam*. See also NBh 1.1.5: *sadviṣayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ sadasadviṣayaṃ cānumānam;* perception has only an existing object, whereas inference can have a nonexisting as well as an existing object. The notion that inference, in contrast to perception, apprehends objects "in all three times" goes back to the *Carakasaṃhitā* (see CS, *Sūtrasthāna* 11.21).

20 MSBh, p. 22, ll. 11–13.

21 Cf. TV 2.1.1, introduction, where Kumārila is confronted with the problem of explaining away Śabara's assertion ad loc. that "in the first book was achieved a definition of the *pramāṇas*" (*prathame' dhyāye pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ vṛttam*). Although Śabara (probably following the Vṛttikāra) may indeed provide us with definitions of the various *pramāṇas* (see MSBh, pp. 30, l. 18–32, l. 10) in order to explain why they are not to be investigated as to their validity (see ŚV, *Anumāna* 1, together with Pārthasārathi's commentary), the fact remains that the *sūtras* themselves do not offer any definitions of them.

22 Cf. the analysis offered by Jayanta, NM, pp. 263, l. 9–264, l. 7. Against the argument, "Yogic perception is not a means of knowing Dharma, because it is a kind of perception, like ours," Jayanta objects that, since the Mīmāṃsaka does not himself believe in the existence of yogic perception, there is no subject (*pakṣa*) of the syllogism, that is, nothing about which to prove that it is *not* a means of knowing Dharma (NM, pp. 265–6)! See also Vyom., p. 560, ll. 3–9. Jayarāśi criticizes Kumārila's interpretation of MS 1.1.4 along similar lines at TUS, pp. 276, l. 21–278, l. 13. He asks, does the perception that the Mīmāṃsaka denies is a means of knowing Dharma present Dharma or some other object? No one will object to the latter alternative, that a perception that represents something *other* than Dharma is not a means of knowing Dharma! If, on the other hand, the Mīmāṃsaka means to assert that it is a perception that represents Dharma which is not a means of knowing Dharma, he will be "confronted with a contradiction." He will be saying that such a perception both represents and does not represent Dharma. See Franco (1994), pp. 525–7, nn. 346, 347. It seems to me, however, that such objections are easily answered.

23 All schools of classical Indian philosophy other than Mīmāṃsā and the materialist Cārvāka school accepted the possibility of a faculty of yogic perception that apprehends objects that are very small (for example, atoms) or far away (for example, the world of Brahmā) or concealed by other objects (for example, the realm of the Nāgas underneath the earth), as well as objects that exist in the past or in the future. Perhaps the oldest systematic treatment of this topic in a philosophical text (references to supernormal powers are frequent in the epics and Upaniṣads, not to mention early Buddhist and Jaina writings; see also CS, *Sūtrasthāna* 11.18–19) is VS 9.13–18: a perception of both the self and of other substances, as well as their various properties, results from a special kind of connection between self and mind – and, in some cases, from a connection of self, sense faculty, mind, and object (the usual four factors that interact in a perceptual experience). Praśastapāda (sixth century), the early commentator on the VS, distinguished two types of yogic perception: (1) that which arises for yogins in the state of *samādhi* (lit., "while practicing yoga," *yukta*) and (2) that which yogins command outside of meditation ("while not practicing yoga," *viyukta*) (see PDhS,

pp. 464–5). The former cognizes one's own and other selves, aether, space, time, wind, atoms, and minds, as well as the qualities, universals, and ultimate differences that inhere in such things, even the category of inherence itself. It is brought about by the mind assisted by merit (Dharma) accrued by the practice of yoga. The latter cognizes objects that are "very small, obstructed, or removed" and results from the connection of self, mind, sense faculty, and object, which is also enhanced by merit engendered by yogic practice. Other philosophers followed Praśastapāda in making this distinction. It is not apparent, however, in the *Yogasūtra* itself. There, on the one hand, knowledge of things past and future, at least, is attained through the practice of *saṃyama*, which is a meditative process (see YS 3.3–4, 16); on the other hand, it would seem that the "knowledge of the very small or concealed or distant" mentioned at YS 3.25 (said to result from "the application of the effulgence" of the "sorrowless, luminous function" of YS 1.35–36) is also a form of *saṃyama*, since it is discussed in the same section. Moreover, the "identification" (*samāpatti*) with the object that results in an infallible knowledge of its nature (*ṛtambharā prajñā*), discussed in the first book (41–50), takes place in meditation as well. Thus, the *Yogasūtra* does not seem to recognize yogic perception outside of meditation, that is, *viyukta-yogipratyakṣa*. See Isaacson (1993).

If perception somehow arises from the interaction of sense faculty and object – as is commonly believed, and as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers themselves accepted – then there is an obvious problem as to how yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) can grasp that which is remote in time and space, for the sense faculty can presumably interact only with an object that is present here and now. This fundamental challenge of Mīmāṃsā was typically answered by, first, observing that there are varying abilities of perception – cats can see in the dark, vultures can see objects very far away – and then arguing that anything that admits of degrees can be increased to an absolute limit – that is indeed what yogins achieve through the practice of yoga. (See NM, pp. 268–9 and NKand, pp. 467–8.) Śrīdhara and Vyomaśiva, following Praśastapāda, suggest that the supernormal perception of yogins is achieved in part by a superabundance of merit, Dharma, built up by yogic practice. Maṇḍanamiśra rejects such views in his VV by pointing out that, although the capacity of the external senses may be increased so that they can know objects that are very small or large or far away, they will still be restricted to knowing their own specific *types* of objects (the eye cannot perceive sound, the ear cannot perceive smell), as well as to knowing objects that are *present*, not past or future, since it is inconceivable how something past or future could cause a perception. (See VV, pt. 3, pp. 1026–40, and NKaṇ thereon.) The Nyāya philosopher Bhāsarvajña (tenth century), eschewing elaborate arguments, stated simply that the possibility of yogic perception is well known from scripture and that those who deny it incur great sin for which they will suffer in hell (NBhūṣ, p. 271, ll. 6–8). However, he also mentions that it can be established by inference, but I have been unable to find a discussion of any such an inference in the NBhūṣ. He may have in mind that just mentioned (varying abilities must admit of an absolute limit), or another presented by Vyomaśiva to the effect there must be persons capable of perceiving atoms and the like, since according to a basic Vaiśeṣika principle, to exist is, among other things, to be cognizable (*prameya*) (Vyom, p. 560, ll. 10 ff.). Bhāsarvajña, meanwhile, avoids the problem of how the sense faculties can interact with objects not present by eliminating any mention of sense faculty–object connection from the definition of perception; for him, perception is simply "that which is productive of a correct *immediate experience*"(*saṃyagaparokṣānubhavasādhanaṃ pratyakṣaṃ*, NSā, p. 84).

Buddhist philosophers offer a different explanation of yogic perception: it is a vivid, nonconceptualized cognition brought about by the force of intense thinking or concentration (*bhāvanā*), similar to apparitions that arise in the minds of those overcome

by desire, sorrow, intoxication, etc. (PV 3.281–282). Continuously thinking about my lover, she finally appears to me as if she were right in front of me. Such representations do not involve the functioning of the external senses, but only that of the mind (*manas*). Nevertheless, because they are vivid and direct and without conceptual content, they are perceptual. Those that receive confirmation, such as the Buddha's cognition of the Four Noble Truths, are *pramāṇas*, valid perceptions, whereas others are not (PV 3.286). A significant expansion of the Buddhist doctrine of *bhāvanā* is achieved by Śāntarakṣita (eighth century) in his masterpiece, the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, where he argues that intense meditation on the doctrine of the selflessness of all entities culminates in a vivid experience of all particulars, past, present, and future, that is, complete omniscience (see TS 3380–3475 with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* commentary thereon, esp. vv. 3440–3448; also Kamalaśīla ad TS 3337–3338). This view was attacked at length by Vācaspatimiśra (tenth century) in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* (see esp. NKaṇ, pt. 3, pp. 1214ff.) and various other Brahmanical authors and was defended in turn against their objections by the later Buddhist thinker Ratnakīrti (eleventh century).

Kumārila had already presented arguments against the possibility of omniscience in the *Codanāsūtra-adhikaraṇa* of his *Ślokavārttika* – not only the complete omniscience ascribed by Jaina philosophers to their founder, Mahāvīra, but also even the limited knowledge of transcendent matters relating to salvation alleged by Dharmakīrti to have been possessed by the Buddha. Thus the rejection of *yogipratyakṣa* in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* lends support to that refutation. Kumārila's principal argument against omniscience is that it is simply something we never observe (*Codanā* 113, 117ab); nor could we ever determine that someone is omniscient without being omniscient ourselves (*Codanā* 112, 134). In general, the Mīmāṃsaka prides himself on making the fewest and safest possible assumptions; to postulate an omniscient human or divine author of scripture is to go considerably out on a limb (*Codanā* 152–153)! As far as attempting to show that the Buddha's statements in regard to matters of salvation, etc., must be valid because we are able to confirm by perception, etc., his statements in regard to other things – such a strategy will not work; for it results in restricting the authority of the Buddha to things that we are otherwise able to confirm, which actually *rules out* the validity of any of his statements in regard to salvation (*Codanā* 121–125). (For a more extensive Mīmāṃsā discussion, probably taken from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, see TS 3127–3245.)

The commitment to yogic perception and omniscience is even more deeply rooted in the Jaina tradition. Mahāvīra is explicitly declared to have been omniscient in canonical texts. Moreover, in Jaina philosophy the soul is considered to have infinite knowledge as one of its inherent attributes. The natural omniscience of the soul is obscured by karma, the removal of which through spiritual practice restores the soul to its original perfect state. Thus, in fact, in Jainism omniscience, *kevalajñāna*, can be attained by anyone; it is an aspect of enlightenment (cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.7.1, among numerous other Upaniṣad passages). An important early Jaina philosophical text that treats omniscience is the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra (fifth century), upon which Akalaṅka (eighth century) wrote a famous commentary, the *Aṣṭaśatī*. Vidyānanda (ninth century), in his supercommentary on Akalaṅka's work (the *Aṣṭasāhasrī*), refutes the views of Kumārila at length. Many other Jaina philosophical texts of the classical period defend omniscience, typically addressing the Mīmāṃsā arguments. See I. C. Shastri (1990) and Singh (1974).

It should be noted, finally, that Kumārila also rejects, along with yogic perception, the traditional Hindu belief in the capacity of the ancient "Seers" (*ṛṣis*) to cognize the Veda (ŚV, *Codanā* 143–149). According to him, there was no first person to hear the Veda – any more than there was someone who composed it. The reliability of the Veda, rather, rests on its having been passed down, forever, from generation to generation.

24 According to Maṇḍana in his *Vidhiviveka* it is the fact that perception is restricted to an object occurring in the present time that determines that it is unable to know Dharma. Perception is not to the same extent restricted in regard to the location, size, or form of an object; for it is able to apprehend objects moving across space, that vary in size, and that are without form (for example, number). However, it can only apprehend things that exist now. Even though the capacities of the senses may be enhanced through yoga so that they are able to perceive things that are very small (for example, atoms) or far away, they still are unable to perceive things in the past or the future. See VV, pt. 3, pp. 1020–40, also NKaṇ, pt. 3, pp. 1188–92.

Kumārila adopts a similar line of argument in his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, cited by Śāntarakṣita at length in the *Sarvajñaparīkṣā* section of his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (see esp. TS 3159–3179). The capacity of the senses can be enhanced somewhat through practice, but they will always be restricted to their proper objects and never be able to grasp what is in the past or future. By practice, one may learn to jump much higher, but one will never be able to leap miles in the air (TS 3167). Thus,

> Even those men who are seen to be superior in wisdom, intelligence, and strength are so only by small degrees, not by virtue of being able to see supersensible things. Even a wise man who is capable of perceiving subtle things surpasses other men without ever really transcending his natural abilities. The perception of a person standing in a certain room is able to apprehend only what is in that room, not what is in a different room. Objects that are far removed by regions, mountains, and oceans, by lands and continents – who could see them while standing here?
>
> (TS 3159–3160, 3169–3170; also cited by Ratnakīrti, SS, pp. 8–9)

Dharmakīrti addresses a problem similar to this in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 2.122–133, 136–137; see Franco [1997], pp. 6–8). He wants to argue that the Buddha's being a *pramāṇa* rests on his great compassion, which he cultivated over many lifetimes. After proving (against the materialist) that it is indeed possible for the same consciousness-series to extend over more than one existence, he examines the question of whether it is really possible for compassion to increase indefinitely through "practice" (*abhyāsa*). An opponent is allowed to object: although a certain increase can be achieved by effort, there cannot be a complete change in one's nature in regard to compassion – one's compassion will always be relatively limited – and he offers the examples of jumping and heating water. The distance one is able to jump can indeed be enhanced through practice, but only up to a certain point; water, on the other hand, can be heated only so much before it begins to evaporate.

In response, Dharmakīrti points out that such limitations exist only when effort does not build upon the results of previous effort (as in jumping – having jumped twenty-six feet, one's next attempt does not begin at twenty-six feet), or the substratum of change is unstable (as in heating water). Neither of these restrictions applies to the cultivation of compassion. Efforts to cultivate it always begin where one left off; moreover, it tends to grow naturally – compassion arises out of compassion. And the substratum of change in this case, namely, the mind, has already be shown to be a continuous stream of causally related mental events that can extend over many lifetimes.

Later Buddhists made use of this sort of reasoning in their defense of the possibility of omniscience. Just as compassion can reach an absolute pinnacle that considerably exceeds the compassion of ordinary humans, so can the power of cognition. See, for example, TS 3409ff. They usually argued, however, that it is the capacity of the mind, not the external senses, that can increase in this way. Śāntarakṣita, however, does not even confine himself to that position. The capacities of action and cognition are truly amazing, he alleges; through yoga, anything is possible. Serpents are known to be

able to hear things through their eyes, so why couldn't similar powers be available to humans?! See TS 3389–3391.

25 I am uncertain of my translation of v. 31. I find both of the recorded readings in 31b, *pratyakṣatvapramāṇataḥ* and *pratyakṣatvapramātvayoḥ*, difficult to construe. In my intepretation I have followed the gloss of Umbeka: *pratyakṣatvena pramāṇatvena ca loke 'prasiddhatvāt pratibhāvad iti*.

26 According to Praśastapāda the authors of scripture have an intuitive (*prātibha*) cognition of "supersensible objects exisiting in all three times, that is, Dharma, and so forth," which is a truthful awareness and which he calls *ārṣa jñāna*, "knowledge of the *ṛṣis*" (see VS 9.28; cf. VP[R] 1.30, 38). Sometimes such cognitions arise for ordinary people, too, and he gives the example, "My brother will come tomorrow; my heart tells me" (PDhS, pp. 627–8). He considers it a *pramāṇa* distinct from perception and inference – or so, at least, Śrīdhara implies, NKand, p. 629, l. 17. It is not produced by the functioning of the external senses but arises from the contact of self and mind. Jayanta, however, offers a spirited defense of *ordinary* intuition (*pratibhā*) as a valid form of perception at NM, pp. 274–7 (cf. NM, p. 60). He wants to argue in particular that it is properly produced by its object – for example, the brother who is coming tomorrow. He insists at the same time that it is not to be considered *ārṣa jñāna* in Praśastapāda's sense, as a category of cognition distinct from perception (see the editor K. S. Varadacharya's note, p. 276). Cf. NBhūṣ, p. 171, ll. 2–6.

Like Kumārila, Maṇḍana attacks intuition (*pratibhā*, *pratibhāna*) in his *Vidhiviveka* on the grounds that it does not yield certainty by itself but depends on another *pramāṇa*, namely inference, to yield certainty. It is not, according to him, the thought that my brother is coming tomorrow that serves as the means of knowing that my brother will come tomorrow, but a feeling of peace or agitation in the heart, from which I infer – however unreliably – that he will come. Thus, intuition cannot know anything that is not already accessible to other *pramāṇas*. See VV, pt. 3, pp. 1316ff. The *Yuktidīpikā*, as usual, develops its own interpretation of the concept *pratibhā*, pp. 75–6, but also rejects it as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

27 See below, verse 37.

28 Cf. ŚV, *Codanā* 13–14, and note 18 above.

29 Diṅnāga, of course, was not the only Indian epistemologist to subject MS 1.1.4 to critical scrutiny. After Diṅnāga's initial attack on the *sūtra* as a definition of perception, Kumārila's attempt to reinterpret it was examined by Jayarāśi and Jayanta, as we have already seen. The later Vedānta thinker Śrī Harṣa presents an elaborate critique of the Mīmāṃsā position on perception in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (KhKh, pp. 282–90; see Granoff [1978], pp. 45–7).

30 *sad ity asadvyudāsāya na niyogāt sa gaṃsyate | samprayogo hi niyamāt sata evopapadyate ||*.

31 Diṅnāga apparently followed the lead of Bhavadāsa in construing *satsamprayoga* in this way. See NR p. 100, ll. 31–32.

32 ***samprayoge*** *puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam*. . . .

33 It is uncertain who these "other" philosophers were, but they may be related to the Sarvāstivāda of Hīnayāna Buddhism. The Sarvāstivādins believed that all things exist in all three times – past, present, and future. Something is "present" at the moment it is "active," but things in the past and future can also causally influence the present. Thus, a connection between sense faculty and object that will occur or has occurred could account for a cognition of the object now. Cf. *Kathāvatthu* 1.6.23–24 (Aung [1979], pp. 90–1): a philosopher suggests that, if everything exists, then one should see a past object now by virtue of the existence of all the conditions of visual consciousness of the past (sense, object, visual consciousness, light, etc.) and a future object by virtue of the existence of all the conditions of visual consciousness of the future.

A different approach to the perception of things in the past and the future is taken by Prajñākaragupta, PVBh, p. 111, ll. 21–30. If there is a revelation of something in the past or the future, then *ipso facto* there has been or will be a functioning of the sense faculty in regard to the object. Prajñākara defines perception as the direct revelation of an object (*sākṣātkāra*). *That* is the criterion for there being a functioning of a sense faculty, not the other way around (see Woo [2003]). Meanwhile the Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña, who accepted yogic perception, argues for the view that a past or future thing, which is a kind of "being" (*bhāva*), even though it does not "exist" (*na vidyate*, *nāsti*), can nevertheless be the object (*viṣaya*) of a cognition, even a perceptual cognition (for it is generally accepted that it can be the object of an inferential cognition!), without *producing* the cognition itself (*jñānasya anarthajanyatva*); for a nonexistent object cannot be causally effective (NBhūṣ, pp. 87–92). As he says, "It is not the case that something is an object of knowledge only insofar as it is causally productive," and cites yogic perception as his evidence (pp. 87, l. 24–88, l. 1). He is vague about the causal mechanism of yogic perception, however, saying merely that a cognition presents a past or future object "due to the collection of causal factors, *adṛṣṭa*, etc." (p. 90, ll. 19–23). In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought *adṛṣṭa* is an "unseen" force, if you will, which is invoked to account for otherwise inexplicable phenomena, such as karmic retribution.

34 Maṇḍana in his *Vidhiviveka* does not stress that the *connection* is existing in the way Kumārila does here, but only that the *object* must be existing. However, Maṇḍana is not commenting in that work directly on MS 1.1.4. At VV, pt. 3, pp. 1332ff. Maṇḍana considers another rather unusual possibility for how there might be a connection between a sense faculty and objects in the past or future that Nyāya philosophers apparently entertained; namely, such a connection can occur insofar as past or future objects are "qualifiers" (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an object that exists now. It is true to say, for example, that "the earth has had many kings in the past and will have many kings in the future" (Vācaspati's example); kings of the past and the future are thus "qualifiers" of the earth. Insofar as one's sense faculty is properly in contact with the earth, which is an object that exists in the present, it is also in contact with all the things of the past and future that qualify it! Needless to say, Maṇḍana rejects this proposal as well. This theory is also considered by Bhāsarvajña, NBhūṣ, p. 92, ll. 5ff., and rejected by him for other reasons.

35 It is of some interest that Kumārila in this section of the PP does not consider the possibility that one could have a cognition of things in the past or the future through the mind as opposed to the external senses. Thus, he does not seem to be aware of the principal Buddhist proposal in regard to yogic cognition, which goes back to Dharmakīrti, that it is a *mental* cognition brought about by intense meditation on an object, *bhāvanā* (see above, note 23); he seems to be discussing the possibility of yogic perception primarily from within a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework. Maṇḍana in his *Vidhiviveka* was perhaps the first Brahmanical author to challenge the theory of yogic intuition arising from *bhāvanā*. He argues that mental cognition in general is dependent on external perception. I can only be aware mentally of an object I have also perceived by means of one of the external senses. Thus, there can be no *mental* awareness of objects in the past or the future, because such objects are never apprehended by the external senses. When it comes to a mental awareness engendered by *bhāvanā*, it can only apprehend (though perhaps more vividly) the same object one has been meditating on, and that will be either something "heard about," that is, learned from scripture, or inferred – for example, the Four Noble Truths or the doctrine of Selflessness. Thus, once again, it will not be able to extend beyond those *pramāṇas* upon which it depends; it cannot comprehend all things in the past, present, and future. See VV, pt. 3, pp. 1040ff. Once again, later Buddhist authors such as Śāntarakṣita,

Kamalaśīla, and Ratnakīrti sought to make the theory of *bhāvanā* invulnerable to these sorts of objections and others raised by other Brahmanical authors (including Kumārila's commentator Sucaritamiśra at Kāś ad PP 29) – the debate is rich indeed. It should be mentioned, however, that the main premise on which Maṇḍana's argument turns, namely, that mental cognition is dependent on external sensory cognition, is developed by Kumārila later in the PP, vv. 160–167.

36 See AKBh 1.44ab. The atoms of the visual sense are arranged on the pupil of the eye and covered over by a transparent skin to keep them in place. The atoms of the sense of hearing are arranged inside the ear cavity, the atoms of the sense of smell, inside the nostrils, etc.

37 Two issues are considered in this section of the NS: (1) whether the sense faculties are "derived from the gross elements" (*bhautika*), that is, made out of earth, water, fire, wind, and space (conceived as subtle matter, analogous to ether), and (2) whether the sense faculties directly contact their objects. Against the first thesis the observation is made that the visual sense is able to perceive objects that are larger and smaller than it; if it consisted of the elements it should only be able to perceive objects the same size as itself (for gross matter is not elastic; it cannot spread out or contract to accommodate larger or smaller objects; cf. NBh 3.1.33: *bhautikaṃ hi yāvat tāvad eva vyāpnoti*). Against the second thesis the point is made that the visual faculty is able to apprehend things behind glass, "a veil of mist," crystal, etc., which it would not be able to do if it came directly in contact with its object. Both objections are answered by appeal to the theory that the visual faculty contacts its object in the form of "rays" (*raśmi*) extending outward from the eye and consisting of the element of fire or light. Since (as is explained by later authors) these rays are able to concentrate or spread out, the visual faculty is able to perceive objects smaller or larger than the eye itself. And since certain types of matter can be penetrated by the rays – for example, glass, but not stone, etc. – the visual faculty is able to apprehend things behind glass, etc.

The objection to the first point seems to derive from Sāṃkhya, which held the senses to be transformations of the *ahaṃkāra* (ego), which is material, to be sure, but of a subtler, purer kind of matter than the elements. The objection to the second point reflects the position enunciated by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*, that the *āyatanas* or *dhātus* of sight, hearing, and mind do not directly contact their objects, whereas the other three senses – touch, taste, and smell – do (AK 1.43cd). (In his own commentary on this verse Vasubandhu mentions that if all senses came directly in contact with their objects, then meditators would not experience "the divine eye" or "the divine ear.") Since vision and hearing do not function by directly contacting their objects, Vasubandhu is also able to say (AKBh 1.44ab) that they are not restricted to objects of the same size. Diṅnāga appears to be following Vasubandhu in his PS: since the faculties of vision and hearing are in fact able to apprehend objects at a distance and larger or smaller than themselves, they must not come directly in contact with their objects. Hence the references to contact (*sannikarṣa*) and connection (*saṃyoga*) in the definitions of perception in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* render those definitions defective. See Hattori (1968), pp. 124–6, n. 3.22. Uddyotakara considers Diṅnāga's (and perhaps other Buddhists') objections to the mentioning of contact in NS 1.1.4 at length at NV, pp. 101, l. 6–107, l. 5. As far as I can tell, no Buddhist philosopher explains *how* vision and hearing are able to perceive objects from a distance, that is, precisely by what kind of causal mechanism; to my knowledge, however, no Brahmanical philosopher makes an issue of this.

For a comprehensive discussion of sense faculty–object contact as a condition of sensory cognition in Indian philosophy see Preisendanz (1989). For a detailed treatment of the issues relating to NS 3.1.32ff. see Preisendanz (1994), esp. vol. 2, pp. 443–56, nn. 150–2. I have relied heavily on the latter work, which constitutes

a veritable encyclopedia of early Indian epistemology and psychology, in producing the notes for this section of the PP.

38 It must be said that this construal, especially of *sam* as 'proper', is rather implausible. However, Indian philosophers often indulged in fanciful etymologies to support their theories.

39 See NR ad PP 39: *bhavadāsena . . . samprayogaśabdaś ca sakalasambandhavacano vyākhyātaḥ*, "By Bhavadāsa . . . the word *samprayoga* is explained as expressing all the connections." Cf. PSV 1.6.5cd–6ab, where Diṅnāga cites the view of the "Vṛttikāra" that that from which a cognition arises is to be regarded as the *pramāṇa* perception, and that "there is no cause of the cognition other than the contact of the Soul, etc., together with the impressions, as mentioned, which could be taught as perception" (Franco [1994], p. 522, n. 338). See Franco and Preisendanz (1995).

40 For a critique by Jinendrabuddhi, Diṅnāga's commentator, of Kumārila's construal of *samprayoga* as *saṃyagvyāpāra*, however, see Hattori (1968), pp. 165–6, n. 6.21. See also NM, pp. 261, l. 4–262, l. 3. One of the points Jinendrabuddhi makes is that *samprayoga* isn't commonly used in the sense of 'functioning'!

41 This might be related to Abhidharma (specifically, Theravāda) theories of perception that regard the object's "coming within range" of the sense faculty (*āpātha-gatattā*) as a condition of perception. See Sarathchandra (citing the *Atthasālinī*), pp. 33, 40.

42 This proposal may be related to the theory, discussed at NS 3.1.53ff., that there is only one sense faculty, namely, touch. See vv. 159–168 below. Jayantabhaṭṭa, among classical authors, interprets this theory as being based on the idea that the different sense faculties are simply different areas of the skin that have unique sensing capacities (NM, vol. 2, pp. 376–7). However, the proponents of this view are unknown. Preisendanz (1994) notes an idea mentioned in ancient medical texts that touch is an aspect of all types of sense faculty–object contact, which could have developed into the theory that the sense of touch, located in the skin, is the only sense faculty (see vol. 2, pp. 609–22, n. 206). However, it is more likely that the proposal of *śloka* 44 is unconnected with any speculation about the actual nature of sensation. Rather, it simply expresses a formal relationship between the senses of vision and hearing and the other sense faculties: given that the latter have the property of coming directly in contact with their objects, these too, insofar as they are sense faculties, must have that property. The same inference (*anumāna*) is employed by Uddyotakara, NV, p. 106, ll. 7–10, except he cites the sense of smell as his example. He goes on to say that one could draw the same conclusion from the fact that the senses are instruments (*karaṇa*) – all instruments, presumably, operating by some kind of contact.

43 See YD, p. 203, ll. 25–32; Preisendanz (1989), pp. 175–80.

44 See note 37 above and Preisendanz (1989), esp. pp. 177–84; regarding the theory of auditory perception, see ibid., pp. 158–64.

45 This does not mean that Kumārila necessarily endorses either of these theories. Indeed, he will later, in the *Śabdanityatā-adhikaraṇa*, refute the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories of auditory perception. And while he may ultimately have accepted either the Sāṃkhya or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of visual perception (we do not have enough information to tell), he is clearly considering these theories here simply as a challenge to Diṅnāga's position.

46 The objection applies most evidently to the sense of vision; how Diṅnāga thought the faculty of hearing moves beyond the body for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher is unclear, for the latter generally considers sound to move *from* the place where it is produced *to* the ear.

47 Once again, in Indian philosophy the sense faculty (*indriya*) is generally distinguished from the physical structure – the eye ball, the nose, the ear, etc. – which is its "seat"

or "basis" in the body. See, for example, YD, p. 197, l. 29ff. Whereas the latter is perceptible, the former is imperceptible (*atīndriya*), even when it is considered material; for the matter that comprises it is of a subtler or finer sort. Although the Buddhists also accepted this distinction between sense faculty and corporeal seat, they nevertheless maintained that the sense faculty does not move beyond its corporeal seat. See Preisendanz (1994), vol. 2, pp. 444–8, n. 151.

48 Since Kumārila uses the term *vṛtti*, 'function', in these one-and-a-half verses, he would seem to have the Sāṃkhya theory in mind. On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers typically explained the visual perception of larger objects by saying that the vision-ray is broad at the tip. Thus, one gets the impression that Kumārila here is trying to defend both theories at once, without having sorted out the terminology. Therefore, the term 'function' should perhaps be taken as including the vision-ray of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of visual perception and whatever (according to Diṅnāga's understanding of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) extends outward from the ear to its object in auditory perception.

49 It would appear from this verse that Kumārila interprets the expression *sāntaragrahaṇam*, lit., 'apprehension or perception that includes a distance/interval', which is employed by Diṅnāga at PS 1.3.1cd (cf. 1.6.5ab: *jñānaṃ sāntaram*) and which is perhaps most naturally construed as 'apprehension of an object located at a distance', to mean in fact, 'apprehension of an object *as being* located at a distance' (*sāntara iti grahaṇam*). This is one of several alternatives considered critically by Uddyotakara, NV, pp. 101–4. Cf. Hattori (1968), p. 126, n. 3.22 and Preisendanz (1994), vol. 2, pp. 448–9, n. 151.

50 See PSV 1.6.5cd–6a'. Diṅnāga mentions there that "the Vṛttikāra," that is, Bhavadāsa, held that the means of knowledge known as perception is "the connection (*samprayoga*) . . . of the soul and other things" – that is, presumably, the sense faculty, the object, and possibly also the mind – "accompanied by impressions (*saṃskāra*), etc." Franco and Preisendanz (1995), pp. 83–4, consider various ways in which to construe Bhavadāsa's idea.

51 I have, for the sake of consistency with Bhavadāsa's interpretation, glossed *samprayoga* here as 'connection', but we have already seen that Kumārila would prefer to render it as 'proper functioning', so that, reading *puruṣasya* and *indriyāṇām* separately, the *sūtra* would now actually come to "The arising of a cognition belonging to a person/self when there is an existing proper functioning of the sense faculties is perception. . . ."

52 This, of course, is but a minor episode in the debate about the existence of a self that extends from the time of the Buddha to the end of the classical period, culminating in Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* and the Navya-Nyāya commentaries thereon. For an authoritative treatment of this debate see Oetke (1988).

53 ŚV, *Ātmavāda* 22–31.

54 See esp. *Ātmavāda* 29. Cf. TS 223–225, which are presumably from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. Just as a snake can change states – coil up or stretch out – without ceasing to be the same snake, so the self can undergo various states of consciousness and remain the same self. For Śāntarakṣita's response, see TS 241ff. Among other arguments, Śāntarakṣita points out that if, indeed, the states that a substance undergoes are not entirely distinct from the substance that has them, as the Mīmāṃska maintains, then the substance *will* change along with its changing states; hence it cannot be considered permanent (*nitya*) (TS 268).

55 The same problem arose for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers as well. Both the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, as I have discussed in the Introduction, p. 6, appear to define perception as a type of cognition. However, perception is a *pramāṇa*, and the word *pramāṇa* etymologically suggests a means or instrument (*karaṇa*)

of knowledge, as opposed to that which results from the operation of that means. (Cf. NBh 1.1.3: *upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇānīti samākhyānirvacanasāmarthyād boddhavyam. pramīyate 'neneti karaṇārthābhidhāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ.*) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers adopted various strategies to deal with this discrepancy. Basing himself more on an etymological analysis of the specific expression for perception, *pratyakṣa*, than *pramāṇa*, the early commentator on the *Nyāyasūtra* Vātsyāyana conceived of perception in a broad way, as "the functioning (*vṛtti*) of each sense faculty in regard to its object" (*akṣasyākṣaya prativiṣayaṃ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*, op. cit.). This enabled him to consider perception to be *either* the contact of the various factors responsible for the arising of a perceptual cognition – object, sense faculty, mind, and self – *or* the perceptual cognition itself; for both can be considered a "functioning." If one considers it to be the cognition, then the result of the operation of the *pramāṇa* is another cognition of the *value* of its object, as something desirable, undesirable, or neither. Later Nyāya thinkers, however, for example, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Bhāsarvajña, understood NS 1.1.4 to refer actually to the *result* of the *pramāṇa* perception; by mentioning the result, which is a certain kind of cognition, the *sūtra* intends implicitly to indicate the means. For Jayanta that would be the collection of all the factors – object, sense faculty, mind, self, contact, etc. (*bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī*) – involved in the arising of a perceptual congnition (NM, pp. 31, ll. 8–9; 173–4); for Bhāsarvajña it is the sense faculty in contact with it object, assisted by other factors such as light, the proximity of the object, etc. (NBhūṣ, pp. 86, ll. 10–17; 103, ll. 1–3). On the Vaiśeṣika side, Praśastapāda, faithful to VS 3.1.13, understood perception to be "that [cognition] which arises dependent on each sense faculty" (*tatrākṣam akṣaṃ pratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣam*) (see Slaje [1983], pp. 32–4, with accompanying notes, for alternative construals of this definition). However, his commentator Śrīdhara explains that, although this primarily refers to the cognition, it should not be taken to exclude the contact (*sannikarṣa*) as the means of knowledge perception, should one choose to understand perception according to the etymology of *pramāṇa*, as a "means" (*karaṇavyutpattyā*) (NKand, pp. 443, l. 13–444, l. 1; cf. NM, pp. 38, l. 13–39, l. 6, where Jayanta argues that *pramāna*, strictly, should refer to what causes the knowing, not the knowing itself).

It would appear that Bhavadāsa understood MS 1.1.4 similarly to how Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña later came to understand NS 1.1.4; namely, it mentions the *result* of the functioning of the *pramāṇa* perception, for the *arising of a cognition* would seem to be the result. Thus, the actual *pramāṇa* is that which is responsible for the arising of the cognition, and that, according to Bhavadāsa, as we have seen (n. 50, above), is "the connection of the soul and other things. . . . accompanied by impressions, etc." Bhavadāsa may have been the first to enunciate clearly the view that means and result must be distinct; see PSV 1.6.5cd–6a'.

56 Diṅnāga's commentator Jinendrabuddhi assigns this interpretation to the "Bhāṣyakāra." Jinendrabuddhi actually considers two ways in which the Mīmāṃsaka could make use of the Vaiśeṣika concept of inherence (*samavāya*) to explain the arising of a cognition as the means of knowledge perception. Either the cognition could come to inhere in the self as the knower or the various universals proper to cognition – cognitionhood, qualityness, being – could come to inhere *in the cognition*. See Hattori (1968), p. 170, n. 6.47; Frauwallner (1968), pp. 101–2.

57 Diṅnāga seems unaware here of the Prābhākara position that inherence can be caused.

58 It is an arising that is a cognition; or else, *vice versa*, it is a cognition that is an arising. In either case, the one word qualifies the other.

59 See, for example, NS 3.2.42–45; Sarathchandra (1958), pp. 42–8.

60 See Introduction, note 67. PP 56 itself can be taken as implying that the "knownness" (*jñātatā, prākaṭya*) of the object is the result of the functioning of the *pramāṇa*. An

alternative interpretation that explicitly brings this out will be developed in the sequel (as alternative (c)).

Cf. the slightly different analysis of Kumārila's understanding of *pramāṇa* offered by Jayanta, NM, pp. 43, l. 3–44, l. 9. In cooking rice one employs various instruments and ingredients: a pot, water, rice grains, fire, etc. These various factors combined together bring about the activity of cooking, which in turn produces cooked rice. Thus, it is properly speaking the action of cooking that is the chief means of bringing about cooked rice. Similarly, in knowing an object the knower employs various factors: a sense faculty (in the case of perception), the contact of the sense faculty with the object, mental attention, and in some cases, such as inference, various other cognitions such as the cognition of the middle term. The combination of these factors yields a process (*vyāpāra*) called cognition (*jñāna*) – as Kumārila says in PP 56, a cognition that insofar as it simply arises is possessed of the nature of a knowing – which in turn produces knowledge of an object as its result. Thus, it is the cognition that is the means of knowledge perception. Its occurrence is postulated (by *arthāpatti*) from the occurrence of its effect, that is, the fact that an object has been made known. Bhāsarvajña offers roughly the same analysis of the Bhāṭṭa view of a means of knowledge in general – a means, *karaṇa*, is an *activity* of an agent brought about by all the other factors (*kartṛvyāpāro' śeṣakārakajanyaḥ*) – at NBhūṣ, pp. 44–5, which he proceeds to critique.

It is clear that both Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña are proceeding in their discussions from the standard notion that a means is the factor most efficacious (*sādhakatamaṃ*) in producing a result (i.e., the definition of *karaṇa* 'means' stated by Pāṇini, *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.42). Thus, they both understand Kumārila to be saying that the *pramāṇa*, the means of knowledge, is whatever process is applied by the agent to bring about a knowing, and that is the *cognition*. In fact, however, Kumārila, according to PP 56, understands the matter slightly differently. It is indeed the cognition that is the *pramāṇa*, but it must be possessed of some other function of its own that accounts for the emergence of the result, as an axe is possessed of movement (cf. PP 61); and in the case of the *pramāṇa* perception that function is just *its arising*. Therefore, Jaimini specifies that it is a cognition as it is arising, *buddhijanma=jāyamānā buddhiḥ*, that is perception.

61 This last alternative is based on taking √*jan* as the *causal* root belonging to the tenth conjugation class (*janayati*), in which case it has the meaning 'to beget', 'to produce', etc. The other alternatives are based on taking it as belonging to the fourth class (*jāyate*) in which case it is an intransitive verb, 'to be born', 'to arise', etc. Alternatives (b) and (c) have been suggested by Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī. The same result as (c) is also obtained if one construes *buddhijanman* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound meaning 'that whose arising is from a cognition', that is, 'that which is born of a cognition'.

62 See note 67, Introduction.

63 For alternative interpretations of *pramāṇa* either as sense faculty–object contact (in the case of perception) or as cognition, see MM 1.10–11.

64 *sati indriyārthasambandhe yā puruṣasya buddhir jāyate, tat pratyakṣam*, Frauwallner (1968), p. 22, ll. 13–14.

65 Although all printed editions that I have consulted, except M, read *buddhis tatra* instead of *vyaktis tasya*, the commentators clearly understand the verse according to the latter.

66 *buddhir vā janma vā sannikarṣo veti naiṣāṃ kasyacid avadhāraṇārtham etat sūtram*, MSBh, p. 22, 16–17.

67 The first view mentioned, that the sense faculty is the means of knowledge, is perhaps intended as the view of common sense. In the same way that one might consider the axe to be the means of chopping down a tree, so might one consider the visual

sense as the means of seeing. This position is not attested in philosophical texts prior to Kumārila. We do find it, however, mentioned by the post-Kumārila author Vācaspatimiśra in his NVTṬ, in the context of a discussion of the concept of *pramāṇa* in general (NVTṬ, pp. 16, l. 23–17, l. 16). In general, Vācaspati explains, an agent does not exert himself directly in regard to the result he or she wants to accomplish, but in regard to a *karaṇa*, a means, which in turn will produce the result; and that means can be either something "accomplished" (*siddha*), such as an axe for chopping down a tree, or something "yet to be accomplished" (*asiddha*), such as a sacrifice for attaining heaven. Similarly, a knower will not exert himself directly in regard to the knowing he wants to bring about but in regard to some instrument, by means of which he will bring it about. That instrument can be either something accomplished, for example, the sense faculty, or something yet to be accomplished, for example, the contact. This view is also defended by Bhāsarvajña. Perception is "the means of producing a valid, immediate experience"; a means is the most efficacious factor (*sādhakatama*, see above, n. 60) in giving rise to an effect. However, it is not something to be brought about itself, but an "already existing thing" directly governed by the agent (*sākṣātkartradhiṣṭhitasyāsādhyasya sataḥ kriyāsādhakatvam*, NBhūṣ, p. 61, ll. 16–17); hence, in the case of perception, it can only be the sense faculty. The sense faculty, then, is the most effective factor among all the causes in the production of knowledge, and what gives it its pre-eminence is contact with the object (NBhūṣ, p. 103, ll. 2–3).

The view that the connection of sense faculty and object is the *pramāṇa* perception reflects the idea that it is not the instrument as such but what it *does*, or what one does *with it*, that yields a perceptual knowing; it is not merely the axe that causes the tree to fall but the raising and lowering of the axe. Thus, Vātsyāyana, NBh 1.1.3, in analyzing the word for perception (*pratyakṣa*) grammatically, suggests that it means 'the functioning (*vṛtti*) of each sense faculty in regard to its object', which may be understood as being either the contact or the cognition. NS 1.1.4 itself suggests that sense faculty–object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) plays the instrumental role in the arising of a perceptual awareness. The commentaries, however, explain that the mention of only sense faculty–object contact is meant to indicate just the factor that is specific to perception. In fact, mind–sense faculty contact and self–mind contact must also occur in order for a perceptual cognition to arise. Indeed, VS 3.1.13 explicitly mentions the contact of all four factors: object, sense faculty, mind, and self. Diṅnāga's commentator Jinendrabuddhi ascribes the view that perception is the contact of sense faculty and object to a certain Vaiśeṣika named Śrāyaska, who is otherwise unknown (see Hattori [1968], p. 135, n. 4.6).

The view that the connection of mind and sense faculty is specific to perception – it is not, for example, a factor in inference – and therefore should be mentioned along with the contact of sense faculty and object in the definition of perception is rejected by Vātsyāyana at NBh 1.1.4 (see NBh, pp. 98–101 and NV ad loc.). This is not the same as saying that perception is the connection of mind and sense faculty, but it provides a basis for saying so. If one need only mention one of the specific factors of perception in order to define it, as Uddyotakara argues ("the mention of any one distinctive factor suffices to differentiate perception," NV, p. 99, ll. 2–3), then sense faculty–mind connection would do as well as sense faculty–object contact. The notion that perception is the connection of self and mind is attributed by Jinendrabuddhi to a certain Rāvaṇa, who is said to have written a commentary on the VS prior to Praśastapāda (see Hattori [1968], pp. 135–6, n. 4.7). Bronkhorst (1991–2) has suggested that this was the *Kaṭandī*, which influenced Praśastapāda. It appears that the latter held that conceptualized perception, at least, is engendered "from the contact of self and mind, dependent on the qualifiers of genus, difference, quality,

substance, and action" (PDhS, pp. 447–59). In his defense of the viability of such a view (vv. 66–68) Kumārila suggests that this connection may be considered the *pramāṇa* because it is the most "proximate" to the arising of the result, a knowing, and so may be considered, of all the connections, the most efficacious. The connection of self and mind is also considered to be instrumental in the arising of perceptions of one's own mental states, such as pleasure, pain, and effort, and in the arising of supernormal perceptions in meditation (see PDhS, pp. 463–5). Therefore, it may well have been seen by some as the *sine qua non* of *all* types of perceptual awareness, hence as the "most efficacious factor."

We have already seen that, while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers tended to emphasize the connection of sense faculty and object as that which is unique to perception, they also acknowledged that it must be accompanied by all the other connections (cf. PDhS, pp. 474–5: *athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyaṃ yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣam*). Meanwhile, the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Bhavadāsa explicitly held the view that all four connections constitute the *pramāṇa* perception. See note 39, above.

68 See Hattori (1968), pp. 42–3 (Bb), and p. 137, n. 4.13.

69 Cf. NBhūṣ, pp. 103, l. 13–104, l. 4. Bhāsarvajña points out that an axe does not destroy all the properties of a tree when it is applied to the trunk!

70 Actually, Diṅnāga raises the problem at PS 1.6.6cd–7ab, in regard to Bhavadāsa's proposal, that "the connection of the soul and other things . . . accompanied by impressions, etc." is perception, but Kumārila applies it here just to the suggestion that the connection of sense faculty and object is perception. See Hattori (1968), pp. 66–7.

71 *akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam*, as cited from the *Nyāyamukha* by, for example, Kamalaśīla, TSP, p. 456, ll. 15–16. See Hattori [1968], pp. 76–7, n. 1.11. Cf. Praśastapāda's statement, PDhS, p. 442, l. 1: *akṣam akṣam pratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣam*. The word *pratyakṣa* admits of various analyses according to the rules of Sanskrit grammar (see Sharma [1985]). Diṅnāga and Praśastapāda have essentially interpreted it as an adverb (i.e., an *avyayībhāva*, apparently in accordance with *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.6), meaning that which arises 'in regard to/dependent on each sense faculty'. Also apparently taking it in an adverbial sense, Vātsyāyana suggests *akṣasyākṣasya prativiṣayaṃ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*, "Perception is the function of each sense faculty *towards/in regard to its object*." However, Uddyotakara, Vātsyāna's commentator, points out that this is not really grammatically possible; the word with which *prati* combines in an *avyayībhāva*, in this case, *akṣa*, should be construed in the accusative, not the genitive. Other philosophers were inclined to see it as an adjective (i.e., a *tatpuruṣa*, in accordance with A 2.2.18), for example, Uddyotakara himself: *pratigatam akṣaṃ pratyakṣam iti*, " 'Perceptual' means approached/related to/dependent on a sense faculty." This allows for the ending of the word to change with the noun it modifies. Thus, a pot, *ghaṭa**ḥ*** (masculine gender), can be *pratyakṣa**ḥ***, "sensible"; a cognition, *jñāna**m*** (neuter), can be "sensory," *pratyakṣa**m***, etc. In his discussion at PS 1.6.8cd Diṅnāga mentions a Mīmāṃsā view that the word *pratyakṣa* "may be applied to a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), to a cognition (*jñāna*), and to an object (*viṣaya*). Of these [three applications] the application to a means of cognition is primary, to the others secondary" (Hattori [1968], p. 68). Jinendrabuddhi says that this was the view of the Bhāṣyakāra (Hattori [1968], p. 169, n. 6.39). See also NKand, p. 444, ll. 5–6; NBṬ, p. 7, ll. 15–16; PVBh, p. 278, ll. 7–8.

72 Sucarita's example: even though the same woman is the mother of both Ḍittha and Ḍavittha, she may be referred to just as "the mother of Dittha."

73 This is similar to the explanation Diṅnāga himself gives as to why the word for perception, *pratyakṣa*, mentions only the sense faculty and not also the object: the object is common to mental cognition (*manovijñāna*), which does not involve the functioning of an external sense faculty, and perceptions in other persons (*anyasantānikavijñāna*), whereas the sense faculty is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇahetu*) of a particular sensory cognition (PSV 1.1.4ab). Buddhists in general recognized that a sensory cognition arises in dependence on both an object and a sense faculty. Vasubandhu explains in his *Abhidharmakośa* that the cognition is named after the sense faculty because the clarity of the cognition varies with the state of the sense faculty and "because the sense faculty is specific" (*asādhāraṇatvāt*, AK 1.45; but cf. PV 3.191cd–193); in his *Bhāṣya* he explains the latter expression along the same lines as Diṅnāga. For some reason Diṅnāga does not think that his way of solving the problem of the term *pratyakṣa* is available to the Mīmāṃsaka he is criticizing at 1.6.6cd–7ab (that is, Bhavadāsa), but it seems that it should be. Here Kumārila is in effect saying – with reference, however, apparently to the Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika rather than the Mīmāṃsaka – that anyone who holds perception to consist in the connection between sense faculty and object *can* justify the word *pratyakṣa* in this way. Note that Kumārila resumes the discussion of the problem of the term *pratyakṣa* later, vv. 124 and 129–131, where the question becomes why perception, if it is really conceptualized, is not named after the *mind (manas)*.

74 See NS 1.1.16; 3.2.56–59, VS 3.2.1–3.

75 Uddyotakara discusses this problem in relation to inference, NV, pp. 140, l. 2–141, l. 8. How can the cognition of the middle term (smoke), together with knowledge of the relation of the middle and major terms (smoke and fire), be the *means* of knowledge when the result is a cognition of the *minor* term (the mountain possessed of fire)? How can the *pramāṇa* and *phala* have different objects?

76 See Hattori (1968), p. 43 (C).

77 This does not seem to be a theory explicitly embraced by any Vaiśeṣika thinker, but an undesirable consequence of the mind–self connection theory urged on the Vaiśeṣika by Diṅnāga.

78 I have tentatively arrived at this interpretation on the basis of the commentaries of Umbeka and Pārthasārathi. At NV, pp. 18–19, Uddyotakara lists various options for considering why a certain factor might be the "most efficacious," hence the *pramāṇa*, in the act of knowing. Among them are "being the last to occur" (*caramabhāvitā*) and "immediately preceding the cognition" (*pratipatter ānantarya*); the former proposal of "being the last to occur" was apparently widely accepted. (See NBhūṣ, p. 59, ll. 11ff. Bhāsarvajña rejects this criterion. Yet he seems to appeal to it himself when defending his own theory that the connection of sense faculty and object is what bestows pre-eminence upon the sense faculty and makes *it* the *pramāṇa*; NBhūṣ, p. 103, ll. 4–12.) It is tempting to construe proximity (*pratyāsatti*) in PP 68 along these lines – indeed, that is what Sucarita seems to do (by saying that the connection of mind and self is most proximate to "the *arising* of the cognition," *jñānotpatteḥ*). Thus, the connection of mind and self would be the *pramāṇa* because it is the last thing to occur before the cognition arises. (See also PP 78, which appears to support the view that the *pramāṇa* is what immediately precedes the result.) Umbeka and Pārthasārathi, however, make it clear that they understand *pratyāsatti* as *physical* proximity: both the cognition and the connection of mind and self inhere in the same thing. Thus, for example, Umbeka: *pratyuta jñānākhyāṃ kriyāṃ pratīndriyāpekṣayā sannikṛṣṭatvena karaṇatvād ātmamanaḥsaṃyogasyaiva prāmāṇyaṃ yuktaṃ, sannikṛṣṭaṃ ca ubhayor apy ekārthasamavāyād iti*, ŚVVT, p. 136. Moreover, it is uncertain why the mind–self connection *would* be the last thing to occur – unless the *conceptual* awareness of the object, which necessarily involves the functioning of the mind, were being considered

the result of perception (cf. PDhS, pp. 447–59, which suggests that a conceptualized perception arises from the contact of self and mind). Later it will become apparent that Kumārila considers the conceptualized perception to be perception in the preeminent sense.

79 Kumārila seems to indicate with this verse that he favors self–mind connection as the *pramāṇa*, but we have already seen (v. 56) that he is committed to considering the cognition the *pramāṇa*. Thus, perhaps the phrase 'according to us' or 'for us' (*naḥ*) in the verse should be taken to mean: *among the various candidates for pramāṇa mentioned in v. 60* – the sense faculty, the various connections, etc. – this seems to us to be the best.

80 As already noted, Pārthasārathmiśra states that Bhavadāsa held that the connection (*samprayoga*) mentioned in MS 1.1.4 means "all [types of] connections" (*sakalasambandhavacanaḥ*; NR, p. 105, ll. 22–3). We have also seen that Diṅnāga at PSV 1.6.5cd–6a' attributes to Bhavadāsa the view that "the connection of the self and other things . . . accompanied by impressions, etc." is the *pramāṇa* (n. 50, above).

81 Diṅnāga attacks this view in the course of his critique of NS 1.1.4 (PS 1.3.3d–4ab; Hattori [1968], pp. 39–41), but its source is really unknown. Contrary to Hattori ([1968], p. 129, n. 3.41), this view is not found in Vācaspatimiśra, who came after Diṅnāga, anyway. It does, however, seem to be reflected by Praśastapāda's statement: *tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ, prameyāḥ dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramitir dravyādiviṣayaṃ jñānam*, "In regard to that [the matter of perception, one possibility is that] the *pramāṇa* that is perception is the mere seeing of universals and differences [themselves], the objects to be known are the categories, substance, etc., the knower is the self, and the knowing is a cognition pertaining to the substance, etc." (PDhS, p. 471). That is to say, the result of perception is the knowing of a substance, quality, or action as qualified by such qualifiers as existence, substancehood, cowness, qualityness, and actionhood. This is one of three ways in which cognition may be construed as perception, according to Praśastapāda; he would appear to base it on VS 8.5–7. (See Candrānanda ad VS 8.6. It should be noted, however, that earlier in his discussion of perception Praśastapāda implies a somewhat different account of conceptualized perception. There, he speaks of a perception in regard to a substance that arises "from the contact of self and mind, assisted by the qualifiers universal, difference, substance, quality, or action, in the form 'existing', 'substance', 'earth', 'possessed of horns', 'white', 'cow', 'moving'," *sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsannikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate sad dravyaṃ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur gacchatīti* [PDhS, pp. 447–59]. One may reconcile this with his statement on p. 471 by assuming that in the latter Praśastapāda meant to include the qualification of a substance by other qualifiers than just universal and difference. However, a completely satisfactory account of Praśastapāda's view of perception is elusive.) Bhavadāsa may also have held that the *pramāṇa* that is perception is the cognition of the qualifying feature (*viśeṣaṇa*). He is known to have said that the *pramāṇa* that is perception is "that from which a cognition arises" (PSV 1.6.5cd–6a') and, more specifically, that "perception is that by means of which an ascertainment (*niścaya*) in the form of 'This is a cow' or 'This is a horse' arises in regard to 'this' [immediately perceived object]" (PSV 1.6.7cd–8ab; Hattori [1968], p. 67 [Dc]; also p. 168, n. 6.31). Thus, on this account, the *pramāṇa* that is perception would be the cognition of the qualifying feature, which in turn gives rise to a cognition of the qualified object as its result. How this is to be reconciled with the idea that the *pramāṇa* that is perception is "all the connections" (*sakalasambandha*), also associated with Bhavadāsa is unclear; we have seen, however, that it was not unusual for Indian epistemologists to put forward more than one proposal as to what the *pramāṇa* that is perception is.

Umbekabhaṭṭa, in any case, assigns the view considered in this verse to "Naiyāyikas," ŚVVT, p. 136.

82 Kumārila's response here seems actually to have been anticipated by Diṅnāga. See PSV 1.3.3d; Hattori (1968), p. 40 (Eb-2).

83 I have followed Sucarita's gloss – without much confidence. Sucarita suggests that the conceptual awareness in question is nonverbal, like that of animals or those without language when they recognize a unique type of object. Kumārila's suggestion here echoes the second proposal of Praṣastapāda for how a cognition is the *pramāṇa*: *sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāv avibhaktam ālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam* . . . , "In regard to the arising of a cognition of the universal or difference a seeing that is undivided (*avibhakta*) is the *pramāṇa* perception . . ." (PDhS, p. 472) – that is to say, a nonconceptual awareness of the universal or difference gives rise in turn to a conceptual awareness thereof. Śrīdhara, however, interprets (ad loc.) the expression *avibhaktam ālocanamātram* as *sannikarṣamātram*, that is, just the contact of sense faculty and object. Cf. Schmithausen (1963), who, *contra* Hattori (1968/9), is also inclined to see in this passage a depiction of the nonconceptualized perception of a qualifying feature (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an object but does not consider the possibility that it yields a conceptualized cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* as its result.

84 See the third possibility mentioned by Praśastapāda: *athavā sarveṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyaṃ yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam . . . pramitir guṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanam*, "Or else a true, inexpressible cognition that arises from the contact of the four [factors object, sense faculty, etc.] in regard to all categories of thing – that is the *pramāṇa* perception. . . . The knowing is the seeing of a benefit, a defect, or indifference" (PDhS, pp. 474–5). (The term 'inexpressible' here does not mean nonconceptualized, but rather that it is evoked just by the object and not by someone's statement. Śrīdhara explicitly states that the cognition in question is a *viśeṣyajñāna*, a cognition of the qualified object, that is, a conceptualized cognition.) Vātsyāyana also says, ad NS 1.1.3, that one may consider either the contact of sense faculty and object or the cognition that arises therefrom perception. In the latter case, notions of wanting to acquire or avoid the object or indifference toward it (*hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ*) would be the result (see above, n. 55). The proposal that the cognition may be considered the *pramāṇa* and the awareness of the value of the object the result was a standard option in the Nyāya tradition and is discussed by various authors. See in particular NM, pp. 174–83. The commentators on the NV who are referred to in that text as the Ācāryas (identified by Cakaradhara in the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* as Adhyayana et al.) hold that the mere (nonconceptualized) seeing (*ālocanamātra*) of the object triggers a memory of its beneficial or harmful nature, which in turn yields a reflective awareness (*parāmarśa*) of the object as a means of pleasure or pain, which in turn produces a cognition of the object as something to be obtained, avoided, etc. Another school of interpretation, referred to as "the Expositors," holds that the "mere seeing" of the object together with the memory of its beneficialness or harmfulness produces an "ascertainment" (*niścaya*) of the object as beneficial or harmful, and that is what is referred to as the awareness of the object as something to be obtained, avoided, etc.

85 This suggestion seems to relate to the sorts of proposals considered by the Ācāryas and Vyākhyātṛs in the NM, mentioned in the preceding note. Kumārila appears to be proposing a simplification: the memory of the beneficialness or harmfulness or neutrality of the object that arises immediately from its initial "seeing" may be considered the *phala*, not some further *ascertainment* of the object as beneficial, etc., engendered by the memory.

86 8cd. *savyāpārapratītitvāt pramāṇaṃ phalam eva sat* ||
9. *svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vā tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ* |

viṣayākārataivāsya pramāṇaṃ tena mīyate ||
10. *yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ* |
grāhakākārasaṃvittī trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthakkṛtam ||

8cd. [The resulting cognition is] the *pramāṇa*, [even though] it is really the result, because it is a cognition possessed of activity (i.e., that of taking on the form of the object).
9. Or else self-consciousness is the result, for the ascertainment of the object has the form of that (i.e., it is a self-conscious awareness of a certain object-form). The cognition's having the form of the object is the *pramāṇa*; by means of that the object is known.
10. That form which the cognition appears as having is the thing-to-be-known. *Pramāṇa* and result, on the other hand, are the subject-form and [self-] consciousness, respectively. These three factors are not different from the cognition.

These famous lines, in my view, reflect the difficulty attending upon the attempt to delineate the terms 'means of knowledge', 'knowing', 'result of knowing', etc., in Indian epistemology. As we have seen, almost everyone who grappled with this problem, including Kumārila, held that there were various options for considering what the *pramāṇa* and *phala* are in a particular act of cognition. Here, Diṅnāga seems to be proposing in the first instance that the cognition that arises from the functioning of the sense faculties should be considered the *pramāṇa*, "even though it really is the result," that is, even though it is the outcome of the operation of the senses. At the same time, he suggests that, if one wishes to hold *pramāṇa* and *phala* distinct, then one could consider the act of self-awareness that accompanies every cognition – for one is never aware of something without also being aware that one is aware of it; indeed, to cognize something without being aware that one is cognizing it would be in effect not to cognize it at all – to be the result; for the ascertainment of the object, which is *prima facie* the result of the act of cognition, is at the same time an awareness that one is ascertaining it. Diṅnāga then tries to specify further how the cognition is the *pramāṇa*: it is the cognition's having the form of the object that serves to make the nature of the object known, hence, strictly speaking, *that* aspect of the cognition can be considered the *pramāṇa*. Finally, with v. 10, he approaches the situation from a slightly different angle, maintaining all the while that it is the cognition viewed from different perspectives that is both *pramāṇa* and *phala*. First, one may consider just the form that appears in the cognition to be the *prameya*, the thing to be known, abstracting from the existence of an external object. Second, the "subject-form" (*grāhakākāra*) of the cognition, that is, the subjective aspect of the cognition that grasps the object-form that appears in it, can be considered the *pramāṇa*. Finally, the self-awareness of the cognition as grasping the object can be considered the *phala*.

Thus, Diṅnāga suggests various ways in which *pramāṇa* and *phala* can be conceived, but they all come down to the same thing: the cognition viewed in one way is the *pramāṇa*, in another way the *phala*. Even a real, external object becomes dispensable in Diṅnāga's scheme, insofar as he considers just the form that appears in the cognition to be the thing to be known (*prameya*). That is to say, the object itself is an aspect of the cognition and does not exist outside the cognition, not unlike the Husserlian intentional object. Thus, the stage is set for defending in the context of the discussion of logico-epistemological issues the thesis that "there is only consciousness." Cf. Hattori (1968), pp. 101–7, nn. 1.61, 62, 63, 64, and 67, who, following classical interpreters, sees Diṅnāga shifting back and forth between realist or representationalist (Sautrāntika) and idealist (Yogācāra) positions in this passage. As I read it, however, Diṅnāga is consistently ambiguous, if you will, throughout. See Iwata, who suggests

that Diṅnāga's epistemology may have been motivated by a concern to "lessen the discrepancy" between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra or to "provide a point of departure acceptable to both positions" (Iwata [1991], pp. 1–2), pointing out that Dharmakīrti in his PV provides proofs of the thesis that the result of perception is self-consciousness (*svasaṃvitti*) from both the Yogācara and Sautrāntika points of view.

87 PS 1.1.9cd, which states that "the cognition's having the form of the object should be considered the *pramāṇa*, for by that the object is known," is generally taken to reflect the Sautrāntika position, which is a kind of representationalism: external objects exist, but we are not aware of them directly but only *via* the forms they produce in consciousness. However, Diṅnāga seems to assimilate this view to the more idealist-sounding position of v. 10: that which appears in the cognition is the thing to be known (*prameya*), and the act of cognition in the end is just the act of self-consciousness: the cognition's knowing itself as grasping a certain object form. Thus, the object is potentially reduced to a mere form within consciousness.

88 The principle that means and end must be distinct, which was perhaps first enunciated by Bhavadāsa, was universally applied by realist philosophers against the Yogācāra theory of perception. See Hattori (1968), pp. 99–100, n. 1.57 for references to Brahmanical and Jaina sources. Even Mādhyamika philosophers appealed to this principle in their critique of the "consciousness-only" theory. See for example, *Madhyamakāvatara* 6.76 (Huntington [1989], p. 166); BCA 9.17.

89 PSV ad 1.1.8cd; Hattori (1968), p. 28.

90 PS 1.1.8cd': *savyāpārapratītitvāt pramāṇam*. . . . Cf. PV 3.307cd–308: insofar as the cognition bears the form of the object it appears as if possessed of the activity of comprehending the object (*arthādhigama*), though in reality it is not a *kāraka*, a causal factor. Cf. also Kumārila's conception of the functioning of the cognition as its arising, v. 56. The general notion that a means of action is that which possesses an intermediate function is stated by Bhartṛhari, VP(R) 3.7.90.

91 However, Hattori (1968) notes, p. 102, n. 1.61, that even the Sautrāntika should accept the theory that self-consciousness is the *phala*. Indeed, Kumārila's commentators consider the following verse to be directed against the Sautrāntika and only vv. 80ff. to be directed against the Yogācāra, and they characterize the Sautrāntika position as being that the object form (*viṣayākāra*) is the *pramāṇa* and self-consciousness (*svasaṃvitti*) the *phala*.

92 *Śūnyavāda* 184ff.

93 Śūnyavāda 64. Pārthasārathimiśra (ad loc.) mentions three ways in which a single thing might be both subject (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*): it could be both the action (*kriyā*) and the object of the action (*karman*), the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the object of the action, or the agent (*kartṛ*) and the object of the action. All three are impossible: the cooking or the cutting (the action) is not itself cooked or cut, and the tip of the finger, considered as either the instrument by which one touches something or the agent that does the touching, cannot itself be touched.

94 Generally, PS 1.1.10 is recognized as presenting the Yogācāra position. However, one should note that Diṅnāga himself introduces v. 10, after v. 9cd, which supposedly presents the Sautrāntika view, with the words, "The same idea is stated [in the following verse]." Thus, I have not distinguished v. 10 as presenting the Yogācāra position, even though that is how Kumārila's commentators view it.

95 I follow here the suggestion of Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī. One should note in this connection that the term *svasaṃvitti* 'self-consciousness' is not employed in PS 1.1.10, but only *saṃvitti* 'consciousness'.

96 Diṅnāga, at PS 1.1.6ab, identifies "desire, etc.," that is, according to his own commentary, "desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc.," as self-cognizing cognitions or acts of "self-consciousness" (*svasaṃvitti*), and designates them,

together with the mental awareness of objects apprehended by the senses, as "mental perception" (*mānasapratyakṣa*). It is Dharmakīrti, however, who argues vigorously (PV 3. 255–266) in favor of the view that pleasure, etc., are indeed mental states that apprehend themselves and not, say, properties of the self apprehended by a distinct faculty, namely, the mind (*manas*), as the realist philosophers believed (see, for example, NBh 3.1.17). Dharmakīrti's arguments are developed further by Śāntarakṣita at TS 1330–1341. Thus, while the Buddhist may calls desire, etc. "mental perception," there is, at least in the case of this kind of mental perception, no separate *faculty* of mind involved. (Matters are more complex when it comes to the other kind of mental perception, the mental awareness of objects.)

Although Kumārila rejects here the view that mental states such as pleasure are self-conscious, he does, interestingly, accept in the *Śūnyavāda-adhikaraṇa* that the *self* is able to cognize itself, that is, by means of a cognition that itself is a property of the self, the self is cognized. However, maintaining that the cognition by which the self is cognized and the self are neither completely identical nor completely distinct, Kumārila believes that this does not violate the principle of the distinction of subject and object. See *Śūnyavāda* 67cd–70.

97 Śāntarakṣita, TS 1331–1335, however, raises the following problem for the position that pleasure, etc., are apprehended by distinct cognitions and do not apprehend themselves. By what cognition is pleasure being perceived when it is continuously experienced simultaneously with an external object (for example, a piece of chocolate)? It cannot be being perceived by the cognition that cognizes *the object*, but neither can it be perceived by another mental cognition; for it is generally accepted by realist philosophers that two cognitions cannot arise at the same time. If one were to suggest that the pleasure is perceived by a mental cognition that follows upon it so closely that it seems simultaneous, then in effect the pleasure would be being remembered; it would not be experienced as vividly as it is. Moreover, adds Kamalaśīla, if pleasure or pain were something apprehended, then it would appear separate like any other object of perception, blue, and so forth. If the vividness of the cognition in the form of joy, etc., were just an illusion, then its existence would still be purely in the form of that joy, etc., which is a kind of self-awareness (this is my guess as to the meaning of 1335). Therefore, the only alternative left is that mental states such as pleasure cognize themselves.

98 PV 3.301–319 (cf. PV 2. 5b'–6c) more or less parallels Kumārila's discussion of the distinction of *pramāṇa* and *phala* in this and the preceding section of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. Dharmakīrti argues that it is the object-form that most directly makes a cognition specifically a cognition of a certain object; it is responsible for the cognition's being a comprehension of *this* particular thing. Thus, that is the *pramāṇa*, the most effective factor in the act of cognition. All other factors – the "mere seeing" (*ālocanā*) of the object, the sense faculty, the connection of sense faculty and object, and the cognition of the qualifying factor (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) – do not qualify as *pramāṇas* because they do not relate immediately to this final effect of object-comprehension (310). The sense faculty (in general), the "mere seeing," and the connection are also common to cognitions of different contents – the sense of vision, for example, is the cause of all visual cognitions. Thus, there is no specific correlation between them and cognitions of certain contents. Even if they were to differ for cognitions of different contents, no cognition would be of the particular object it reveals if it itself did not take on its form; thus taking on the form of the object should be considered preeminently the *pramāṇa* (312–313a), the "most effective" factor. As for the problem that the same thing cannot be both means and end in the same action (cf. PP 74), Dharmakīrti suggests that the distinction of means and end has to do, not with one

factor *bringing about* the other, but with one *defining* the other (315b'–315cd); as stated, it is the object-form that defines a cognition as *of* a particular object. In general, however, *any* relation we conceive to exist between things is not real but merely superimposed (319).

He presents further specific objections against considering the connection of sense faculty and object or the cognition of the qualified object (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) the *pramāṇa*. If the connection were the *pramāṇa*, there would be no restriction as to which properties of the object are cognized (316) – Kumārila considers and refutes this objection with PP 62–64. As for the cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* being the *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti points out that it will either have the form of its object, the qualifying feature, or not. If it does not, then it cannot be distinguished by means of its content from the cognition of the qualified object (*viśeṣyajñāna*), the result. However, if it does, then the latter cognition will have the form of its object too, that is, it will be a cognition of *that which is qualified by the qualifying feature*, and so have an altogether different content from the cognition of just the *viśeṣaṇa*; thus, *pramāṇa* and result would pertain to different objects (313b–314ab). This objection Kumārila refutes with v. 70. However, Kumārila does not seem to have an answer for Dharmakīrti's last argument against considering the *viśeṣaṇajñāna* the *pramāṇa*, namely: if both *viśeṣaṇa-* and *viṣeṣyajñāna* had the same object, they could not arise in succession, so that the one could not be considered as bringing about the other (314c–315b'). Cf. TS 1345ff. and also the helpful article by Bandhyopadhyay.

99 The contrast of "ordinary perception" versus "nonconceptualized" perception in these two verses may reflect the fact that Kumārila considers conceptualized perception or perceptual judgement to be the standard notion of perception. See v. 131 in Part 2.

100 MSBh, p. 22, ll. 19–20.

101 Diṅnāga proceeds in his discussion from the assertion that inference and the other *pramāṇas* besides perception are not mentioned in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* because they are "preceded by" perception; hence they are "similar" to it – presumably in that they too are not means of knowing Dharma. See Frauwallner (1968), p. 85, and above, nn. 7 and 8. Frauwallner suggests that this view may derive from the early commentator on the MS to whom Jinendrabuddhi refers as "the Bhāṣyakāra" (ibid., p. 102).

The idea that inference, at least, is dependent on perception is already enunciated at NS 1.1.5: *atha tat[=pratyakṣa]pūrvakaṃ trividham anumānam. . . .* Cf. CS, *Sūtrasthāna* 11.21–22; also PDhS, p. 476: *liṅgadarśanāt sañjāyamānaṃ laiṅgikam*, "Inferential [knowledge] is that which arises from the seeing of an inferential mark."

102 Cf. PSV 2.49ab. Diṅnāga (as I gather from Frauwallner's translation) points out that perception, which is nonconceptualized, has something that is "not common" (*asādhāraṇa*) as its object. Therefore, it cannot grasp a connection, which resides in more than one thing; but that is essential to inference.

103 Kumārila gives a rather unusual account of the means of knowledge comparison (*upamāna*), largely driven, it seems, by his criticisms of the Nyāya position. According to the latter, comparison is an instruction to the effect that something unknown is similar to something known – for example, "A wild cow is similar to a domestic cow" – which brings about an awareness, upon seeing the unknown thing (the wild cow), of what it is (see NBh 1.1.6). Kumārila criticizes this view on the grounds that the cognition that results from the employment of the comparative statement can be analyzed in terms of other types of cognitions. Thus, on the assumption that it is the similarity of the wild cow to the domestic cow that is apprehended (Kumārila rejects the standard Nyāya explanation that one apprehends the connection of the name with the thing named, *Upamāna* 12–13), one would cognize *that* either simply by means of testimony (*śabda*), that is, from the original statement, "A wild cow is similar . . .," or else by means of a memory of that statement (which does not qualify as a true *pramāṇa*),

or else by perception (*Upamāna* 8–16; Kumārila argues at length that similarity is a real object of perception, *Upamāna* 18–34). The only thing which, in an awareness of similarity, is not already accounted for by other *pramāṇas* or memory is the fact, which emerges upon *seeing* that a wild cow is similar to a domestic cow, that the *domestic cow* that one remembers is similar to the wild cow one sees! Although the similarity of the wild cow to the domestic cow is something one perceives, and the domestic cow itself is something one remembers, *the domestic cow qualified by similarity to the wild cow* is something apprehended neither by memory nor perception nor any other known *pramāṇa*. Hence, one must posit another, distinct *pramāṇa* that apprehends it – let that be *upamāṇa* (*Upamāna* 37–38). Cf. Jha (1978): the Prābhākaras had a similar account.

It seems that Jayanta was right to point out, among other problems, that this is a means of knowledge that has very little, if any, application (NM, pp. 392–4). See Bhatt (1962), pp. 304–8.

104 Kumārila argues at length in the *Arthāpattiparicchedа* chapter of his ŚV that *arthāpatti* is distinct from inference, *anumāna*, under which all other schools except Vedānta considered *arthāpatti* to fall. He is convincing. By *arthāpatti*, essentially, one postulates something unseen to explain observable (or otherwise established) facts. This is a kind of reasoning that is surely distinct from that which simply unpacks the content of stated premises. The American philosopher C. S. Peirce called it "abductive inference."

105 See *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 29ab, also *Arthāpatti* 5. Kumārila offers various other examples: the capacity of fire to burn and of the sun to move are known by *arthāpatti*. He classifies different types of *arthāpatti* according to the means of knowledge by which the established facts are known. Thus, in the case of the capacity of fire to burn, the fact of burning from which that capacity is postulated is known by perception; in the case of the capacity of the sun to move, the fact of the sun's moving is known by inference (*Arthāpatti* 4).

106 At PSV 2.5 Diṅnāga notes that the presence of the *liṅga* (inferential mark) in the *pakṣa* (subject of inference) can be known either by perception or inference

107 Kumārila, *Autpattikasūtra* 11ab, seems to see this notion as implicit in MS 1.1.5, which states that the natural connection of word and meaning (that is, language), *in regard to an object that has not been previously ascertained* (*anupalabdhe 'rthe*), is the means of knowing Dharma. Thus, throughout the ŚV Kumārila assumes that memory is not a *pramāṇa*, nor any statement that repeats another statement (*anuvāda*). See Pārthasārathi's discussion of MS 1.1.5, ŚD, pp. 70–1, which concludes, "Thus, the definition of a *pramāṇa* has been shown by the author of the *sūtras* . . . [namely]: a *pramāṇa* is a cognition that is without any defect in its cause or other cognition that refutes it and that grasps something that has not been grasped before (*kāraṇadoṣabādhajñānarahitam agṛhītagrāhijñānaṃ pramāṇam*)." This, in fact, agrees with a verse from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* quoted by other authors (see Krasser [2001], p. 194): "A definite cognition of a previously unknown object, which is not refuted and which is produced by a non-defective cause, is generally believed to be a *pramāṇa*." Diṅnāga seems to accept this criterion, too. Thus, PSV 1.1.3b: "Such mental faculties as recollection, desire, anger, etc., since they operate on an object once cognized, are not independent means of valid cognition" (Hattori [1968], p. 25; this is the basis for rejecting "recognition" [*pratyabhijñā*] as a *pramāṇa*). Dharmakīrti also accepted it; see n. 8 earlier.

108 The thesis that the other *pramāṇas* are dependent on perception resembles the thesis of empiricism in Western philosophy that all knowledge is derived from the senses. However, the latter is made in the context of the debate about whether there is any *a priori* or innate knowledge, a proposition not considered in Indian philosophy. In general, it is safe to say that all Indian philosophers were empiricists, according to the usual understanding of that term.

109 Here we find Kumārila possibly referring to the views of other expositors of the *Śābarabhāṣya*. I have followed the classical commentators in interpreting this puzzling verse.

110 As a result of which, according to Kumārila's analysis, one becomes aware that the *remembered* object is similar to the object at hand, this latter awareness being the result of the *pramāṇa* comparison. See note 103.

111 See NBh 3.2.67. Karma accounts for the "nonrestriction," that is, distinction and difference, of bodies in terms of high or low birth, health or sickness, happiness or suffering, etc. Cf. BSBh 2.1.34, AK 4.1a.

112 Kumārila seems to be alluding to the ancient cosmological theory that there is no identifiable cause that can account for why things are the way they are – not God (*īśvara*), nor *prakṛti* (the prime matter of the Sāṃkhyas), nor fate, nor the elements. Rather, things occur in the way they do, arising at certain places and times and yielding in turn certain effects, simply because that is their nature, *svabhāva*. In the end this view represents the rejection of all attempts at meaningful causal explanation; it is sometimes summarized by the statement that all things are "independent" (*nirapekṣa*) and "without cause" (*ahetuka*). Historically, it is associated with the Cārvāka school; see Kaviraj (1990). Although Kumārila does not embrace the view that there are no valid causal explanations, he does seem to acknowledge here that at least in the case of actions and their effects the most one can say is, simply, that an action has a certain effect because that is the effect it has – that is its potency (*śakti*). No other factor need be introduced. Cf. also the naturalistic explanation of the origin and diversity of bodies at NS 3.2.61–67.

113 My translation is tentative. Most editions read 110b as *nānumā nopameṣyate*. According to this reading, the first half of the verse is saying that just as *arthāpatti* cannot provide specific knowledge of Dharma, neither can inference nor comparison. That is how Umbeka interprets it. Pārthasārathi, apparently reading the verse the same way as Umbeka, interprets it to mean only that inference, like supposition, cannot provide specific knowledge of Dharma; comparison, he says, is mentioned just as an example. Sucarita proposes the interpretation I have followed, apparently reading 110b as *nānomānopameṣyate*. However, he notes the other reading as well.

2 "THE DETERMINATION OF PERCEPTION" (*PRATYAKṢAPARICCHEDA*): TEXT AND COMMENTARY, PART 2

1 PS 1.1.3c: *kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣam*, also stated in his *Nyāyamukha*. Diṅnāga elaborates at PS 1.1.5: "A thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense. The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible" (Hattori [1968], p. 27). He develops his view somewhat more at PS 1.6.7cd–8ab in rejecting the Mīmāṃsā theory that perception gives rise to a *niścaya*, an ascertainment, in the form of "This is a cow," "This is a horse," etc. "One cognizes an object as a cow or the like when it is associated with cowness and other such [qualifiers]. [But] sense-cognition has no ability to bring about the association [of the qualifier] with the [perceived] thing" (Hattori [1968], p. 67); see also the *Vṛtti* ad loc. He also discusses the problem in relation to the Vaiśeṣika definition of perception, PS 1.4.1ab (Hattori [1968], pp. 43–4; pp. 138–9, n. 4.17).

2 Umbeka suggests that the expression 'that assists the form of the object' serves to exclude error and memory, which are also types of conceptual awareness. In fact, Kumārila will explain later at some length (i.e., at PP 237cd–246ab) how a conceptualized perception can be said to "assist" its object. In essence, it enables one to cognize it more distinctly.

3 Bhartṛhari is notoriously difficult. However, the leading argument that may be gleaned from the discussion extending from VP(R) 1.129 to 142 (for the *Vṛtti*, see VP[I] 1.113–121) may perhaps be paraphrased as follows. All purposive action surely depends on awareness informed by language; the ability of consciousness to discriminate (*vi√mṛś*, *prati ava √mṛś*) things is best explained by its being shaped in some way by words. Yet we see children behaving purposively. They know how to move their bodies, even articulate the organs of speech to imitate the sounds made by their parents; they are able to play together with other children, etc.; and they are able to do these things even before they have learned how to talk. Therefore, it would appear that consciousness *as such* is informed by language. Even before learning to talk children possess a subtle awareness of language based on the use of language from previous existences. Although we may indeed have certain sensations that are not linguistically articulated, precisely for that reason they are not pronounced enough for us to make use of them; they cannot serve to reveal objects to us. The power of consciousness to reveal things depends on the capacity to *discern*, and that, it would seem, requires some means for *determining* its object, viz., language. A living creature cannot even be considered sentient if it does not have the power to act, which is grounded on intention, which consists in a consciousness that "has the form or essence of speech" (*vāgrūpa*; VP[R] 1.132–135). See Houben (1995), pp. 75–7. As Maṇḍanamiśra, who shared Bhartṛhari's viewpoint, puts it, "The fact that consciousness is consciousness depends on the form of speech" (*vāgrūpādhīnam eva citaś cititvam*, BS, p. 19, l. 10; see Thrasher [1993], p. 94).

As mentioned in the Introduction, this idea has also taken hold of certain Western thinkers, especially in the twentieth century. One particularly vivid expression of it is contained in the following passage from Merlau-Ponty:

> If speech presupposed thought [i.e., some kind of prelinguistic consciousness], if talking were primarily a matter of meeting the object through a cognitive intention or through a representation, we could not understand why thought tends toward expression as towards its completion, why the most familiar thing appears indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name, why the thinking subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not formulated them for himself, or even spoken and written them, as is shown by the example of so many writers who begin a book without knowing exactly what they are going to put into it. A thought limited to existing for itself, independently of the constraints of speech and communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink into the unconscious, which means that it would cease to exist even for itself.
>
> (Merlau-Ponty [1962], p. 206)

Bhartṛhari also makes the point that language has the power to bring things into existence. When someone is waving a firebrand in the air and words are uttered such as, "Look! A circle of fire!," then, Behold! A circle of fire appears (VP[R] 1.142). Thus it would seem that language serves to constitute objects for us and is therefore essential to consciousness.

Later critics and defenders of the Grammarian position give rather different accounts of it. Vācaspatimiśra sees the Grammarian as holding that cognition is always informed by language because we are always aware of things as *identical* with words! That is to say, not only are all objects associated with words, they are identified with them; for in naming things, we say "That is 'cow'," "That is 'horse'," and so on. The occurrence of the term for the object and the term for the word (i.e., the word used to refer to itself) in grammatical coordination reflects an experience of the identity of word and object. Maṇḍana, in fact, makes a similar point. When we express

knowledge of something from inference, the inferential mark is not put in grammatical coordination with the object known; for example, we say that we know of the presence of fire "from smoke." When an object is comprehended from a word, on the other hand, the word is put in grammatical coordination with the object. Thus it would seem that the object is experienced *as having the form of the word*. See BS, p. 18, ll. 4–10. Vācaspati also points out in his presentation of the Grammarian position that there is a "diminishing" of the cognition when the word is taken away and an "enhancing" of it when it is added, and one presumes that this is because the *object* of the cognition is reduced or enhanced by the addition or omission of the word. Hence, it would appear that the object *is* the word. (Cf. BS, p. 19, ll. 5–10.) Thus, any awareness of objects, insofar as it is true, will be linguistic in nature. See NVTṬ, pp. 108, l. 28–109, l. 21.

Maṇḍanamiśra's commitment to the position that all awareness is linguistic in nature stems from his acceptance of the identification of Brahman with the Word in the Upaniṣads, where there are various references to Brahman as *akṣara*, "the syllable," "Om," etc. His attempt to show that the cognition of things is inextricably bound up with language, therefore, serves to support the thesis that everything is Brahman. In essence, if everything is Brahman, and Brahman is the word, then everything must be of the nature of language (BS, pp. 16, l. 23–19, l. 13). The view that Brahman, *qua* the Word, transforms itself into the things of the world (= meanings) is already articulated in the *Vṛtti* to the opening verses of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP 1.1 introduces Brahman as *akṣara*, which, however, may simply mean 'imperishable'). Jayanta in his presentation of the Śabda Advaita position, NM, vol. 2, pp. 477–8, also clarifies that the thesis that all cognition is informed by language subserves the idea that all is just Brahman, which is the Word. The idea that things cannot be cognized except through words easily leads, by his analysis, to the notion that a thing – a meaning – is really just the illusory appearance (*vivarta*) of a word.

4 Diṅnāga, too, says that perception is "the mere seeing of the object" (*viṣayālocanamātra*, PSV 1.4.1ab). Praśastapāda also used the expression *svarūpālocanamātra* 'a mere seeing of the thing itself' to refer to the first stage of nonconceptualized perception(see Intro., n. 36). The Vaiśeṣika philosopher Śrīdhara, who was well acquainted with Kumārila's thought, describes a nonconceptualized perception thus: "It grasps both universal and difference, but it does not cognize that 'this is the universal and this is the difference,' because it does not relate the object to other things" (NKand, p. 446, ll. 11–13). Similarly, Pārthasārathimiśra, ŚD, p. 59: "Some think that all cognition is conceptualized, none is nonconceptualized. But that is contradicted by experience. For we perceive that immediately upon contact of the sense faculty there is a cognition of mere seeing (*ālocanajñāna*), which has an indistinct thing (*saṃmugdhavastumātra*) as it object and which does not distinguish universal and difference." Cf. also the Nyāya philosopher Vācaspatimiśra, explaining the term *avyapadeśya* 'inexpressible' in the NS 1.1.4 definition of perception: "A cognition in which there is not something to be designated is *avyapadeśya*; it comprehends the genus, etc., themselves but does not comprehend the relation of genus, etc., with each other as qualifier and thing qualified" (NVTṬ, p. 108, ll. 27f.).

It is possible that Kumārila is building here on the notion of "non-apprehension" (*anadhyavasāya*), one of the four types of cognitive states that according to Praśastapāda do not count as knowledge (i.e., it is a kind of *avidyā*). The other three cognitions that fall into this category in Praśastapāda's scheme are doubt, error, and dream. He writes, "Non-apprehension, pertaining to an object of perception or inference, also arises [as a kind of non-knowledge]. Pertaining to an object of perception, in regard to familiar or unfamiliar things, there is a non-apprehension that is a mere seeing (*ālocanamātra*) in the form of 'What may this be?' because one is either distracted or desirous of it (?*arthitvāt*). Thus, a Bāhīka has a non-apprehension

of a jackfruit tree, and there arises for him in regard to it a distinct cognition [which becomes progressively more distinct] depending on an awareness of being, substancehood, earthness, treeness, possession of color, etc., and branches, etc. Even its being a jackfruit tree, which is common to other jackfruit trees but distinct from mango trees, is perceptible; however, due to the absence of instruction [by someone who knows its name] the cognition of the name of the distinct type (*viśeṣa*) does not arise" (PDhS, pp. 434–5). Bhāsarvajña, however, simply relegates *anadhyavasāya* to the category of doubt, NBhūṣ, p. 23.

The Viśiṣṭa Advaita philosopher Rāmānuja emphasizes the manifestation of the distinctness of the object in nonconceptualized perception, in order to underline the point that nonconceptualized perception cannot establish the existence of undifferentiated Being, which the Advaitin holds is the reality of everything. Both conceptualized and nonconceptualized perceptions apprehend a determinate thing, that is, something characterized by certain features; "for every cognition arises by means of some qualification, in the form 'This is thus', since it is impossible for anything to be apprehended without some specific configuration such as a triangular dewlap [in the case of cows]." However, one has a nonconceptualized perception when one encounters the first individual among substances of the same type and a conceptualized perception when one subsequently encounters other individuals of that type. The genus of the first individual is not evident *qua* common to other individuals of its type in the same way as it is for later individuals (Śrī Bh, pp. 50, l. 10–51, l. 13). Thus far, Rāmānuja seems to agree with Kumārila. He goes farther than Kumārila, however, in emphasizing that in nonconceptualized perception the object is manifest *as distinct* from other things. "At first the object is cognized as excluded from everything else (*sakaletaravyāvṛtta*), and this exclusion is due to its being perceived as qualified by the particular configuration of cowness, insofar as one recognizes 'This is thus' " (Śrī Bh, p. 52, ll. 3–5). This tendency is also evident in Rāmānuja's predecessor, Yāmuna; see Mesquita (1990), p. 132. We shall see that Kumārila, by contrast, maintains that in non-conceptualized perception *both* the difference and commonness of the object are manifest, without being manifest *as such*. See Mesquita (1990), p. 132, 134–50.

5 As I have indicated, this does not mean that the object of nonconceptualized perception is the bare particular devoid of all properties. The Mīmāṃsaka wants to distinguish his position from that of the Buddhist, who holds that perception apprehends just the particular. Thus, Pārthasārathimiśra, ŚD, p. 65, ll. 5ff.: "Others [i.e., the Buddhists] hold that nonconceptualized cognition has the particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object. That, too, is refuted by experience. For there is perceived at first a thing whose form is indistinct, which is later conceived by a conceptualized cognition in a five-fold way, according to genus, substance, quality, action, or name. . . . A nonconceptualized cognition apprehends the thing of multiple aspects indistinctly (*saṃmugdham*), while the conceptualized cognition has as its object one aspect which it has distinguished from the others." Cf. NM, pp. 253, l. 6–254, l. 4.

6 Kumārila, who otherwise shows a deep knowledge of Bhartṛhari, here ignores the fact that Bhartṛhari, at least, considered even newborn children to have an awareness of words based on past impressions, that is, impressions from previous lives. Perhaps he intends simply to contradict him. In any case, at VP(R) 1.129 Bhartṛhari says, "Every way of doing things in the world is based on words. Even a child, endowed with impressions deposited by previous births, has such knowledge." That is, even children know how to smile, cry, and suck the breast due to an incipient awareness of language based on impressions left behind by previous experience. (See TS 1215. The examples are from Kamalaśīla ad loc. Bhartṛhari himself refers to how children are able to control the breath and articulate the organs of speech to make sounds, VP[R] 1.130. See also BS, p. 18, ll. 13–17, which Thrasher, however, wants to interpret

as implying that Maṇḍana believed that *nonconceptualized* awareness is also verbal [pp. 87ff.]!) In general, all intentional activity presupposes conceptual awareness, which for Bhartṛhari had to be linguistic in nature (VP[R] 1.135). Thus, he may have thought that even animals possess linguistic awareness, insofar as they appear to undertake actions (see VP[R] 1.134: the consciousness, both internal and external, of "transmigrating beings" consists in its having the form of speech [*vāgrūpatā*; pronominal reference carried over from 1.132]; also VP[R] 2.117, 146cd–149. See also Kāś. ad PP 113, where Sucarita argues, *contra* the Grammarian, that *nonconceptualized* cognitions may well serve as the basis of action: we spontaneously move away from fire, for example, as soon as we feel burning).

On the other hand, the author of the *Vṛtti* to 1.132 (=VP[I] 1.115), who may have been Bhartṛhari himself, also appears to concede the possibility of nonconceptual, nonlinguistic cognitions that do *not* serve as the basis of action: "Just as when the habitual exercise of words (*śabdabhāvanā*) is contracted or restricted, similarly, even if a nonconceptualized cognition were to arise in regard to the objects to be known, no action is accomplished by it"; and he cites the sensations that arise as one's feet brush against clods of dirt and blades of grass. Still, the same writer (i.e., the Vṛttikāra) maintains, "even the consciousness that initially arises in regard to external objects reveals just the thing itself (*vastusvarūpamātra*), without apprehending its various features, by means of a [subtle] mental function such as 'This is that' " (VP[I]*Vṛtti* 1.116) – which he presumably takes to be conceptual and linguistic. Thus, it would seem the Grammarian explicitly rejects an initial nonconceptualized perception. (cf., however, Thrasher's discussion of VP[I]*Vṛtti* 1.115, pp. 91–3). In sum, any cognition that can function as a *pramāṇa* and give rise to action is for the Grammarian necessarily conceptual and linguistic. Sensations of blades of grass and the like, on the other hand, may have been considered nonconceptual, but they hardly count as proper cognitions – for the most part, they are not even noticed. (Cf., however, the discussion of Abhinavagupta, ĪPV, pp. 119–20, where he argues that even actions done very rapidly, such as running, reading, and reciting, must also involve a subtle aspect of "reflection," *vimarśa*.) See also in this connection the discussion in Houben (1995), pp. 277–82, of whether the "purity of cognition, which is without any form whatsoever" (*jñānasya* ... *śuddhim* ... *arūpikām*), which Bhartṛhari mentions in VP(R) 3.3.56–57, might be a state of consciousness devoid of linguistic representations.

It seems that Indian philosophers were much of the time talking past each other in the debate over nonconceptualized perception. Some insist that it is self-evident, others that it is not self-evident; some that it is evidenced by the initial awareness of an object as "this," others that it is *refuted* by that awareness, which would appear to be linguistic; some that it can serve as the basis of action, others that it cannot, and so on. At one point in his discussion of perception Jayantabhaṭṭa despairs, "Even in regard to a matter of direct perception there are these differences of opinion! A difference of opinion about something that is not evident to the senses is put to rest by means of perception. But how will a difference of opinion about that which is perceptible end? When there are differences of experience, 'It is manifest,' 'It is not manifest,' then in trying to convince others people resort to the utterance of curses!" (NM, p. 252).

7 See also ŚD, p. 59. This was a widely employed argument for the occurrence of an initial nonconceptualized perception; see, for example, Vyom., p. 557, ll. 26–29; NKand., p. 446, ll. 7–10; NVTṬ, p. 111, ll. 16–22. Further arguments against Bhartṛhari's thesis are developed by various Brahmanical and Jaina authors. See, in particular, Vācaspatimiśra's sophisticated discussion, NVTṬ, pp. 221, l. 24–224, l. 6. Another frequently employed argument is that if words were always associated with the things we experience, then one would never have to learn linguistic conventions. A particularly intense, sustained refutation of the Grammarian position is presented by the Jaina

philosopher Prabhācandra, PKM, pp. 39, l. 1–43, l. 11. The property of being permeated by language is not evident in cognitions, he asserts. What would it mean to say that they are like that? Perhaps that they are *perceived* as such? However, the senses cannot apprehend cognitions; rather, they apprehend sensible objects like color, etc. Perhaps the *object* that appears in a cognition is permeated by language. Again, what would that mean – that a word appears in the same location as the object? But obviously, the object is present before us in the absence of the word. Could it mean, then, that the object presents itself *as identical* with the word? However, in a visual cognition, say, the object and the word would be grasped by different senses (sight and hearing), and things grasped by different senses cannot be identical; and so forth. Nor is it possible for the permeation of cognition by language to be established by inference.

Prabhācandra's own position is that all cognition that counts as a *pramāṇa* is determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*, *niścayātmaka*), but not linguistic. A conceptual awareness, he says, is not necessarily an awareness associated with a name; being the basis of a name (*nāmsaṃśrayatā*) is not the nature of all conceptual awareness (p. 32, ll. 19–21). He also argues at length against the suggestion that a conceptualized perception is preceded by a nonconceptualized cognition that arises immediately upon the contact of sense faculty and object (pp. 27, l. 19–36, l. 12). Thus, for him, every cognition that is a *pramāṇa* is conceptualized; for the essence of a *pramāṇa* is that it determines how things are. However, conceptualized does not mean structured by language.

Although the Grammarian position was rejected by most other Indian schools, it was skillfully defended in the eleventh century by the great philosopher of Kashmir Śaivism Abhinavagupta. See his discussions of *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* 1.5.19 in both his ĪPV and ĪPVV; the latter is treated by Matilal (1990), Chap. 12.

8 In the *Tarkakāṇḍa* of his *Brahmasiddhi* Maṇḍanamiśra states that everything is cognized as the same, as "mere being" (*sanmātrarūpe sarvatra pratīyamāṇe* . . . , p. 58, ll. 20–21). This "undivided form" (*abhinnarūpa*) is recognized in every object; there is a cognition of "the same object" as a result of an initial nonconceptualized cognition (p. 59, ll. 11–12). In another passage he says that each thing is "penetrated by non-difference" (*abhedānuviddha*). Although the moon appears broken up by many waves, we still see the moon in each wave; similarly, each individual thing in the world is identified in the same way, as "this," "that," "an object" (*artha*), or "a thing" (*vastu*) (p. 72, *kā*.31 together with the *vārttika*). *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 71, ll. 1–2, is quite close to PP 114–115: "First a nonconceptualized perception has the mere thing (*vastumātra*) as its object; the conceptual cognitions that follow comprehend differences." Thrasher (1993), pp. 78–80, has suggested that Maṇḍana's references to the "mere thing" or "mere object" can be taken as references to mere Being. Since Maṇḍana came after Kumārila – for he quotes Kumārila in various places, and indeed much of the *Tarkakāṇḍa* is specifically directed against Kumārila's theory of nonconceptualized perception – we must assume that Kumārila is attacking an earlier representative of the same doctrine. That may have been Bhartṛhari, even though he is also associated with the view just criticized, that all cognition is conceptualized.

At VP(R) 3.1.32ff. Bhartṛhari expounds the theory that it is the universal Being (*sattā*) that is the ultimate designation of all words, hence, presumably, the ultimate object of experience: "The real and the unreal being residing in each entity – of those, the real is considered the universal, the unreal the particulars. Being, which is divided into [classes of things such as] cows, etc., because of the differences of things associated with it, is called the universal. All words are based on it" (3.1.32–33). Moreover, in his discussion of the view that it is the particular, that is, the substance (*dravya*), that is the meaning of a word, he characterizes substance as "self, thing, essence, body, reality" (3.2.1). Thus, substance for him is that stuff that appears in many forms, indeed, the same reality that is called the universal by those who hold that the

meaning of a word is the universal! "The true thing (*satyaṃ vastu*) is ascertained by means of those untrue forms. The true or real alone is designated by words, possessed of false limiting adjuncts (*asatyopādhibhiḥ*)... just as undifferentiated gold, etc., differentiated [as it were] by perishable forms, becomes the designation of expressions such as 'bracelet', etc." (3.2.2, 4; see Bronkhorst [1991]). In different ways, then, Bhartṛhari conceives Being to be the ultimate object of experience and referent of all language. Contrary to the position Kumārila attacks here, however, he does not maintain that it is apprehended initially in a *nonconceptualized perception*, as Maṇḍana does. Once again, Bhartṛhari appears to hold that all cognition, except that which is useless for knowledge and action, is conceptualized.

The Advaita theory that there is an initial, nonconceptualized perception of mere Being or Being as such is probably to be distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika teaching that the senses apprehend existence or reality (*bhāva*, *sattā*), which Kumārila takes up later, vv. 157ff. The existence with which Vaiśeṣika is concerned is that which accounts for our considering substances, qualities, and motions as "real" or "existing," as VS 1.2.7 states. There is no suggestion that it is presented as an "undivided form," which is recognized in every object.

Another depiction of the Advaita position regarding perception is found in Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*, pp. 35, l. 6–36, l. 2; Rāmānuja refutes it, ŚrīBh, pp. 50, l. 10–55, l. 6. See also the discussion of Pārthasārathimiśra, ŚD, pp. 59–65.

9 Cf. here the discussion of Śāntarakṣita, TS 1270–1272, where he argues – in response to the view of the Jaina philosopher Sumati and in harmony with Kumārila, according to Kamalaśīla – that a distinct individual is apprehended in nonconceptualized perception.

10 Maṇḍanamiśra attacks the notion that one is aware of a distinct individual in nonconceptualized perception, which one is, however, unable to notice or articulate as distinct, at BS, pp. 70, l. 23–71, l. 7. *Kā*. 27 states: "The mere thing (*vastumātra*) is cognized by the cognition that arises initially. That a difference of which we are unaware also presents itself is quite ridiculous." At the beginning of the *Tarkakāṇḍa* Maṇḍana argues that perception only affirms what *is*; it does not express any negation, for example, that its object *is not* something else. Thus, it cannot present difference. For a helpful synopsis of the philosophy of the *Brahmasiddhi* see R. Balasubramaniam, esp. Chap. 4.

11 Umbeka honestly admits that he does not understand the second half of the verse, beginning with *lakṣaṇākhyeyam* (p. 150, ll. 12–13). Pārthasārathi and Sucarita offer rather unconvincing interpretations, based on reading *lakṣaṇākhyeyam* as *lakṣaṇa-ākhyā iyam*, "This is the statement of a definition." Kumārila has previously used the same root, √*lakṣ*, in v. 43b in the sense of 'to know indirectly'. Specifically, the expression *kāryalakṣita* 'indicated by its effect' in that verse has the sense of 'posited on the basis of its effect', that is, known by *arthāpatti*, supposition. The well-known Bhāṭṭa position that the meaning of a sentence is comprehended by *lakṣaṇā* (see Kunjunni Raja, pp. 210–11) is to be understood as the idea that the sentence meaning is known only indirectly, insofar as the individual words in the first instance indicate their "own meanings" (*svārtha*), which are universals, which in turn evoke a cognition of a specific state of affairs. See NRM, p. 125, ll. 8–21.

12 This view is directly challenged by Maṇḍana, with specific reference to Kumārila, at BS, pp. 63ff. See esp. pp. 66–7, where Maṇḍana poses a dilemma. If a real thing (*vastu*) is both universal and particular in nature, then either due to the particular nature it will fail to have anything in common with anything else, in which case there would only be difference, or different things; or else, due to its universal aspect, it will be identical with everything else, in which case there is only nondifference or one thing.

As mentioned above, n. 4, Rāmānuja builds on Kumārila in his refutation of Advaita in his *Śrībhāṣya*, which appears to be specifically directed against the tradition of Maṇḍana. There is never a cognition of an undifferentiated entity, he maintains, not even in nonconceptualized perception. Even then, one cognizes the object as having a character distinct from other things. Rāmānuja appears to go further than Kumārila in holding that this differentiation is explicit and distinct in nonconceptualized perception.

13 Kumārila seems here to be offering an account of conceptualized perception in terms of an awareness of the sameness and difference of an object from other objects, or we could say, in terms of its species and differentia. However, he does not go on to develop this idea, and in the ensuing discussion of conceptualized perception he relies on established views of conceptualized perception as involving either the association of a word with the object or the apprehension of the object as possessing certain properties or "qualified" by determinate features, or both.

14 See PS 1.1.3d and the *Vṛtti* thereon. Hattori (1968) translates,

> What, then, is this conceptual construction?
> k. 3d. The association of a name, genus, etc., [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing].

Exactly what Diṅnāga means here is, as usual, not very transparent. One way of interpreting him is as saying that *kalpanā* is the association of *either* a name *or* a genus, a quality, an action, or another substance with the object. These two alternatives, the second consisting of four possibilities, probably represent the two main theories as to the nature of conceptual construction in Diṅnāga's day. The former views *kalpanā* as just the association of a name or verbal expression with the object; this was probably Diṅnāga's own position. The latter considers *kalpanā* as the (mental) joining of a genus, etc., with the object. Since this seems to presuppose the reality of the qualifiers that are joined, and since Buddhists rejected the reality of universals, etc., this probably was the position of certain non-Buddhists (but cf. Franco [1984]; Franco speculates that they were actually Buddhists). Thus, in alluding to both of these positions, Diṅnāga is referring to both correct and incorrect understandings of *kalpanā*. This is one interpretation of the verse put forward by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and further developed by his commentator Kamalaśīla (TS 1220; see Funayama [1992], pp. 70–3; see also NBhūṣ, p. 176, ll. 15–19). Diṅnāga's main point would seem to be that perception is free from *kalpanā* in either sense.

Another interpretation of this quarter-verse, which is also considered by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, is that *kalpanā* is just "the joining of a name [with the perceived object] *by means of* a genus, etc." (*nāmajātyādiyojanā=nāmnaḥ jātyādibhiḥ yojanā*; TS 1223–1224). The idea of this proposal seems to be that *kalpanā* is just the joining of a name with the object *insofar as it is considered – presumably, erroneously – as qualified by a genus, etc.*; it is *not* the joining of the genus, and so forth, themselves, which do not really exist. (Cf., however, Franco [1984], pp. 395–7.) In the end, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla stress that, however one looks at the matter, *kalpanā* must somehow involve the joining of a name with the perceived object (TS 1229ff.).

At first sight Dharmakīrti appears to define *kalpanā* more precisely than Diṅnāga, as "a cognition that has a representation capable of being combined with a verbal expression" (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ*, NB 1; PVin, p. 40, l. 8). This seems to emphasize the linguistic nature of the awareness, for reference to the other categories of genus, etc., is left out. It was noted, however, by his commentator Dharmottara that since this only says that the representation is potentially, not actually, combined with a verbal expression, it allows for the possibility that an infant *without*

command of language could also experience *kalpanā* (NBṬ, pp. 10, l. 21–11, l. 8; cf. NBhūṣ, p. 176, ll. 22–24). Śāntarakṣita also believes that newborn children can have *kalpanā* – due to the presence of impressions of language use from previous births (TS 1214–1215). That, however, may not be exactly what Dharmakīrti has in mind. He could, rather, be thinking of a cognition that is determinate but not yet linguistic at all; rather, it has a structure that *lends itself* to verbal articulation – this indeed seems to be the trend of Dharmottara's discussion. This possibility is to an extent supported by Dharmakīrti's treatment of conceptualized perception in both the PVin and PV. He first argues against the validity of a conceptual awareness *qua* cognition that associates a word with the perceived object – primarily on the grounds that it misrepresents its object, since words are not features of objects at all. Then, however, he moves on to consider the view that conceptualized perception consists just in the (mental) joining of a particular qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), which presumably could be either a universal, a quality, an action, or another substance, with the object, and rejects that as well. Here, there is no mention of any role for language (see PVin, p. 44, ll. 1–15; PV 3.145–173; his commentators, however, say that he rejects this proposal on the grounds that it is *impossible*). One must note, in any case, that the locution 'a cognition that has a representation *capable* of being combined with a verbal expression' does appear to leave room for the possibility that *kalpanā* could be the identification of the object as having a certain nature or as belonging to a certain type before language comes into play at all – even on the basis of impressions from previous births. (Note also, though, that this locution in the PVin glosses a less ambiguous statement, that "conceptual construction is a cognition joined with an expression," *abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā*, p. 40.) Although Dharmakīrti, like Śāntarakṣita and probably also Diṅnāga, may have favored the view that *kalpanā* requires some explicit or subtle application of language, in the end it doesn't matter. Conceptual construction, however one considers it, has nothing to do with perception.

However, non-Buddhist philosophers were more inclined to consider conceptual awareness a *viśiṣṭa*-(or *viśeṣya*-) *jñāna*, the cognition of an object qualified by qualifiers of any of the various categories genus, etc. Bhāsarvajña, for example, takes the result of a conceptualized perception to be a cognition that arises either "by indication of a connection [of the object] with just a name" (*jñānaṃ kevalasaṃjñāsambandhollekhena utpadyate*), for example, the cognition "Devadatta," or one that arises "by indication of a connection with a qualifier" (*viśeṣaṇasambandhollekhena* . . .), that is, a genus, quality, action, or another substance – for example, "A man armed with a stick." He defends at length the view that the intentional object (*ālambana*) of the latter type of cognition is just the thing qualified (*viśeṣya*), not both the qualifier and the thing qualified. See NBhūṣ, p. 173, ll. 10–14. (This view may originally have been put forward by "the Ācāryas" whom Jayanta cites in his *Nyāyamañjarī*; see NM, pp. 218, l. 11–219, l. 18.) Śrīdhara also discusses the idea that *kalpanā* is a cognition "that apprehends a qualified object, having the nature of the joining of a category" (*arthasaṃyojanātmikā viśiṣṭagrāhiṇī*) at NKand, pp. 457, l. 10–459, l. 9, alongside the view that it is a "cognition consisting in the joining of a word" (*śabdasaṃyojanātmikā pratītiḥ*). He holds that neither is really *kalpanā* in the Buddhist sense, that is, a completely imaginary, false construal of the object. Perhaps the most penetrating discussion of conceptual awareness as a *viśiṣṭajñāna* is Vācaspatimiśra's in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*. In essence, he shows, in his critique of the Buddhist rejection of conceptualized perception, that the association of a word with the object is due to perceiving the object as (really) endowed with a certain property, which in turn evokes a memory of the word for that property. This in effect combines both proposals regarding the nature of conceptual awareness (cf. TS 1229ff., which also considers the combination of both theories);

it seems to be the assumption in the background of most Brahmanical discussions of conceptualized perception. See NVTṬ, pp. 115, l. 2–121, l. 18, esp. p. 117, ll. 19–21.; also p. 108, ll. 22–28. An early indication, but by no means explicit statement, of the view that one cognizes a "qualified object" in conceptualized perception is found in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśastapāda. See Part 1, n. 81. In fact, this idea may go all the way back to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS 8.6–7). That Diṅnāga was aware of it as an established Brahmanical position is evident from his criticism of it in relation to the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā definitions of perception (see Hattori [1968], pp. 39–41, 129–30, n. 3.41 [re. Nyāya]; pp. 43–51, 138–9, n. 4.17 [re. Vaiśeṣika]; pp. 67, 168–9, nn. 6.31–33 [re. Mīmāṃsā]). In his discussion of the Mīmāṃsā proposal he cites Bhavadāsa.

It is interesting that Kumārila does not clarify for us exactly how *he* conceives of conceptual awareness. In vv. 121–123 he may be thinking of it primarily as a kind of linguistic awareness, which requires an act of memory, presumably in order to recall a linguistic convention; but in vv. 140–168 he is considering problems associated with the view that it involves predicating properties of a substance. Then, in vv. 169ff. he is clearly thinking of it as a verbal identification of the object, for he is trying to refute the objection that it falsely *superimposes* a word upon the object. There is no reason, however, why Kumārila might not have thought that both theories were compatible. The model for thinking that they are is provided, as mentioned, by Vācaspati (even though Vācaspati came two or three centuries after Kumārila). The associating of a certain word with an object, for example 'cow', should not be seen as *attributing* the word 'cow' to the object as one of its properties, but rather as *employing* the word to express a judgement that the object is endowed with a certain property, namely, the genus cowness. Since, as other Naiyāyikas emphasized, the object in such a cognition does not appear as qualified or delimited *by the word* (cf. NM, pp. 210–220 *passim* – this was the view of the Ācāryas), the word serving merely to illumine the object or distinguish it from others (cf. NM, p. 246, ll. 6–8; NBhūṣ, p. 175, ll. 2–7), there is no real danger of the word being superimposed upon the object. Indeed, Kumārila himself is clear that the object in a conceptualized perception is not obscured by the word (PP 172); it remains as evident as it was in the initial nonconceptualized perception. The word, rather, serves to highlight one aspect of the object among others (PP 178–179); it "assists" in the emergence of a discriminative knowledge of the object (PP 111, 241cd–246ab).

It is more difficult to see how this theory fits together with the proposal of v. 119 that conceptualized perception consists in the awareness of the nature of the object in terms of its sameness or difference from others. Two authors I am aware of, Śrīdhara and the Prābhākara philosopher Śālikanātha, attempt to combine the proposals, but their discussions are not very coherent or convincing (see NKand, pp. 446, l. 6–447, l. 3; PPañc, pp. 160, l. 3–167, l. 2; see also NVTṬ, p. 108, ll. 22–28; on Śālikanātha's theory see Schmithausen [1963]). Both suggest that the awareness of a qualifier–qualificand relation arises on the basis of an awareness of difference, as a result of comparing the object with others. (One might see support for this in VS 8.6, which says that a cognition of substance, quality, or action "depends on universal and difference." One might take that to mean that the isolation of a substance, quality, or action as a qualifying feature of an object [a substance in the form of a stick serves as a qualifier of the person holding it] is based on the comparison and contrast of the object with others. However, Praśastapāda confuses the issue by saying that it is a *nonconceptualized* perception of universal and difference [*sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamātram pratyakṣam*] that yields a cognition of a qualified substance, etc. [PDhS, p. 471].) However, it is also plausible to think that the relationship could be reversed: the awareness of difference or sameness, the association or dissociation

of the object from other things, depends on identifying its properties. In fact, it is generally believed that the identification of a thing as falling under a certain concept, which usually involves naming it, serves to categorize it in relation to others. One suspects in the end, however, that these two accounts of conceptual awareness were prevalent in different traditions – the one in terms of species and differentia in Vedānta, the other in terms of qualifier and thing qualified in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (though traces of the former account are found there as well). Kumārila, naturally, follows the former in his critique of the Advaita proposal regarding the nature of conceptual awareness, then shifts to the latter in his defense of conceptualized perception against Buddhist objections, but he never really reconciles them. I think this led to confusion among subsequent authors.

15 See PSV 1.4.1ab, Hattori (1968), p. 44. Hattori (1968), p. 139, n. 4.18, suggests that Diṅnāga is considering the Vaiśeṣika view along the following lines. The Vaiśeṣika holds that a conceptualized perception is the cognition of a qualified object (see preceding note). The qualifier is cognized first, then it is combined with the object to be qualified (cf. Candrānanda's commentary on VS 8.7). The qualifier, therefore, must be retained in memory – if only for a moment – in order to be related to the object; in that case, however, the cognition would be mental, not perceptual. It seems doubtful that Kumārila would be restricting himself in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* to considering just this rather odd account of how memory is involved in conceptualized perception; other accounts seem more plausible, and this one doesn't fit very well the standard Buddhist position that conceptual awareness consists in the joining of a verbal expression. The notion that perception is unable to relate qualifier and thing qualified also comes up in Diṅnāga's discussion of the Mīmāṃsā definition of perception (see PSV 1.6.7cd–8ab); there memory is not mentioned at all.

16 *saṅketasmaraṇopāyaṃ dṛṣṭasaṅkalanātmakam // pūrvāparaparāmarśaśūnye tac cākṣuṣe katham //.*

17 Vācaspati explains that there are two distinct acts of memory involved in conceptual awareness. First, one recalls that a particular property the object has is a property one experienced before; then one recalls the name for the property. "The object, when it is first seen, possessed of genus and difference, causes a memory of itself at the time the convention was grasped [i.e., when one learned what that kind of object is called], and in turn necessarily causes a memory of the word that occurred at that time" (NVTṬ, p. 117, ll. 19–21; cf. NBṬ, pp. 10, l. 21–11, l. 7). He emphasizes that a conceptual awareness of an object as possessing a property occurs even prior to the assignment of an expression: "Having looked at the indistinct object possessed of the universal, as a result of the contact of object and sense faculty, the self, assisted by a recollection of a previously experienced individual [of the same type] produced by an awakened memory impression, conceives of it as a cow merely by means of the visual faculty even at the beginning" (NVTṬ, p. 120, ll. 21–22; cf. NBhūṣ, p. 174, ll. 19–20: *samayasmaraṇasahakāriṇā viśeṣaṇatatsambandhajñānena viśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ janyate*). (Vācaspati refers to such a cognition as "a conceptual awareness born of the sense faculty" *indriyaja vikalpa*. See p. 118, ll. 9ff., where he defends at length the possibility that a visual cognition, with the aid of memory, can apprehend present and past states of an object.) In Nyāya literature the expression *anusandhāna/pratisandhāna* has the sense of an identifying connection in which, for example, two objects perceived by different senses are recognized as the same thing: "I am now touching the thing that I previously saw." See, for example, NBh 3.1.1, where various derivatives of the verb *prati sam* $\sqrt{}$*dhā* are employed.

Vācaspati's theory actually seems to derive from Kumārila. Versus 229–230ab is where Kumārila comes closest to presenting such an account. In arguing that the conceptual awareness that arises when the sense faculties are in contact with an object

must be considered a *perception*, not a memory, he says, "... The cognition that arises for a knower who is remembering the connection of word and object, due to associating a previously experienced object [with the one that is being experienced] – that would not be a non-perception. ... The word and the connection would be remembered, so let them not be objects of perception, but the perceivability of the object is not excluded by *their* not being perceptible. Although cowness, etc., were comprehended previously and are contacted through memory, they are nevertheless now being cognized distinctly from the previous awareness." This passage suggests the following picture: to recall a word for an object – or perhaps, indeed, a word for a property of an object – one must recall the convention that assigns the word to that kind of object or property. That means, one must recall the convention at the time it was taught; one must recall the word being used to designate an object of the same type one is experiencing now. Thus, two acts of memory are involved in applying a word to an object: (1) the memory of a previously experienced object of the type one is experiencing now and (2) the memory of the word assigned to that type of object when one was taught the convention by one's elders. Such an understanding of Kumārila's view of conceptualization as involving two acts of memory is confirmed in a concise way by his commentator and, in my opinion, most reliable interpreter, Pārthasārathimiśra: "For a thing present before one is to be conceptualized by someone who has remembered a certain previously experienced universal and a certain expression (*pūrvānubhūtaṃ jātiviśeṣaṃ sañjñāviśeṣaṃ ca*)" (ŚD, p. 59, ll. 5–6). At ŚD, p. 66, ll. 2–3, however, Pārthasārathi seems to want to reverse the order of memories in a *nāmakalpanā*: "The word functions to recall a previously experienced object and the object that is in front of one is conceived as identical with that remembered object." I'm not sure how significant this is.

18 The point that the self is the agent of memory in conceptualized perception, hence a capacity of memory needn't be attributed to the sense faculty, is made by other Brahmanical authors specifically in response to Dharmakīrti's objection at PVin 1.8. See, for example, NVTṬ, p. 120, ll. 14ff. (where PP 122 is cited); NM, p. 247, ll. 12–17; NKand, pp. 454, ll. 4–7; 458, ll. 7–9. Bhāsarvajña takes a rather different approach to answering this objection, NBhūṣ, pp. 184, l. 19–185, l. 5.

19 "But even if there is an application of the object [in the arising of the cognition], if the sensory cognition depends on a remembered connection with the word, the object would be separated or removed"; *athopayoge 'pi punaḥ smārtaṃ śabdānuyojanam / akṣadhīr yady apekṣeta so 'rtho vyavahito bhavet //* (cf. Steinkellner [1972], pp. 201–2; Franco [1994], pp. 461–4, n. 244). The verse stresses that the *object* would not cause the conceptual awareness, since it is removed from the arising of the cognition in time by an intervening act of memory. (The object existing only for a moment, it would no longer exist to cause the conceptual awareness.) Therefore, the conceptual awareness could not be a perception. The verse can also be interpreted as suggesting that the object would not be cognized as *something immediate*. One's experience of it would be just the same as when one thinks about it in its absence, an aspect of conceptual awareness that Dharmakīrti highlights in such passages as PV 3.176 and 183.

20 This phrasing, "conceiving a thing by means of its property, even though remembering" (*... smarann api | vikalpayan svadharmeṇa vastu ...*) is another indication that Kumārila thinks of conceptual awareness as a *viśiṣṭajñāna*, a cognition of an object as qualified by a certain property and not just as joined with a certain expression. The act of memory mentioned here is presumably the memory of a certain term based on the awareness that one has before one an object qualified by a property of a certain *type* (viz., that type of property to which that term was assigned when one learned the convention). Cf. Sucaritamiśra ad loc.: "This is the meaning. In this case the connection of sense faculty and object is not broken, but there being such a connection, the genus,

etc., *by means of which one has conceived the object, insofar as one remembers the word, etc.* (*śabdādi smarann api yenaiva jātyādinā vastu vikalpya*) – of that [genus, etc.] a person has a perception" (NR, p. 255, ll. 12–14).

21 Later Brahmanical authors developed the position – again, specifically in response to Dharmakīrti's objection – that the connection of sense faculty and object *assisted by memory* causes a conceptualized perception. Memory, on such a view, is not a factor that potentially intervenes between the functioning of the sense faculty and the arising of the cognition; it is rather an "auxiliary cause" (*sahakārin*), which works together with the connection of sense faculty and object. See, for example, NVTṬ, p. 118, ll. 4–7; NM, pp. 244, l. 13–245, l. 12; NBhūṣ, p. 182, ll. 13–26; NKand., p. 452, ll. 1–9. A point often made in these discussions is that many other factors besides sense faculty-object connection are required for a perception, even a nonconceptualized perception, to occur: light, attention, and so forth. The fact that memory is required for a certain type of perception to arise should not invalidate its status as a perception. Jayanta says in this connection that the object is no more "separated" from us by an act of remembering the word for it than by light; indeed, just as a lamp serves to illumine the object, so does a word (NM, p. 246, ll. 2–7).

22 This alternative interpretation has been suggested by Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī.

23 At PVin 1.15 Dharmakīrti points out there is no presentation of the object itself when one is just reflecting on it by means of internal dialogue, whereas there is such a presentation in direct perception. Thus, he concludes, a perception makes known something that cannot be designated by language (*anirdeśasya vedakam*). That would seem to imply that a conceptual awareness, in which one's awareness of the object is mediated by language, is *ipso facto* not a perception. Cf. PV 3.185–187. Kumārila may be responding to this objection, or one related to it, here. It is a *non sequitur* to suggest that if the object is not vividly manifest when one is reflecting on it, then it can never be both perceptually and conceptually apprehended. Rather, it is plausible to hold that if the senses remain connected with the object as one conceives it by means of a certain expression, then one's cognition, even though informed by language, is a perception.

24 "That which does not produce the cognition earlier would not do so later, either, because its causal influence is the same," *yaḥ prāg ajanako buddher upayogāviśeṣataḥ | sa paścād api* (cf. Steinkellner [1972], p. 202; Franco [1994], pp. 461–4, n. 244). The intended subject of this statement is uncertain. Dharmakīrti seems to have in mind the object (*artha*) of perception. On such a reading, his objection is that, if an object does not produce a conceptual awareness upon the first contact of the sense faculty with the object, how could it do so later? Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* responds to this partial verse with a verse of his own: "Why can't that which does not earlier produce a cognition cause it later when it has acquired an auxiliary cause?" (NM, p. 245, *kā*. 82). However, he seems to understand the subject of this rhetorical question to be the connection (*sannikarṣa*) of sense faculty and object; the auxiliary cause he has in mind is the remembering of a word. Other Brahmanical authors took a similar approach in answering this objection. Vācaspati employs the analogy of a seed: although it may not sprout in a store-room, that does not mean it cannot do so when supplied with auxiliary causes such as earth, moisture, etc. (NVTṬ, p. 118, ll. 7–8). Bhāsarvajña cites the example of fire: it may not immediately produce ash or charcoal as it burns a piece of wood, but it does so eventually. He also points out that the reason Dharmakīrti gives in his argument, "because its causal influence or application is the same (*upayogāviśeṣataḥ*)," is false: something does in fact acquire an enhanced causal capacity when it is associated with an auxiliary cause (NBhūṣ, p. 182, ll. 19–22; see continuation through p. 183, l. 9; cf. NM, p. 245, ll. 8–10). See also NKand, p. 452, ll. 2–9.

The Cārvāka Jayarāśi charges that the Buddhist is actually inconsistent in denying that an object could delay in causing a cognition of it, for he himself accepts that this is what happens in the case of a mental cognition of an external object, which is preceded by a (nonconceptualized) perception of it by the external sense. See TUS, pp. 212–14.

25 Veṅkaṭarāma Śāstrī has suggested these two alternative interpretations.

26 This, once again, would seem to relate to the sorts of concerns raised by Dharmakīrti in PVin 1.5 and 15.

27 Cf. NBhūṣ, p. 182, ll. 27–28: *atha tajjanakānubhavajanmany upayogaḥ [arthasya]. tataḥ kim? atropayuktasyānyatrānupayoga iti cet. . . .*

28 Such an expression is referred to in Sanskrit linguistics as *yogarūḍha*, derivative-conventional. See Kunjunni Raja (1963), pp. 61–2, and Kāś, p. 256, ll. 20–24.

29 These words are referred to as simply *rūḍha*, conventional. See Kunjunni Raja (1963), pp. 60–1.

30 Cf. PVBh, pp. 278–9, *kās*. 352–353. Prajñākara counters, it is only the immediate revealing of an object (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) that counts as perception in the world (*kā*. 354).

31 Literally, 132cd reads: "Therefore, this [word] should not be removed from that in regard to which it is [usually] employed."

32 Cf. PV 3.287.

33 Kumārila's commentators seem to be drawing on Abhidharma ideas in explaining this suggestion. According to the *Abhidharmakośa*, for example, mind (*manas*) is a cognition (*vijñāna*) that immediately precedes the arising of any of the six types of cognitions (AK 1.17ab). That is to say, it is *any* type of cognition – even a sensory cognition – that is the basis for the arising of another cognition (often another sensory cognition of the same type) insofar as it serves as its immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*). In general, the Buddhists did not believe that cognition can arise solely on the basis of material factors; that is, they were emphatically not physicalists. A cognition, rather, must be produced by another cognition of some kind along with other factors, and the latter cognition is what is called "mind" (see AK 2.62ab; AKBh 1.44cd). Although *manas* is also identified as a sense faculty (*indriya*; see AKBh 2.2ab, p. 39, ll. 8–9) and is grouped together with the external senses in the schemes of the *āyatanas* and the *dhātus*, it is not material like the other senses. It is just a cognition. Thus, one might consider the self-awareness of a conceptualized cognition to have been caused by mind *in the form of the immediately preceding nonconceptualized cognition*. See Sucarita ad loc. It is uncertain whether any Buddhists explicitly held such a theory. Sucarita cites some words that appear to derive from Dharmakīrti (Kāś, p. 258, ll. 21–22; cf. NB 1: *tac caturvidham.indriyajñānaṃ samanantaraviṣaya. . . .*), but Dharmakīrti's text concerns the mental perception of an *external object*, which is caused in part by the preceding (nonconceptualized) perception of it (which therefore could be seen to be functioning as *manas*) and which arises immediately after the latter. It says nothing about the arising of a self-awareness of a conceptualized cognition. In fact, Dharmakīrti actually did not consider self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) to be a type of mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*), but rather a distinct category of perception unto itself. Although he believed that every cognition, even a conceptual awareness, cognizes itself, *manas* does not play an instrumental role therein. The self-awareness of a cognition was for him simply due to its intrinsic self-luminosity. It was, typically, Brahmanical thinkers who believed that the mind is involved in the perception of internal mental states, or in reflecting on cognitions immediately after they occur. For them, however, *manas* or mind was a permanent faculty, not a fleeting cognition; in fact, for the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas (and probably also Kumārila) it was a substance (*dravya*).

34 This follows Pārthasārathimiśra, as I understand him. Sucarita proposes a different interpretation of 135b. The Buddhist may think that a conceptualized cognition is a perception insofar as it is (directly) aware of itself, but ordinary people regard a conceptualized cognition as determining some other thing as, say, a cow. It does not characterize *itself* as "I am a cow!"

35 Mind (*manas*) is clearly considered a sense faculty by the Nyāya philosopher Vātsyāyana (though Diṅnāga points out that the *Nyāyasūtra* enumerates only five *indriyas*, leaving *manas* out, PS 1.3.2cd–3ab). It must be postulated as the faculty by means of which we perceive "pleasure, etc." (NBh 3.1.17; also 1.1.4, p. 123, l. 4; see NV ad loc.). Kumārila refers to this function above, PP 83. However, *manas* has a variety of other functions in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is the instrument (*karaṇa*) that mediates between the senses and the self. The principal proof of the existence of *manas* proceeds from the (alleged) observation that cognitions of different senses do not arise simultaneously; therefore, there must be something that establishes a link between the self, the subject of cognition, and this or that external sense in succession. See NS 1.1.16; cf. VS 3.2.1. *Manas* is also identified as "the means of thinking" (*matisādhana*, NBh 3.1.16) and the cause of memory (NS 3.2.25–33). At NBh 1.1.16 Vātsyāyana offers the following list of cognitive states and acts from which he says mind may be inferred: memory, inference, (the comprehension of) testimony, doubt, intuition (*pratibhā*), dreaming, reflection (*ūha*), the perception of pleasure, etc., and desire. (Concerning the evolution of the idea of *manas* as an all-purpose faculty, see Frauwallner [1953–56], vol. 2, pp. 68–73.) At NBh 1.1.4 (pp. 121–123), in his discussion of doubt, he also maintains that subsequent to the apprehending of an object by the sense faculty there is an apprehension of it by the mind that is dependent on the sense faculty. Thus he seems to accept a mental cognition of external objects, assisted by the external senses – though he does not refer to *mind* as a sense faculty in this connection. This "after-ascertainment" (*anuvyavasāya*), however, came to be interpreted (already by Vācaspatimiśra) as a reflective awareness of the preceding *cognitive state*, that is, not a mental cognition of a pot but the awareness, "I know a pot" (which, however, includes the pot as the "qualifier" of the cognition; see for example, NVTP, pp. 285, l. 22–286, l. 6). See Matilal (1986), pp. 142–4, 156–7; Sen (1984), Chap. 11.

The Buddhists also conceive of the mind as a faculty that can perceive both internal and external objects. As mentioned in n. 33, it is identified as one of the *indriyas* or sense faculties in Abhidharma thought. It apprehends not only pleasure and pain (which fall under the category of sensation, *vedanā*) as well as many other mental states, but also the same objects perceived by the external senses (AK 1.48a). (However, AK 1.32–33 implies that whereas sensory cognition is free from conceptualization, mental cognition is not.) This doctrine of a dual perception of external objects is held to have been enunciated by the Buddha in the following statement cited in later works: "Visible form, Oh monks, is cognized by a twofold cognition, the visible perception and the mental perception produced by it" (see Kajiyama [1966], p. 47). Diṅnāga defines "mental perception" (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) as ". . . consisting of the nonconceptual awareness of an [external] object and the self-awareness of [such inner states as] desire, etc." (PS 1.1.6ab). Dharmakīrti differs from Diṅnāga in declaring the self-awareness of mental states to belong to a separate category of perception, namely, "self-awareness" (*svasaṃvedana*), and considering mental perception to be only the mental apprehension of external objects. Since both Dharmakīrti and Diṅnāga are clear that all perception is without conceptualization, this mental perception cannot be a conceptual awareness. As Dharmakīrti explains it (PV 3.239ff.), a mental perception of an external object is a cognition that arises immediately following a perception of the object through the external senses and takes as its object the immediately

succeeding moment of the object grasped by the external sense faculty (see Hattori [1968], pp. 93–4, n. 1.46; also Matilal [1986], pp. 148–53). It would appear to be a sort of after-image of the object engendered by the mind *qua* the immediately preceding sensory cognition, a bare awareness of the object just as devoid of conceptual content as the latter. Since this cognition seems indistinguishable from the sensory cognition, later Buddhist authors struggled to come up with a justification for postulating it. See Nagatomi (1980).

We have already seen that mental perception played a large role in the debate about yogic perception. Although it was generally acknowledged that the external senses, which depend on contact, may not be able to apprehend objects in the past or future, some – typically, Buddhists – believed that the mind could do so, even independently of the external senses. Continuous concentration on any object can, in time, make it vividly present in a nonconceptual awareness.

Sāṃkhya philosophy also looks upon the mind as apprehending the changes brought about in the sense organs by external objects, hence implicitly as a kind of sense faculty (SK 27, 30, 33, 35; Diṅnāga, takes the author of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* to task for not explicitly identifying *manas* as a *pramāṇa*, PS 1.5.8ab, but *manas* is called an *indriya* in SK 27b). At *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 27a it is stated that "mind is possessed of thought (*saṅkalpaka*)." Although the anonymous author of the *Yuktidīpikā* interprets *sañkalpa* to mean desire, the later commentator Vācaspatimiśra – though clearly under the influence of Kumārila, whom he quotes – understands it to mean the conceptualizing activity of the mind, which apprehends an object as qualified by a qualifying feature, by distinguishing universal and difference (STK, pp. 195–6). Such a theory may be traced back to a commentary on the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* that argues that the mind directly apprehends external objects together with the external sense faculties.

Kumārila, thus, appears to be building on previous theorizing – my guess is that he is drawing mainly on Sāṃkhya discussions – about *manas* in suggesting that it is a sense faculty that is instrumental in the production of conceptualized cognitions of external objects. Exactly how he thinks the mind functions in this capacity, however, is unclear. Does it apprehend the object as possessed of a certain property, perhaps even without making a propositional assertion, as Vācaspati suggests? Does it merely recall the name of the object, or a term for one of its properties? Does it, in its role as *indriya*, combine all of these functions? Kumārila simply doesn't say. Later, however, in vv. 166–167, he will say that every sensory experience of an object is accompanied by a mental apprehension of it, which in turn serves as the basis of memory. Thus, the capacity of *manas* in question seems more akin to a perceiving of the nature of the object than a power of association or attention.

36 For example, in grasping that something is smoke, from which one may infer the presence of fire. Pārthasārathi explains that the Buddhist, in believing that a particular inference, say, an inference to the effect that something is a horse, can be contradicted by a perception, say, that it is a cow, must accept that perception is determinate, that is, conceptualized. Cf. below, v. 213.

In his *Tattvasaṅgraha* Śāntarakṣita mentions, in the course of his lengthy debate with the Mīmāṃsaka over the existence of an omniscient person, another interesting consequence, alleged by the Mīmāṃsaka, of the Buddhist denial of the validity of conceptual awareness: namely, it would follow from the fact that the Buddha was a teacher, that he was *not* omniscient, since he could have taught only when his mind was in a conceptual, that is, on the Buddhist's hypothesis, a deluded, state. See TS 3358–3361.

37 The transition from the preceding section to this section can be seen in another way. Up to this point Kumārila has been arguing against the Buddhist position that a conceptual

awareness is not perceptual, even if it arises immediately after a (nonconceptualized) perceptual cognition. Now he turns to refute the view, which is presented here more explicitly than in Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, that a conceptual awareness is, in one way or another, always false. Certainly, Diṅnāga at PS 1.1.7cd–8ab seems to be suggesting that any kind of conceptual awareness is "not true perception" (*pratyakṣābha*). Dharmakīrti, however, generally considered the possibility that a conceptual awareness, for example, an inferential cognition, can be a *pramāṇa*, conventionally speaking, insofar as it is confirmed. His commentator Dharmottara explicitly develops the position that *perception* can be considered a *pramāṇa*, a means of *knowledge*, only insofar as it gives rise in turn to a conceptual awareness that ascertains the nature of the object! By itself, it is not a *pramāṇa*, because it does not *determine* anything. It requires the assistance of a conceptual awareness to determine the object, so that one can be directed toward the object to experience its causal efficacy, which confirms the perception. See Krasser (1991), pp. 47–52; Shah (1967), pp. 206–8.

38 As in Diṅnāga's, of course, as well. Dharmakīrti critiques conceptual awareness as a *viśiṣṭajñāna* at PV 3.145–146. He states, "After having apprehended the qualifier, the object qualified, their connection, and the customary rule and combined them together, one can cognize something in this way [i.e., as a qualified object], not otherwise. Since there is no discerning of the genus, etc., distinctly, as in the case of a man with a stick, there is no joining of them with that which possesses them. Therefore, there is not even a conceptual construction in regard to these things" (cf. PVin 1.7). That is to say, one cannot cognize an object as qualified by a qualifier such as a genus, a quality, or an action unless one is able to discern separately the object to be qualified and the qualifier; one cannot have an awareness of a combination of things unless one is distinctly aware of the things to be combined, as we are of a man and his stick when we form the judgement "There is a man armed with a stick" (cf. PSV 1.4.1ab; Jambuvijayaji, p. 170, ll. 10–11). Genus, quality, and action, however, are never discerned apart from their substrata and *vice versa*; they are mixed together "like milk and water" (PVin, trans., p. 45; cf. Steinkellner [1972], p. 202). The argument is fully developed by Prajñākaragupta, PVBh, pp. 153–4; see also TS 1218–1219. The "customary rule"mentioned in PV 3.145 is understood as the conventional distinction between qualifier and thing qualified, to the effect that the genus, etc., are qualifiers whereas the "substance" (*dravya*) is that which is qualified (see Manorathanandin ad loc.).

Dharmakīrti's commentators do not take him in this passage to be questioning the validity of the cognition of a qualified object as a second type of conceptual awareness distinct from linguistic awareness so much as denying that such an awareness is possible at all (PVV, p. 144, ll. 21–22; PVBh, p. 253, ll. 16–18). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla argue that even if one believes that there is a kind of conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) that combines universal, quality, etc., it would still require the application of a word to unite them into a whole; they cannot unite by themselves, any more than two objects (say, a pot and a cloth) placed next to each other (see TS 1229–1233 and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* commentary thereon). Thus, all conceptual construction must necessarily be of the nature of the joining of a word.

Dharmakīrti's statement above was widely noted and refuted by other Brahmanical writers, who, however, understood it in different ways. See, for example, NVTṬ, pp. 116, ll. 4–10; 120, l. 8–121, l. 18; NM, p. 247, ll. 6–10; NBhūṣ, p. 183, ll. 10–23. Bhāsarvajña directly contradicts Dharmakīrti: we are indeed able to perceive in individual cows a common nature, cowness, which sets them apart from buffaloes, etc., and also see that it is something distinct from those individuals!

39 See PSV 1.4.1a, Hattori (1968), pp. 43–4 (D) (cf. Jambuvijayaji, p. 170, ll. 8–14); also PSV 1.6.7cd–8ab, p. 67 (Dc). I quote from the latter passage:

> According to your [the Mīmāṃsaka's] view, sense-cognition is able to perceive cow-ness and also to perceive the [thing which is the] abode of that cow-ness, but not relate them together. Insofar as there is no relation [between them], there cannot be the ascertainment of [an object as] a cow, etc. [by perception]. Therefore, in all cases of [our cognizing] a qualifier with a qualified or a name with an object named, there is [involved] a conceptual construction produced by the mind, which ascribes identity (*abhedopacāra*) [to the two factors], and [there is] not sense-cognition.

Diṅnāga seems to be stressing in this passage that the attribution of identity is a mental process, not something that can be performed by the sense faculty. Therefore, a conceptual awareness cannot be considered a perception. He does not expressly say here that a cognition involving an attribution of identity of property and property-bearer must *ipso facto* be false. However, that is clearly implied in his discussion of the Vaiśeṣika account of conceptualized perception, beginning with 1.4.1ab. There he stresses that a conceptual awareness in the form of the joining of a qualifying feature with an object qualified by it associates things apprehended by different senses. If they are apprehended by distinct senses then they cannot really be one, yet that is how the awareness presents them. See PP 156ff. The point that a conceptual awareness *either* identifies things that are different *or* distinguishes things that are identical was regarded by Brahmanical philosophers as one of the main reasons given by the Buddhists for holding that conceptual awareness is mere "imagination," that is, *kalpanā* (in the pejorative sense of that term). See, for example, NM, pp. 240, l. 9–242, l. 9; 248, l. 7–250, l. 2; NVTṬ, pp. 117, l. 15–118, l. 4. (In the NM *jāti*-, *guṇa*-, and *karma-kalpanā* are specifically said to distinguish things that are identical, whereas *nāma-* and *dravya-kalpanā* identify things that are different.) It is the *only* argument against conceptualized perception that Prabhākara considers; see Bṛh, pp. 41, l. 4–45, l. 1. (In Prabhākara's account, *jāti-* and *guṇa-kalpanā* distinguish things that are really identical, whereas *nāma*-, *karma*-, and *dravya-kalpanā* identify things that are really different; see Bṛh, p. 43, ll. 4–5.)

40 The doctrine that a thing is both universal and particular in nature, or that the particular is both identical and different from the universal, is one of the more distinctive teachings of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. It is more fully developed by Kumārila in his chapter on universals, the *Ākṛtivāda*. The leading idea is that everything gives rise to notions of its being both distinct from other things and common to other things. A cow gives rise to the notion that it is distinct from other cows, yet also to the idea that it is the same as other cows (*Ākṛtivāda* 5). Since we must take our cognitions at face value unless and until they are refuted – this is the principle of intrinsic validity, which lies at the foundation of Kumārila's epistemology – we should accept in this case what our cognitions appear to be telling us, namely, that all entities have a dual nature: from one point of view they are particular, from another universal (*Ākṛtivāda* 7). Here, it is expressly a matter of one thing having different aspects, not two different kinds or categories of thing being located in the same place. The latter option is untenable because of the impossibility of explaining how two such categories could be related to each other; the relation of inherence, *samavāya*, to which the Vaiśeṣikas appeal, cannot do the job. Moreover, the fact that universal and particular are incapable of existing separately, that they are *ayutasiddha*, as the Vaiśeṣika philosophers say, indicates that they are really identical (*Ākṛtivāda* 9–11).

The principal objection to the dual-nature theory is that universal and particular have contradictory properties. For example, a universal occurs in many places,

a particular in only one place; one would think that it is impossible for the same thing to exist both in many places and in only one place. Moreover, if universal and particular are identical, each would take on the properties of the other: the universal would be divided into many things and many particulars of the same type would be just one thing. Every thing would be both one and many (*Ākṛtivāda* 51–53). Kumārila's response is that contradictory properties can exist in the same thing insofar as it is viewed under different aspects. Viewed as a universal, a thing occurs in many locations; viewed as a particular, it exists only in one place. It is only impossible for contradictory properties to exist in the same thing at the same time and in the same respect. Just as a speckled object can be viewed as having now this color, now that one, so a thing can be viewed as either particular or universal, as one wishes, depending on one's perspective (*Ākṛtivāda* 54–58ab). While the dual-nature theory maintains that universal and particular are identical insofar as they are both aspects of the same thing, it also holds that they are not identical, insofar as they are *distinct* aspects of it. On Kumārila's theory of universals in general, see Bhatt (1962), pp. 405ff.

Maṇḍanamiśra launches a sophisticated attack against Kumārila's dual-nature theory in the *Tarkakāṇḍa* of his *Brahmasiddhi*, as already noted (BS, pp. 63–7). He regards it as a challenge to the essential Advaita teaching that reality is the nondual Brahman. Pārthasārathimśra defends it in turn in his *Śāstradīpikā* (ŚD, pp. 202–8). As evidence for the dual nature of entities he cites the fact that when we say, "That is a cow," both words 'that' and 'cow' are in grammatical coordination, so they must refer to the same thing; yet they are not synonyms, so they must refer to different things (p. 205, ll. 1–3)! Dharmakīrti seems to be dismissing the dual-nature theory at PV 3.41cd; it would make it impossible for something to be one, he says. The Prābhākara Śālikanātha, also rejects it – in favor of the position that universal and particular are truly distinct; see PPañc, pp. 93, l. 7–94, l. 3. He is concerned, in particular, with dispelling the notion that in that case one would apprehend the universal as something contained "here," *in* the particular. It is precisely the fact that one seems to apprehend the particular *as having the form of the universal* – we do not perceive particular and universal in relation to each other like a man and his staff – that suggests to the Bhāṭṭa that they are identical. See also the discussion of Śrīdhara, NKand, pp. 748, l. 15–752, l. 6.

The dual-nature doctrine of the Bhāṭṭa school suggests a strong affinity with Jaina thought. Although the Jainas adopted a variety of positions on the existence and nature of universals, one prominent view, that of Samantabhadra, for example, who was probably a precursor of Kumārila, was that universal and particular are both identical and different (ĀM 61ff.); this idea is elaborated further by his commentator Vidyānanda (see Dravid [1972], pp. 138–40). Prabhācandra defends the dual-nature theory at length in his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (PMK, pp. 524ff.). In general, the dual-nature theory is consistent with what is often identified as the central teaching of Jainism: perspectivalism or nonabsolutism (the *anekāntavāda*), that is, that nothing is exclusively one way or the other. Seen from one point of view a thing is permanent, from another, changing; from one perspective it is one, from another, many, and so on (see Dixit [1971], pp. 96–7, 110–13, 135–9).

41 Cf. Bṛh, pp. 42, l. 4–43, l. 2.

42 This interpretation – of my own – presupposes that Kumārila, following the Vaiśeṣika school, considered qualities tropes, that is, particulars. See Halbfass (1992), pp. 122–7, regarding the Vaiśeṣika theory. Kumārila implies that he accepts such a theory in his *Tantravārttika*, while he appears to reject it elsewhere in the *Ślokavārttika* (see Halbfass [1992], p. 135, n. 69 and p. 136, n. 84). Sucaritamiśra resorts to perspectivalism to give a different explanation as to why qualities and actions are identical with the substances to which they belong. Although the substance remains the same through

the appearance and disappearance of different qualities and actions, and so appears to be distinct from them, nevertheless it can also be seen as changing with them, insofar as they are after all *its* qualities and actions, and so does *not* appear distinct from them! "Here," he says, "when the quality or action ceases to exist the thing (*vastu*), too, ceases to exist" (p. 261, ll. 21–23). Nor do the qualities or actions really disappear, insofar as they have the nature of the substance, which is permanent! I see this solution as essentially question-begging and so have not followed it in my commentary.

43 Unfortunately, this amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of Kumārila's position. Precisely because two things, such as crystal and lac, could be distinct even though they may never be perceived separately, we should not assume that property and property-bearer are identical on the grounds they are never perceived separately.

The strongest of Śāntarakṣita's objections against the Bhāṭṭa theory of conceptualized perception in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* can be mentioned here, since it pertains to the idea that a conceptualized perception apprehends the individual as having the form of the genus, etc., expressed in PP 142. How could that really be the case? For it seems that the conceptualized perception – which Śāntarakṣita insists must, in one way or another, be linguistic in nature – could only apprehend the universal, since the individual is inexpressible in words. In that case, however, the universal would be manifest as something completely distinct from the particular, since the latter is apprehended by a distinct cognition, namely, the preceding nonconceptualized perception, as Kumārila himself suggests (PP 113; see TS 1294–1295). If one maintained that the preceding nonconceptualized perception apprehends *both* universal and particular in an inchoate way, then the subsequent conceptualized cognition (of the universal) would really just be a memory and not a perception, because it would cognize something cognized before (TS 1297).

44 See PDhS, pp. 773ff. Praśastapāda, following VS 7.2.29, also says that *samavāya* is the "cause of the notion 'here'," that is to say, of the notion that one of the terms exists, or subsists, *in* the other. Inherence is not only the relation of universal to particular (which may be either a substance, quality, or motion), but also that of ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) to (eternal) substance, whole to parts, and quality or motion to substance.

45 The doctrine of inherence was the Achilles heel of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. It was routinely attacked by philosophers of other schools. See Halbfass (1992), pp. 74–5, 147–9. Dharmakīrti criticizes it at PV 3.149, in connection with his rejection of the possibility of a cognition of a qualified object. Not only can qualifier and object qualified not be distinctly apprehended in order to be combined, but even if they were, they could not be perceived as related to each other by inherence, since inherence is, according to Vaiśeṣika, imperceptible (cf. PDhS, pp. 784, l. 4–785, l. 3). (Naiyāyikas, however, generally defended the idea that *samavāya is* perceptible. See Joshi [1986], pp. 585–6). Dharmakīrti goes on, 3.150–153, to criticize the idea that inherence accounts for the relation between a cloth and its threads (i.e., a whole and its parts). Śāntarakṣita develops a more elaborate critique, TS 822–865. If inherence were only one – for it gives rise to the same kind of idea, "this subsists in that," in every case – then a universal that inheres in one thing would inhere in all. If it were eternal, as the Vaiśeṣika also believes – for it does not appear to have a cause – then it is difficult to see how complex substances such as tables and pots, which supposedly inhere in their parts, could ever cease to exist. Another extensive refutation along different lines is presented by the Jaina Mallavādin, DN, pp. 523–35. Bhartṛhari discusses inherence at VP(R) 3.3.8–19, denying that it can account for the relation between word and meaning. Vyomaśiva, interestingly, seems to go along with some of the standard criticisms of inherence in arguing for the position that the existence of inherence

can only be inferred (not perceived) from the arising of the cognition that something subsists "here," in something else (Vyom, p. 699, ll. 1ff.).

46 I construe the *tat* in *tadviklptau*, not as *samavāya* 'inherence' but as *sambandha* 'connection' or 'relation' – the alternative to 'separation' *viyoga* which is considered in the first half of the verse. I see this reference as carrying over to *tasya tasya* of the final foot of the verse, which could be read literally as "because for now this, now that [relation] there is a connection (*saṅgati*) with another [relation]." Such a reading is not clearly proposed by any of the commentaries.

47 For, as mentioned (n. 45), inherence always gives rise to the same idea of one thing subsisting in another. See PDhS, p. 780, ll. 3–4.

48 See PDhS, p. 783, ll. 2–4.

49 Praśastapāda, proposes this answer to the problem of the relation of inherence to its terms, PDhS, pp. 783, l. 4–785, l. 4. The example, however, is mine.

50 Cf. NM, pp. 240, l. 9–241, l. 4. The Buddhist holds that genus, quality, and action are not really distinct things from the substances to which they are attributed. Thus, a *jāti-*, *guṇa-*, or *karma-kalpanā* is the imagining of things that are really identical as different. Cf. Prabhākara's analysis of *jāti-* and *guṇa-kalapanā*, Bṛh. pp. 41, l. 4–43, l. 6.

51 One of the most famous passages in Buddhist literature, the analogy of the chariot in the *Milindapañha* (*The Questions of King Milinda*), argues against the existence of a substance distinct from its components, specifically in relation to a "person" (*puggala*). Just as none of the parts of the chariot – the axle, the wheels, etc. – is the chariot, nor all of them together, nor anything besides them, so is none of the parts of the body nor any other *skandha* the monk Nāgasena, nor all of them together, nor anything besides them. The chariot/Nāgasena is a mere sound; there is no chariot/Nāgasena. See MP, pp. 19–21. Later discussions combat the notion that something must be posited as the substratum (*āśraya*) of qualities. There is no cognition of a substance apart from certain qualities – of a primary substance such as earth apart from touch, color, taste, and smell, or of a complex substance such as a pot apart from color, hardness, etc. Remove the qualities and you remove the substance. See AKBh 9, pp. 475, l. 12–476, l. 3, and the Buddhist position as presented by Uddyotakara, NV 1.1.14, p. 206, ll. 9ff.; see also Matilal (1986), pp. 371–8. The mature Buddhist position, complete with refutations of the Brahmanical counter-arguments can be found at TS 546–620.

52 Pārthasārathi glosses *āvirbhāvatirobhāvadharmakeṣu* as *raktatvaharitatvādidharmeṣv āvirbhāvatirobhāvadharmakeṣu*.

53 See *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 68–9. Pārthasārathi agues that a substance, *dravya*, is established in two ways: first, by the fact that the same thing is perceived by two different senses. By means of the faculty of touch I touch what I saw by means of the faculty of vision. Thus, the same thing is perceived as being the substratum of different sensible qualities. (This argument derives from NS 3.1.1, where, however, it is employed to establish the unity of the perceiver – as something distinct from the senses – not that of the object.) Second, I *recognize* the same object even after it has undergone change – a fruit as it changes from dark blue to red, a piece of clay as it passes from the state of a lump to that of a pot to that of a bowl, etc. That is to say, I cognize the changed object as the same object that existed previously. Thus, I cognize an enduring substratum of fleeting properties (see also NR ad loc.). "Recognition" (*pratyabhijñā*) is also cited in Mīmāṃsā as evidence for the permanence of the self (e.g., ŚV, *Ātmavāda* 107ff.) and of words (MSBh 1.1.20). Śāntarakṣita presents a general refutation of recognition as a means of cognizing permanence at TS 444–460; indeed, neither Diṅnāga nor Dharmakīrti accepted recognition as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

54 Kumārila's argument here is reminiscent of the point made by Uddyotakara (NV, pp. 208, l. 9–209, l. 1) that one may perceive a crystal without perceiving its actual color, namely, when it has taken on the color of an object placed next to it. Śāntarakṣita offers other examples of substances being perceived independently of their properties at TS 556–557: a line of cranes flying in the sky at night (their white color is not perceived; cf. NV 3.1.1, p. 711, ll. 8–10), a man covered by armour, and a piece of cloth colored red. He refutes these examples easily, vv. 563ff. Pārthasārathi cites the example of the cranes, NR ad loc.

55 Cf. v. 145. This point clearly turns on Kumārila's doctrine of the intrinsic validity of all cognitions. Generally, a cognition presents itself as true unless and until it is invalidated by another cognition that apprehends its object differently, or by a cognition that ascertains the cause of the original cognition to be defective. When I walk into a room and see a glass of water on a table, my cognition possesses a certain force or credibility; it carries with it a sense of its own truth. I do not have to go over to the table, pick up the glass of water, and drink it in order to be convinced that I am seeing a glass of water. Were I, however, to turn away and then not see the glass of water on the table when I turned back toward the room, then the intrinsic validity of my original cognition would be removed.

56 See NBh 3.1.1. The *sūtra*, which reads "Because the same object is apprehended by vision and touch" (or "Because an object is apprehended by vision and touch as one"), is taken by the commentators to express a reason for holding that there is a self distinct from the senses (see Preisendanz [1994], pp. 183–7, n. 16). There must be something that connects visual and tactile perceptions of the same object, as when one touches an object one previously looked at. Neither of the individual senses in question could be the connecting principle, since vision cannot apprehend the quality of touch nor the sense of touch apprehend visible form. Thus, there must be some other thing that relates these two experiences to each other, that is, the subject of different experiences, *via* different senses, of the same object – let us call that the self. In subsequent *sūtras* it is shown that the subject of experience cannot be the body or the mind, either. Thus, NS 3.1.1 is usually explained as proving the existence of a self distinct from the senses, but at NV 1.1.14 Uddyotakara also cites it in support of the idea that not just sensible qualities like color, etc., but also substances such as earth are directly perceived (thereby construing the expression *pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ* in NS 1.1.14 as a *dvandva* compound; see NV, pp. 203, l. 16–204, l. 2). The argument he is considering seems to be the following. Both vision and touch apprehend *the same thing* as having now visible properties, now tangible ones – hence an entity *distinct* from the qualities that are the specific objects of those senses. Diṅnāga seems to be evaluating this argument at PS 1.4.1cd–3ab, insisting on the principle that different senses must have different types of objects, and that if anything is grasped by different senses, then it must in reality be more than one thing. He attributes the fact that there is an idea of one thing, or "an identical apprehension in regard to substance, etc." (*dravyādāv abhinnaṃ grahaṇam*) to a memory cognition pertaining to the collection of entities that comprise the object (*samudāya*) (PSV 1.4.3b; see Jambuvijayaji, p. 172, ll. 5–9; also Preisendanz [1994], pp. 189–97). Uddyotakara attacks the Buddhist position at length, NV, p. 204, ll. 12ff. Meanwhile, it was established in Vaiśeṣika that the substances earth, water, and fire are (directly) perceived (PDhS, p. 63, l. 3) – presumably, by vision and touch. Praśastapāda states that number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, moisture, fluidity, momentum, and motion are perceptible by both vision and touch "due to their inherence in perceptible substance" (PDhS, pp. 460–3; cf. VS 4.1.12, which says only that these qualities are "visible" due to their inherence in a visible substance), which at least suggests that

the substances in which those qualities inhere can also be apprehended by those two senses.

57 In Vaiśeṣika philosophy there are in fact various "general qualities" of substances perceived by more than one sense, specifically, number, distance, etc., mentioned in the previous note as being perceived by both vision and touch ("motion," *karman*, however, is a separate category, not a quality; see Frauwallner [1956], vol. 2, pp. 125ff. for a discussion of the general properties of Vaiśeṣika). However, each of the characteristic qualities of the five elements (earth, water, fire, wind, and space), namely, smell, taste, color, touch, and sound, is perceived by only one specific sense: smell by the sense of smell, taste by the sense of taste, color by the sense of vision, and so on.

58 Hattori translates this passage as follows:

> [. . . the Vaiśeṣikas may argue as follows: "That an object is grasped by means of two perceptions does not necessarily mean that it is not a single entity. For example, we see that] one and the same substance (*dravya*) is grasped by [two] different senses [visual and tactual]." If such [were the case], it would follow that
>
> k. $1c_1$. [it is] not [a] single [entity];
>
> [If it were to be admitted that the substance is apprehended by different senses, then] it would be manifold, like color and other entities. In regard to [objects that are different, such as] color, etc., we never experience them as single in spite of their being grasped by different senses.
>
> k. $1c_2$. otherwise there would be no difference (*abheda*) of color and other objects [from one another].
>
> (Hattori [1968], p. 44 [Ea]; cf. Jambuvijayaji, p. 170, ll. 15–17.)

Diṅnāga, however, is not developing the objection that Kumārila is considering here. He is not, that is, arguing that a conceptual awareness falsely distinguishes things that are really identical. Rather, he is making more or less the opposite point. He is objecting, as I read him (relying, as usual, on Hattori's translation), to the notion, prevalent in Vaiśeṣika, that a conceptual awareness combines a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) with an object to be qualified (*viśeṣya*; see earlier, n. 14), each perceived by a different sense faculty. He mentions as an example the cognition "Fire is hot." Fire is an object of vision, whereas heat is an object of touch. Indeed, as mentioned in n. 56 earlier, the Vaiśeṣika seems to believe in general that the substances fire, water, and earth are perceived by both vision and touch, whereas some of their qualities are perceived by other senses. For example, taste, the distinctive quality of water, is perceived by the faculty of taste. If it is the case, as Diṅnāga alleges, that objects of different senses are different things, then a *viśeṣaṇa* that is the object of one sense and a *viśeṣya* that is the object of another should not be attributed to one thing. On the pitfalls of attempting to relate PP 153ff. to PS 1.4.1cd–2ab, see Preisendanz (1994), pp. 613–15.

This controversy about whether different senses can apprehend the same thing reminds one of the interesting debate about the convergence of the *pramāṇas* in Indian epistemology. The Buddhist maintains that perception and inference apprehend two entirely distinct entities, the individual characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), which is real, and the universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which is imagined. Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, held that different *pramāṇas* can pertain to the same object. One can know fire through testimony, by being told about it; one can know the same fire through inference, by inferring its presence from smoke; and one can know it through perception, by seeing it. See NBh 1.1.3, pp. 91, l. 5–92, l. 8; NV 1.1.1, p. 13, ll. 2ff.; NVTṬ ad loc.; NM, pp. 87–93, NBhūṣ, pp. 81–3, etc.

59 This was an established doctrine of Vaiśeṣika; see VS 1.2.18, 4.1.14. Praśastapāda states, "For us, the apprehension of existence (*bhāva*), substancehood, qualityness, and actionhood inhering in perceptible substrata, by the senses, which apprehend their substrata, is perception" (PDhS, p. 464). VS 1.2.7 says that existence (*sattā*; the terms *bhāva* and *sattā* are synonymous in Vaiśeṣika) accounts for the application of the notion 'existent' or 'real' (*sat*) to substances, qualities, and motions. Thus, *sattā* in Vaiśeśika is actually rather different from the "mere Being" (*sanmātra*) or Being as such of Advaita Vedānta, alluded to in PP 114 as the object of nonconceptualized perception. See earlier, n. 8. For a general discussion of the notion of existence in Vaiśeṣika, see Halbfass (1992), Chap. 7. The theory of the perceptibility of existence by the various senses is alluded to by Diṅnāga, PSV 1.4.1d (Jambuvijayaji, p. 171, l. 1) and 1.4.3d (Jambuvijayaji, p. 172, ll. 10–20).

60 See note 58.

61 PS 1.4.1d'–2a:

> Admittedly we do experience undifferentiated cognition (*abhinnaṃ jñānam*) [of substance]. Nevertheless,
>
> k. 1d2. such [a cognition] is not given by the senses – Such a cognition is not the apprehension by means of one sense [for example, the visual sense] of the object of another sense [e.g., the tactual sense]
>
> k. 2a. because the variety of the senses would [then] be useless. If we allow one sense the power (*śakti*) to grasp the object of another sense, then it would be useless to recognize various senses for [various objects, such as] color, etc.
>
> (Hattori [1968], p. 45 [Eb]; cf. Jambuvijayaji, p. 171, ll. 2–5.)

62 Diṅnāga himself clearly distinguishes the internal and external functions of the mind, PS 1.1.6ab. See earlier, note 35. Moreover, he chides both the Naiyāyika and the Sāṃkhya – in regard to the specific texts he is considering (i.e., the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*) – for not positing *manas* as a faculty for perceiving inner states such as pleasure, pain, desire, etc. See PS 1.3.2cd–3ab (Hattori [1968], pp. 38–9; Jambuvijayaji, p. 211, ll. 6–11); PS 1.5.8ab–9 (Hattori [1968], pp. 60–2).

63 See PDhS, pp. 216, l. 3–218, l. 2: *śrotrādyavyāpāre smṛtyutpattidarśanāt*.... Kumārila does not cite in this connection the perception of inner states such as pleasure and desire as a reason for postulating another faculty distinct from the external senses, as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers do. However, it is clear from vv. 83 and 160 above that he understands *manas* to have that function as well.

64 The principle of the dependence of the inner faculties on the external ones in regard to the mental awareness of currently existing objects is clearly articulated in Sāṃkhya philosophy. See YD ad SK 30, esp. p. 212, ll. 28–30. *Both* in regard to an object currently being sensed *and* one not currently being sensed (30c: *dṛṣṭe tathāpy adṛṣṭe*; i.e., one that was *previously* experienced by the senses, though the text also problematically mentions objects that are in the future and ones that are "concealed"), the triad of internal faculties consisting of mind, ego, and intellect is dependent on the external senses (30d: *trayasya tatpūrvikā vṛttiḥ*). See also SK 33. See Frauwallner (1958), pp. 106–7.

65 See NS 3.1.53 with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, where it is maintained by an opponent that there is only one sense faculty, namely, touch, because the seats of the different sense faculties in the body are "pervaded" by the skin. We could consider "specific parts of the skin" as having different capacities at different corporal locations. Preisendanz (1994), pp. 612–15, emphasizes that this was not the Buddhist position, and indeed, the possibility that there could be just one sense faculty is mentioned by Diṅnāga in PS 1.4.2a only as an unwanted consequence of the Vaiśeṣika notion that more than one

sense could perceive the same thing (viz., substance). See Preisendanz's discussion, pp. 616ff., for possible sources of the idea that touch is the only sense, and note 42 of Chapter 1.

66 This could possibly be an allusion to PS 1.4.2b, "That which has power over its own object has so even over different varieties [of that object]" (Hattori [1968], p. 45) – at least Pārthasārathi takes it that way. Diṅnāga, however, in this half-verse is merely citing the accepted Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine that each sense is able to apprehend different varieties of the type of object specific to it; vision, for example, is able to perceive a variety of colors, etc.; see VS 4.1.12, NS 3.1.57–58. Diṅnāga's point seems to be that, though this may be true, each sense is still restricted to objects of a certain general type; it does not support the notion that two different senses could apprehend the *same thing*, that is, substance.Thus, this is not necessarily a doctrine he embraces himself – though one can think of no reason why he would reject it; rather, it seems to stem from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discussions. Nor is it clear that he wishes to expand it into the idea Kumārila is considering here, that there is only *one* sense faculty possessing multiple capacities.

67 At this juncture Kumārila may have in mind PS 1.5.8cd–9 (Hattori [1968], pp. 60–2), where Diṅnāga is criticizing Sāmkhya epistemology. Diṅnāga takes the Sāṃkhya to task for not mentioning *manas* as one of the *pramāṅas*, even though the Sāṃkhya believes that the mind apprehends the functioning of the senses and therefore ought to qualify itself as sense faculty. (Diṅnāga probably has in mind Vārṣagaṇya's definition of perception, which states that the functioning of the senses is "governed" by the mind, *manasādhiṣṭhitā*; see Frauwallner [1958], p. 127.) If the Sāṃkhya were to maintain that the mind's cognition of the functioning of the senses is actually a memory, so that there would be no fault in not mentioning it as one of the senses (since memory is not a *pramāṇa*), then one must ask how the mind is able to remember something it has not previously experienced. If one held that the mind experiences the functioning of the senses as the senses grasp their objects, then just for that reason the mind should be mentioned as a sense faculty itself; for it is able to apprehend the functioning of the other senses just as they are able to apprehend their objects. For similar reasons, the mind should not be able to remember previously experienced objects. In the first place, the Sāṃkhya generally maintains that the mind is aware, not directly of objects, but of the senses, which assume the form of objects; thus, it does not have a previous experience of objects that would serve as the basis of memories. If the Sāṃkhya were to go against the spirit of his own theory and hold that the mind directly apprehends objects simultaneously with the senses, then there would be no need for the other senses. The mind would be able to apprehend external objects by itself.

Frauwallner has shown that Diṅnāga, in this section of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, draws on a debate that took place within Sāṃkhya itself and can be traced to two commentaries on the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, among other sources; see Frauwallner (1958), pp. 106–15. Whether Kumārila was aware of the debate as it was conducted among the Sāṃkhyas or just Diṅnāga's rehearsal of it cannot be determined. In any case, Kumārila seems to be taking up a definite position in regard to the Sāṃkhya controversy about the mind's role in memory here; namely, the memory of external objects is based on the mind's having previously experienced those objects simultaneously with the external sense faculties. Kumārila has already, v. 136, entertained the possibility that the mind is a sense faculty itself that grasps the determinate nature of the object of perception. This, however, does not make the other sense faculties superfluous. In vv. 162c and 164cd Kumārila has pointed out that the mind is still dependent on the external faculties in knowing external objects. If an external sense faculty is impaired, perceptual cognitions of its specific type of object stop.

It was partly, it seems, to avoid problems associated with the apprehension by both mind and external sense faculty of the same object that led Dharmakīrti to suggest that in mental perception the mind apprehends *the immediately succeeding moment* of the object apprehended by the external sense – thus, in reality, a completely different object. See PV 3.243.

68 See, for example, NBh 3.1.16: "Of the knower there are various means of knowledge: by means of the faculty of vision one sees, by means of the faculty of smell one smells, by means of the faculty of touch one feels. Similarly, there is for the one who thinks and is aware of all types of objects (*sarvaviṣayasya*) a faculty of thinking consisting of the internal organ (i.e., the mind), which has every kind of thing as its object (*sarvaviṣaya*), by means of which one thinks" (p. 737). Vācaspatimiśra clarifies, ad loc., that "thought" means "a cognition of memory, inference, etc." Thus, according to these commentators, the *sūtra* posits mind as the faculty of memory. See above, n. 35. The mechanics of memory are discussed at length, NS 3.2.25ff. Precisely because the mind is the instrument by means of which the knower remembers, however, the mind is *not* the rememberer. It is the self who employs the mind and other faculties that is the knower and rememberer (3.2.38–40). This is consistent with what Kumārila has already said earlier in v. 122 and will repeat in the next verse. Thus, Kumārila cannot be arguing here that the mind is the *subject* of memory. He must be arguing, rather, that in order to function as the *instrument* of memory the mind must have somehow previously grasped the object to be remembered.

69 I am groping to find Kumārila's argument here. The commentaries do not provide much help. At NV, pp. 185, l. 8–186, l. 6, Uddyotakara says that cognitions that have different subjects, different objects, or different causes cannot be connected together in memory. Thus, Devadatta cannot remember what Yajñadatta experienced. Nor can one remember a certain *color* one saw as the quality of *touch* one is now feeling. Nor can one remember the faculty of touch by means of which one *felt* something as the faculty of vision by means of which one is now *seeing* it (following Vācaspatimśra's gloss). Perhaps Kumārila has some such principle in mind here? Not only must the subject of memory be the same person who had the experience that is being remembered, there must be a continuity of means as well – a faculty not restricted to just one type of sense object, but one that apprehends all. Moreover, if I remember an object as something *determinate* by means of the mind now, then I must have previously experienced it through the mind as something determinate.

70 The same problem is considered at NS 3.1.57–58. See note 66 above.

71 Both Pārthasārathi and Sucarita gloss *mūrti* as *parimāṇa*.

72 Cf. NV, p. 204, ll. 9–11.

73 Pārthasārathimiśra announces that at this point Kumārila begins to consider verbal conceptual awareness, *śabdavikalpa* (Kāś, p. 135, l. 14), that is to say, conceptual awareness *qua* the joining of a word or name with the perceived object

74 Kāś, p. 271, ll. 13–15.

75 This resonates with the Buddhist notion that conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) is merely the joining of a particular word – a word for a genus, a word for a quality, etc. – with the percept. See earlier, commentary to v. 120.

76 See Hayes (1988), pp. 261ff.; DN, pp. 607–8. The following account of this passage is rather impressionistic, based as it is on Hayes' translation and Jambuvijayaji's Sanskrit reconstruction.

77 DN, p. 607, ll. 28–9.

78 VP[R] 3.1.6: "First the own universal is expressed by all words; next that [own universal] is superimposed on the meaning universals" (Houben, p. 90). Cf. VP[R] 2.127cd–128; Houben (1995), pp. 66–75, 157–62. The idea that superimposition is the primary relation between word and meaning is brought out more forcefully by

Bhartṛhari's commentator Helārāja; Puṇyarāja, another of Bhartṛhari's commentators, maintains that superimposition is the preferred view of the Grammarians (Houben [1995], pp. 159–60). It is criticized by Śāntarakṣita at TS 898–899, so it seems clear that this was not the Buddhist position. *Aṣṭādhāyī* 1.1.68, which is discussed at length by Patañjali, already states that a word may be used to indicate its "own form" – certainly, this is how words are typically employed in grammar.

79 See VP[R] 1.51–70. Houben translates vv. 51, 54–58 as follows (with one minor emendation).

> Just as, in a cognition, its own form and that of the [object] cognized are perceived, in the same way, in a word (*śabda*), the form of the thing-meant is revealed and that of [the word] itself.
>
> Just as the mind of the speaker first turns towards the words, in the same way, the attention of the hearer also is first directed towards them.
> Having become secondary to the meanings, their purpose fulfilled [in the expression of] specific things to be expressed, the [words] are not attended to by people in daily life, because they are there for something else.
>
> Just as light has two capacities, that of being revealed and that of being the revealer, similarly, all words have two distinct capacities.
>
> No meaning is conveyed by words which have not [themselves] become the objects [of knowledge]. By their mere existence, if they are not grasped, they do not convey meaning.
>
> Therefore, when the own form [of the word] is not discerned, one asks 'what did he say?' In the case of an object to be revealed [by the senses], the form of the senses is not similarly perceived.
>
> (Houben [1995], pp. 69, 71)

Houben interprets this passage as being concerned with what he calls a "two-capacity" theory, according to which an uttered word expresses both its own form and its meaning, not the "two-level" theory I have just described, according to which a word first expresses its own form, then through that its meaning. However, he notes, pp. 72–3, that these two models cannot, in the final analysis, be kept strictly apart.

80 The notion that the linguistic convention "is of the nature of the mutual superimposition of word and meaning" (*padapadārthayor itaretarādhyāsarūpa*) is also found in YBh 3.17; see Kunjunni Rājā (1963), pp. 112–13. According to the *sūtra*, by practicing *saṃyama* on the distinction between word, meaning, and cognition one achieves "knowledge of the cries of all creatures." Patañjali says in his commentary that he who is knowledgeable of the distinction is "omniscient."

81 See PrPr ad VP 3.2, esp. p. 123, ll. 10–16; p. 125, ll. 7–16; Houben (1995), pp. 333–9. See also the presentation of the Grammarian position in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, NM, p. 206, l. 15ff. The Grammarian believes that when, in a conceptual awareness, a word is applied to an object, it "illumines both itself and the object" in such a way that the object appears *qualified* by the word that expresses it (*vācakāvacchinnavācyapratibhāsa*; p. 208, ll. 11–14).

82 At VP[R] 2.122–124 he considers the view that the word expresses the universal, which necessarily implies the particular. This, generally, seems to have been the Bhāṭṭa position.

83 PS 5.6ab. Hayes (1988), p. 267; DN, p. 608, l. 8.

84 DN, p. 629, l. 5.

85 Cf. NBhūṣ, p. 176, ll. 21–22. Bhāsarvajña notes that certain "others" (does he mean other *Buddhists* or non-Buddhists?) consider the "conjunction" (*saṃsarga*) of an expression indicated by Dharmakīrti as the defining characteristic of conceptual construction (implicitly, in the definition, *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ*) to be "the uniting of the form of the designation and that of the the thing designated as

objects of cognition in regard to one thing, or in other words, a cognition that presents [the thing] as identical with the name, etc." (*abhidhānābhidheyatvākārayor ekatra jñānagrāhyatayā mīlanaṃ nāmādinaikatvāpādanapratipattir iti*).

86 Here one should also note Śrīdhara's discussion of the Buddhist understanding of *kalpanā*. One of the alternatives he considers is that *kalpanā* is a cognition "having the nature of the joining of a word" (*śabdasaṃyojanātmikā pratīti*) insofar as "it causes the object to have the character of the word" (*arthaṃ śabdātmakaṃ karoti*), NKand, p. 453, ll. 5–7. Thus, it is possible that the position Kumārila is considering is one that certain Buddhists explicitly defended. See, again, the statement of Bhāsarvajña cited in the previous note.

87 On this topic in general, see Herzberger (1986) and Lindtner (1992b).

88 See Frauwallner (1959), pp. 107–18. According to Frauwallner, Diṅnāga begins the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* with a verse of his own declaring time to be unreal, then attaches vv. 53–87 of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* with only a few omissions, and concludes with two other verses of Bhartṛhari's, drawn from elsewhere in his corpus. The verses themselves contain only a few alterations, which are insignificant except in one place where Diṅnāga substitutes the term 'consciousness' (*vijñāna* or *citta*) for Bhartṛhari's 'Brahman'.

89 Cf., however, Frauwallner (1959), pp. 114–16. One of the puzzles of the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, he believes, is that it represents a standpoint incompatible with Diṅnāga's later logical works, such as the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Frauwallner's solution to this puzzle is that, when he composed the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, he was a follower of the Mahāyāna teacher Maitreyanātha – this is indicated by another, apparently early work of his, the *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṅgraha* – whose views are in certain respects remarkably close to Advaita.

90 The verses read, in Houben's translation:

> Just as, through a defect in an organ of sense, a cognition arises from the objects, as it were with some element superimposed (*mātrādhyāropavān*), like that is an idea born from statements.
>
> A word is based on a cognition which does not reflect its object in its entirety. It expresses the object, not ascertained according to its form, through another form.
>
> When they are in the course of everyday life and perceive (*rūpaṇa*) or speak about (*vyapadeśa*) something, the child and the wise are alike in their knowledge and words.
>
> (Houben [1995], pp. 272–3)

These verses in Bhartṛhari's text come after 3.3.52, which is left out of Diṅnāga's treatise:

> Verbal usage follows [only] one aspect of a part [of reality]; or [it follows] an ascertainment through an external factor; or a reversal [of reality]; or something non-existent.
>
> (Houben [1995], p. 272)

Helārāja's commentary on this verse identifies four views relating to these four ways in which language is imperfect. The second, which he associates with the phrase of the verse 'ascertainment through an external factor', is referred to as the *saṃsargadarśana*, the mixture or confusion view – Houben prefers to call it the association-view – and described as follows: "[Verbal usage follows] an ascertainment through an external factor, that is, through a Universal, etc. In the association-view (*saṃsargadarśana*), a cow is not a cow by itself; it is a cow on account of a relation with cow-ness. Therefore, a substance which cannot be dealt with [in words] directly, just like Brahman [the entity of Existence], enters into verbal usage as having a form

imposed by an external factor" (trans. Houben, p. 391; see PrPr, p. 161, ll. 1–2). The description of this view, and particularly the term Helārāja uses to refer to it, calls to mind Diṅnāga's charge against the Brahmanical theory that words express particulars possessed of universals that it would render all linguistically mediated cognitions false "because of the characteristic of mixture or confusion" (*saṃsargarūpāt*).

On Bhartṛhari's understanding of the relation between word and meaning in terms of *adhyāsa*, superimposition, see Houben (1995), pp. 157–62.

At least one other verse of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* that Diṅnāga includes in his *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, namely, 3.3.82 (=*Traikālyaparīkṣā* 28), clearly suggests that Bhartṛhari considered any awareness informed by language to be a kind of false imagination:

> All everyday verbal usage takes place by means of a word meaning (*padārtha*) that is dealt with as literally true (*mukhyena iva*), but is in fact a reality (*bhāva*) created by conceptual differentiation (*vikalpa*).
> (Houben [1995], p. 310; see Helārāja ad loc., trans. by Houben, p. 420.)

Since Bhartṛhari, as we have seen, considered *all* cognition by means of which we do things in the world – that is, all cognition that counts as cognition for practical purposes – to be informed by language, his statements imply that our awareness of the empirical world *in general* is deceptive or false. See Houben (1995), pp. 275–6, 18–21, who, however, speaks more mildly of Bhartṛhari's "admission of a certain gap between truth and reality on the one hand and on the other hand what is expressible in speech" (p. 19).

91 Umbeka, it should be noted, specifically cites the first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* in his commentary on PP 172.

92 See NM, vol. 2, pp. 479, l. 10–480, l. 5. Jayanta cites PP 172 in pursuing a similar line of argument against the Grammarian view.

93 Vācaspatimiśra finds this idea expressed in NBh 1.1.4, where Vātsyāyana is discussing the rationale for including the term *avyapadeśya* 'inexpressible' in the definition of perception. See Introduction, n. 36. Vātsyāyana introduces the Grammarian position as follows. "There are as many names and words as are there objects. By means of them there is a firm notion (*sampratyaya*) of objects, and as a result of a firm notion, there is practical activity." Vācaspati interprets the expression 'firm notion' to mean a cognition that is distinctive or extraordinary (*samadhika pratyaya*), noting that when there is a "removal of the word" (*śabdāpakarṣa*) there is a diminishing of the cognition and when there is an "augmenting of the word" (*śabdotkarṣa*) there is an augmenting or enhancing of it (NVTṬ, p. 109, ll. 15–18). This fact supports the identity of language and cognition. This idea can also be seen reflected in verses of the *Vākyapadīya* such as VP(R) 1.132.

94 This verse may be a play on VP(R) 1.67ab: *prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhāt saṃjñā rūpapadārthikā*, "Before connection with the named, a name has its form as its meaning" (Houben [1995], p. 72). That is to say, before a name is assigned to a thing as its meaning it expresses its own form as its meaning. Kumārila is saying here, before an object is associated with a certain expression as its meaning, it is manifest in its own form. See also NM, pp. 208, l. 15–209, l. 2, where 175d, *saṃjñitvaṃ kevalaṃ param*, is cited tendentiously *in support* of the Grammarian position. It is taken as implying that, after one has learned language, there exists an established relation between word and meaning, such that the meaning is only manifest *as qualified* by the word.

95 See NKand, p. 452, ll. 12ff. Śrīdhara, scrutinizing the Buddhist position, considers two basic possibilities for the theory that *kalpanā*, conceptual construction, is a "cognition having the nature of the joining of a word" (*śabdasaṃyojanātmikāpratīti*): either (1) the word is somehow applied to the object or (2) the cognition itself is joined

with the word. Of the former alternative there are three further possibilities: (a) the cognition causes the object to have the character of the word (*śabdātmakam artham karoti*), (b) it grasps the object as "influenced" by the form of the word (*śabdākāroparaktaṃ gṛhṇāti*), and (c) it indicates the object by means of the word (*śabdena vyapadiśati*). Śrīdhara rejects option (a) on the grounds that the object is manifest even in the conceptualized cognition according to the same form grasped in the nonconceptualized cognition. Moreover, the object still possesses causal efficacy, *arthakriyā*; its reality is therefore not in any way obscured by the word. Finally, if the object were made to take on the form of the word, then two people, one versed in language and other not, would not ascertain the same object at the same time (p. 453, ll. 5–7).

In considering option (b), that a conceptualized cognition presents its object as somehow influenced or "colored" by the word, in the same way a crystal is affected by an object placed next to it, Śrīdhara maintains that that is contrary to our experience. The word we associate with the object does not in any way affect it; the object does not appear to take on the qualities of the word. For one thing, the word is not something *visible*. In this connection he quotes the following verse, which probably derives from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (cf. NVTṬ, p. 118):

> *saṃjñā hi smaryamāṇāpi pratyakṣatvaṃ na bādhate /*
> *saṃjñinaḥ sā taṭasthā hi na rūpācchādanakṣamā /*

> A name, even when it is being remembered, does not annul the perceivability of the thing named. For, being neutral, it is not capable of obscuring the form of the object.

96 Helārāja considers essentially this objection in his commentary on VP(I) 3.3.2, p. 124, l. 6 ("But isn't it the case that in the meaning no sequence of phonemes is perceived?"), and rejects it by resorting to the mystical teachings of the Grammarians. He identifies the word with the power of consciousness that manifests itself as both word and meaning. See Houben (1995), pp. 334–5.

97 The idea that a conceptual awareness serves to highlight a certain aspect of an object stands in contrast to Dharmakīrti's theory that it serves to *exclude* a property falsely superimposed on the object; thus, he believes, the intentional object (*gocara*) of a conceptual awareness is an exclusion (*apoha*). See PV 1.48ff.; cf. TS 1298–1302. Recall again in this connection Vācaspatimiśra's idea that the association of a word with the perceived object brings about a certain "enhancement" of the cognition; see earlier, n. 93.

98 The idea that the word functions as the instrument (*karaṇa*) or means (*upāya*) in a conceptualized cognition also comes up in the discussions of other Brahmanical thinkers. See, for example, NM, pp. 210–11. The Ācāryas argue that if the word is the means of revealing an object in the act of cognition, it cannot also be what is revealed (i.e., the *karman*).

99 Kumārila employed a similar argument earlier, vv. 154–155, in arguing that the judgement that a thing "is" a certain property – green, blue, cowness, etc. – cannot be considered false, even if property and property-bearer are really distinct, if that is how it always appears (by virtue of the inherence of the property in the property-bearer). See also v. 145. Here he appears to saying that, even if one accepts the superimposition thesis, conceptual awareness will not be false. If one *always* cognizes the meaning *as* the word, never otherwise, then one's cognition counts as true.

100 Here Kumārila seems to go so far as to entertain Bhartṛhari's thesis: the meaning really *is* the word.

101 *jñānaṃ prayoktur bāhyo 'rthaḥ svarūpaṃ ca pratīyate / śabdair uccaritais teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ//* "From uttered words the cognition of the speaker, the

external meaning, and the own form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed." See Houben (1995), pp. 145–54. Bhartṛhari does not emphasize in this connection that this triple function accounts for the form of the word being *superimposed* upon its meaning. Helārāja, however, presents the superimposition theory at length in his discussion of the next verse, 3.3.2.

102 Verse 183 is obscure. I think I am following the interpretation of Sucarita. Pārthasārathi appears to read *vaktṛsarūpatā* for *vaktṛsvarūpatā*, but how he goes on to construe the verse on that basis is unclear to me.

103 Kumārila held that we are not immediately aware of a cognition when it occurs. Rather, we only postulate its existence after it has occurred, as the means of cognizing a certain object, from the fact that the object has become manifest to us. Moreover, as we have seen in the first part of the PP, he did not believe that a cognition assumes the form of its object, as the Buddhist believed; thus, it is "formless." It is merely a means of illumining an object completely distinct from it.

104 The position Kumārila has developed in this section appears related to that of the Ācāryas, early commentators on the *Nyāyavārttika*, cited by Jayantabhaṭṭa and occasionally referred to by me elsewhere in these notes. The Ācāryas held that in conceptualized perception the object is not presented as qualified or delimited or influenced by a word (*śabdaviśiṣṭa*, *śabdāvacchinna*, *śabdānurakta*), as their opponents, the Vyākhyātṛs, maintained. Rather, the object is presented as qualified by whatever feature the word indicates; the word, functioning merely as a means of being aware of the object in a determinate way, is not part of the content of the awareness. See NM pp. 210, l. 6–212, l. 4; 214, *kās*. 28–30; 218, l. 10–220, l. 6. Such an interpretation of conceptualized perception serves to remove the objection that it is not genuine perception at all but merely a form of verbal awareness (*śābda jñāna*), that is, an altogether different means of knowledge. Cf. Gupta (1963), pp. 94ff., which however in my opinion offers a somewhat misleading analysis of this view.

In the course of his presentation of the Ācāryas' position Jayanta makes various statements that resonate with Kumārila's refutation of the Superimposition Theory in this and the following sections of the PP. Thus, we have these verses (NM, pp. 214–15, *kās*. 29–33), in which the Ācāryas chide the Vyākhyātṛs:

> And if there were an awareness of the meaning from the word as imitating the latter (*svānurāgena*), then there would also be an awareness [in an inference] of the major term from the middle term as delimited by the latter (*svāvavacchedena*).
>
> But [in inference] fire is not comprehended as being accompanied by smoke. So here, too, a cow and so forth are not comprehended as joined with a word (*śabdayogena*).
>
> And there is no property of a thing called "being expressed by a word." If there were, it would appear in a nonconceptualized cognition, too, like visible form.
>
> And how will the blundering Buddhist, claiming that words do not "touch" objects, be refuted by you if not by the weapon of perception?
>
> How will there be a function of words in regard to perceptible objects for you? For that in regard to which they actually have a function is made by you into something verbal.

That is to say, if the words that inform conceptual awareness themselves appeared as features or qualifiers of the object of awareness, they would in effect refer to themselves. The object would not present itself in conceptualized perception distinctly from the word. Jayanta refers to this view as that of the "superimposition of the word" (*śabdādhyāsa*), p. 215, l. 10.

The position of the Ācārya school is reiterated in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña. Responding to Dharmakīrti's criticism of conceptualized perception on the grounds that it falsely ascribes a word to an object, he says,

> This [objection], too, is refuted already by [our] denial that the qualifying [word] and the qualified [thing] are the object of the same cognition. For the word ['cow'] does not appear in the cognition "This is a cow." What then [appears in the cognition]? A thing that has a dewlap, etc., [and it appears that way] because of the cognition that [several perceptible factors] have a common locus [in the form:], "This white, plump, horned [thing] moves," etc. (NBhūṣ, pp. 180, l. 25–181, l. 1; trans. from Franco [1994], p. 461, n. 243.)

105 In connection with the previous verse, 186, Pārthasārathi announced that Kumārila has begun considering the view of those who, denying the reality of the universal, believe that a word indicates its own form as superimposed upon the individual, and that it is the unity of the word itself that accounts for the sameness of the various objects to which it refers, not the universal. This starkly nominalist idea, as further developed in 187ab, seems to be a caricature of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*. It is clearly not Bhartṛhari's view.

106 See ŚV *Śabdanityatā-adhikaraṇa* 284ff., *Sphoṭavāda* 96ff.

107 That is, it is an indivisible and partless entity, the *sphoṭa*. Pārthasārathi and Sucarita say that 192c'd is directed against those who believe that the meaning of a word is either a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the word or an illusory appearance (*vivarta*) of it, like a reflection. They believe that Kumārila is asking: how can that which is without form transform itself or appear as something having form? Only something like a piece of clay, which already has form, can be transformed into a pot; only something having color and shape, like a face, can be reflected in a mirror. The understanding of word-monism, Śabda Advaita, the metaphysical teaching of the Grammarians, as implying that the word assumes the guise of its meaning as an illusory form – in the same way a face appears as a reflection in a mirror – is presented by Jayanta, NM, vol. 2, pp. 477–8.

108 The objections Kumārila raises against the Superimposition Theory, from here through v. 199, parallel objections he brings against the Buddhist *apoha* theory. See ŚV *Apohavāda* 115ff. If words referred only to exclusions, he maintains, they could not stand in various grammatical relationships with each other, such as that of qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatva*), nor would they be used in grammatical agreement (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*, 116ac'). He specifically mentions the example 'blue lotus'.

109 At ŚV *Sambandhākṣepa-adhikaraṇa* Kumārila argues that there is an eternal relation of *vācaka–vācya*, expression and thing expressed, between word and meaning, which nevertheless must be learned, either from observing the usage of elders or from being directly instructed. That it must be learned does not contradict the fact that the word has a natural capacity (*śakti*) to express its meaning, nor imply that the relation between word and meaning is merely conventional. See *Sambandhākṣepa* 21cd–24ab and 29cd–37.

110 This relates to the point raised in the first part of v. 192.

111 This point reminds one of the arguments Diṅnāga makes against the theory that words indicate individuals possessed of universals in PS 5. See the commentary to PP 171 earlier.

112 This, once again, relates to the mystical teaching of the Grammarians that the meaning of a word is its illusory appearance, like the reflection of a face in a mirror or the moon in water. See earlier, n. 107.

113 This relates to the point made in the latter part of v. 192.

114 Cf. NKand, p. 453, ll. 10–11, also NM, vol. 2, p. 483, ll. 5–8. Kumārila's entire discussion of the absurd consequences of the Superimposition Theory, from PP 172 through 212, is summarized, point by point, by Jayanta, NM, vol. 2, pp. 478–83. Jayanta specifically cites PP 172, 182cd, and 185.

115 As discussed in the Introduction, the Buddhist accepts only two kinds of *pramāṇas*, perception and inference; however, scripture is also considered a valid means of knowledge as a variety of inference. One is able to infer from uttered or written words a certain state of knowledge of their author, given that he or she is a reliable witness in regard to the matters of which he or she speaks. The Yogācāra epistemologist's understanding of the word of the Buddha as a valid means of knowledge, based on the reliability of the Buddha as a person of supernormal vision, which is to be inferred in turn from his practicing compassion over many lifetimes, is worked out in detail by Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*. See Franco (1997), Chapter 1, for an analysis of Dharmakīrti's argument there.

116 This follows the interpretations of Pārthasārathi and Sucarita. However, the last part of the verse literally says, "for a meaning is not cognized from a false statement." Kumārila may, therefore, be saying that the thesis that all conceptual awareness is false implies not just its own falsehood but its own nonsensicality. This may refer to Kumārila's account of the meaning of human, as opposed to Vedic, utterances in the *Codanāsūtra-adhikaraṇa*. Śabara states, MSBh, p. 18, ll. 12–13, that from a statement made by a human one receives the idea, not that matters are a certain way, as one would from an authorless statement (a well-formed string of words by themselves), but that the *speaker* is possessed of a certain cognition. Kumārila clarifies, however, that this is the case only if the speaker is reliable (*āpta*). If the speaker is not reliable, that is, if he sometimes says what is not the case, whether intentionally or not, then one cannot be confident of ascertaining his state of mind from what he says; for no correlation can be established between the words he utters and actual states of affairs. It seems but a logical extension of this idea that if *all* conceptual awareness were false, nothing anyone said would be a reliable indication of his cognitive state. Thus, no human utterance would have a determinate meaning – including the claim of the Buddhist that all conceptual awareness is false. See ŚV, *Codanā* 160ff., discussed by Taber (2002), pp. 183–5.

In the *Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa* Kumārila will argue at length that the argument for idealism based on the indistinguishability of waking experience from dreaming – "The cognition of a post, etc., is false, because it is a cognition, like a cognition in a dream" (cf. *Viṃśatikā* 1) – is self-refuting, because it denies the reality of distinct terms of inference, that is, subject, reason, and property-to-be-proved, upon which it is based. If the thesis of the inference is true, namely, that every cognition is false because nothing outside consciousness corresponds to it, then the inference cannot be intelligibly asserted. See Taber (1994).

117 This seems to be an allusion to the point made in v. 181a. Sucarita, however, maintains that in that verse the falsehood of conceptual awareness is rejected on the assumption that word and meaning are identical (*śabdātmakatā*), whereas in this verse it is rejected on the assumption that the meaning "has the form of the word merely by virtue of its [eternal] connection with the word" (*śabdasambandhamātreṇa . . . śabdākāratva*).

From v. 219–228 Kumārila defends the validity of conceptual awareness on the basis of the idea that we are aware of the meaning of a word in the form of the word, much like Bhartṛhari proposes, even though Kumārila has been vigorously arguing against the Superimposition Theory prior to this. However, we have seen elsewhere in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* a willingness on Kumārila's part to consider matters from a variety of perspectives. Thus, to cite another example, after rejecting the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence in vv. 146–150, Kumārila turns around in vv. 154–155 to defend

the validity of conceptual awareness on the assumption of inherence: a conceptual awareness that apprehends the property-bearer as always having the form of the property that inheres in it could not be incorrect. In the first part of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* we noted Kumārila's willingness to entertain other theories in connection with his discussions of the relation between sense faculty and object and of the identity of the *pramāṇa* perception. Thus, in general, although Kumārila does favor a particular position on all of these matters, he does not dogmatically exclude other points of view – except of course that of the Buddhist. Bhartṛhari can been seen as exhibiting a similar tendency, except in his case, not even the Buddhist is excluded. See Houben (1995), pp. 16–18.

118 At *Sambandhākṣepa* 31cd–42ab Kumārila explains that a word functions to make one aware of its meaning – that is, it functions as a *gamaka*, an indicator – insofar as it is *known* as an indicator of its meaning. Words are not meaningful for those who have not learned what they mean. That, however, does not compromise the natural capacity, *śakti*, of the word to indicate its object, just as the fact that light is required to see does not invalidate the innate ability of the eye to see. Knowledge of the relation of word and meaning is an auxiliary (*aṅga*) of the *śakti* of the word. At *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 31cd–39 he develops this idea further. "A white object in the vicinity of both blind and seeing people is not cognized by the blind, but it is cognized by the others. To that extent there is a cognition of it as existing or not existing. But because of the difference of capability and incapability of men, there is no contradiction here.... Thus, the apprehension of discourse is the same as an apprehension by means of the senses. Those who have [the capacity to cognize the denotative power of words] will understand the meaning, not others who are like the blind" (vv. 37–39).

119 That there is a "natural" (*autpattika*) relation between word and meaning, which is the basis of the Vedic injunction's serving as the sole means of knowing Dharma, is asserted at MS 1.1.5, immediately following the *sūtra* that excludes perception. The doctrine of a beginningless relation between word and meaning, independent of human agency, goes back to the ancient Grammarian Kātyāyana, who referred to the relation as "established" (*siddha*). Patañjali is ambivalent about whether this should be interpreted to mean permanent or eternal, that is, *nitya* (as opposed to produced, *kārya*); he seems to favor that view, yet he gives various reasons for and against and does not completely resolve the issue. In the end, he seems to settle on the position that "established" means that, *from a human point of view*, all three things – word, meaning, and the relation between them – are fixed to begin with and that is it not the role of the grammarian to define or create them; rather, he must accept them as given. See Houben [1995], pp. 36–41. Bhartṛhari also states, VP (R) 1.23, "That word, meaning, and their relation are permanent is taught in [grammar] by the great seers, the composers of the sūtras, the ancillary texts and the commentaries" (Houben [1995], p. 31), and although he uses the word *nitya* in this verse, he too seems to understand permanence to mean givenness from a human perspective. Thus, he also says, 1.28, "Whether these are [held to be] permanent or produced, their beginning is not found, as in the case of living beings. And it is this situation that is called 'permanence' " (Houben [1995], p. 64). Thus, the "permanence" of language for the Grammarians seems compatible with the possibility that it was created by humans, through the establishing of conventions, sometime in the distant past – though this could hardly have been Bhartṛhari's preferred position, since he clearly sees the world itself as a transformation of the word.

It was, however, the Mīmāṃsakas who stressed the absolute beginninglessness of language as a requirement of the authorlessness of the Veda, upon which its authority is grounded. Śabara himself states that *autpattika* means *nitya*, permanent or eternal, whereas the Vṛttikāra glosses it as "authorless" (*apauruṣeya*). The principal Mīmāṃsā

argument in support of the thesis that the relation of word and meaning is uncreated is that there is no *pramāṇa* that establishes its having been created. Certainly, there is no perception of it, but neither is there any memory of it, and as a rule one only resorts to a convention mindful of its author and his intention in establishing it, as when citing one of Pāṇini's rules. Nor must one postulate an author of the relation, since the usage of words in a certain way by one generation can be explained simply by the usage of the previous generation. A beginning to this progression needn't be postulated, in fact it would be unnecessarily going out on a limb to do so. This argument is already fully presented by the Vṛttikāra, MSBh, pp. 42, l. 12–48, l. 10; it is developed further by Kumārila in his *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*. The commitment to an eternal relation between word and meaning of course also entails commitments to the eternality of words and meanings themselves. Both of the latter are also already defended at length in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, the eternality of words in MSBh 1.1.6–23 (to which the *Śabdanityatā-adhikaraṇa* of the ŚV corresponds) and the eternality of meanings *qua* universals in MSBh 1.1.5 (to which the *Ākṛti-* and *Vanavāda* chapters of the ŚV correspond).

120 Cf. ŚV, *Sambandhākṣepa* 33 and 43cd. Kumārila argues at length in his *Tantravārttika*, under 1.3.30–35, that universals are the meanings of words, and he will refute the view that the relation between word and meaning is established by convention later in the ŚV, in the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* chapter. In the first verse of his chapter on universals, the *Ākṛtivāda*, he points out that universals must be established as the meanings of words in order for there to be an eternal connection between word and meaning. For the specific view that the meaning of a proper name is a universal, see TSP 1225.

121 This follows Pārthasārathi. Sucarita, as I understand him, construes the phrase 'in regard to the cognition of that form' (*tadrūpapratyayaṃ prati*) as referring to a cognition of the form of the meaning, for example, in the case of 'Devadatta', of his being a gift of the gods. In other words, even in the case of a word like 'Devadatta' the meaning is a universal.

122 See ŚD, pp. 66, l. 2–67, l. 8. In this verse Kumārila has momentarily reverted back to the view that the meaning does *not* have the form of the word. Thus, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi believe that Kumārila is speaking from his own point of view. If he were speaking entirely from his own point of view, however, then when he says in v. 226 "prior to [knowing] the word," he would really mean prior to becoming aware of the *eternal* relation between word and meaning. He would not be talking about a conventional relation.

123 Thus, Kumārila is even willing to make room for the conventionalist theory. To my knowledge, however, this is the only place where he entertains this possibility. In the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* he is generally skeptical of the idea that one could ever establish a convention that originally fixes the meaning of a word.

124 The charge that a conceptualized perception is merely a memory because it cognizes what was previously cognized by a nonconceptualized perception is a common objection in later discussions. See, for example, TS 1297.

125 Cf. vv. 126–127.

126 This discussion seems to refer back to vv. 129–139. There, however, the issue was whether a conceptualized perception can really be considered a perception if it involves the mind and does not arise just through the functioning of a sense faculty. Here, the issue is whether there isn't some distortion of the object in a conceptualized perception due to the fact that it is not caused purely by the sense faculty. These are really two sides of the same issue.

127 This would appear to be an allusion to VP(R) 1.123 = VP(I) 1.111: *ṣaḍjādibhedaḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ | tasmād arthavidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabdamātrāsu*

niśritāḥ || "The difference between *ṣaḍja* and the other [musical notes] is perceived [only] if it is explained by words; so all divisions of objects are based on the dimensions of words" (Houben [1995], p. 76). (Note, however, that Rau reads *śabdādibhedaḥ* in the first *pāda*; Iyer reads *ṣaḍjādibhedaḥ*.) Maṇḍanamiśra seems to be turning aside Kumārila's argument here at BS, p. 19, 5–8, insisting that the object is present more clearly and distinctly after learning its name, thus implying that knowledge of the object is still inextricably intertwined with speech. See Thrasher (1993), pp. 94–5. Of course, Kumārila does not deny that one has a clearer awareness of the object when one is able to identify it by means of an expression; indeed, he says as much in this verse. His point, rather, is that one is still aware of the nature of the object, by virtue of which it is distinct from other things, prior to that.

128 Kumārila argues in this section of the *Anumānapariccheda* for the perceivability of universals as a requirement for inference. If the inferential mark, or middle term, of an inference – for example, 'smoke' in the inference "The mountain is on fire because it possesses smoke" – which in fact is a universal (*qua* the meaning of a general term) qualifying the subject term of the inference ('mountain') – if this inferential mark itself were knowable only through inference, a regress would ensue. For the Buddhist the only means of knowledge other than inference through which the inferential mark could be known is perception, since he recognizes only inference and perception as *pramāṇas*. Hence, universals must be objects of perception. As a defense of the perceivability of universals, Kumārila's discussion in the *Anumānapariccheda* is at the same time a defense of the validity of conceptualized perception. Later in the course of his argument he rejects the proposal that a mere particular (*asādhāraṇa artha/vastu*), the proper object of perception for the Buddhist, could be the middle term. "And that which cannot be designated and is without conceptual awareness (*vikalparahitasya* – i.e., the particular), cannot be an inferential mark without remembrance of a previous instance [of the inferential mark, perceived as connected with the property to be proved]" (163). He concludes, "Therefore, any other *pramāṇa* is believed to be dependent on perception (*pratyakṣapūrvatva*); and the universal must be amenable to perception, otherwise there would be no cognition of it" (173).

129 I have taken more liberty than usual in rendering the syntax of this verse.

APPENDIX

1 I have noted that in a copy of the 1898–99 edition, obtained from the University of Washington library, OCLC accession no. 19222846, which, however, lacks a title page, the first eighty pages (through *Codanā* 201ab) consist of an insertion from this apparently later edition published by ChSS. On the next page, numbered 101 (*Codanā* 181), the text continues with the original Tailaṅga edition. I saw a similar copy at the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London (in July 2004), which had a title page identifying it as edited by Rāma Śāstrī Tailaṅga, ChSS, no. 3, Benares: ChSS Office, 1898. One supposes that sometime in the first half of the twentieth century ChSS wished to reissue the 1898–99 edition by Tailaṅga but perhaps had lost the galleys to the first fascicle or so and simply substituted pages from this anonymous edition. Indeed, though it extends beyond this point, it may have been commissioned for precisely this purpose. It is, nevertheless, a carefully made edition, even preferable to Tailaṅga's.

2 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *ca.*

3 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *siddhis teṣām*.
4 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *vidyate*.
5 Tr, M; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T: *tadetatpūrvakatve*.
6 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr; T, M: *svarūpe yat tayor*.
7 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *na hy ekaṃ*.
8 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *anena*.
9 Tr; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, M: *tadābhāse'pi*.
10 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *saṃyogavyāpāreṇa*.
11 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *bhrāntyādiḥ*.
12 Ch$_2$, T, Tr, M; Ch$_1$: *jñāyate*.
13 Ch$_2$, Tr, M; T, Ch$_1$: *dharme nimittatā*.
14 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *tadaprāmāṇyasiddheś*.
15 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T; Tr, M: *badhyate*.
16 Ch$_2$, T; Ch$_1$, Tr, M: *tasyāpi vinivāryate*.
17 Ch$_2$, T, Tr, M; Ch$_1$: *bhaviṣyaty asya*.
18 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr, M; T: *vā*.
19 Ch$_2$; Ch$_1$, M, Tr, T: *pratyakṣatvapramāṇataḥ*.
20 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *yoginām*.
21 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *saptamyaiva*.
22 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *lakṣaṇatvena*.
23 T; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr, M: *lakṣaṇavyāptisiddhyartham*.
24 Ch$_2$, T; Ch$_1$, Tr: '*pi*; M: *ca*.
25 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *vānyaḥ*.
26 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *iṣyate*.
27 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *-kāras tu*.
28 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *tataś*.
29 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr, M; T: *pṛthutvam*.
30 Ch$_1$, T, Tr, M; Ch$_2$: *adhiṣṭhānapidhānam*.
31 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *ca*.
32 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *tu*.
33 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, M; Tr: *vā pramātmakam*.
34 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *ucyate*.
35 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, M; Tr: *yadā tv*.
36 M; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr: *buddhis tatrendriyādhīnā*.
37 Tr, M; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T: *aśnute*.
38 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, M; Tr: *-bhāvas tu*.
39 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *yadā*.
40 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *saṃyogo*.
41 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *te vijñeyāviṣayāntaram*.
42 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *-nivāraṇā*.
43 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *niścayo hi phalaṃ tasya*.
44 M; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr: *nāsāv ālocito yadā*; T: *nāsāv ālocite tadā*.
45 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, Tr; M: *karaṇatvam*.
46 Ch$_1$, T, Tr; M: *bhinnārthatvān na mucyate*; Ch$_2$: *bhinnārthatvaṃ na yujyate*.
47 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T, M; Tr: *manasaś cendriyatvena*.
48 Ch$_2$, T; Ch$_1$, Tr: *nānyātmā*; M: *tān ātmā*.
49 Ch$_2$, M; Ch$_1$, T, Tr: *kalpyate*.
50 Tr, M; Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, T: *vidyamānopalabhitvāt*.
51 Ch$_1$, Ch$_2$, Tr, M; T: *anumānādi no*.
52 Ch$_2$, T, M; Ch$_1$,Tr: *liṅgasambandhayos*.
53 Ch$_2$; Ch$_1$, T, Tr: *smṛteḥ*; M: *smṛtaḥ*.

54 Ch_1, T, Tr, M; Ch_2: *prāyo 'nanyadṛṣṭe*.
55 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *sampratīyeta*.
56 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *sambandhiliṅgiliṅgānām*.
57 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *karaṇād*.
58 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *dharmaśakteś*.
59 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *vā*.
60 Tr, M; Ch_2, T: *ca citratā*; Ch_1: *tathāpi citratā*.
61 T; Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M: *nānumā nopameṣyate*.
62 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr, M; *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1285: *ādyaṃ cen*.
63 Tr; Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M: *vyāvṛttānugatātmanā*.
64 Tr; M: *tv asādhāraṇatvena*; Ch_1, Ch_2, T: *cāsādhāraṇatvena*.
65 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *viśeṣāvagamākḷpteḥ*.
66 Ch_2, M, TS 1287; Ch_1, T, Tr: *vastudharmair*.
67 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *buddhir*.
68 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *tatsmṛtyādyasamarthatvād*.
69 M; Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr: *satī jātiḥ pratīyate*.
70 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr, M; TS 1289: *gamyante*.
71 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr, M; TS 1290, *tatra vibuddhyante*.
72 Ch_1, Tr, M; Ch_2, T: *asambaddhavikalpe*.
73 Ch_2, T, Tr, M; Ch_1: *tena sādhāraṇatvam*.
74 T; Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M: *rūḍhitvam*.
75 Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M; T: *tatra*.
76 M; Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr: *ca*.
77 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *asadrūpe*.
78 M; Ch_1, Ch_2, T: *na tu jātyādinirmuktam*; Tr: *na hi jātyādinirmuktam*.
79 Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M; T: *tasmāt cāpi*.
80 Ch_1, T, Tr, M: Ch_2: *tasyānyasaṅgataḥ*.
81 Ch_2, Tr, M; T: *asadrūpasaṃvedyaḥ*. Line 155ab is missing in Ch_1.
82 T, M; Ch_2, Tr: *saṃvedyo vānyathā*. Line 155ab is missing in Ch_1.
83 Ch_2, T; Ch_1, Tr: *bhinnaśarīrasya grāhyatvād bhinnarūpatā*; M: *bhinnaśarīrasya grāhyatvād rūpabhinnatā*.
84 Tr; Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M: *tatsamam*.
85 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *sattārūpādibhedataḥ*.
86 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *gamyate*.
87 Ch_2, M; Ch_1, Tr, T: *sarvair*.
88 Ch_2; Ch_1, Tr, M: *na ca sarvā smṛtir*; T: *na cāsarvā smṛtir*.
89 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *kāraṇapekṣitā*.
90 Ch_1, T, Tr; Ch_2, M: *dravyamūrtī*.
91 Attested by Musalgaonkar, p. 150, n. 1; Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr: *buddhī rūpeṣu buddhivat*; M: *buddhirūpe 'mbubuddhivat*.
92 Ch_1, Ch_2, T; Tr: *cakṣuśśrotradhiyā*; M: *cakṣuśrotradhiyā*.
93 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *rūpe 'dhyāropa*.
94 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *rūpāntaram adṛṣṭaṃ*.
95 Ch_1, T, Tr, M; Ch_2: *vaktuḥ svarūpatā*.
96 Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M; T: *sāsnādimadrūpāṅ*.
97 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *bhavatu*.
98 Ch_1, Ch_2, M; T, Tr: *tat tantram*.
99 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, Tr; M: *kin tu*.
100 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *pūrvagṛhītārthasambandhād*.
101 Ch_1, Tr, M; Ch_2: *pratīyatām*; T: *pramīyate*.
102 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *gṛhyate*.

103 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *avagacchanti*.
104 Tr, M; Ch_1, Ch_2, T: *anumānataḥ*.
105 Ch_1, Ch_2, T, M; Tr: *vikalpyeta*.
106 Ch_1, Ch_2, Tr, M; T: *gotvaṃ*.
107 Ch_1, T, Tr, M; Ch_2: *vijñeyam*.

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ĀM *The Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra with the Pramāṇaparīkṣā of Vidyānanda*, ed. Gajādharalāl Jain, *Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā*, nos. 7 and 8, Varanasi: Kṛṣṇayantra Press, 1914.

ĀP *Āgamaprāmāṇya of Yāmunācārya*, ed. M. Narasimhachary, GOS, no. 160, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1976.

BĀUBh *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad with the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara and the Ṭīkā of Ānandagiri*, ed. Kāśīnāth Śāstrī Āgāśe, *Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series*, no. 15, Pune, 1982.

BCA *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, no. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960.

Bṛh *Bṛhatī by Prabhākara Miśra with the Commentary Rjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra*, ed. A. Chinnaswami Sastri, ChSS, no. 391 (fasc. 1), Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1929.

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BSBh *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāshya, with the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala*, ed. Anantakrishna Śāstrī and Vasudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī Paṇsikar, *Krishnadas Sanskrit Series*, no. 25, Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 1982.

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DN *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa, with the Commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*, ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī, 3 vols., Bhavnagar: Sri Jain Atmanand Sabha, 1966–88.

HB *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ,* ed. and trans. Ernst Steinkellner, Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1967.

ĪPV *Śrī Utpaladevācārya's Īśvarapratyabhijñā with the Vimarśinī Commentary of Abhinavaguptācārya*, ed. Sarvadarshanacharya Shri Krishnanad Sagar, Varanasi: Anand Kanan Press, 1981.

ĪPVV *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vivṛtivimaśinī by Abhinavagupta*, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī, 3 vols., *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, nos. 60, 62, and 65, Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1938–43.

Kāś *Kāśikā*, in *Mīmāmsā Slokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamiśra*, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Sāstrī, *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*, nos. 90, 99, Trivandrum, 1926, 1929; rpt. Trivandrum: CBH Publications, 1990.

KhKh *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khādya of Mahākavi Śrīharṣa*, with the *'Śāṅkarī' Commentary by Mm. Śaṅkara Miśra and the 'Tattvabodhinī' Hindi Commentary by Swāmī Hanumāndāsjī Ṣaṭśāstrī, Kashi Sanskrit Series*, no. 197, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970.

LT *Laghīyastraya*, in *Akalaṅka Granthatrayam*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, *Siṅghī Jaina Series*, no. 12, Ahmedabad–Calcutta: Sañchālaka-Siṅghī Jaina Granthamālā, 1939.

MM *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa*, ed. and trans. C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Adyar Library Series*, no. 105, Madras: Adyar Library, 1933.

MMK *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, ed. J. W. de Jong, *Adyar Library Series*, no. 109, Madras: Ayar Library, 1977.

MN *The Majjhima-Nikāya*, ed. V. Trenckner, 4 vols., London: Pali Text Society, 1964.

MP *Milindapañha*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1979.

MS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (*tarkapāda*), in Frauwallner (1968).

MSBh *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya* (*tarkapāda*: MS 1.1.1–5), in Frauwallner (1968).

NB *Nyāyabindu*, in NBṬ.

NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya*, in NS.

NBhūṣ *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, Varanasi: Saḍdarśana Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhāna, 1968.

NBṬ *The Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara Āchāraya, to which is added the Nyāyabindu*, ed. Peter Peterson, *Bibliotheca Indica*, no. 128, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1929.

NKaṇ *Nyāyakaṇikā*, in VV.

NKand *Nyāyakandalī*, in PDhS.

NKC *Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Nyaya Shastri, 2 vols., *Māṇik Candra Digambara Jain Granthamālā*, nos. 38–39, Bombay, 1938, 1944.

NM *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*, ed. K. S. Varadacharya, 2 vols., *Oriental Research Institute Series*, no. 116, Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969. (All citations are from vol. 1 unless otherwise noted.)

NR *Nyāyaratnākara*, in ŚV.

NRM *Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathimiśra with the Commentary of Rāmānujācārya entitled Nayakaratna*, ed. K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, GOS, no. 75, Baroda, 1937.

NS *Nyāyasūtra*, in *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, *Calcutta Sanskrit Series*, nos. 18 and 29, 1936, 1944; rpt. Calcutta: Metropolitan Publishing House, 1985.

NSā *Nyāyasāra*, in NBhūṣ.

NV *Nyāyavārttika*, in NS.

NVTP *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi*, in *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati and the Pariśuddhi of Udayana* (vol. 1, chap. 1), ed. Anantalal Thakur, Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text, no. 20, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.

NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in NS.

PDhS *Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Srīdhara Bhatta, along with Hindi Translation*, ed. Durgādhara Jhā, *Gaṅgānātha Jhā Granthamālā*, no. 1, Varanasi, 1977.

PKM *Prameyakamala-Mārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Chandra*, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Bombay, Nirnayasagar Press, 1941; rpt. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990.

PP *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, in ŚV.

PPañc *Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śri Śalikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-Siddhi*, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri, *BHU Darśana Series*, no. 4, Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1961.

PrPr *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, in VP(I), *Kāṇḍa III, part 1.*

PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chap. 1, in Hattori (1968); Chap. 2, vv. 1–25, Chap. 5, vv. 1–20, 25cd–36, in Hayes (1988); Chap. 2, vv. 47–52, in Frauwallner (1968).

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, in Hattori (1968), Frauwallner (1968), and Hayes (1988).

PV *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti, with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Acharya Manorathanandin*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, *Bauddha Bharati Series*, no. 3, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

PVBh *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam, or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVin *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam*, ed. Tilmann Vetter, Vienna, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966.

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, in PV.

ŚD *Śāstradīpikā*, ed. Kiśordāsa Svāmī, Varanasi: Srī Sādhuvelā Saṃskṛtamahāvidyālaya, 1977.

SDS *Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava*, ed. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, 3rd. edn., Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978.

SK *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, in YD.

ŚrīBh *Bhagavad Badarayana's Brahma Sūtra or Sariraka with Sri Bhashya by Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja and Its Commentary Named Bhashyartha Darpana by Abhinava Desika*, ed. Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, part 1, Madras: Sreevathsa Press, 1963.

SS *Sarvajñasiddhi*, in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, ed. A. Thakur, *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series*, no. 3, Patna, 1957.

ŚŚV *Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandgiri*, ed. N. Veezhinathan, Madras: University of Madras, 1971.

STK *The Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, ed. Rāmśaṅkar Bhaṭṭācārya, Benares: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969.

ŚV *Ślokavārttika of Srī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimiśra*, ed. Svāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī, *Prāchyabhārati Series*, no. 10, Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.

ŚVVT *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa*, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy, Madras University Sanskrit Series, no. 13, Madras: University of Madras, 1971.

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Series and journals

ALB *Adyar Library Bulletin*
ANIS *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien*
ChSS *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*
GOS *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*

HOS	*Harvard Oriental Series*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
WSTB	*Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*
WZKSO	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*

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Textual passages cited in the commentary – mostly from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Pramāṇavārttika*, and *Ślokavārttika* – are listed in the index. Primary texts and authors cited in the notes appear only if they are to some extent discussed and not merely mentioned. Similarly, modern authors cited in the notes are listed only if their views are discussed or critically commented on, if only briefly. Please also note in general that references to textual passages in this work include line numbers only when necessary.